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Abstract 
 
Helm (2008) asked: „Climate change policy: why has so little been 
achieved?‟ Cultural Theory (CT) has been used to analyse the debate over 
climate change, arguing that competing worldviews mandate divergent 
policy responses (Rayner & Malone 1998).  CT‟s framework suggests the 
monolithic structure of the UNFCCC process fails to integrate these 
multiple worldviews, hindering effective action.  This thesis uses a 
complementary framework, Fiske‟s (1992) Relational Model‟s Theory (RMT).  
Whereas CT analyses the debate at the societal level, RMT proposes a 
framework of individual social cognition comprising four models of social 
exchange: „Equality Matching‟, based upon reciprocity; „Communal Sharing‟, 
based on equal entitlement within a community; „Authority Ranking‟, based 
upon established status; and „Market Pricing‟, based on an external 
currency of merit.  RMT implies that the relational models found in 
individual cognition should be mirrored in any debate at the societal and 
inter-personal levels.  Content analyses of media articles and focus group 
interviews support the view that there are four coherent Standpoints 
matching these relational models in the debate. Survey respondents who 
believe in climate change used different models from those who did not, 
but survey evidence also gave support to the view that individuals use 
multiple models to reason over novel or contested issues such as climate 
change.  CT explicitly argues that one of the four hypothesised worldviews, 
the „fatalist‟, is not active in shaping policy. In contrast, these empirical 
studies suggest that the closest equivalent relational model, Equality 
Matching, generates the Commons Dilemma (Hardin, 1968) that actually 
drives much of the debate. The studies also raised new questions about the 
structure connecting the four relational models, or the worldviews.  Lastly, 
the framework confirms it will be difficult to get concerted action before 
climate change impacts intensify, at which point social as well as climate 
thresholds will have been crossed. 
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WoN An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (Smith, 1993) 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter is divided into two parts.  The first introduces the climate change 
debate and some of the ways social science has tried to analyse it.  The second 
sets out the prevailing social psychological contribution to this analysis.  Part 1 
has four sections: 
1. “An emerging debate” briefly outlines existing contributions made by the 
social sciences, and social psychology in particular, to the debate.  Against 
this background the section identifies the theoretical framework adopted 
in this thesis. 
2. “Why study the psychology of the global warming debate?”  justifies the 
importance of the topic. 
3. “What is the debate about?” outlines briefly the key scientific and policy 
questions addressed by the debate. 
4. “Making sense of the debate” establishes how the theoretical framework 
adopted analyses the debate. 
Part 2 of this chapter looks at the prevailing social psychological approach to the 
debate.  This comprises an extensive literature addressing pro-environmental 
attitudes and behaviour, and other antecedents of such behaviour.  This research 
has typically sought to enable policy both to make individuals more willing to 
engage in pro-environmental behaviour and to identify and remove contextual 
obstacles to such behaviour.  Part 2 is divided into five sections: 
5. “Rationality in context” describes the model of a rational actor maximising 
utility.  Within attitude theory this model has gradually acquired 
hypothesised cognitive variables responsive to the specific context.  A 
challenge to the rational actor model comes from the recognition that 
much decision making appears to be irrational. 
6. “Values and Rationality” introduces more recent versions of the rational 
actor model.  Many of these, especially those examining pro-
environmental behaviour, have sought to incorporate deep-lying values 
into the actor‘s cognitive processes.  This prompts the question as to what 
form of cognition such values represent and where they come from. 
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7. ―Social psychological accounts of concern about climate change‖ looks at 
the literature which specifically focuses on the challenge of climate 
change amongst other environmental concerns.  This reveals a tension 
between approaches that seek to influence individual choices and those 
that look for more fundamental change in the social and physical context 
that individuals inhabit and make their choices in. 
8. “Values rationalised” briefly discusses the way that the rational actor 
account makes sense of competing value systems. 
9. “Conclusion” briefly explains how Chapter 2 explores these values that 
Chapter 1 finds lie at the heart of the debate. 
1.1 An emerging debate 
1.1.1 An urgent debate 
Books on climate change have proliferated in recent years.  Many proclaim 
urgency and also despair, with eschatological titles like ‗The Last Generation: How 
Nature Will take Her Revenge for Climate Change‘ (Pearce, 2007) or ‗Requiem for 
a species: why we resist the truth about climate change‘ (Hamilton, 2010).  Other 
titles bemoan the hysteria, such as ‗Scared to death : from BSE to global warming 
- how scares are costing us the Earth‘ (Booker & North, 2007), or strive for an 
aloof rationality:  ‗An Appeal to Reason: A Cool Look at Global Warming‘ (Lawson, 
2008). 
 
This thesis provides an account of the different standpoints taken in this debate. 
The subject is how this topic is debated rather than the issue itself.  Although the 
intention is to contribute to the debate by improving understanding, formally, it 
analyses the debate rather than participates in it.  To place this inquiry into 
context this first section looks at the emergence of the social science covering the 
debate before subsequently setting out the component questions that make up the 
debate itself in section 1.3.  In Chapter 1 the ‗debate‘ principally refers to the 
debate carried out in publicly accessible media or political and international 
arenas. 
1.1.2 The role of the social sciences in the debate over climate change 
―Climate change is...  too important to be left to science or to economics‖ 
(Szerszynski & Urry, 2010, p3). 
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Szerszynski & Urry introduced a special issue of the journal ―Theory, Culture and 
Society‖ by asserting that the wider social sciences ‗have been nowhere‘ (ibid p3) 
in the debate over climate change.  Yet the bibliographies to the assembled 
papers demonstrably contradict this claim.  The failure is rather that the wider 
social sciences have had little influence on the debate.  Instead, activists on both 
sides, such as James Lovelock and Bjorn Lomborg, who are able to project their 
academic qualifications as directly relevant, have joined economists like Nicholas 
Stern and metereologists like James Hansen to define the social challenges posed 
by anthropogenic climate change. 
Social scientists have described many of the elements of the emerging debate 
more than they have shaped the debate as a whole.  The ‗Risk Society‘ identified 
by Ulrich Beck (1992) could hardly have found a more perfect instantiation than 
the IPPC reports and the Stern Review.  The inventories of greenhouse gases are 
the inevitable product of an audit culture‘s determination to measure and account 
(O'Neill, 2002).  The human consumption and production of material that drives 
our impact on the planet remains as central to sociological theorising as it was for 
Marx; the morality and meaning of such consumption continues to be contested by 
the heirs of Diogenes, Adam Smith, and Thorsten Veblen, whether they be 
mainstream social scientists (Kasser, 2002) or cultural interpreters like Jean 
Baudrillard (1998). 
Many of the participants in the debate have had to face stinging criticism.  The 
scientific community, in the shape of the highly bureaucratic IPCC, has had to 
acknowledge important mistakes, or in the shape of the Climate Research Unit at 
the University of East Anglia has been accused of obscuring the data and has had 
to submit its procedures to external review (Hulme et al., 2010; Nature Editorial, 
2009a).  Vested interests fighting to discredit climate science have engaged in 
shameful distortions and guerrilla tactics (Oreskes & Conway, 2008).  Political 
leaders implementing the UNFCCC process stress the urgency of the issue and 
engage in uplifting rhetoric, but they have not delivered agreements that can be 
expected to achieve meaningful carbon emissions reductions (Environmental News 
Bulletin, 2009, 2010).  Some will claim the glass is half full: for them initiatives 
such as the European Emissions Trading Scheme are successful first steps (Grubb 
et al., 2011).  Yet key inputs to the economic models are driven by political and 
moral choices which have not yet been made.  Dieter Helm (2008) was quite right 
to subtitle a recent paper ‗Why has so little been achieved?‘: so little has.  In 
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2011, his question could be reframed to ‗Why have we given up so quickly?‘  In 
December 2009 the Economist‘s front cover anticipated the UNFCCC COP 15 
meeting in Copenhagen with the headline ‗Stopping Climate Change‘ (Economist, 
2009): in November 2010 their front cover anticipated COP 16 in Cancun with the 
front cover headline ‗How to live with climate change‘ and a leader column 
utterly convinced by the science but just as convinced that the main policy focus 
should be how to adapt to changes we would fail to stop (Economist, 2010). 
1.1.3 A moral and an economic debate 
The public debate treats the issue as a moral and an economic one, with 
meteorologists and other natural scientists called as witnesses in the argument.  
The moral argument emerges from traditional concern over intemperance and 
goes on to generate a critique of excess human consumption, stressing human 
limits (e.g. Goldsmith et al., 1972; Meadows et al., 1972).  Opponents repel what 
they see as an attack on mainstream liberal economics and the political 
prioritisation of economic growth, emphasising in turn human possibilities 
(Maddox, 1972, Ch 7; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, Ch 9).  Typically, 
economics addresses the problem as a cost benefit analysis (Nordhaus, 1991 sets 
out the terms of the debate).  Recent economic literature defines itself in relation 
to the Stern Review (Stern, 2007), entitled ―The Economics of Climate Change‖, 
which sought to quantify the costs and benefits of the whole range of possible 
human responses to the threat of climate change.  The moral debate suffuses the 
economic debate by arguing over what kind of sustainability represents an ethical 
economic goal (Neumayer, 2003, Ch 2) and whether policy should be directed at a 
wider notion of well-being than one measured in money, such as the UN Human 
Development Index (United Nations Development Programme & Leiserowitz, 2007, 
pp. 229-234).  A brief review of the history of the climate change debate and 
some of this literature is given later in this chapter. 
1.1.4 Social Psychological analysis of, and within, the debate 
For social scientists, a key concern is how environmental concern translates, or 
does not translate, into pro-environmental behaviour (Jackson, 2005).  Economists 
assume that concern is suppressed by the price signals that discourage pro-
environmental behaviour, tracing the arguments back to Pigou‘s analysis of public 
goods (Stern, 2007, Ch2).  Social psychologists typically employ attitude theory to 
explore the links between concern and behaviour.  In terms of advice to policy-
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makers, it is this approach that represents the mainstream social psychological 
contribution (American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 64ff).  The exploration 
of heuristics and biases can also be applied to individual behavioural change, 
especially with regard to discounting remote consequences (ibid. 2010, p. 24ff).  
The thrust of this research is to identify psychological or perceived practical 
barriers to individual behavioural change in order to give policy makers a chance 
to break those barriers down.  This mainstream work concentrates on the 
individual level and relies on the psychological model of the rational actor.  Social 
influences and norms operate as inputs to individual cognition.  The economists‘ 
price signals represent another input to individual cognition.  Attitude theory 
encourages the search for the most effective blend of economic incentives and 
social norms to bring about individual behavioural change, whether in energy 
efficiency (Hutton et al., 1985; Stern & Aronson, 1984) or recycling (Barr, 2007; 
Bratt, 1999; Vining & Ebreo, 1992) or composite measures of pro-environmental 
behaviour (Kaiser, Wolfing, & Fuhrer, 1999). 
At the societal level, analysis can easily be seduced into framing the issue of 
climate change solely as a critique of capitalism and the market economy.  These 
can come from the far left (Neale, 2008), but Stern‘s own diagnosis of climate 
change as the ―greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen‖ also falls 
into this category (Stern, 2006, p.1).  The most influential social psychological 
analysis of the climate change debate conducted at the societal level is Cultural 
Theory (―CT‖).  Developed out of the anthropological work of Mary Douglas, CT 
has been used to provide a comprehensive analysis of the policy frameworks 
available to societies wanting to address the challenge of climate change (Rayner 
& Malone, 1998).  Proponents continue to use the theory‘s approach to mount a 
critique of climate change policy (Prins & Rayner, 2007b) as well as to provide 
advice to the UK government (Rayner, 2004).  The core thesis is that a limited 
number of ‗worldviews‘ (something akin to ideologies) serve to shape a society‘s 
responses to risks and opportunities (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).   Further, 
successful policy must respond to the values implied by each of the different 
worldviews in order to maximise the buy-in of society‘s members. 
Cultural theory is regularly criticised for being circular (Jackson, Allum, & Gaskell, 
2004) and both muddled and tautologous (Boholm, 1996).  Even its supporters 
acknowledge it lacks empirical support (Rayner, 1992) and it is noticeable that 
many of Rayner‘s recent contributions advocate CT‘s pluralism while eschewing 
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detailed reference to the theory itself (Pielke et al., 2007; Prins & Rayner, 2007b; 
Rayner, 2004).  Yet the broad claims CT makes clearly have resonance: Douglas‘s 
account of risk fits comfortably into social constructionist accounts of risk even 
though these rarely pay much attention to the detailed framework that CT 
hypothesises (e.g. Carvalho & Burgess, 2005) .  More recently, the leading, and 
highly influential, UK climate scientist Mike Hulme (2009) published a widely 
discussed (Kitcher, 2010) examination of the debate which explicitly relies on 
Cultural Theory.  In summary, CT has contributed to the debate in very general 
sociological terms, but the detailed social psychological mechanisms hypothesised 
by the theory (most thoroughly reviewed in Thompson, et al., 1990) remain 
marginalised. 
1.1.5 The analysis put forward by this thesis 
Reflecting the issues identified above, this thesis: 
1. Follows the social science path of providing a description of the debate 
2. Proposes an alternative to CT‘s analysis by linking individual and societal 
arguments over climate change 
3. In doing so provides one answer to Helm‘s question, ―Why has so little 
been achieved?‖ 
The heart of the thesis is the proposed alternative to CT‘s analysis, which draws 
upon Alan Fiske‘s Relational Models Theory (―RMT‖).  RMT has close similarities to 
Cultural Theory as Fiske (1992) himself recognised at the outset.  Both theories 
propose a 4-way taxonomy for categorising social relations and insist that the 
taxonomy is comprehensive. A key difference is that RMT provides an account of 
individual cognition of social relationships: the theory draws strength from many 
parallels in classic theories of societal dynamics (Fiske, 1992) but to date it has 
been applied to individual level phenomena, including psychopathologies, as well 
as to organisational psychology (Haslam, 2004).  It has not been applied to societal 
phenomena such as the climate change debate. 
This thesis applies RMT‘s taxonomy to the climate change debate in the way that 
previously cultural theorists applied CT‘s taxonomy.  This approach highlights the 
powerful role of one of Fiske‘s Relational Models, that of ‗Equality Matching‘, in 
generating the so called ‗Commons Dilemma‘ (Hardin, 1968) that lies at the heart 
of the challenge posed by climate change. 
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The above outline highlights the thesis‘ intention to synthesise some explanations 
that have been applied at the individual level and some previously applied at the 
social level.   Chapter 3 discusses the challenges raised by combining different 
levels of explanation. 
1.1.6 Scope of this thesis 
The thesis analyses the climate change debate taking place within the UK.  The 
issue is global, and material is drawn from elsewhere, but no attempt is made to 
provide a comprehensive or comparative account of the debate outside the UK. 
1.2 Why study the psychology of the global warming debate?  
Average temperatures on Earth have risen by 0.7 in the last 100 years (IPCC, 
2007, p. 5).   They are forecast to rise by a further 2-3 by 2100, and there are 
fears of higher rises beyond that date (Stern, 2007, pp. 67-68).  Temperature rises 
in excess of 5 are predicted to have potentially ‗catastrophic‘ consequences 
(Stern, 2007, pp. 67-68, 98), while others think that rises above 2° will be 
catastrophic (Hansen et al., 2007; McGuire, 2008, Chs 1-2).  The principal cause of 
this warming is ‗very likely‘ to be human behaviour, mainly the economic 
activities of energy consumption and agriculture and the consequent emission of 
Greenhouse Gases (―GHGs‖) such as CO2  (IPCC, 2007, pp. 2-4).  These conclusions 
have not gone unchallenged.  Contrary views play a prominent role in the debate 
analysed in this thesis.  However, careful reviews of the scientific literature 
testify to an overwhelming consensus position on the science (Oreskes, 2004; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2008).   Recently, papers by the National Research Council 
(2010) in the US and the Royal Society (2010) in the UK have reaffirmed the 
central conclusions concerning the level of past warming, its probable causes, and 
the likely level of future warming. 
The climate system is extremely complex.  Feedback effects may lead to abrupt 
climate change, such as the switching off of the gulfstream.  Judged unlikely 
before 2100 (IPCC, 2007, p.818) such processes are very difficult to predict, but 
they do remind us that in the long term the Earth as a whole, together with 
everything on it, will determine the course and consequences of global warming.  
Human activity is merely a part of that whole, acting within a world that responds 
in accordance with its own physical laws.   In the shorter term however, certainly 
for the next century, it is fair to argue that human behaviour will determine the 
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progress of global warming (Falkowski et al., 2000; Steffen, 2010; Vitousek et al., 
1997).  Inevitably humans are also focussed on the impact of global warming on 
human beings and how humans should adapt to resultant changes.  As local 
climatic conditions change, one of the principal effects of higher level warming 
will be human mass migration (Stern, 2008b, p. 8), an anthropocentric fear born 
of an anthropogenic problem.  ―[Climate change] starts with people and it ends 
with people‖ (Stern quoted in Kavalski, 2008, p. 437). 
Human nature will therefore be the major determinant of the course of global 
warming over the next century.  Humanity can reduce its activities; has 
opportunities to develop technological alternatives that maintain or grow activity 
levels but with lower consequent global temperature rises; or humanity can 
pursue a business as usual path very likely to generate severe temperature rises, 
and possibly attempt geo-engineering solutions to mitigate those rises.  Different 
views of human nature will yield different answers to the question of whether 
humanity has a free choice as to which path it pursues, but human nature will be 
a principal determinant of the outcome.  It follows that policy makers must 
anticipate how humans think about and respond to the challenge of climate 
change, and not merely instantiate in their own actions these ways of thinking and 
responding.  Study of the psychology underlying the debate can contribute to 
making policy more effective. 
1.3 What is the debate about? 
There are a number of questions central to the debate: 
1. Is the world getting warmer? 
2. Is this warming anthropogenic? 
3. (a) What are the possible consequences of the warming?  (b) Are these a 
problem? 
4. (a) Should we try to stop it?  (b) Can we stop it? 
5. What are the best policies for stopping it? 
6. How do we share the burden of stopping it?  
Given the possible consequences, the debate inevitably raises questions like 
‗Whose fault is it?‘ as well, but for the purposes of this summary that question can 
be treated within 2 and 6. 
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Appendix A provides a timeline of key events and publications in the development 
of the debate. 
1.3.1 Questions 1&2 
1. Is the world getting warmer? 
2. Is this warming anthropogenic? 
Section 2 above sets out the consensus answer to these two questions.  Scientists 
started to link global warming to atmospheric CO2 in the 19
th century, and in the 
early 20th century suggested that the CO2 produced by human industrial activity 
might cause increases in global temperature (Fleming, 1998 Ch 6).  These 
hypotheses became warnings which eventually grew to reach public attention, 
perhaps most notably with James Hansen‘s testimony to the US Senate in June 
1988 (Mazur & Lee, 1993).  Public concern generated calls for something to be 
done.  In due course the first IPCC report in 1990 led, via the 1992 Earth summit in 
Rio de Janeiro, to the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1994 (IPCC, 2004). 
Since the theory of anthropogenic global warming ("AGW") was first proposed over 
100 years ago, subsequent temperature data have vindicated the hypothesis.  The 
neat simplicity of this ‗experimental proof‘ feels particularly persuasive (Henson, 
2006; King, 2005).  The continuing accumulation of data resulted in the IPCC 
upgrading their conclusion in the most recent 2007 assessment that recent global 
warming was anthropogenic from ‗likely‘ to ‗very likely‘.  This probabilistic 
language does not help public understanding but the IPCC‘s conclusion is the 
definitive statement of a scientific consensus regarding questions (1) and (2). 
However, the consensus conclusion has been and still is disputed to great effect 
by a vociferous scientific minority.  These ―deniers‖ are even eulogised in a book 
subtitled ―The world-renowned scientists who stood up against global warming 
hysteria, political persuasion and fraud‖ (Solomon, 2008).  The deniers are also 
successful: a 2008 UK survey showed 60% agreeing with the statement ―Many 
scientific experts still question if humans are contributing to climate change‖ and 
only 41% disagreed with the statement ―I sometimes think climate change might 
not be as bad as people say‖, (Ipsos-Mori, 2008) whilst the ‗Climategate‘ leaked 
email scandal also achieved the presumed objective of the hackers in reducing 
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public trust (Lieserowitz et al., 2011)1.  There are four main thrusts to the sceptic 
case: 
a) attacks on the data, 
b) alternative explanations for the data, 
c) certainty and uncertainty 
d) generalised dismissal of the consensus position as wrong-headed. 
There are many valid criticisms and debates to be had over the data: 
reconstructing temperature records from proxies such as tree rings and CO2 
concentrations from ice cores present many technical and interpretative 
challenges (Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette, & Belitz, 1994).  Even the validity of 
modern temperature records has to be examined as formerly rural weather 
stations are swallowed up by urban development (IPCC, 2007, pp243-5).  Other 
explanations for the data, principally variations in solar activity or in cloud 
formation, have not been disproven, merely shown to be unlikely to account for 
all of the observed warming: this feeds the third strand, which challenges 
suggestions that there is certainty, or consensus, over the science.  Finally, many 
sceptics and critics draw strength from a conviction that history shows how 
humans have too often been prey to alarmists: the hard headed, truly scientific 
approach, is to remain sceptical while there is doubt. 
A good case can be made for the opposite view, that climate change will actually 
be much worse than ‗people say‘.   Sociologist Brian Wynne argues that the 
scientific practice and institutional culture of the IPCC inevitably leads to a 
probable understatement of the risks (Wynne, 2010).  The public debate can only 
reinforce this, with the scientific community cowed by the ‗Climategate‘ scandal 
that claimed to catch scientists overstating their evidence.   The Royal Society 
report of 2010 is touted as a climb down by sceptics (O'Sullivan, 2010) after 
prominent members of the society claimed that earlier papers had understated 
the uncertainties and presented an excessively ‗alarmist‘ assessment (Royal 
Society, 2010). 
Leading scientists who break away from the consensus position to sound the alarm 
much louder, such as James Lovelock (2006) or James Hansen (Brumfiel, 2008), 
                                            
1 In late 2009 leaked emails suggested that climate change scientists had knowingly 
overstated the case for anthropogenic global warming (Nature Editorial, 2009a).  
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are cast in the role of activist.  The scientific propriety of their stance itself then 
becomes a topic for debate (Sarewitz, 2010). 
In spite of the consensus on the overall trend, the science of global warming, and 
in particular the linkages through to specific consequences, is hugely uncertain 
(Schiermeier, 2007, 2010).   Unfortunately, the status of science has encouraged 
the public to expect certainty: the IPCC process itself tends to promise greater 
certainty from still more studies, when there will always be plenty of uncertainty 
remaining (Wynne, 2010).  As a result, in terms of public opinion, the scientific 
data often seems to be little more than a rhetorical football. 
1.3.2 Question 3, pt1 
(a) What are the possible consequences of the warming? 
(b) Are these a problem? 
General consequences, i.e. consequential climate change 
Public understanding of the possible consequences of global warming is still more 
confused.  Scientific and governmental reports describe predicted temperature 
increases both globally and in defined locations in the form of ranges qualified by 
probabilities.  The public seeks to process predictions as if these were certain 
facts.  A report issued by the Hadley Centre (2005) suggesting possible seasonal 
peak temperature increases of 11° was summarised in one newspaper as follows: 
―The world is likely to heat up by an average of 11°C by the end of the century….. 
far higher than the 2°C previously forecast‖ (Metro, 2005). 
The same newspaper article succinctly summarises what the public understands to 
be the consequences of rising temperatures: ―Such a rise… would see Britain 
endure tropical temperatures, flooding and devastating drought.  It would change 
the weather patterns of the world, melt the polar ice caps and warm the oceans, 
causing a surge in sea levels threatening the lives of billions of people.‖  This 
public expectation of rapid melting and imminent inundation is not congruent with 
the IPCC prediction of 21st century sea level rises in the range 0.2 to 0.5m (IPCC, 
2007, p.810)4.   The melting of the Greenland ice sheet will occur if global 
temperatures rise by 3º but it will take at least 1,000 years for sea levels to rise 
by 7m as a result (Gregory, Huybrechts, & Raper, 2004), although Hansen (2007) 
argues for faster timescales.  
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Whether these consequences are a problem is debated.  Bjorn Lomborg (2001, 
2007) is perhaps the most prominent of those denying that these consequences 
present a severe problem.  He argues that the consequences are not as bad as 
suggested, for example fewer cold periods will deliver greater benefits than the 
harms caused by increased heat waves.  However, his principal argument is one of 
priorities: the consequences of global warming simply are not as important as 
those of more immediate threats such as malaria and poverty.   On the other hand 
Stern has no doubts that a disruption to the world we are used to will have grave 
consequences (e.g. Stern, 2007, p. 25).  Necessarily these two analyses go hand in 
hand with different policy philosophies: for the first, there has always been 
change and man has always adapted, usually prospering still more as a result; e.g. 
Lawson (2008 Ch 2-3) and Lomborg on the Maldives (2007, pp. 91-93).  For the 
second the threat is serious and significant effort and resources should be 
committed to mitigating or preventing the threat (Stern, 2007, p. 649ff). 
1.3.3 Question 3, pt2 
(a) What are the possible consequences of the warming? 
(b) Are these a problem? 
More specific consequences - extreme weather events 
Inevitably, certainty as to the extent and timing of the global consequences of 
predicted warming is less than certainty as to the level of warming itself.  
Certainty as to specific local consequences is even lower (Schiermeier, 2010).   
This is reflected in the debate over whether past extreme weather events, such as 
Hurricane Katrina or the European heat wave of 2003, are attributable to global 
warming (IPCC, 2007, pp. 308-312), and continued in the same question for more 
recent occurrences (Easton, 2009).  These events are often taken as iconic 
evidence of AGW at work (e.g. Brown, 2003; Buncombe, 2005; Henderson, 2005; 
Hope, 2003).  The IPCC will only go as far as to say that it is ‗more likely than not‘ 
that there has been a human contribution to an increasing trend in droughts, 
higher precipitation events and intense tropical cyclone activity (IPCC, 2007, p. 
52) The assessment takes pains to point out the great difficulty in linking specific 
individual events to AGW (IPCC, 2007, p. 53). 
For the public, concrete specific events make an issue meaningful.  The hot 
temperatures in the US summer of 1988 made early discussions of AGW resonate 
(Mazur & Lee, 1993).  Recent cold snaps provoke humorous doubt over whether 
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global warming is really happening (Leake, 2009) or may be taken as further proof 
that it is not (Booker, 2009).  Inevitably, the confusion over how to account for 
past events only deepens the uncertainty as to what the concrete future 
consequences of global warming might be. 
1.3.4 Questions 4 & 5 
4. (a) Should we try to stop global warming?  (b) Can we stop it? 
5. What are the best policies for stopping it? 
Calls for something to be done have resulted in steps being taken.  At the global 
level the UNFCCC created the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1998) and the 
Copenhagen ‗Accord‘ (Environmental News Bulletin, 2009).  At the regional level 
the EU established the Emissions Trading System ('ETS', European Commission, 
2008b), while at the UK national level governments are seeking to encourage 
energy efficiency and the installation of wind farms and other renewable sources 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2008).  At the individual level, numerous websites 
provide tips on how individuals can cut their personal carbon footprint (e.g. 
www.direct.gov.uk/actonco2, www.liveneutral.org).   The approach adopted here 
necessarily assumes that (at least some) individuals have a moral motivation to be 
frugal in their energy use of their own free will. Tax instruments, such as the 
Climate Change Levy, Fuel Duties and Air Passenger Duty, have also been used in 
the UK.  The logic of tax instruments, as well as emissions trading schemes, is to 
raise the price of carbon, expecting this to promote efficiency, lower absolute 
consumption and encourage the development of non-carbon energy alternatives.  
The Kyoto protocol necessitates costly investments and is widely criticised from 
diverse quarters.  There are more pressing problems and better ways to spend the 
money (Lomborg, 2001, 2006); the measures will achieve nothing because of the 
impact of increasing emissions in the developing world (Booker & North, 2007 Ch 
14, esp p. 389); adaptation is much better than mitigation (Lawson, 2008 Ch 3).  
Alternatively, focus on Kyoto‘s unachievable targets inhibits useful action by 
concentrating on the targets themselves (Victor, 2004 Ch 1) rather than on the 
need for high tech investments (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, pp. 113-115); 
the targets are nowhere near aggressive enough (McGuire, 2008, pp. 220-223; 
Monbiot, 2007, p. 48); the difficulties in achieving, let alone implementing, the 
global multi-party agreements needed to create a carbon market from a ‗cold 
start‘ are just too great (Victor, 2004 Ch 2).  The ETS has also faced criticism, 
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even from the UK government (EAC, 2007b, p. 22).   While policymakers spend all 
this energy on global agreements, typically they treat individual efforts to cut 
personal carbon footprints as a laudable sideshow (Blair, 2006).  The Stern Review 
(2007, pp. 448-452) gives individual preferences greater status in writing, but 
Stern himself can be candid when speaking: ―this [issue] doesn‘t have to turn on 
everybody changing lifestyles, and [I‘m] making the politically pragmatic point 
that if it did we‘d lose [the argument]‖ (Stern, 2008a). 
At their heart the policy options have to engage with questions of sustainability.  
Can mankind‘s economic activity and the concomitant consumption of natural 
resources be sustained at current levels or not? 
1.3.5 Sustainability 
The economic debate over global warming has emerged within the framework of 
arguments over sustainable development.  The sustainable development described 
by the Brundtland Commission promises a reconciliation of conflicting goals: short 
term economic growth to enable human development for the present generation, 
together with the long term replenishment and sustenance of the resources that 
will be needed to provide human development to future generations (World 
Commission on Environment and Development. & Brundtland, 1987).  Neoclassical 
economics repudiates the idea that these goals are in conflict, arguing that 
growth today generates the resources for tomorrow‘s generations to manage their 
environment (Beckerman, 1995 Introduction).  At its heart, belief in the need for 
sustainable development depends upon the deductive logic of Malthus (1798): at 
some point finite resources must be exhausted by growing demand.  Neoclassical 
economics instead relies upon the empirical evidence that human ingenuity has so 
far adapted and successfully expanded resources and resource availability 
(Beckerman, 1995 Ch 4; Singer, 2006).  Using inductive logic, the best assumption 
is that it will continue to do so.  The past errors of the Cassandras mean we must 
dismiss their fears as alarmist.  More broadly, this confidence in human progress 
emphasises the many material and health advantages enjoyed by many people 
today, and sees alarmism as threatening such continued progress and the delivery 
of those same advantages to the developing world (Durkin, 2007; Gardner, 2008, 
Ch. 12; Goklany, 2009). 
Neither argument can be falsified (Neumayer, 2003 Ch 3).  That the Cassandras 
have been wrong so far certainly does not mean that Malthus‘ finite resources 
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argument is erroneous: the Greeks did sack Troy.  That mankind does not have the 
technological capacity today to sustain 9bn people long term does not mean that 
solar energy and mediating technologies cannot make this possible.  Some argue 
that mankind will inevitably find the energy it needs (Huber & Mills, 2006, p.181).  
Arithmetic can just as easily show that we ‗only‘ need to cover 0.3% of the Sahara 
with solar cells to source all of Europe‘s electricity needs (Jha, 2008).   Others 
argue that we will have no difficulty feeding a world population of 9bn, the issue 
will be to manage the environmental consequences (Nature Editorial, 2010).   
Malthus‘ predictions have been undone by successive agricultural revolutions and 
so far the world has fed itself, at least in the sense of supporting continuing 
human population growth. 
To opponents, this unfalsifiability makes each position vacuous.  Of course 
Malthus‘ theory is arithmetically correct, but the consequences of this, in the 
form of changes in population and consumption, will in themselves be a form of 
adaptation.  Of course mankind will have found the amount of energy it actually 
uses, but this may have entailed radically adapting its needs in order to need, and 
use, less energy.  One reason for this vacuity is the slippery distinction between 
precautionary mitigation and adaptation.  Reducing fossil fuel consumption 
(usually called mitigation) can easily be described as an adaptation forced by 
increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations: building flood defences (usually called 
adaptation) is a mitigation of increasing future flood risks.  Looking forward to an 
uncertain future, precautionary steps typically mitigate risk.  Looking back, steps 
taken were typically adaptations to the changing environment. 
The important question is whether hindsight will judge that (1) the environment 
forced this adaptation painfully onto mankind, whether expressed as the nihilistic 
interpretation epitomised by Gray (2006) or the apocalyptic vision of Lovelock 
(2006);  or (2) that humanity anticipated the threats and successfully managed a 
path to a less materially intensive form of economic growth, the interpretation 
anticipated by Huber and Mills (2006); or (3) a further alternative scenario sees 
the abandonment of economic growth as the focus of economic policy, replaced 
by a sustainable equilibrium level of economic activity (these are three of the 
alternatives represented by Jim Dator‘s four visions of the future, the final 
‗vision‘, (4), being a do-nothing response hoping for continued growth without 
radical technological or social transformations (Turney, 2010, p. 70).  Clearly 
many who fear version 1 (catastrophe) instinctively look for the prescriptions of 
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version 3 (abandoning growth): believers in version 2 (re-engineered growth) may 
well pursue policies closer to version 4 (doing nothing).   While the Malthusian 
pessimists and classical economics optimists clearly anticipate a different future, 
neither can demonstrate that the other is logically wrong in its predictions. 
Much of the argument can be distilled into an equation: 
I = PAT. 
Environmental impact equals Population x level of Affluence x Technology of 
production (Ehrlich, Holdren, & Commoner, 1972).  This forces the debate into an 
argument over which of the three right hand variables society has to reduce, 
unless we simply adapt to whatever ‗Impact‘ arises.  What is often neglected is 
that ‗P‘, ‗A‘ and ‗T‘ are all part of the environment that is impacted – reduction in 
any one or all of them may happen irrespective of deliberate human efforts to 
reduce ‗I‘. 
1.3.6 Question 6 
How do we share the burden of stopping global warming? 
In addition to complaints that the Kyoto protocol will not work, the treaty is also 
criticised as unfair.   The differentiation between developed and developing world 
was used to justify the USA‘s refusal to sign (Sachs, 2008, pp. 108-109): on this 
argument the proposals are unfair on developed countries.   On the opposing side, 
that of developing countries, campaigners look for much more aggressive 
‗convergence‘ in per capita emissions (McGuire, 2008, pp. 223-225).  The Stern 
Review describes the effects of climate change as ‗global, intertemporal and 
highly inequitable‘ (Stern, 2007, p. 31).  The developed world has emitted the 
majority of past man-made greenhouse gases (‗GHG‘s) and continues to emit 
much higher GHGs per capita than the developing world.  However, the 
developing world will experience proportionately more severe consequences from 
AGW.  In addition, these consequences will be borne by future generations.  If 
action is not taken now they will be bequeathed both a higher stock of CO2 in the 
atmosphere and infrastructure committing them to ongoing high emissions.  These 
arguments, emphasising the obligation of present generations towards the future, 
are central to the philosophy of sustainability (above). 
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A contrary view holds that future generations will be wealthier and more 
technologically advanced, and so much better able to resolve and adapt to 
environmental problems that might arise in future from present actions.  This view 
also assumes that the best way for developed nations to help developing nations is 
to speed up their economic growth, facilitating their ability to fend for themselves 
(Beckerman, 2003 esp Ch 7; Lawson, 2008 Ch 7) and emancipating their people 
(Ridley, 2010). 
1.3.7 Fairness and Responsibility 
Beyond the questions of whether AGW is real and if so what should be done about 
it lies the question of who should do what about it (Question 6 above).  
Sustainability raises the issue of intertemporal equity, whether this generation has 
obligations to the next.  Policymaking today tends to be more pressed by 
questions of equity between developed and developing nations, rich and poor.  
The issue raises the other side of inter-temporal equity: who bears responsibility 
for past emissions?  Developed countries such as the UK rather priggishly boast of 
their obligation to show leadership (EAC, 2007a, p. 3): this follows the recognition 
that developed countries have contributed much more to historic GHG emissions 
and currently emit far more per capita than lesser developed nations (United 
Nations Development Programme & Leiserowitz, 2007, pp. 40-43).  Official 
documents emphasise the need for all nations to play their part (e.g. European 
Commission, 2008a, pp. 16-17) but developed countries are inhibited from 
lecturing developing countries. 
The world‘s atmosphere is a common good.  We all benefit from it, irrespective of 
who looks after it.  In the long term we will all suffer losses if atmospheric CO2 
rises to concentration levels that engender dangerous global warming.  In the 
short term poorer nations such as Bangladesh are likely to suffer greater negative 
consequences from AGW (Stern, 2007, pp. 65, 99), an example of the inequity 
described by the Stern Review. 
Hardin (1968) described the social dilemma created by common goods as ―The 
Tragedy of the Commons‖.  A collection of self-interested actors all using a 
common good will be motivated to exhaust the capacity of the common good.  An 
extensive literature has grown since Hardin‘s original article (Kennedy, 2003).   
This spans many of the social sciences, e.g. looking at the evolution of altruism, 
analysing pay-off matrices for different responses to social dilemmas, often 
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building on the tradition of the prisoner‘s dilemma in game theory, (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981) while social psychologists have experimented with the social and 
contextual variables influencing responses to dilemmas (Dietz et al., 2002; 
Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002).  In the UK, the centrality of Hardin‘s 
formulation to the debate is evidenced by one word: ―China‖ (e.g. Wilson, 2007).  
It makes no sense for the UK to ‗go it alone‘ and cut emissions for the global good 
when China‘s fossil fuel CO2 emissions increase each year by 80% of the UK annual 
total (using figures for 2000 to 2005 from Marland, Boden, & Andres, 2008), an 
argument referred to below as the ‗China syndrome‘.  In the US this desire for 
fairness provoked great concern that steps to mitigate global warming would put 
the US at a competitive disadvantage against Asian economies.  So much so that 
the US Senate legislated to enshrine the principle of not signing up to emissions 
treaties that differentiated between the developing and developed world (United 
States Senate, 1997). 
Fairness and responsibility have always been central to environmental debate.  
‗Nimbyism‘, the tendency to object to any new development close to one‘s own 
residence, expresses an emotional judgement that it is not fair that ‗we‘ are the 
ones putting up with an unpleasant or dangerous facility, or indeed any new 
development, in ‗our‘ area.  The ‗Polluter Pays Principle‘ asserts that the fair 
attribution of responsibility for cleaning up pollution is for everyone to clean up 
their own mess. The China syndrome says that it is not fair, as well as being 
pointless, for developed nations to cut their emissions if China does nothing: if it 
is a shared problem, there have to be shared solutions. 
1.3.8 An argument about science or ideology? 
Ostensibly the debate about the science (Questions 1, 2 and 3(a)) is about 
questions of fact.  The remaining questions (3 (b), 4, 5 and 6) are questions of 
both fact and value combining analysis and choice.  Rationally, the scientific 
assessment might be expected to inform the choices.  In practice, it seems that 
for many people their policy preferences come first and their understanding of the 
science is driven by a desire for the science to justify their policy preference, to 
provide a consistent picture.  The result is a debate filled with accusations of 
irrationality - ‗green‘ is the new religion (Lawson, 2008 Ch 8) versus myth-
peddling faith in a ―pro-carbon crusade‖ (Hari, 2005, 2007). 
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1.4 Making sense of the debate 
This thesis will provide a description of the debate that maps many of these 
arguments onto different models of categorising social relationships and different 
conceptions of fairness embedded in those models.  Relational Models Theory 
(RMT) offers a taxonomy of social relationships which is used here to analyse the 
arguments put forward by the different participants in the climate change debate.  
Underlying the different models proposed by RMT are different principles of 
justice (Fiske, 1992).  RMT built on the taxonomy of justice suggested by Deutsch 
(1985) who argued that these different principles are irreducible to each other: 
hence the experience in the climate change debates that opponents are as 
impervious to reason as religious fundamentalists.  For Deutsch the solution to this 
irreducibility is to redefine the situation so that a different framing of the 
problem - and a different principle of justice - can be applied.  Only then can 
entrenched positions be reconciled2.  Exploration of the challenge of reconciling 
competing principles and traditions of justice is not confined to social psychology, 
but can be found in sociology (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) and philosophy 
(MacIntyre, 1988): both suggest, like Deutsch, that the different principles are 
incommensurable but often co-existent (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 Ch. 7; 
MacIntyre, 1988, Ch. XX). 
This coexistence forces competing positions to be developed and framed as if in 
an argument with an opposing position (Billig, 1987; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 
p.47).  MacIntyre (1988, p.10) sums this up: ―[Of the four traditions] each has 
entered into relationships of antagonism or of alliance and even synthesis, or of 
both successively, with at least one of the others‖.  This interaction and 
combination inevitably challenges this thesis‘ proposal to disentangle the 
competing models.  However, once the co-existence of these competing 
standpoints is acknowledged important implications for policy-making follow.  
Policy needs to be shown to meet the requirements of each of the different 
principles.   Otherwise adherents to a standpoint not satisfied by policy proposals 
will ridicule particular implications of the policies or abuse them as immoral or 
contrary to voters‘ interests.   UK citizens, for example, will have to believe that 
it is fair for them to shoulder additional energy costs before developing countries 
do, and also that it is in their long term interests.  Unfortunately they do not 
believe this is in their interest, and citizen action falls well short of citizens‘ 
                                            
2 Deutsch‘s (1985) different justice principles are included in Appendix C. 
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concern (Ipsos-Mori, 2007; Retallack, Lawrence, & Lockwood, 2007).  Although the 
public demand leadership, this gap between concern and action discourages 
leaders from decisive action.  Indeed, fears of popular revolt against ‗green‘ taxes 
are justified by the experience of the 2000 fuel protests (Porritt, 2008a).  As a 
result policy-makers resort to indirect methods such as the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme.  The scheme will only bite slowly on consumers and only indirectly 
through the utility companies as intermediaries. 
Public conception of policy options, however, seems to be restricted to individual 
voluntary efforts, taxation and government regulation: surveys typically do not 
even ask about the carbon markets policy-makers consider central to global 
solutions to the problem (Eurobarometer, 2008; Ipsos-Mori, 2007).  In spite of this 
restricted view of policy options, citizens want to see something done to tackle 
the global challenge; they expect their leaders to take the responsibility to lead, 
and they want policies to be fair (Ipsos-Mori, 2007; Retallack, et al., 2007). 
So what would be fair?  This question is often reframed to be closer to ‗What 
would be sensible?‘ The next sections of this chapter outline the mainstream 
social psychological analysis of how individuals, and society, establishes what is 
sensible. 
1.5 Rationality in context 
1.5.1 Rational actors maximising utility 
Deutsch‘s taxonomy of justice proposes plural rationalities, each suitable to 
different situations or contexts (Deutsch, 1985, pp. 38-45).   Much of the social 
psychological literature on environmental issues focuses on individual decision-
making and proposes a single rationality experiencing different inputs.  Inputs 
include individual attitudinal variables and contextual variables. The central 
character of this literature is the rational, self-determining inhabitant of the 
world of classical economics.  The single rationality is one of maximising utility.  
In this world individuals make decisions based on the information available to 
them after weighing up the relative utilities of competing courses of action 
(Jackson, 2005 Ch 4). 
Whilst this model has long been criticised for being too simplistic (Simon, 1955), it 
nevertheless provides the foundation for many models of individual decision-
making.  The deciding individual is modelled as an information processor analysing 
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utilities. Competing versions can offer alternative structures for the processor; 
they can debate what kinds of information are relevant to decision making, and 
they can offer alternative accounts for how a currency of values is established by 
which utilities can be measured; but the model is still one of inputs to a processor 
that outputs either an intention to behave in a certain way or the behaviour itself, 
even as the input variables multiply (for example there are seven input variables 
in Perugini & Bagozzi‘s (2001) Model of Goal-Directed Behaviour).  The key 
objective of research of this kind is to facilitate policies that will change 
individual behaviour by identifying input variables that could be changed by 
policy.  This leads to public information campaigns and debates over how to alter 
the normative environment or social context (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000) or 
consideration over how variations in the physical context affect behaviour (e.g. 
Tanner, Kaiser, & Wolfing Kast, 2004). 
Attitude theory as a rationality model 
Researchers often illustrate their models of the cognitive processor with 
flowcharts to illustrate the processor, at the heart of which is: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1:  Attitude Behaviour Model 
Many of the citations below include such flowcharts.  Ajzen & Fishbein (1973)  
concluded that for attitudes to be predictive of behaviour, specific attitudes had 
to be relevant to specific behaviour.  This conclusion led to a gradual accretion of 
specific situational variables as perceived by the individual decision-maker.  Ajzen 
& Fishbein‘s Theory of Reasoned Action, ―TRA‖, (1980) added ‗subjective 
normative beliefs‘ to capture the influence upon decision-makers of their beliefs 
about what others thought about them behaving in that way.   Ajzen & Madden‘s 
(1986) Theory of Planned Behaviour, ―TPB‖ added ‗perceived behavioural control‘ 
to encompass the decision-maker‘s perception of external constraints upon 
his/her accomplishing some intended objective.  All of these developments anchor 
the relevance of an individual holding an attitude to an increasingly specific 
context. 
 
Behaviour 
 
Attitude(s) 
42 
 
The need for ‗perceived behavioural control‘ is found in the Commons Dilemma.  
Here individual self-restraint (reduced material consumption) is felt to be 
pointless if others do not similarly restrain themselves: the individual feels they 
have no control over their objective because of the relative insignificance of their 
actions.  This is a recurrent theme in individual surveys (Christie & Jarvis, 2001) as 
well as the public discourse of the China syndrome referred to above. This thesis 
will stress how the need for fairness creates the Commons Dilemma; but the fact 
that it is rational from a utilitarian point of view to conclude that there is no point 
acting alone as an individual is also core to the problem.  It is possible to provide 
informative analyses of the dilemma both from a Relational Models perspective 
and from a rational actor perspective. 
1.5.2 Irrationality, or a ‗deficit‘ model of rationality 
The problem with this model of the rational actor is that it is so obviously not 
representative of our everyday experience of individual decision-making (Simon, 
1986 provides a succinct critique).  Portraying each decision as carefully weighed 
up ignores heuristic judgement, biases, habits and emotional responses.  Each of 
these additional elements has been welded into variants of processor models: 
heuristics, e.g. by Eagly and Chaiken (1993 Ch 7) and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982b), habit, e.g. by Triandis or Bagozzi, (Jackson, 2005 Ch 10) and affective 
responses acknowledged by most theorists to a greater or lesser extent.  Much 
subsequent literature approaches the topic by analysing how human decision-
making deviates from pure rationality, essentially a deficit model.  This is perhaps 
best illustrated by two standard reference collections of papers (Arkes & 
Hammond, 1986; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). An important criticism of 
this ‗deficit‘ model of rationality is that it tends to ignore the frequent practical 
advantages of ‗irrational‘ cognition (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2008)3. 
Many formulations like TRA or TPB include socially derived influences upon 
individual decision-making.  However, the foundational motivation of self-interest 
almost by definition prevents a satisfactory examination of ‗pure‘ altruism.  
Indeed, some theories explicitly propose that altruism could be, ultimately, 
egotistic, enabling ‗the purchase of moral satisfaction‘ (Kahneman & Knetsch, 
                                            
3 Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011) vigourously rejects this criticism but it is hard to avoid 
reading his work as idealising rational deliberation while accepting the practical necessity 
of heuristic responses. 
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1992).  The next section examines one attempt to integrate socially derived 
motivations into the rational actor model. 
1.6 Values and Rationality 
1.6.1  Altruism and individual decision-making.  Stern‘s VBN theory 
Concluding that unselfish acts must, ultimately, be selfishly motivated contradicts 
our intuitive sense that some actions are purely altruistic in motivation.  Schwartz 
(1977) aimed to address this with a theory of norm activation.  In this model the 
individual possesses a personal norm, a sense of moral obligation towards others, 
which is activated by individuals‘ awareness that their actions might have 
consequences for others and the degree to which individuals perceive themselves 
to be responsible for those consequences. 
Paul Stern (1978) set himself a challenge ―to identify, within each society, 
commonly held values which are consistent with the maintenance of common 
resources for the future‖ (p156).  His own response was to expand on Schwartz‘ 
model (Stern, Dietz, & Black, 1986) until arriving at a detailed theory of 
environmentally motivated behaviour (Stern, 2000b; Stern et al., 1999), the 
‗Value-Belief-Norm‖ theory (VBN).  This model proposed three distinct spheres of 
core values: biospheric, or concern about nature, altruistic, or concern for other 
people, and egoistic, or self-interest.  The theory proposes a ―causal chain [which] 
moves from relatively stable, central elements of personality and belief structure 
[ie the core values] to more focussed beliefs about human-environment relations, 
their consequences, and the individual‘s responsibility for taking corrective 
action‖ (Stern, 2000b, p. 413).  A flowchart illustration of VBN theory, taken from 
Stern (2000b, p. 412) is shown below: 
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Figure 1-2: Stern's value belief norm model 
The theory picks up the ―New Environmental Paradigm‖ (NEP) which was first 
formulated by Dunlap in 1978 (Dunlap et al., 2000) as a variable that synthesises 
ideological factors contributing towards a particular orientation of concern for the 
environment.   An important phase of the process described by the model is the 
awareness of consequences and ascription of responsibility: this is the nub of the 
Commons Dilemma.  With remote consequences (weak AC) and an infinitesimal 
share of the responsibility (weak AR), the VBN model neatly encapsulates how 
individual consumers are not generally motivated to save the planet. 
The policy consequences of VBN are similar to those of attitude theory.  The focus 
is on improved information for citizens – in VBN terms, increasing ‗Awareness of 
Consequences‘ - and on removing practical impediments to action, such as making 
recycling centres more available or improving public transport.  One of the main 
‗barriers‘ to engagement with climate change is the perception that it is too 
difficult (Stoll-Kleeman, O'Riordan, & Jaeger, 2001) or that there are too few 
enabling initiatives (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007).  These 
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studies show that barriers enable denial of responsibility.  In VBN terms, removing 
those barriers increases ‗Ascription of Responsibility‘ (Jackson, 2005). 
1.6.2 Critique of the VBN model 
Although Stern and his collaborators provide survey support for their theory in the 
works cited, more recent work by others has suggested that the original and more 
parsimonious TPB model has greater explanatory power (Kaiser, Hubner, & 
Bogner, 2005).    A greater concern about VBN theory is that it merely tantalises 
by offering the ‗biospheric‘, ‗altruistic‘ and ‗egotistic‘ values, when it is exactly 
the origin of these, and the ways in which they interact or compete with each 
other, that is of greatest interest. 
Like most attitude based models VBN suggests a deliberative process in a 
controlled environment or context - or at least an environment in which only 
selected variables are treated as relevant.  Although attitude theory fully 
recognises that there are short-cut, heuristic ways of thinking or reaching a 
decision (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 Ch 7), models like the VBN, which break out sub-
components into a logical analysis, necessarily imply a reasoned process 
proceeding from agreed premises in the form of the attitude cues.  Again, this 
seems to stop short of the more interesting questions: first, where do these 
premises come from, and second, since the starting cues appear to be almost 
instinctive or to be articles of faith, what, cognitively, are they?  Similarly, the 
policy implications of the VBN and other attitude models, such as improved 
information together with the removal of external impediments to behavioural 
change (Stern, 2000a) do not work (Verplanken, 2011).  The focus on improving 
information to citizens fails to address the fact that people know about the 
environmental consequences of high energy consumption, are aware of practical 
steps that would enable them to cut back, but do not do so (Populus, 2006); 
awareness of and concern over the damage done to the environment by air travel 
does not translate into an intention to fly less often (Ipsos-Mori, 2007, p. 38). 
1.6.3 Post-material values 
One challenge for policy-makers is that the ‗biospheric‘ values VBN posits appear 
to emerge over the long-term.  Inglehart (1990) followed a Maslowian analysis and 
used extensive survey evidence to support his theory that citizens who feel secure 
and reasonably affluent place greater value on emancipative values and 
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environmental concerns.  He documented a long-term post-war trend of increasing 
concern for the environment.  Consistent with attitude theory, objective 
contextual factors also played a big part in his findings, with Russian citizens in 
the mid-1990‘s showing high concern for the environment despite low security and 
declining affluence, which Inglehart attributed to firsthand experience of extreme 
environmental degradation (Inglehart, 1995).  Later extension of the theory ties 
socio-economic development and democratically delivered personal freedom into 
an overall ‗human development syndrome‘ (Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingemann, 
2003): again, if these are factors driving environmental concern, these phenomena 
will only change over the very long term.   
Attitude theory suggests first that converting concern for the environment into 
action is difficult for policy-makers to achieve.  Second it suggests that positive 
attitudes to pro-environmental behaviour derive from underlying value 
orientations: Inglehart‘s research suggests that individual policy-makers will 
struggle to drive those values so much as be driven by them. 
These difficulties, however, should not deter researchers from trying to 
understand the foundations of environmental concern better.  The following 
section describes the recent research which has, unsurprisingly, given particular 
attention to concern over climate change. 
1.7 Social psychological accounts of concern about change 
debate 
1.7.1 Introduction 
Paul Stern described his early investigation of pro-environmental attitudes and 
values explicitly as a quest to understand the psychology of Garrett Hardin‘s 
Commons (Stern, 1978; P. C. Stern, 2009).  His 1978 article was a general call to 
arms, mentioning a range of specific sustainability problems from pollution and 
water resource management, to energy conservation and fisheries.  It is only 
relatively recently that the social psychological study of environmental concern 
has come to be dominated by the topic of climate change4.  This section looks at 
this more focussed research. 
                                            
4 Pidgeon (2010) stresses that public concern over climate change itself is not so new: the 
point here is that only recently has it come to dominate the overall field of research into 
environmental concern generally.  Szerzynski & Urry (2010) also observe that ‗climate 
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Social psychological study of the societal response to climate change starts with 
the assessment of public opinion, before looking at the determinants of public 
opinion and subsequently the determinants of behaviour change.  The key 
questions may be summarised as follows: 
A. Is this is a subject the public are concerned about?  Once a level of 
concern is established, two linked questions follow: 
B. What are the drivers of public concern? 
C. Does public concern translate into behavioural change?  Answers to 
(A) and (B) look at both social psychological constructs and aspects 
of the social and physical context as possible factors and lead to 
two further linked questions designed to foster public engagement: 
D. What policy levers could best promote individual behavioural 
change? 
E. How should policy makers most effectively communicate with the 
public on climate change?  Beyond these five questions a more 
fundamental issue, urged by both ideological and epistemological 
considerations, is always present, and sometimes explicitly 
addressed: 
F. Should the societal response to climate change emphasise changing 
individual attitudes and behaviour, or rather focus upon reordering 
the social context?5 
1.7.2 A. Public opinion 
1.7.2.1 Studies of US public opinion 
Riley Dunlap (1991) comprehensively reviewed the emergence of US public opinion 
towards environmental attitudes.  In line with the key events highlighted in 
Appendix A, public concern ‗developed dramatically‘ (p285) in the late 1960‘s, 
and declined in the 1970‘s before increasing again in the 1980‘s.  In amongst the 
many surveys reviewed, the greenhouse effect starts to be included in the 1980‘s 
                                                                                                                           
change‘ has come to subsume other environmental dangers.  This emphasis in the research 
fails to reflect public attitudes, where other environmental worries continue to have 
salience alongside climate change (Eurobarometer, 2008) 
5 The literature usually addresses several of these questions at once: academic studies of 
public opinion (e.g.  Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012) often also analyse drivers of 
public opinion.  This analysis of the academic debate into these 6 questions should not be 
taken to imply that studies referenced herein are only addressing the specific question 
being discussed at the time. 
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and Dunlap shows a marked increase (from 26% to 52%) in the numbers identifying 
this as a ‗high environmental threat‘ either side of 1988 (identified as a critical 
moment in the emergence of public concern over the issue in 1.3.1).  Brewer 
(2005) analysed polls from 1989 to 2004 to show that concern (defined as worrying 
a great deal or a fair amount about global warming) fluctuated between 50% and 
72%.  With typically over 50% of the public concerned about global warming, 
researchers seeking to analyse public understanding of the issue found much 
confusion, particularly when it first came to public attention.  Kempton (1997), 
reviewing data gathered from 1989 to 1992, found that the public tried to make 
sense of climate change within the framework of existing environmental issues 
such as air pollution and ozone depletion, or alternatively their experience of the 
weather.  His finding that these framings led to misconceptions anticipates the 
interest in framing prevalent in much recent research (Brulle, et al., 2012; 
Maibach et al., 2011). 
After recognising the success of the environmental movement in generating public 
concern over environmental issues (Mertig & Dunlap, 1995), Dunlap‘s subsequent 
research has focussed particularly on the efforts of the US political right to stem 
the growth of public concern over climate change (Dunlap & McCright, 2008, 2010; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2010).  Their research inevitably segments the US public into 
partisan sub-groups with very different responses to the issue of climate change.  
Leiserowitz (2005) also segmented public opinion and identified two 
‗interpretative communities‘ (p1439) closely linked to political ideology at the 
extremes of concern; he dubbed these ‗naysayers‘ and ‗alarmists‘.6  In subsequent 
work with Maibach and others, Leiserowitz developed this segmentation into 6 
grades of concern about climate change (Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 
2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2011; Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2009).  The 
authors defined these as ‗Global Warming‘s 6 Americas‘.  Identifying these groups 
as ‗Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful and Dismissive‘, their 
segmentation enables a subtler analysis of the factors influencing public opinion 
on the topic (e.g. Leiserowitz, et al., 2011) and a more sophisticated approach to 
communicating the issue (Maibach, et al., 2011). 
The ‗6 Americas‘ studies show that concern about climate change peaked at the 
end of 2008, with the authors suggesting that the subsequent recession and the 
                                            
6 In the same paper Leiserowitz also notes a ‗confused‘ group who muddle up climate 
change with ozone depletion, echoing Kempton‘s (1997) findings. 
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release of the ‗climategate‘ emails7 may explain the decline in concern 
(Leiserowitz, et al., 2011, p. 5).  Brulle and others (2012) construct a time-series 
measure of US public opinion to generate a ‗Climate Change Threat Index‘ that 
peaks earlier, in 2007.  Regressing this index onto a number of factors 
hypothesised to influence public perception of the threat, they conclude that the 
cues provided by political elites and advocacy groups are the most critical factors.  
Like Dunlap and McCright (above), they find US climate change risk perceptions to 
be defined by political or ideological partisanship, just as suggested by the media 
analysts (e.g. Boykoff, 2008b; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004).   This political divide in 
risk perception is a distinctive feature of US opinion that is less noticeable in 
other countries (Pidgeon, 2010). 
1.7.2.2 Cross-national studies of public opinion. 
Dunlap and Leiserowitz have each also studied cross-national surveys of public 
opinion, (Dunlap, Gallup jr, & Gallup, 1993; United Nations Development 
Programme & Leiserowitz, 2007).  Leiserowitz‘s data showed concern about 
climate change to be considerably lower in the US than in Europe or many 
developing countries.  Brechin (2010) shows rising concern between 2002 and 2007 
in most countries.  The more recent polls he reviews also show improved 
awareness and understanding of the issue, but when compared to economic 
concerns climate change remains a secondary issue.  The worrying conclusion 
drawn by Brechin (p201) is that ‗respondents in the US, Great Britain, Russia and 
(urban) China were among the least concerned.  This is quite troubling given that 
these are some of the major emitters‘ (p201).  Also important are his observations 
on the divergent relationships in different countries between levels of concern 
and support for mitigation policies.  These necessarily suggest that in any country 
a complex mix of factors determines attitudes to and engagement with climate 
change. 
Lorenzoni & Pidgeon (2006) also found lower levels of concern in the US when 
compared to the EU, and they too found that survey respondents rarely treat 
climate change as a pressing issue.  As they go on to identify, climate change has 
little salience in most people‘s daily lives.    A recent Eurobarometer survey on 
climate change (2011a) demonstrated high levels of concern over climate change 
across Europe and indeed high levels relative to other issues but this was in 
                                            
7 See footnote 1 on page 28. 
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response to a prompted list of global worries.  The more general ‗Standard‘ 
Eurobarometer surveys (e.g. 2011b) typically rate climate change well down the 
list of ‗most important issues‘ facing Europe8.   This suggests that the logic of the 
problem demands that it be taken seriously in principle, but it does not compete 
when set against concerns closer to our daily lives. 
1.7.2.3 Public Opinion in the UK 
Following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the British Social Attitudes Survey 
(‗BSAS‘) regularly polled environmental attitudes (Christie & Jarvis, 2001; Taylor, 
1997; Witherspoon, 1994; Witherspoon & Martin, 1992).  These surveys repeatedly 
found British concern over the environment to be either superficial or incoherent.  
The disjunction between public concern and actual willingness to do anything 
about environmental challenges seems to have discouraged further BSAS polling.  
Not until 2010 did the BSAS include another environment module in their annual 
survey, although from 2005 the annual survey did include individual questions on 
the link between travel emissions and climate change: these show a decline in 
climate change concern over recent years (Taylor, 2012).  The review of the 2010 
survey links this decline to the climategate email leaks and, less conclusively, to 
the economic downturn (Taylor, 2012).  Although belief in the phenomenon of 
climate change has declined, Poortinga et al. (2011) point out that in the UK 
scepticism is still not very widespread.  Thus, in the BSA 2010 survey only 17% 
think that the statement ―Every time we use coal or gas or oil we contribute to 
climate change‖ is definitely or probably not true (Taylor, 2012, p. 100). 
Christie & Jarvis (2001)‘s conclusion that UK environmental concern was 
incoherent could best be overcome by ceasing to treat public opinion as 
homogeneous.  Defra (2008) used a social marketing approach to generate a 
segmentation of 7 different types of citizen engagement with the problem: like 
the 6 Americas studies the aim was to use this analysis to target communication 
better by showing that there was some coherence to the views held by those 
within the different segments.  Most of the academic studies of factors driving 
                                            
8 The first of the surveys asked ‗Which of the following do you consider to be the single 
most serious problem facing the world as a whole?‘ Climate change, with 20%,  ranked 2nd 
out of 7 prompts and other spontaneous suggestions, after ‗Poverty, hunger and lack of 
drinking water‘.   In the second survey, only 5% mentioned climate change in response to 
‗What do you think are the two most important issues facing the European Union at the 
moment?‘, ranking it 11th out of unprompted issues such as ‗the economic situation‘, 
‗terrorism‘ and ‗crime‘ (p24).   
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public concern are alive to these subtleties but inevitably the need to offer an 
overarching narrative, together with the availability of aggregate measures of 
concern, tends to pull in the other direction. 
1.7.3 B & C: Drivers of public concern and behavioural change 
Much of the research into the drivers of public concern and behavioural change 
can be loosely aligned to the components identified in Paul Stern‘s VBN model – 
values, beliefs, ‗awareness of consequences‘, ‗ascription of responsibility‘, norms 
and behaviours.  The review below makes use of these constructs but is not rigidly 
demarcated by them since there are inevitable overlaps between them. 
1.7.3.1 Values and identity:  
The US studies of politically partisan attitudes to climate change, mentioned in 
1.7.2.1 above, clearly suggest that values can be predictive of concern and 
willingness to act.  Not only Paul Stern‘s work in respect of environmental concern 
generally (e.g. Stern, 2000b) but also other studies in the UK confirm this for at 
least some segments of survey samples (e.g. Christie & Jarvis, 2001; de Groot & 
Steg, 2010).  Exactly how values translate into willingness to act and through what 
mediation continues to be explored.  Marquatt-Pyatt et al. (2011) and Poortinga et 
al. (2011) show values as predictive of belief in, or scepticism about, AGW, while 
Shwom et al. (2010) show values as predictive of support for climate change 
policy.  Leiserowitz (2006) shows links between values and both risk perception 
and policy preferences.  Chapter 2 examines the role of values further. 
The apparently powerful role of political partisanship suggests that values to some 
extent work through social identity: Malka et al. (Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009) 
found that political partisans paid attention to expert sources they identified 
with, affecting the likelihood that new information about climate change will 
generate increased concern.   
1.7.3.2 Beliefs, consequences and responsibility: 
 The preliminary review of public opinion above ignores the difference between 
belief in climate change and concern about climate change.  People‘s affective 
responses to climate change are generally negative (see below).  The bare logic of 
the phenomenon suggests that if survey respondents are aware of and accept the 
science they are likely to be ‗concerned‘ about it: a survey respondent or 
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interviewee does not have to buy into the ‗New Environmental Paradigm‘ to 
answer that they are concerned, at least in the abstract, about the future of the 
human race.  Getting from belief to concern is less the issue than getting from 
abstract concern to concrete willingness to act and so a key focus of research is 
therefore on this second disjunction.  In the terms of Stern‘s VBN model, the 
‗consequences‘ are spatially and temporarily remote, and the personal 
‗responsibility‘ is minimal.  That the opinion polls reviewed reveal a rather 
abstract or superficial concern which does not compete with issues salient in daily 
life should not be surprising.   
Yet knowledge of a potential threat does not automatically lead to perception of 
risk: Slovic showed how lay perception of risk differs from scientific assessment of 
potential harms (Slovic, 1987).  He went on to identify the role of affective 
influences on risk perception (Slovic et al., 2002).  Leiserowitz‘ studies apply this 
specifically to climate change and demonstrate a substantial affective component 
in climate change risk perception (Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 
2006): others too attest the powerful role of emotions in negative evaluations of 
climate change (Stoll-Kleeman, et al., 2001). 
Affective responses will inevitably be influenced by previous experience.  
Kempton (1997) found that people initially made sense of climate change by trying 
to fit it into models of previously encountered phenomena (e.g. weather) or ideas 
(e.g. pollution or ozone depletion).  Bostrom and Lashof (2007) confirm that 
people have continued to conflate weather and climate, and Nicholas Stern (2010, 
79th minute) believes that colder winters in the UK have much to do with the 
decline in concern over climate change.  The logic of the ‗availability heuristic‘ 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a) suggests that we need the experiential confirmation 
of warmer weather to be convinced that the world is warming. Weber (2010) 
argues that personal experience is far more likely than statistical descriptions to 
generate ‗cognitive uptake‘ (p333) and an enduring belief that humans are 
warming the world.  Yet the interaction between direct weather experience and 
climate change beliefs is not straight forward.  On the one hand: 
 Spence and others (2011) demonstrate that experience of flooding impacts 
beliefs about climate change and indirectly willingness to reduce energy 
use 
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 The presumption that extreme weather events are experienced as the most 
salient aspect of climate change was taken as a common sense view in the 
American Psychological Association‘s (2010) review of psychological 
contributions to the challenge of climate change.  The galvanising effect 
of Hurricane Katrina in making climate change a national security concern 
is one example of this salience (Center for a New American Security, 
2007), the role of drought and bushfires in Australian experience of 
climate change another (Brechin, 2010, note 7). 
On the other: 
 The IPCC themselves stress that specific weather events should not be 
attributed directly to climate change, only the likely frequency of weather 
events (IPCC, 2007, pp. 299-316). 
 Brulle‘s (2012) study of levels of concern found no connection with 
extreme weather events. 
 Before Hurricane Katrina Lieserowitz (2005, p. 1439) concluded that ‗few 
Americans associate global warming with extreme weather events‘. 
 Weber (2010) found that people tend to interpret present and remembered 
past weather in accordance with their pre-existing views on the climate – if 
you believe the climate is changing or stable you can adjust your 
interpretation of past weather to match. 
As with the opinion polling, it is necessary to recognise both the heterogeneity 
and the reflexivity of beliefs.  Not everyone‘s climate beliefs are influenced by 
current weather patterns, and while direct experience of weather plays a role in 
shaping climate beliefs, pre-existing beliefs play a role in shaping experience of 
the weather. 
Personal experience is seen as important first because a major challenge of 
climate change is the remoteness, spatially and temporarily, of the threatened 
harms (Pidgeon, 2010), and second because predicted weather frequencies are too 
abstract to be meaningful or personally relevant (Marx et al., 2007).  The 
remoteness of consequences is a significant barrier to engagement with the 
challenge of climate change, making it locally and personally irrelevant 
(Lorenzoni, et al., 2007; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Stoll-Kleeman, et al., 2001).   
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Remoteness, and personal relevance, is critical not only in respect of the 
‗awareness of consequences‘ of climate change but also in respect of the 
‗ascription of responsibility‘ for climate change.  Irrespective of the fact that 
some people continue to show some confusion or uncertainty about the scientific 
arguments for global warming (Leiserowitz & Smith, 2010; Lorenzoni, et al., 
2007), the personal barrier for many people is in connecting their own actions to 
the distant consequences.  Stoll-Kleeman et al. (2001) highlight the many forms of 
this barrier amongst their strategies of denial (p112): 
 ―denial of responsibility: I am not the main cause of this problem 
 rejection of blame:   I have done nothing so wrong as to be 
destructive 
 ignorance:    I simply don‘t know the consequences of my 
actions 
 powerlessness:    I am only an infinitesimal being in the order of 
things 
 fabricated constraints:  There are too many impediments‖9 
Lorenzoni and others (2007) also find that despite finding people were willing to 
acknowledge ‗moral responsibilities to address climate change‘ (p449) their study 
participants also identified similar barriers as explanations for not actually 
engaging with climate change.  Bickerstaff et al. (2008) define the problem as one 
of allocating responsibility between citizens and the state.  The problem is a 
collective one, but the individual must act both as a citizen within the collective 
and also as an individual consumer.  Aitken et al. (2011) emphasise that individual 
action is confronted with the powerlessness of the Commons Dilemma.  On the 
other hand, with respect to collective action, the individual feels little trust in 
political institutions to deliver effective action (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007).  
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003), however, introduce a more complex understanding 
of the role of trust, suggesting that a critical public that engages with institutional 
deliberation can be healthy.  This flows from their finding that confidence in 
government sharing one‘s values significantly influences levels of trust in risk 
regulation.  Engagement is likely to raise confidence that government shares one‘s 
                                            
9 This is part of a list the authors take from Schahn, J., 1993. Die Rolle von 
Entschuldigungen und Rechtfertigungen fur umweltschadigendes Verhalten. In: Schahn, J., 
Giesinger, T. (Eds.), Psychologie fur den Umweltschutz. Weinheim, Beltz, pp. 51 - 61. 
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values.  Gifford (2011) refers to a lack of such mutual understanding as 
‗discredence‘. 
1.7.3.3 Behaviour: 
The constraints of survey and interview methods mean that most research 
analyses associations between the constructs above and self-reported behaviour or 
stated intentions to behave, or willingness to act.  The latter follows Ajzen and 
Fishbein‘s compression of the Attitude-Behaviour-Cognition model to stop short of 
objectively measured ‗behaviour‘ at ‗intention to behave‘ (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1973).  Studies look at both mitigation behaviour and willingness to take measures 
to adapt: 
 Mitigation actions: e.g. Spence et al. (2011) show how personal experience 
does influence preparedness to reduce energy use; de Groot and Steg 
(2010) look at how subjects choose a car and how much weight they place 
on environmental performance; Ferguson & Branscombe (2010) consider 
energy conservation and willingness to pay green taxes. 
 Adaptive action is typically defined for a specific social group within a 
specific locality reacting to specific circumstances, e.g. Swedish forest 
management practices (Blennow & Persson, 2009).  
 Each study typically tests the links between its own psychological 
constructs and behavioural intentions.  It does not do justice to them to 
squeeze them into the framework of the VBN model; however, for the 
purposes of this review this oversimplifying generalisation is fair.  Some do 
draw on factors that clearly go beyond individual psychological constructs 
such as Wolf et al‘s (2010) study of the role of social capital in 
determining the elderly‘s readiness to take adaptive action in response to 
heat waves. 
1.7.4 D: policy options 
Research into behavioural intentions helps to determine the public acceptability 
of different policy options.  Policy makers can influence the social context to 
respond to identified barriers to behaviour or to publicly expressed policy 
preferences.  Barriers can include lack of information (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007) or 
lack of understanding (Weber & Stern, 2011).  A major problem is the lack of 
enabling facilities or affordable solutions (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007).  Policy 
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responses have typically emphasised providing information (Verplanken, 2011).  
Indeed, one element of the logic of market mechanisms and their response to the 
challenge of affordability is that prices do provide such information as well as 
incentivising the creation of new infrastructure.  It is noticeable that the political 
presumption that the public will not stomach regulation (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007) 
actually contradicts the public expectation that CO2 should be regulated  (e.g. 
Leiserowitz, 2006). 
However, it is noteworthy that policy options typically work with the grain of 
existing social institutions and practices: by continuing to emphasise the role of 
individual choice they are a form of business as usual even as they try to achieve 
social change (Shove, 2010b).  
1.7.5 E: communication 
As identified in the introduction, much of social psychological research expressly 
seeks ways to improve communication of climate change risks and opportunities 
for mitigation.10  The mass media are instrumental in generating public attitudes 
to climate change (Brulle, et al., 2012) and studies of the impact of films with 
climate change messages in both the US (Leiserowitz, 2004) and UK (Howell, 2011) 
demonstrate increased concern among viewers, albeit mainly in the short term. 
Research hoping to improve communication is inevitably informed by studies of 
media coverage of climate change.  Boykoff & Boykoff (2004) demonstrate how 
the US politicisation of climate change referred to above was played out through 
the media.  In the UK Carvalho & Burgess (2007; 2005) and Ereaut & Segnit (2006) 
also showed vested interests pushing their agendas through the media.  Boykoff 
(2008a)‘s study of UK tabloid coverage echoes Kempton (1997)‘s argument that 
people use familiar frames to make sense of climate change: for Boykoff, the 
tabloids rarely discussed the thorny issues of risk and justice, but rather used 
‗shock and awe‘ stories about ‗charismatic megafauna‘ or potential economic 
collapse to stimulate attention (p557).  Shock and awe may stimulate attention in 
the short term, but it is commonly observed that fear-inducing messages do not 
succeed in generating effective public engagement (Hulme, 2007; O'Neill & 
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). 
                                            
10 To mention just a few articles where communication,  information provision or public 
discourse  is specifically referenced in the abstract: (Berkhout, 2010; Lorenzoni, et al., 
2007; Maibach, et al., 2011; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O‘Neill & Hulme, 2009; 
Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011).  
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More generally, communicators try to frame the issue within familiar discourses.  
Politicians try to frame the issue within overarching narratives such as the 
national way of life (Kurz, Augoustinos, & Crabb, 2010).  The press uses routine 
frames such as celebrity culture to address climate change (Boykoff, 2008a). 
In a broader reflection on the role of the media, Boykoff (2009) points up the 
tension between media preference for a simple message and the complexity of 
the challenge.  The uncertainties that abound in climate science are contagious: 
the uncertainties about exactly what the consequences will be allow motivated 
commentators to offer the simplified message that the whole phenomenon of AGW 
is unproven.   When risks are shown to be exaggerated with alarmist rhetoric, the 
simplified conclusion is that the whole issue is overblown (Whitmarsh, 2011).   As 
the studies of barriers to engagement show, the uncertainty and divergent 
messages provide the public with a ready strategy of denial (Lorenzoni, et al., 
2007; Stoll-Kleeman, et al., 2001). 
Yet research focussing on ‗strategies of denial‘ underemphasises the principle 
barrier to ‗engagement‘, the fact that changing habitual behaviour within a 
physical and social infrastructure that entrenches energy-intensive routines is very 
difficult.  Verplanken (2011) uses the same social psychological theories as those 
above, namely Ajzen and Madden‘s Theory of Planned Behaviour and Stern‘s VBN 
model, to lay the foundation for a recent collection of papers on ‗Engaging the 
Public with Climate Change‘ (Whitmarsh, O'Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2011): but he goes 
on to explain why information campaigns do not change habits and to argue for 
interventions that target moments of disruption in people‘s routines. 
If fear-inducing messages and information campaigns do not work, what is the 
alternative approach to communication?  Drawing together the research that (a) 
segments public attitudes to climate change, (b) identifies trust as key, or (c) 
rejects over-simplification and ‗shock and awe‘ tends to encourage 
communication strategies that treat the public seriously and recommend 
deliberative involvement (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011; Pidgeon, 2010) and tailored 
messages (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007).  Those involved in deciding to behave 
differently are more likely to follow through with behavioural change (Lewin, 
1958). 
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More challenging to the standard paradigm of rationalist policy-making are 
Pidgeon and Fischoff (2011)‘s suggestions that the scientific community needs to 
start listening to the public rather than simply offering information.  Demeritt 
(2006) argues that the ritual invocations of ‗sound science‘ as the basis for policy 
represent homage to a rationalist myth.  He goes on to suggest that the IPCC‘s 
greatest achievement has been the deliberative involvement of a wide range of 
NGO actors and to ensure empowered participation by developing countries.  The 
truth about climate change needs to be a co-production between scientists and 
society.  Hulme goes further, arguing against the globalising tendencies of a single 
scientific ‗knowledge‘ of climate change and for the importance of local 
understandings (Hulme, 2010b).  Not only has the boundary between naturally 
produced weather and anthropogenic climate been dissolved (Hulme, 2010a), but 
so too has the boundary between sound natural science and culturally generated 
meaning in creating our understanding of ‗climate change‘.  Berkhout (2010) also 
calls for a more ‗open‘ boundary between the two11. 
1.7.6 F: Individual behavioural change and social change 
Another boundary dispute emerges between sociological approaches to climate 
change and much of the social psychological research.  In a ‗deliberately 
provocative‘ paper sociologist Shove (2010a, p. 1273) attacks much of the social 
psychological literature for buying into the rational choice model of 
individual/societal interaction by framing the research objective as seeking ways 
to influence individual choices.  Szerszynski & Urry‘s (2010) criticism of the social 
science contribution to the climate change debate, or lack of it (see 1.1.2), sits 
alongside another paper by Shove (2010b) in a special issue of Theory, Culture and 
Society, in which she describes a ‗gulf‘ (p284) between the psychology on which 
policymaking depends12 and critical social theory.    
Whitmarsh et al. (2011) responded robustly to Shove‘s critique.  They concede the 
validity of sociological approaches that explore how infrastructure and cultural 
practices perpetuate unsustainability (see on routines and habits above); they 
acknowledge too that emphasis on individualistic models of social change 
facilitates the redistribution of ‗responsibilities our institutions and governance 
                                            
11 Latour‘s approach to the generation of scientific knowledge is foundational to this kind 
of analysis (Latour, 1999), although in these papers neither Hulme nor Berkhout  
specifically cite Latour while Demeritt (Demeritt, 2006) does. 
12 Shove specifically identifies Jackson (2005) and Defra (2008) as examples of this kind of 
psychology. 
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structures should arguably shoulder‘ (p259).  But they reject the presumption that 
climate change must be subsumed within a critique of society generally and seen 
‗through the lens of panacea/opportunity for radical change‘. 
This is an age old problem, echoing Bem‘s (1967) challenge to the assumption that 
behaviour follows attitudes: do you seek to change from within, taking as given 
that we live in a consumer society, and try to work with the grain of existing 
values?13  Or do you insist that the social context must be fundamentally changed 
because, as the strategies of denial attest, it is simply too difficult for individuals 
to change within the existing context?  If you change how people think and feel, 
do you change what they do?  Or if you change what they (have to) practice, do 
you change what they think and feel?  The cognitive dissonance literature 
(Festinger, 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) indicates that if we change 
practices attitudes should follow.  In recent years we have not changed practices 
in spite of widely held credence in the anthropogenic driver in AGW: as a result 
Pidgeon (2010) plausibly suggests that dissonance reduction may be one factor 
underlying the recent decline in the belief in climate change. 
1.7.7 Attitudes and behaviour; habits and identity 
Attempts to separate out the constituent part of a cognitive and behavioural 
model inevitably struggle with oversimplified boundaries.  Bem‘s (1967) challenge 
to the ‗attitude -> behaviour‘ sequence encourages the common sense reflection 
that consistent attitudes and behaviour will intensify each other.  Repeated 
behaviour can be seen as becoming part of who one is.  Charng and others (1988) 
first proposed this for blood donors, but similar findings have been made for pro-
environmental behaviour (Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010). 
 
If repeated behaviour can create a pro-environmental identity, campaigners can 
hope that engaging in one type of behaviour can generate spillover effects by 
leading to other pro-environmental behaviours (Crompton & Thøgersen, 2009; 
Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010).  However, the high structural barriers to behaviour 
change can in fact lead to the opposite result: those engaging in one pro-
                                            
13 The idea of working with the grain of existing values is central to the policy advocacy in 
‗Common Cause‘ (Crompton, 2010).  This report stresses that people do hold strongly pro-
social values and not just individualistic ones, and it is the pro-social values that need to 
be appealed to.  But inevitably those critical of prevailing values fear that working with 
the grain of existing values inescapably perpetuates business as usual (see e.g. 
Swyngedouw (2010)). 
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environmental behaviour can ‗rest on their laurels‘ and not take the next, maybe 
harder, step (Crompton & Thøgersen, 2009, p. 18), excusing themselves by 
claiming ‗I protect the environment in other ways‘ (Stoll-Kleeman, et al., 2001, p. 
112). 
1.7.8 The direction of social psychological research into concern about climate 
change 
Whitmarsh and Lorenzoni (2010) set out a research program in their editorial 
commentary to the second issue of WIRE–climate change.  While the ‗social 
mediation of climate risks‘ (p160) is included in their definition of the domain of 
study, the principle scope of the domain is clearly individual perceptions and 
responses (including individual perceptions under social influences).  Pragmatically 
we have to work with the grain of an existing culture that privileges individual 
choice. 
But it is noticeable that social psychological researchers do often seem to feel 
constrained by working within this paradigm.  Leiserowitz & Fernandez (2008) 
wrote an impassioned conference report entitled ‗Towards a new consciousness‘, 
making it very clear that only radical change will do.   This is not new.  Paul Stern 
(1978) concluded his call to arms by pleading: 
―We need to learn more about the process of creating new institutions in a way 
which can increase group consciousness and future consciousness.  The whole 
proposed research effort assumes the advent of major social change, but social 
change can occur in ways which increase or decrease group consciousness‖ (p158). 
And he goes on to prescribe the same deliberative engagement that today‘s 
researchers advocate: 
―Available knowledge suggests that social change is most likely to increase group 
consciousness when it maximises participation in planning, increases 
communication between people, democratizes decision-making, and increases 
autonomy for local groups in the management of locally available resources‖ 
(p158). 
This hope for a new consciousness, a step change in the social response, echoes 
the physical science discourse of climate tipping points (Nature Editorial, 2006; 
Russill & Nyssa, 2009).  But talk of tipping points is easily attacked as alarmist 
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(Risbey, 2008), just as calls for a social revolution are hard to square with wanting 
to work with the grain of existing values. 
1.7.9  ‗A new consciousness‘ or ‗consciousness as usual‘ 
For Shove, working within the paradigm of policy facilitating individual choice 
maintains consciousness as usual.   For social psychologists who have explored 
human values, targeting a new ‗group‘ consciousness is targeting a consciousness 
already available to us and regularly accessed by us in many contexts. 
The point of ‗Common Cause‘s‘ insistence that we work with the grain of people‘s 
values is that those values are not restricted to individualism.  They include the 
altruistic ‗group consciousness‘ and the biospheric ‗future conciousness‘ that 
Stern went on to include in his VBN model.  The challenge is to activate these 
values in a social context which is constantly intensifying the competing value of 
individualism.  Chapter 2 discusses some of the theories that have addressed the 
plurality of values that humans bring to bear on social problems.  
Before moving onto these theories, however, it is important to examine how 
persistent utilitarian rationality, the prevailing ‗consciousness as usual‘, can be. 
1.8 Values rationalised 
1.8.1 ‗Consciousness as usual‘ 
It is worth reflecting on the way that the consciousness represented by 
‗individualism‘ rationalises values.  The rational actor model accounts for values 
as revealed preferences.  Post-material values attribute higher utility to quality of 
life and environmental concerns and some aspects of the behaviour of affluent 
western societies provide evidence for this.  For this reason, a considerable 
amount of pro-environmental attitude research tests ‗Willingness to pay‘ (Christie 
& Jarvis, 2001; Kahneman et al., 1993) for environmental improvements.  If 
citizens prefer to spend their money on flying rather than saving the planet, the 
impression left by current surveys (e.g. Ipsos-Mori, 2007), and if the citizens‘ 
representative government chooses to expand airport capacity (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2008; DfT, 2009), society‘s post-material 
anxieties appear to be shallow.  A society‘s true values can be determined by 
where it spends its money.  This approach encourages policy-makers to use price 
signals, whether taxes or market mechanisms, to influence environmental 
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behaviour.  As described in Part 1, public intolerance for green taxes has led 
governments down the indirect, and gradualist, market mechanism of Kyoto. 
The rational actor model assumes that the different goals of different actors can 
be made commensurate through a utility calculus.  Policy-making targets the 
maximisation of utility for ‗all‘.  Inevitably, this leads back to the debates 
identified in Part 1: (a) how should the utility of future generations be factored 
into this equation, and (b) if all really is to mean all, should we also try to achieve 
an equitable distribution of this maximised utility?  These appear to be questions 
of value that the rational actor model cannot, on its own, address. 
1.8.2 Self and other 
As suggested above, many feel instinctively that the rational actor model does not 
accurately model how human beings think and behave.  The origin of this model 
may be found in Adam Smith‘s Wealth of Nations (1993 originally published in 
1776; referred to below as "WoN") in which he pictures society as an aggregate of 
competing individuals pursuing their own ends, their desire for material self-
improvement driving the economy as a whole.  The individual ―intends only his 
own gain‖ (WoN p292) and ―neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it‖ (WoN p291).   For Smith‘s rational economic 
actor, self-restraint makes sense if longer-term ends justify it.   Restraint occurs 
because the prudent individual consumes only what he must of his ‗stock‘, and 
seeks to generate revenue from the balance (WoN p162).  
It is with this analysis that Smith has held so much influence over modern social 
and economic theory.  Yet his analysis of individual morality in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments presents a different picture (Smith, 2006 originally published in 
1759; referred to below as "TMS") . 
A feature of models of individual decision-making is that they take the same shape 
as an individual‘s own post-hoc rationalisation of how he/she came to a decision. 
The individual self-justifies his/her actions as if to others, almost as if to a jury of 
others in a court of law.  Foucault‘s analyses of this objectification of the self 
show how it was a direct and fundamental consequence of the Western 
Enlightenment (e.g. Foucault, 1984, 1986).  
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The understanding of the self through the eyes of others is encapsulated by 
Smith‘s ―impartial spectator‖.  It is one of the ironies of individualism, an ideology 
of self-realisation, that its explanation of individual conduct necessarily resorts to 
the viewpoint of the other.  For Smith, the viewpoint of the other, the impartial 
observer, explicitly constructs the self‘s morality:  ―We endeavour to examine our 
own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine 
it.  If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the 
passions and motives that influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the 
approbation of this supposed equitable judge‖ (TMS p111).   Enlightenment‘s 
dualism is taken to the logical extreme: ―When I examine my own conduct, …it is 
evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons, and 
that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, 
the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of‖ (TMS p113).   From a 
historical distance, our perspective is that this moral philosophy crystallised into 
the suffocating etiquette of Victorian society, a world of excessive concern for the 
good regard of others, a perspective that emphasises the self as a prisoner of the 
society it finds itself in.  Looked at as if from the present however, Smith‘s 
psychology is closely related to the interactionism of GH Mead (1967, originally 
published in 1934) which sees the self formed through interaction with others.  
Smith‘s opening passage on ‗Sympathy‘ shows that, just as for Mead, a self 
independent of others would be unintelligible.   Unfortunately, although Smith 
recognises that the individual‘s values are essentially socially derived norms, his 
interest in what ‗socially derived‘ might mean hits a contemporary buffer.  He 
short cuts his enquiry into where these norms come from by rationalising that God 
would require an altruistic concern from each of us. 
 The implied selfish materialism of classical economics has been decried by 
Smith‘s detractors.   With his more complex view of the individual Smith himself 
would not have recognised the narrow caricature his critics have made of his 
economic actors.  For him the ―impartial spectator‖ represents a very powerful 
conscience.  He takes it as given that ―The wise and virtuous man is at all times 
willing that his own private interest be sacrificed to the public interest of his own 
particular order or society‖ (TMS p236).  This reliance on the essential goodness of 
human nature is equally evident in Milton Friedman‘s advocation of Smith‘s free-
market economics: see, e.g. Ch 7 on Capitalism and Discrimination (Friedman, 
2002). 
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What Adam Smith‘s reflections emphasise is how difficult it is to integrate 
motivations, and morality, derived from concern for others with motivations, and 
morality, derived from the rational actor‘s self-assertion.  This does suggest that 
models which accept a plurality of motivations, as well as competing and 
incommensurable principles of justice, may provide a more useful account. 
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the issues that are central to the public debate over 
climate change.  It has also set out the terms of much of the social psychological 
research into the climate change debate.  Most commonly this focuses on 
individual choices and as such is closely tied to a rationalist framework that relies 
upon utilitarian values.  Although the existence of competing values seems to be 
self-evident, it is hard to reconcile these with indivdualism.  Chapter 2 looks at 
the alternative account provided by two different theories.  The first, Relational 
Models Theory, hypothesises that these divergent ‗values‘ are in fact an exercise 
of social cognition tools.  The second, Cultural Theory, emphasises the social 
forces that determine which values carry the greatest weight in particular 
contexts. 
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Chapter 2  Two theories of multiple rationality  
 
Chapter Outline 
As described in Chapter 1, much social psychological analysis of pro-environmental 
behaviour uses the economic model of the rational actor.  Some versions of this 
model attempt to integrate deeper underlying values as motivating the actor.  
Two important weaknesses stand out in these accounts.  First, the origin of such 
values remains unclear.  Second, the resolution of conflicts between competing 
values typically collapses apparently incommensurate values into a single currency 
of utility and self-interest.  An alternative approach rejects the rational actor 
model.  Theories in this tradition instead propose multiple rationalities.  
Typically, these theories propose that individuals, and societies, employ multiple 
analyses of social situations and problems, and that these analyses rely upon 
underlying value principles that cannot be reduced to one another.  Such theories 
propose that pro-environmental behaviour is commonly motivated by different 
rationalities from that of the rational actor seeking to maximise utility. 
Before going further, it is worth clarifying what is meant by plurality of values and 
plural rationalities.  The hegemony of enlightened self-interest has tended to 
equate rationality with the pursuit of self-interest.  On this basis rationality 
equates to the hedonic or utilitarian calculus.  If instead we suppose that there 
are plural end-values other than self-interest, it is possible to use rational means 
to try to achieve those end values.  Alternative end values, such as maintenance 
of the existing order, or the absolute primacy of the group to which one belongs, 
logically impose different normative imperatives.  For example, the ‗rationale‘, or 
justification, of putting the family before oneself may contradict self-interest, as 
might prioritising seniority over merit14.  Each rationale or end value will generate 
a cluster of linked prescriptions: the phrase plural rationalities is used to describe 
these coherent, but incommensurable, clusters.  
 
                                            
14 As described in Section 1.8, the rational actor account deals with this argument by 
redefining ‗self-interest‘ such that the primacy of any particular goal is revealed as the 
self-interested preference of the individual.  Even pursuing the perceived good of one‘s 
community through suicide bombing can be incorporated into the utilitarian calculus using 
this circular argument. 
66 
 
This chapter has five parts: 
 “Background to pluralist approaches” contrasts some of the underlying 
assumptions behind utilitarian and pluralist approaches, and introduces 
some of the social psychological literature proposing plural rationalities 
 “Cultural Theory” provides an outline of the theory as well as criticisms of 
the theory, and an account of recent developments and applications.  This 
is followed by a review of how Thompson, Rayner and others have used the 
theory to analyse the climate change debate 
 “Relational Models Theory” provides an outline of Alan Fiske‘s theory, and 
examines existing criticism of the theory as well as making some new 
criticisms.  The section notes how the theory has been applied to date and 
justifies using the theory to give an account of societal level phenomena. 
 “Detailed Mechanics” suggests that similarities between the two theories 
prompt similar questions.  How do other cognitive and social processes 
relate to those that the two theories hypothesise?  Cultural Theory 
proposes a 2x2 dimensional matrix structure to generate its four 
‗worldviews‘ while Relational Models Theory proposes four independent 
unipolar categories, but is the structure of either of them satisfactory 
when attempts are made to map them onto real life variety? 
 Conclusion establishes the research questions raised by the challenges 
observed in Chapter 1 and the review of the literature in chapter 2.  The 
conclusion also claims that the four models of Relational Models Theory 
offer a better analysis of the climate change debate than Cultural Theory‘s 
use of worldviews. 
2.1 Background to pluralist approaches 
2.1.1 Is economic progress the progenitor of environmental concern? 
Section 1.6.3 explained that Inglehart‘s Maslowian analysis suggests modern 
environmental concern is largely a luxury enabled by freedom from material want 
(Inglehart, 1990).  In the logic of classical economics this can be accounted for by 
arguing that, in a time of material plenty, ‗quality‘ of life is the scarce 
commodity.  Increased spending on holidays, leisure and aesthetic objects reveal 
this new preference, and Damien Hirst makes millions while over-producing dairy 
farmers are left pleading with their supermarket customers. 
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Yet this account of concern for the environment seems to ignore centuries, even 
millennia, of folk-lore celebrating the sanctity of the land or the transcending 
bond of kinship or tribal affiliation.  A society that gives primacy to either of these 
values will experience normative imperatives for behaviour apparently irreducible 
to a simple utilitarian calculus.  Respect for the land and nature is a logical 
response to being at the mercy of the seasons and the experience of material 
insecurity; indeed, fruitless striving for a security that could not, maybe cannot, 
be obtained could be regarded as maladaptive.  It is only because modern society 
has given primacy to material security, perhaps because it now appears 
attainable, that environmental concern has come to be regarded as the 
fashionable whim of a spoilt and capricious public.   Downs tartly titled his article 
arguing precisely this 'Up and down with ecology: the issue attention cycle' (1972).  
2.1.2 Or has there always been environmental concern? 
The progressive confidence of materialism treats the modern conditions giving rise 
to environmental concern today as new and different.  By contrast, pluralist 
approaches often start by looking at the universal concerns of human existence.  
They argue that there are a number of basic challenges human beings have to face 
at all stages of history, and that there are likely to be a number of basic ways in 
which such problems can be faced.  This is well expressed by Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck (1961, p. 10): 
―First it is assumed that there is a limited number of common human problems 
for which all peoples at all times must find some solutions.  This is the universal 
aspect of value orientations because the human problems to be treated arise 
inevitably out of the human situation.  The second assumption is that while there 
is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither limitless nor random 
but is definitely variable within a range of possible solutions.‖ [italics in orig] 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961, p. 12) go on to provide a taxonomy of values, 
listing 5 distinct domains in which values orientate people‘s thought and 
behaviour:   
i. Human nature – is it evil, good or neutral, is it fixed or mutable? 
ii. Man‘s relationship with nature, 
iii. Time, 
iv. Activity – ‗being‘, ‗being-in-becoming‘ or doing 
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v. Social relationships 
For the purpose of this enquiry into the origins of environmental concern (domain 
(ii) above), they hypothesise three alternative orientations, with Man either 
subjugated to nature, in harmony with nature or the master over nature.  As they 
note, mastery over nature is the dominant value orientation within this domain for 
modern Americans. 
Fundamental to the pluralist approach is the assertion that modern materialism, 
and its assumptions about humanity‘s relationship with nature, is only one possible 
human value orientation. 
2.1.3 Some other plural value theories 
Both Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck‘s postulation of five distinct domains of 
orientation, and their belief that individuals‘ value orientations vary according to 
context and role contrasts with two more recent and influential value taxonomies 
(Tsirogianni, 2009).  Rokeach (1973) hypothesised 18 x 2 distinct values, while 
Schwartz (1994) proposed ten.  Both build taxonomies that rely on psychometric 
methodologies; although both address the process of change, the necessary 
presumption that a snap-shot psychometric profile gives a picture of the 
individual‘s enduring values inevitably emphasises the static rather than dynamic.  
Rokeach quite reasonably asserts from the outset that it is part of the essence of a 
‗value‘ that it is enduring while not completely stable (1973, pp. 5-6). 
Rokeach‘s aim was to provide a definitive, objective account of values and value 
systems.  He explicitly distinguished his concept of value from Kluckhon & 
Strodtbeck‘s because of their separation of values into five separate dimensions.  
For Rokeach ―The notion of value system, in contrast, implies a rank ordering of 
terminal or instrumental values along a single continuum‖ (1973, p. 22).  On this 
view, having a ‗system‘ precludes the possibility of incommensurability, since the 
purpose of the individual having a system is to resolve possible conflicts. 
Schwartz explicitly sought to reveal an underlying structure to human values.  He 
proposed a continuous ‗circumplex‘ of ten values, with the ten grouped within 
two bipolar dimensions (Openness to change versus Conservation; Self-
enhancement versus Self-Transcendence). Like Kluckhon and Strodtbeck, Schwartz 
starts from observing universal human needs (biological, social interaction and 
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group cohesion) and recognises that fundamental to any scheme of values is the 
inevitable competition between incompatible objectives.  However, the focus on 
an individual‘s values guiding their behaviour emphasies self-actualisation and 
relationships between the individual self and other people.  The human 
relationship with the physical and temporal world appears subsidiary to an 
understanding of values as modes of agency and self-expression.  Schwartz also 
presents the circumplex as a continuum.  A typical individual can be mapped onto 
the circumplex with a scatterplot of value scores, implying that these can be 
averaged to locate the individual in some part of the diagram.  This could not be 
done in a scheme which takes plural values as disjunctive and incommensurable.   
As a consequence, Schwartz‘s system can still be reconciled to an overall 
modernist materialism.  End-values of transcendence or harmony with nature may 
compete with values of self-enhancement, but could still be explained as revealed 
preferences within individual utility.   
The desire to pinpoint the individual‘s belief system inevitably underplays three 
factors: 
 The role of long term social context in stimulating alternative values or 
priorities: in affluent societies environmental concern rises (Inglehart, 
1990) 
 The role of short term social context: it does seem likely that individuals 
willingly live out different values in different situations (Tsirogianni, 2009) 
 The relationship with the physical environment: the emphasis on the ‗self‘ 
tends to treat the ‗other‘ as social, and constraints upon the self as social.  
Environmental values are characterised as the self positively seeking 
harmony with the physical world, but the physical world can be 
experienced as ‗other‘ too.  The issue of climate change may return us to 
experiencing the physical world as constraining.   For all the cross-cultural 
studies, Schwartz‘ circumplex feels too contemporary to capture such a 
shift. 
2.1.4 Plural Rationalities and Heuristic Reasoning 
The utilitarian calculus is a key element of materialism.  As shown above in 2.1.1 
the calculus can provide a backward looking analysis using revealed preference to 
subsume other values.  Typically, alternative forms of decision-making are treated 
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as biases (Kahneman, et al., 1982, see section 1.5.2), or deviations from rational 
logic.  On this account, short-cut heuristic reasoning is used when there is 
insufficient information or time to complete a full utilitarian calculus. 
It is possible to view heuristic reasoning differently.  Rather than treating 
heuristics as deficient from an ideal rationality, this approach also embraces 
plurality.  It follows the same logic as Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck by arguing that 
recurrent problems may have given rise to ‗fast and frugal heuristics‘, thinking 
tools that facilitate people‘s ability to tackle problems in real time when a 
ponderous calculation of utilities is impossible (Gigerenzer, 2008).  Just as 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck proposed a set of discrete value orientations that are 
not reducible to each other, Gigerenzer suggests a toolbox of multiple but 
discrete tools that equip people to deal differently with recurrent but different 
situations. 
This thesis will not address an important question: are these two pluralities, 
alternative methods of reasoning and alternative end values, different?   A 
plurality of values can provide different ‗base currencies‘ (ie not just utility) but 
the methods of reasoning how to achieve the divergent values can be the same 
between values.  Multiple heuristics are different cognitive processes – critically 
they are not trying to achieve a best guess at the answer a utilitarian calculus 
would produce.  They perform an analysis by their own rules.  Yet in many ways 
‗values‘ perform the function of heuristics, guiding real-time decision making.  
Determining whether ‗values‘ operate cognitively as heuristics is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
2.1.5 Cultural Theory and Relational Models Theory   
Both Cultural Theory and Relational Models Theory follow Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck‘s lead in proposing a limited number of solutions to recurrent human 
problems (Fiske, 1992; Mamadouh, 1999).  Each originates from anthropological 
observation that prompted a desire to map the universals common to social 
relationships in any society or culture. 
The contrasting origins of pluralist and materialist accounts predetermine their 
approach to accounting for the arguments that societies have over contested 
knowledge such as risk assessment.  The pluralist account argues that different 
situations or environments call for different human responses, which implies that 
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the environment determines which human response is the appropriate one.  The 
materialist presumes that human agents are seeking to control as best they can 
their circumstances: seen from the subjective perspective, the agent is always 
trying to optimise the utilitarian calculus.  Faced with famine or storm, blaming 
the gods is mere superstition not an alternative rationality; what you need is a 
cool head to regain mastery over the environment and your own fate.  For the 
materialist, the only real social problem is restraint on freedom of action, either 
self-imposed by the agent‘s own lack of aspiration, or imposed by others. 
2.2 Cultural Theory (“CT”) 
2.2.1 There are different versions of Cultural Theory 
Before outlining Cultural Theory (―CT‖) it is necessary to warn that there are 
different versions of the theory (Douglas, 1999; Mamadouh, 1999) .  Like other 
pluralist accounts, the theory proposes a typology of social relationships and 
associated values, but different versions claim four or five different ‗types‘, while 
application of the theory to specific social dilemmas tends to focus on the role of 
only three of the types.  Different theorists also assert a hard version, in which 
the typology is claimed to be exhaustive.  Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990, 
hereinafter referred to as 'TEW') set out this hard version very clearly.  The soft 
version makes less grand claims advocating the typology as a parsimonious 
capturing of the most influential and enduring ‗types‘ (Douglas, 1999). 
The theory‘s originator, Mary Douglas, made very clear that she was explaining 
how societies behave and argue.  She was not providing an analysis of individual 
cognition, so it is generally recognised that the theory applies at the social level 
(Renn, 1992).  Yet several researchers have used the theory to carry out 
psychometric surveys that explore the extent to which an individual‘s adherence 
to one or other of the different cultural ‗types‘ or so-called ‗worldviews‘ might 
affect attitudinal and behavioural dependent variables (Dake & Thompson, 1999; 
Kahan et al., 2007).  Inevitably all cultural theorists resort to illustrating the 
social level typology with individual level ‗vignettes‘ (Douglas, 1999; TEW). 
These differences are important.  Douglas‘s soft version is hugely influential 
(Milton, 1996, Ch3).  Most of the criticism of CT is actually directed at the hard 
version.  The criticism also exploits this apparent confusion over which level of 
explanation the theory is operating at, individual or societal. 
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2.2.2 Brief outline of Cultural Theory 
Cultural Theory hypothesises two bi-polar dimensions, high/low ‗Grid‘ and 
high/low ‗Group‘.  When these interact they provide 4 possible relational types, 
together with a possible 5th null or disengaged type (Mamadouh, 1999).   The Grid 
concept represents the extent to which an individual is bound by predetermined 
rules and the extent to which social roles are pre-defined.  When social roles are 
sharply defined and separate, this is ‗high Grid‘.  Where social roles are 
interchangeable and fluid this is ‗low Grid‘.  The Group concept ‗refers to the 
extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units‘ (TEW p5).  
Douglas herself (1982b, p. 3) refers to Group as a measure of ‗commitment‘ or 
‗allegiance‘ to a group. Thus in a ‗high Group‘ society individuals are absorbed 
into and nurtured by the group; their identity is largely that of membership of a 
group.  In a ‗low Group‘ society individuals define themselves independent of 
group membership. 
Combining these two dimensions produces a 2x2 typology (Douglas, 1982a; 
Mamadouh, 1999).  For example, a ‗high Grid‘ and ‗high Group‘ society is typed as 
a ‗hierarchical‘ society, in which members know their roles and status and see 
these as fixed.  They also rely on the community, and their certainty as to their 
place within it, for their well-being and identity.  The different types are 
described as cosmologies (Douglas, 1982a, throughout), 'ways of life' (TEW, 
Verweij et al., 2006), ‗social solidarities‘ (Thompson & Rayner, 1998), 
‗worldviews‘ (Gaskell & Allum, 2001) or even ‗ways of organising‘ (Thompson, 
2008 Ch 5).  This trouble with naming the types derives from the fact that the 
types both describe how a society is organised and how the prevailing ideology 
deems society should be organised.  Douglas‘s central argument is that how a 
society is organised determines how its members think it should be organised 
(Douglas, 1999).  She goes further, to argue that the function of the society‘s 
dominant worldview is to reinforce the prevailing form of organisation (Douglas, 
1982a; Douglas & Isherwood, 1996). 
 
The 2x2 formulation begs for illustration which is provided typically in the form 
below (e.g. Douglas, 1982b, p. 4; Mamadouh, 1999, p. 399; Thompson & Ellis, 
1997, p. 3).  Each box contains one of the four worldviews and its place in the 2x2 
grid/group matrix: 
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Fatalist Hierarchist/Bureaucrat
High Grid, Low Group High Grid, High Group
Nature capricious Nature perverse/tolerant
 
Individualist/Entrepreneur Egalitarian
Low Grid, Low Group Low Grid, High Group
Nature benign Nature ephemeral
 
 
  Figure 2-1: Cultural Theory 2x2 illustration 
Subsequent versions of the 2x2 map frequently incorporate four different ‗myths 
of nature‘ nature as included above (e.g. TEW Ch 1, Gaskell & Allum, 2001).  
Thompson derived these from the work of ecologists such as C S Holling who had 
developed a taxonomy of different ways of conceptualising nature (Holling, 1986, 
TEW p.23)15.  This emphasis on the interpretation of nature and man‘s relationship 
with it dovetailed with the early application of Cultural Theory to the societal 
interpretation of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  The combination encouraged 
the application of CT to the analysis of environmental risks as well as to the 
interactions between economic and technological development and the natural 
world (e.g. seat belts, Adams, 1995; water resource management, Gyawali, 1999; 
climate change, Rayner & Malone, 1998; nuclear power, Thompson, 1982). 
Expanding on the ‗myths‘ of nature: 
 top left, nature capricious, takes the fatalist view that human activity is 
unlikely to make much difference to nature but that natural events could 
easily affect humanity. 
 bottom left, nature benign, takes the view that nature can cope with 
whatever man throws at it, and man should continue the Promethean 
scientific project through trial and error experimentation. 
                                            
15 Holling (1979) observes that mankind needs myths to deal with uncertainty.  With the 
environment the empirical method of exploring uncertainty by trial-and-error 
experimentation is often too risky. 
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 bottom right, nature ephemeral, sees nature as fragile and at risk from 
human activity, mandating the precautionary principle. 
 top right, nature perverse/tolerant, emphasises that while nature is there 
to be enjoyed there are limits to what nature can put up with from 
humans, requiring the authorities to identify those limits through science 
and then regulate human activity to stay within those limits. 
  As indicated above, and discussed below at 2.2.4.1, the argument that connects 
each worldview to a specific myth of nature is functionalist: the worldview needs 
to take the relevant view of nature to maintain its preferred social order.   
2.2.3 Some complications to the outline of Cultural Theory 
From the outset Thompson‘s (1982) own exposition adds a third dimension and a 
fifth way of life or type.  This third dimension seeks to measure the degree of 
engagement with the world; the fifth way of life is that of the disengaged or 
autonomous hermit.  Throughout his writing Thompson (e.g. 1982, 2008) makes 
extensive use of topology to explore how the dimensions combine with each other, 
how the ways of life relate to one another and how changes in worldview come 
about.  Thompson‘s more complex framework has never caught on, even though it 
gets to grips with the charge that Cultural theory grossly oversimplifies how we 
make sense of the world (Renn, 1992).  Mary Douglas herself (1982a, Part 1, 
Introduction on Method) admires the ingenuity of Thompson‘s approach: but Grid-
Group was originally conceived as an analytical tool (Mamadouh, 1999) and the 
parsimonious simplicity (Douglas, 1999) of the 2x2 matrix is what seduces and is 
what has influenced more generalist writers (e.g. Hulme, 2009; Mulgan, 2007). 
The strongest, and most provocative, claim of CT is that the five ways of life (if 
one includes the disengaged way of life) represent the only ―viable‖ ways 
available to societies (TEW p84).   Unfortunately CT undermines the confidence of 
this claim because there is not just blurring at the edges of the framework but 
also uncertainty over its core structure.  In one of the early versions,  Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982) compress the types to two, the ‗centre‘, located in the Western 
world on the individualist-hierarchist axis, and the ‗border‘.  Much of the later 
work on institutions and policy-making explicitly excludes the fatalist way of life 
as having no impact on policy, effectively reducing the typology Cultural Theorists 
use to three (Thompson, 2008, p. 19; Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 285; Verweij, 
et al., 2006, p. 8).  Uncertainty over the status of the disengaged way of life or 
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worldview – is it ‗a way of life‘ or something different; how does it relate to the 
‗Group‘ and ‗Grid‘ dimensions? – further clouds the picture.  Attempts to integrate 
other typologies are also imperfect: Thompson‘s myths of nature, and their 
topological illustrations (TEW Ch 4), do not in fact match Holling‘s original 
formulation which has no equivalent of ‗nature capricious‘ (Holling, 1979)16. 
The lay concept of a ‗worldview‘, namely a coherent cluster of beliefs through 
which an individual or society makes sense of the surrounding social and physical 
world and builds the principles by which life should be led, represents the heart of 
CT.  The social context is what conditions how the individual learns to make sense 
of the world (Douglas, 1982b).  Inevitably this process is recursive.  The social 
context moulds prevailing worldviews, and worldviews construct the social world.  
The functionalism is also reflexive, the dominant worldview helps members who 
embrace it thrive in a particular society, and so maintains the prevailing order.  
CT, in typical anthropological style, seeks to unpick these constructions.   This 
approach is evident in Douglas & Wildavsky‘s account of Risk (1982).  For them 
societies do not encounter objective risks to which they respond.  Societies select 
those potential dangers that they are going to be concerned about and deem 
these to be risks that should be managed (Rayner, 1992).  Risks do not correpond 
to exact probabilities of dangerous occurences in the physical world.  The function 
of risk selection is to reinforce the prevailing cultural order (TEW p63).  The 
approach is also applied to consumerism (Douglas & Isherwood, 1996) to show how 
societies endow consumer goods with meaning.  Societies‘ choices as to what is of 
value and what is not also serve to reinforce the prevailing cultural order.  This 
formulation of cultural reproduction with its Marxist overtones encourages 
criticism.   Less provocative would be to argue that societies interpret and engage 
with the flow of contingent events in ways that do not undermine themselves.  
The need for coherence motivates at the social level as well as the individual 
level, and for both will sometimes trump the need for correspondence. 
If society continually reproduces itself, then how does change occur?  Cultural 
Theory has constantly wrestled with balancing its apparently determinist account 
of a static society against our experience of dynamic social change and the desire 
to incorporate free individual agency in any theory.  This point is addressed below 
at 2.2.4.2.   
                                            
16 Holling‘s list is Benign Nature, Ephemeral Nature, Perverse/tolerant Nature and 
Resilient Nature (p97). 
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2.2.4 Basic Criticisms 
It is unfortunate that in providing illustrations CT laid itself open to the accusation 
of rigid stereotyping (e.g. Boholm, 1996; and see Rayner, 1992) and 
oversimplification (e.g. Renn, 1992).  In early expositions of CT, the 4 types are 
illustrated by prototypical individuals (e.g. TEW Ch1 pp5-11).   This frequently 
leads to circular, or vacuous, accounts (Boholm, 1996; Jackson, et al., 2004) – e.g. 
the high-caste hindu is cited as a typical hierarchist because he lives in a caste-
based society.  
2.2.4.1 Basic Criticism - tautology 
This criticism is unfair.  Boholm (1996) claims that cultural theory is essentially 
tautological, that its conclusions are entailed in its premises.  This fails to 
understand one of the great strengths of Cultural Theory, its exposition of the 
links in argumentation between fundamental value premises and applied policies.  
It is not tautological to unpack the many ways in which someone committed to a 
hierarchical social order ‗thinks‘ hierarchically.  Boholm complains: ―People of 
culture A habitually do X because they share this culture A that prescribes that 
they do X.  Observations of behaviour are used inductively to extrapolate features 
of culture, features that are then used to explain the very same behaviour that 
was used to formulate the theory‖ p72.  Yet this manner of explanation is a 
necessary consequence of TEW‘s theory that there is a closed system – it is 
necessarily circular.  TEW‘s mistake is not in their logic but their tendency to 
ignore the context surrounding the closed system.  This is particularly evident in 
their metaphor of society as a flock of starlings (TEW Ch 5): this is used to 
illustrate the way that the unstable tensions between the different worldviews 
engender change.  Change is theorised to come from within the system itself 
simply because it is unstable, more than because the system is surprised and 
challenged by interactions with its surrounding social and physical environment.   
Boholm acknowledges that other cultural theorists such as Rayner suggest a much 
more fluid story, in which ―the person is portrayed as a mosaic of ways of life, 
each enacted in its proper context‖ (Boholm, 1996, p. 77).   This more nuanced 
version feels more realistic, but it does then prompt the second order question of 
how context and ‗way of life‘ or worldview interact, beyond recognising simply 
that they do.  If CT‘s central thesis is that ‗worldview‘ constructs the social 
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context, and vice-versa, the dynamic account has to allow space for some parts of 
the social context to emerge unconstructed by the dominant worldview. 
TEW make no bones about the fact that their theory is a functionalist one, using 
forms of explanation ―in which the consequences of some behaviour or social 
arrangement are essential elements of the causes of that behaviour‖, (TEW p2), 
quoting Arthur Stinchcombe.  Boholm, like many others, takes for granted that 
any functionalist approach is flawed (Boholm, 1996, p. 79).  This dismissal is 
unhelpful.  It is reasonable to argue that natural and social phenomena persist in 
the form they have ‗because this form works‘, but only provided a detailed 
account of how it works is provided.  The same objection of tautology was raised 
by Popper against adaptationist analysis in biology – the fittest are fittest because 
they survive (Curd & Cover, 1998 Ch 1); and the same objection can be rejected 
provided an adequate account is given of how the fitness does fit the environment 
successfully, and, better still, an adequate account of the mechanisms whereby 
this is achieved, just as Mendelian genetics suggested mechanisms whereby 
selection might be effected. 
CT falls short of providing this much substance to its analysis of social phenomena, 
but functionalism per se is not a reason for rejecting it.  Typically, (e.g. Verweij & 
Thompson, 2006) the 2x2 framework provides a tool to structure rich descriptions 
of how different groups within societies tackle significant problems.  
Nevertheless, the reasoning is still circular, even if rich and ‗unpacked‘.  Such 
theories really only move from ‗thick description‘ to ‗satisfactory‘ explanation 
when some plausible account of the original cause of phenomena – either in the 
social or biological field – is given.  TEW‘s reliance on social construction within a 
closed system precludes this. 
Lastly, although it is a weak argument to throw criticism back at competing 
theories, 2.1.5. above identifies that this accusation of circular reasoning applies 
equally to the rational actor account.  Revealed preference relies on empirical 
hindsight to argue that societies value what they happen to have chosen in 
preference to alternatives.  Further, the view from the standpoint of individual 
rational agency necessarily believes in human possibility (utility optimisation) and 
opportunity when interacting with the physical world, rather than identifying the 
physical limits oppressing a passive victim.  For CT, this is a clear example of an 
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Individualist worldview, that of the rational individual begat by the Enlightment, 
shaping the social context to sustain itself. 
2.2.4.2  Basic Criticism - determinism 
The theory is also criticised for being deterministic (see Douglas, 1999; Milton, 
1996, p. 97; Rayner, 1992, p. 106), a charge which TEW work hard to rebut.  They 
picture social systems as closed but dynamic, with constant tension between the 
different worldviews played out in the public sphere.  Each worldview needs the 
other, and, as later work on policy-making stresses, defines itself in its opposition 
to the other (Douglas, 1999; Thompson, 2008; Thompson & Rayner, 1998).  This 
tension, and an ever-shifting balance between competing worldviews, is essential 
to hold society together.  Despite being closed, any system is necessarily situated 
within a context, most obviously within the physical world.  The constraints 
imposed by the physical world (TEW p25) or a wider social context introduce 
surprise which, if powerful enough, forces a change in worldview (TEW Ch 4).  This 
unpredictable, fluctuating dynamism is very different from the determinism of 
teleological accounts such as that of Marx. 
The role of ‗surprise‘ reflects the influence of ecological interest in ‗surprise‘ 
disturbing states of ecological equilibrium (Clark, 1986; Holling, 1986; Thompson, 
1986).  CT‘s recognition of context, and externally induced change, appears to 
contradict the point made earlier that CT over-emphasises change driven by 
forces endogenous to the closed system derived from its inherent instability.  This 
is an issue of balance.  CT asserts that much of the external world, at least in so 
far as society interacts with it, is socially constructed (TEW Ch 1).  Inevitably such 
a theory stresses the importance of endogenous forces over exogenous forces.   
What is developed, for each worldview, is a coherent body of beliefs that 
aggregate into a worldview formed around the basic architecture for each of the 4 
(or 5) social structures posited by the theory.  As with scientific theory, a 
paradigmatic worldview will only be revised rarely when driven to do so by the 
accumulation of new, surprising or anomalous data (Kuhn, 1996).  This is precisely 
the account provided by CT (Mamadouh, 1999). 
The criticism of determinism exploits the tendency of CT to use individual level 
illustrations when the theory applies at the social level.  At the individual level, it 
seems clear that individuals should be swapping between different worldviews 
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according to different contexts relatively frequently.  At the social level, 
however, we should expect that change in fundamental outlook, and the 
fundamental organisation of society, is only slightly faster than glacial.  A useful 
theory is going to stress the relatively static aspects of any dominant worldview. 
2.2.4.3 Basic Criticism – Reductionist Relativism 
Shrader-Frechette (1991) vigorously attacks Douglas & Wildavsky‘s ―Risk and 
Culture‖ (1982) for taking the view that because culture does influence risk 
perceptions, then there can be no objective bases for risk assessment.  Again, this 
has to be an issue of balance.  For those willing to accept the dualism of some 
objective reality and some socially generated meaning, the balance should be 
struck by pragmatic considerations.  How useful are the assertions made by the 
partisans on either side? 
2.2.4.4 Basic Criticism – Incoherence 
Mamadouh (1999) identifies incoherence as the most important charge against CT.  
Both Jackson et al. (2004) and Boholm (1996, 2003) come close to saying that the 
theory is too muddled to be truly useful. 
The charge stems from three problems that have already been mentioned.  First, 
there are different versions of Cultural Theory – the different typologies with two, 
three, four or five ‗types‘ (2.2.3. above) suggest that the actual number chosen is 
almost arbitrary, which would make absurd TEW‘s absolutist claims for the schema 
they propose.  Second, although Douglas makes very clear that worldviews 
operate at the societal level, the extensive work done by theorists on worldviews 
at the group (organisational) and individual level appears to contradict this.  
Third, CT tries to achieve a balance between a static and a dynamic account of 
society and between change engendered by endogenous and by exogenous forces.  
Frequently, an over-emphasis on one of these appears to contradict those 
occasions where theorists have stressed the opposite aspect. 
2.2.4.5 Basic criticisms –the source of the problem 
Verweij (2007) puts his finger on the source of much of the criticism of Cultural 
Theory.  CT is explicitly trying to go beyond, or perhaps between, the dualism of 
the individual and the collective.  Most rival approaches are committed to the 
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primacy of one or the other.  CT tries to establish a middle way that synthesises 
the two.  This has important methodological consequences, since it identifies the 
‗worldview‘ as the unit of analysis, not individual cognitions (attitudes available 
for psychometric testing), nor institutions and organisations.  As many have found, 
trying to steer a middle course between well-established antagonists tends to 
provoke both.  It does not help to tell them they have been fighting the wrong 
battle all along. 
When treated like this, the ‗worldviews‘ have similarities with Social 
Representations (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).  Both are present at the level of 
individual cognition and at the level of social interaction.  Both are argued to have 
a powerful coercive force upon individuals.  Both, offered as a unit of analysis, 
suggest a way around the dualism of the individual and the collective.  CT could 
only be synthesised with Social Representation Theory (SRT) by arguing that the 
worldviews drew together coherent clusters of representations.  SRT typically 
looks at the dynamic on-going generation of representations amongst communities 
and individuals confronted with new objects of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2007): 
CT, as shown above, pictures a more static communal shaping and interpretation 
of information. 
2.2.5 Methodological issues 
Section 2.2.4. encapsulates how frustrating Cultural Theory is to work with.  On 
the one hand, the broad idea of the interconnection between how a society is 
organised and the prevailing worldviews, even ideologies, within that society is 
powerful.  Further, the four, or five, worldviews posited by the theory‘s taxonomy 
do indeed seem to capture the essence of the core worldviews available in most 
societies.  Yet it is hard to know how best to operationalise the theory or to test 
it. 
Gross and Rayner (1985) recognised this challenge.  They felt that Douglas‘ 
reliance on ‗ethnographic and literary sources‘ (p16) did not adequately address 
their desire to make Grid/Group theory really useful; ―One wants to know exactly 
what kinds of observable social behaviour indicate either grid or group 
constraints, and how grid and group constraints can be definitively distinguished‖ 
(p16).  They proceeded to construct a fictitious case study to look at local 
attitudes towards a nuclear reactor in a putative New England town.  In this they 
show at length how documenting – enumerating and categorising – types of 
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behaviour could provide quantitative data with which to map the presence of Grid 
and Group within the sub-cultures or groups present within the town.  It is 
surprising that this fictitious exercise has not drawn more scorn from CT‘s critics, 
since it seems to encapsulate CT‘s fondness for stereotypes, for distilled theory 
over granular reality.  Suffice to say, no one has implemented the proposed 
‗paradigm‘ in a case study. 
Mary Douglas herself understood the problem.  Her introduction to Gross and 
Rayner‘s book (Douglas, 1985) stresses that what is measured is relationships and 
differences of opinion, not individual attitudes.  In spite of this CT researchers 
have used psychometric attitude surveys (Dake & Thompson, 1993; Kahan, et al., 
2007): CT‘s use of individual stereotypes emphasises CT‘s assertion that dominant 
worldviews in a society do indeed manifest themselves in individual sense-making. 
Tansey & O‘Riordan (1999) claim that for Douglas, Cultural Theory itself 
represents a rejection of the presumption of methodological individualism: but 
Douglas is actually wishing to have the best of both worlds (Douglas, 1997).  She 
hopes to marry societal level evidence, such as case studies, with individual level 
data that demonstrates the impact of societal worldviews at the level of 
individual cognition and inter-individual interaction.  The trouble is twofold: first, 
evidence for CT at individual level is weak (Jackson, et al., 2004; Marris, 
Langford, & O'Riordan, 1998; Rayner, 1992); second, the hegemony of 
methodological individualism specifically acts to depoliticise risk even as Cultural 
Theory tries stresses that all risk is political.  Douglas recognises the strengths of 
the risk research that relies on psychometric data, typically individual attitude 
surveys (Slovic, 1992), because much of this can be construed as consistent with 
her view that social forces significantly impact risk assessment.  Equally, however, 
the psychometric data can be construed as saying that individual attitudes to risk 
are distorted by those social forces, justifying an emphasis on expert calibration 
of ‗objective‘ risks (Douglas, 1997). 
2.2.6 Recent research directions 
It can be seen, then, that CT finds itself in the middle of a conventional contest 
between a constructivist outlook and a positivist one, with criticism from both 
sides.  Unfortunately, CT researchers tend to be drawn to define their work 
according to this conventional boundary.   For the constructivists, the richness of 
the insights provided by the analysis justifies the approach.  For the positivists, 
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empirical data suggest that ‗worldviews‘ have limited predictive power for 
individual attitudes and behaviour. 
The result has been a divergence in the development of the theory.  Down one 
route researchers have sought to improve the empirical results and have found a 
more fruitful way of using the theory to predict individual attitudes (Braman, 
Kahan, & Grimmelmann, 2005; Kahan, et al., 2007).  These authors treat Grid and 
Group and the four worldviews in a similar way to deep lying values in attitude 
models.  Like PC Stern‘s VBN model outlined in Chapter 1, they are proposing 
alternative underlying cognitive variables of ‗Grid‘ and ‗Group‘ values and argue 
that these have predictive power17A.  This approach accepts the hegemony of 
positivism:  Douglas (1985) noted that one response to this hegemony would 
essentially be if you can‘t beat them join them. 
Down the other path the constructivist approach has been emphasised to provide 
rich accounts of institutional behaviour and policy-making. 
This latter approach is more obviously within the mainstream tradition of 
Douglas‘s ideas and anthropological research.  Douglas‘ disciples commonly 
published their work alongside a paper or a short introduction by Douglas herself, 
and almost up to her death proponents of this approach continued to collaborate 
with her (e.g. Verweij, et al., 2006).  They abandoned the early accounts that 
appeared to lock individuals into worldviews that were hard to shift: at the 
individual level the idea of rigid or static worldviews clearly flies in the face of 
the common sense experience that most individuals can marshal each of the 
worldviews but may probably be predisposed to access one more than the others 
according to context18.  Instead, the focus on the policy making process, backed 
by good historical data, has been used to provide more compelling arguments that 
CT can illuminate our understanding of the policy-making process at the social 
level (e.g. Adams, 1995 Chs 7 & 8; Gyawali, 2006; Prins & Rayner, 2007b).  This 
work argues that the plural worldviews present in society need to be reflected in 
                                            
17 Endnotes, denoted by letters, are found starting on page 430. 
18 The early exposition of CT fully acknowledged that individuals accessed multiple 
worldviews according to context, TEW (p265ff) has a short section towards the end 
entitled ―The Multiple Self‖ which recognises exactly this.  Yet it reads as an afterthought 
to the main thrust of their argument.  A theory whose roots lie in the study of traditional 
societies inevitably emphasised rigidity and constraint upon individual thought and action.    
Certainly most readers (e.g. Fiske, 1992, p. 715) take CT‘s social constructionism to be 
fairly rigid: ie the political structures in a particular society determine how members 
frame their social relationships mentally. 
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institutions, providing what are called ‗Clumsy solutions for a complex world‘ the 
title of Verweij & Thompson‘s book (2006). 
2.2.7 Analyses of climate change policy-making 
Rayner & Malone‘s 4 volume ‗Human Choice & Climate Change‖ (1998) represents 
a sustained use of the CT approach to analyse the climate change debate.   
Although they do not yet use the term ‗clumsy solutions‘, the 1998 study 
advocates the same philosophy that policy should be shaped to respond to 
multiple worldviews.  In their joint chapter, Thompson & Rayner (1998) elaborate 
the way in which three of the worldviews construct arguments about the threat of 
anthropogenic global warming (AGW), and in particular the policy preferences 
that flow from each worldview.  They explicitly omit the fatalist (p285) and 
hermetic worldviews since, although motivated differently, neither engages 
actively in policy discussions: this omission will be returned to later in the thesis. 
What their analysis does is to show the logic that connects policy preferences with 
fundamental worldviews.  They are able to summarise these in the following 
matrix (from pages 327 and 329): 
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  Market 
(Individualist) 
Hierarchical Egalitarian 
Myth of nature p284 Benign Perverse/tolerant Ephemeral 
Diagnosis of AGW p294 Pricing PopulationB Profligacy 
Policy bias p294ffC Libertarian Contractarian Egalitarian 
Distribution p318D Priority Proportionality Parity 
Consent p320 Revealed Hypothetical Explicit 
Liability p318 Loss spreading Deep pocket Strict fault 
Intergen responsibility Weak Balanced Strong 
... ie Present>future Present=future Future>present 
Discounting Diverse/high Tech standard Zero/-ve 
Time perceptionE Short term Long term Compressed 
Risk management19 F Proof required Regulatory 
Balance 
Precautionary 
 
Figure 2-2: Cultural Theory: Matrix of Climate Change policy preferences 
Thompson & Rayner‘s account (1998) builds on this matrix by providing illustrative 
explanations of a number of the proposed logical connections between the policy 
preferences and the underlying worldview.  Rather than explain each entry in the 
matrix individually, some examples of how the matrix can be used are given 
below: 
Those committed to a market-based interpretation of relationships typically 
require a high burden of proof that a risk will, rather than might, materialise 
before acting upon it; they prioritise present generations over future and they 
expect future losses to be shared rather than allocated according to historic fault 
(Beckerman, 2003 Ch 5 & 7; Lawson, 2008 Ch 7). 
By contrast egalitarians take a precautionary approach to protect against risks 
that may materialise; they prioritise future generations over the present and they 
expect losses to be attributed to those that generated them - in other words the 
developed world owes the developing world.  Most of the environmental 
movement analyses climate change in this way (e.g. Juniper, 2008), and indeed 
the UN‘s own analysis embodies this approach (United Nations Development 
Programme & Leiserowitz, 2007, pp. 39-46). 
                                            
19 This is an addition to their list. This, and various differences between the above and 
Fiske‘s own (1992) matrix are discussed in the Endnotes. 
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 So-called ‗hierarchists‘ focus on mending the deficiencies of the prevailing 
order so that it can be preserved.  Thus Nicholas‘s Stern‘s diagnosis of 
‗market failure‘ rejects individualist calls to adapt as and when the 
problem materialises (Stern, 2007).  This leads to proposals to remedy the 
failure while preserving global free markets: it explicitly rejects egalitarian 
proposals to reduce consumption and rein back economic growth.  It places 
great faith in the IPCC experts and the established organisations like the 
UN, while looking to the deep pockets of the developed world to shoulder 
the burden.  This worldview takes a long term stewardship perspective, 
and advocates discounting mitigation costs by a technical method designed 
to support a long term view, hence the extensive debate over Stern‘s 
discount rate (Atkinson et al., 2009; Beckerman & Hepburn, 2007; Yohe & 
Tol, 2008). 
Some of the entries in the matrix are less than obvious and are open to challenge: 
these are discussed further in the endnotes. 
A consequence of the closed system within which these worldviews operate 
(according to the theory) is that they define themselves in relation to each other.  
Thompson and Rayner‘s analysis is particularly effective in showing how the 
worldviews establish their more specific attitudes and detailed preferences in 
‗contradistinction‘ to each other, and Douglas (1999) herself emphasised how 
important this element of the more developed theory is.  Worldviews, like 
ideologies, are developed as an argument with alternative points of view. 
CT‘s analysis is powerful, developed in some detail, and persuasive.  By making 
the worldview the unit of analysis Thompson and Rayner (1998, p. 333) can 
develop coherent clusters of beliefs gathered around each worldview as they do in 
the matrix above.  What remains problematic when embracing a pluralist 
perspective is that it is difficult to become a policy advocate.  Rather like the 
theory‘s own hermit, standing on the sidelines observing the contest between the 
antagonists, the realism implied by accepting as valid competing worldviews re-
inforces the status quo, which is to take little action.  A similar problem is faced 
by other critics of the monolithic UNFCCC framework such as Victor (2004): 
realistically we can only expect gradual change; pluralism‘s tolerance of 
competing viewpoints vindicates ‗clumsy‘ gradualism (Prins & Rayner, 2007a, 
2007b), but how do you overthrow gradualism if it simply will not be fast enough?  
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CT‘s determinism justifies the pessimism of those who judge that humanity is 
incapable of meeting this challenge (Gray, 2002, 2006). 
CT‘s focus on the internal logic of the worldview often leads the theory to neglect 
external context, as noted above. CT's focus on the internal logic of each 
worldview, and the positioning of each worldview in contradistinction to each 
other, encourages a socially constructivist understanding of social change and 
neglects the possibility that outside forces may well engender change.  It is as if in 
a nation with liberal and conservative factions, the actions of the two factions will 
be the only factors that drive change, when in reality activity in outside countries, 
or natural changes in the physical world, will both play their part too.  Thompson 
and Rayner retain the TEW formulation of a closed system sustained by constant 
dynamic interaction between the different worldviews: ―which means that 
instability and conflict are inherent to the framework, as they are in real life, and 
do not require the action of an exogenous agent for changes in social organisation 
or the values that support it.‖ (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 328) It is more 
comfortable to hope that we can voluntarily prevent major climate change than to 
anticipate that we will have to respond to extreme weather events and to adapt 
to major long term changes, and that only such external shocks will force mankind 
into significant change. But the conclusion flies in the face of basic behavioural 
science and in the face of reality, as well as in the face of CT‘s own use of the 
notion of surprise (2.2.4.1 and 2.2.4.2 above):  Hurricane Katrina had a role in 
shifting US attitudes to climate change (for example a US think tank‘s report on 
the ―foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global climate Change‖ 
regularly refers to Katrina (Center for a New American Security, 2007), and hot 
summers brought global warming to the attention of the US public in the late 
1980‘s (Mazur & Lee, 1993) and Europe in 2003 (Stern, 2007, pp. 16-17 reflects 
this link).  Behavioural science asserts that behaviour will respond to changed 
environmental stimuli: this, after all, is what adaptation means. 
Although mankind has developed techniques to manipulate the environment and 
has developed greater and greater ability to anticipate changes in the 
environment, nevertheless, these advances still leave society as a subset of the 
total physical world, not a separate system closed off from it.  Deductive logic 
enabled Aarhenius to argue for anthropogenic global warming over a hundred 
years ago, but without empirical stimuli such as actually rising temperatures and 
extreme weather events, there would be no human behavioural change.  Even 
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today enhanced scientific predictions combined with actually experienced 
consequences do not appear to constitute sufficient conditions to generate 
change. 
2.2.8    Mainstream use of Cultural Theory 
Cultural Theory is frequently acknowledged within discussions of risk (Hood, 
Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001, Ch1; Renn, 1992; Rosa, 2003), but it is fair to say that 
it has remained marginal.  It gets no mention in most of the mainstream social 
science accounts of the climate change debate (e.g. Giddens, 2009).  There are 
signs that this may be changing, even if only slightly.  Leading UK metereologist 
Mike Hulme (2009) explicitly uses Cultural Theory to develop his view on his title 
problem ‗Why we disagree about climate change‘.  Social theorist and one-time 
labour policy adviser Geoff Mulgan (2007) also sees Cultural Theory‘s pluralist 
insights as essential.  Leading statistician and risk researcher David Spiegelhalter 
also cites the recent research by Dan Kahan‘s group as good evidence of the 
impact of worldviews on risk perception (Spiegelhalter, Pearson, & Short, 2011).   
Cultural theorist Steve Rayner has provided policy advice to the UK government 
(Rayner, 2004): but as mentioned in 2.2.7, a pluralist point of view is good for 
identifying the difficulties in others‘ policy prescriptions but is a difficult platform 
from which to advocate decisive policy oneself. 
In spite of these green shoots of influence, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
some of the problems identified in Cultural Theory above are contributing to this 
lack of meaningful impact.  Section 2.3 now looks at an alternative pluralist 
theory; a synthesis between this and CT could alleviate some of these difficulties. 
2.3 Relational Models Theory 
2.3.1 Outline 
Fiske‘s Relational Models Theory, ―RMT‖, (Fiske, 1992) posits four basic models of 
social relationships.  The theory grew out of Fiske‘s anthropological work in 
Burkina Faso, but Fiske connects each of the four models to a wide range of 
analyses of social relations from Marx to Adorno, from Durkheim to Polanyi and 
many more.  In the 1992 article summarising the theory he traces these 
connections to classic theory for each of the four models before leaping to a bold 
conclusion along the following lines for each: ―The inference is that all of these 
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aspects of social relations exhibit the same form because, in every case, people 
are using a common psychological model‖ (Fiske, 1992, p. 700). 
The four different relational models (―RMs‖) are: 
 Communal sharing:  within a ―CS‖ relationship people treat each other as 
equally entitled members of a shared group.  The needs of the group as a 
whole come first and members are entitled in so far as they are members 
of the group.  People know where they stand by knowing to which group 
they belong. 
 Authority ranking: within an ―AR‖ relationship people associate with each 
other in accordance with a ranked hierarchy.  People know where they 
stand; both in terms of obligations upwards to their superiors and in terms 
of obligations of protection downwards to their inferiors, as well as in 
terms of the obligations of others towards themselves. 
 Equality matching: within an ―EM‖ relationship people require and expect 
to both give and receive exact equivalence in reciprocation.  People take 
turns in games, demand an eye-for-an-eye to compensate for offences, or 
feel obliged to reciprocate dinner invitations at a finely judged interval.  
People know where they stand in relation to whose turn it is. 
 Market Pricing: within an ―MP‖ relationship ―social transactions are 
reckoned as rational calculations of cost and benefit‖ (Haslam, 1995b, p. 
43) between free agents.  What is common in the relationship is the 
accepted use of a common scale such as money to provide comparisons of 
value.  People know where they stand by reference to the scale. 
The four models are essentially models of social exchange.  Fiske (1992, pp. 708-
710)  identifies two additional possible types of interaction between people where 
no proper exchange takes place, ‗Asocial‘ and ‗Null‘: 
 Asocial: when a protagonist is aware of a counterpart‘s sociality but makes 
no commitment to any form of relationship with them. 
 Null: when the protagonist does ―not recognise any shared standards or 
ideals as governing the interaction, any more than one does when stepping 
around a tree‖ (p708). 
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Labels come with baggage attached.  Fiske‘s labels for the four RMs carry plenty 
of preconceived notions, in some cases obscuring the essential elements of the 
model.  To avoid confusion this thesis retains Fiske‘s labels, but later chapters will 
try to unload some of the baggage.  Similarly, lists come in an assigned order.  The 
RMs are always listed in the order CS, AR, EM and MP.  Fiske considers that this 
order follows a developmental path but, like the labels, a rigid order tends to 
obscure some of the links between the RMs.  This thesis will on occasion vary the 
order in which the RMs are presented and analysed. 
2.3.2 Cognition 
Exactly what form of cognition is taking place when an individual applies these 
models to a relationship, or perhaps more accurately to a situation in which social 
relationships play a part?  Haslam, one of Fiske‘s closest collaborators, proposed 
that the application of an RM was an act of categorical representation (Haslam, 
1994).  He contrasted this with what he termed prototypical representation and 
dimensional representation. Dimensional representation refers to cognitively 
placing an instance between two extreme poles.  Prototypical representation 
refers to cognitively comparing instances to a never exactly matched ideal-type: it 
is similar to dimensional representation in that instances lie on a continuum, 
either far or near to the ideal type.  Categorical representation, in principle, is a 
binary belongs/does not belong allocation to a group, tempered by possible 
blurring at the edges in instances of uncertainty. 
Fiske, Haslam and Fiske (1991) asked 24 people to maintain diary records over 7 to 
10 days of occasions when they misremembered people‘s names.  Subjects 
classified the relationships with the people misnamed and the people whose 
names had been erroneously substituted were categorised (by the subjects) 
according to the 4 different relational models.  Out of 115 reported 
misrememberings, 77 held ‗constant the mode of relationship with the two people 
confused‘ (p662).   A further study, reporting 60 misrememberings, was used.  
This produced the same results and was also used to establish that this 
‗concordance‘ in the relationship mode of confused persons was independent of 
confusions based upon gender, race or roles.  A further study of non-verbal actions 
towards others found similarly that subjects mistakenly performed actions towards 
counterparties in the same relationship mode as the intended counterparty. 
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Haslam (1994) asked 50 students to identify 40 relationships they were party to, 
from which 10 were selected for analysis.   Students then ranked these 500 
relationships against 48 7 point likert scale descriptions of the nature of the basis 
of exchange between themselves and each counterparty.  These descriptive 
statements included some  representative of each of the relational models as well 
as some representative of Foa and Foa‘s alternative resource-based 
categorisations (Foa, 1993).  Haslam used analyses of the covariance of the these 
appraisals of the relationship to argue that the relational models were categorical 
representations rather than dimensional or prototypical representations.  He also 
used the analysis to argue that the relational models had greater utility and 
information value than Foa‘s resource-based categorisations. 
Haslam (1995a) conducted a factor analysis on the same data.  These suggested a 
two dimensional factor space of communality and inequality, with the four models 
distributed within this space, albeit with only Communal Sharing demonstrating a 
tightly coherent profile and, at the other extreme, Equality Matching, appearing 
to be something of a composite between two modes of relating (equality and turn-
taking).   This rather inconclusive outcome prompted further work.  Haslam and 
Fiske (1999) conducted a similar study with 42 participants from diverse 
backgrounds (i.e. not recruited from a student population), each naming 40 
relationships from which 10 were chosen.  Again 52 descriptions of the 
relationship were ranked on a 7 point likert scale (from not at all true to very 
true).  Using 33 of these statements the authors used confirmatory factor analysis 
to show that a framework based upon 4 unipolar, but inter-correlated, relational 
models provided the best summary of the data.  This conclusion regarding the  
structure of the four RM‘s and how they relate to each other contrasts with the 
structure of the worldviews hypothesised by Cultural Theory.  The differences are 
explored later in this chapter. 
2.3.3 Relational grammar 
An alternative way of looking at the type of cognition taking place when an RM is 
applied is to look at the function they perform.  Haslam suggests (1994, 1995b) 
that the RMs act as an innate relational grammar.  He draws the analogy of 
Chomsky‘s universal grammar.  On this analogy the RMs taken together would 
function as a ‗Culture Acquisition Device‘.   Fiske does not use this term but in 
later accounts describes the RMs as ‗Cultural coordination devices‖ (Fiske, 2000).  
The RMs enable children and new immigrants to co-ordinate their experience of 
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the ambient culture (Fiske & Haslam, 2005).  In themselves the RM‘s are ‗empty of 
any specific content‘ (Fiske, 1991, p. 142): the prevailing culture specifies the 
implementation rules of the RMs, for example who is included within the CS 
community, what constitutes equality in an EM exchange, how to determine AR 
status or the underlying assumptions about property and contract rights 
manifested in MP relationships. 
This recursive interaction (Fiske, 1991, p. 150) between cognitive structure and 
ambient culture implies that the mental architecture reflects and is reflected in 
the structure of ambient culture.  A seductive suggestion within Fiske‘s (1992) 
elaboration of the relational models is that they follow the logic of the 4 basic 
arithmetical measurement scales (nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio).  This 
would imply that there is a close alignment between how human perception of the 
physical world is structured and how human perception of the social world is 
structured, although this idea has not been taken further by Fiske or his followers.  
Setting aside possible connections to perception of the physical world, Fiske‘s 
account of recursive interaction between the RMs and ambient culture encourages 
the belief that RMs share the pragmatic virtue of correspondence to the external 
world that, according to Gigerenzer (2008), explains the ecological success of 
cognitive heuristics. 
2.3.4 Correspondence between levels of analysis 
The account of Cultural Theory given above highlighted the challenge of 
connecting a theory of societal level phenomena with individual level evidence.  
Social psychologists are rightly cautioned to be mindful of the difficulty of moving 
between different levels of analysis. 
However, this issue is unavoidable with both theories.   CT contends that societal 
forces shape how a society‘s members make sense of the world.  Thus it expects 
that the worldviews constructed at a social level will be manifested in individual 
sense-making.  By contrast, RMT contends that certain observed patterns of 
individual cognition can also be observed in how societies make sense of 
relationships.  A taxonomy hypothesised at the individual level is also 
hypothesised to be manifest at the social level.  Both theories effectively assert 
that the interaction between the two levels is recursive.  Both also implicitly rely 
on the adaptationist logic that the correspondence between the way the social 
world is put together and the way individuals make sense of it is inevitable: it can 
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not work for an individual to try to understand family relationships in terms of 
market pricing. 
This highlights a fundamental assumption of this thesis: that there is a 
correspondence between RMT‘s hypothesised models and their social 
manifestation, for the purposes of this thesis in the public discourse over climate 
change.  The thesis does not attempt to provide a causal explanation for how 
phenomena at either level bring about change in phenomena at the other level.  
In a book chapter entitled ‗Relational Models Theory 2.0‘ Fiske (2004b) breaks 
down the RMs into the innate cognitive ‗proclivities‘, which he terms ‗mods‘, and 
the specific cultural, situational instantiations and expressions which he terms 
‗preos‘.  Social exchange is co-produced by these two constituent parts of the 
Models: ie an Authority Ranking Model is situated in a particular time and culture, 
drawing upon the core logic of the predispositional ‗mod‘ and the local ‗preos‘. 
However, in this thesis the approach is closer to that adopted originally by Fiske, 
which sidestepped the question as to what the causal connection between the 
social and individual manifestations of the phenomena might be, restricting itself 
to the suggestion that the similarities between the two cannot be co-incidental 
(Fiske, 1992, pp. 700, 702, 705). 
2.3.5 Criticism of RMT 
RMT has not attracted the level of criticism described above for CT.  Mainly, this 
reflects the fact that there are many researchers proposing models of the mind 
comprising cognitive modules or tools (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2008; Hirschfeld, 1998; 
Sperber, 1996 Ch 6; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).  Humans have many tools in their 
cognitive toolbox, as acknowledged by Fiske (2004a, p. 127): usually other 
researchers can treat the RMs as further tools that are complementary rather than 
competitive to their own hypothesised tools.  RMT can then be usefully adduced as 
corroborative evidence simply to support the general argument that the mind is an 
evolved toolbox (e.g. Pinker, 2008, pp. 400-414). 
Fiske (1991, 1992; and in private correspondence 2008), makes clear that the 
individual cognitive modules have counterpart manifestations in the social realm, 
but this has not been the focus of subsequent research activity.  If RMT had been 
treading on sociological toes, we might expect that there would have been the 
same sort of sustained criticism that CT has been subjected to. 
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One cogent critique has come from CT itself.  Verweij doubts that RMT‘s four 
models in the classification are ―jointly exhaustive as well as mutually exclusive‖ 
(Verweij, 2007, p. 9).  He offers examples of social arrangements which represent 
overlaps between EM and MP, AR and MP, EM and CS, and EM and asocial 
relationships.  These examples do not disprove RMT, which explicitly hypothesises 
that the RMs combine to create social arrangements (Fiske, 1991, pp. 21-22) so 
that we should expect to diagnose multiple RMs in specific real world 
circumstances.  However, it does remind us of the limitations of any simplifying 
classification when applied to the apparently infinite complexity of the real world.  
This obviously poses a problem for RMT.  On the one hand, the thrust of research 
has to be to break down social relationships into constituent RMs, still the main 
aim of Fiske‘s more recent writing (Fiske, 2004a Ch 3).  On the other, much of the 
analysis of real life situations offers combinations of RMs at work.  For example, a 
Market Pricing defence of bankers‘ bonuses rests on the operation of the free 
market correctly valuing the worth of the bankers‘ efforts.  The extreme MP 
position attacks authoritarian interference and government regulation of free 
markets, so that the MP arguments are often set up in opposition (or in CT 
language, ‗contradistinction‘) to an AR standpoint.  However, government defence 
of its own reluctance to regulate bankers‘ bonuses typically relies on asserting a 
defence of the status quo, the existing ‗order‘ of the global market, effectively 
creating an alliance of AR and MP arguments.  Any one RM can assert that pursuing 
the goals of another RM is a means to achieving its own ends: just as utilitarians 
can define any pursued goal as the revealed utilitarian preference of the pursuer.  
Yet Verweij must be right to insist that, in a truly pluralist system, when push 
comes to shove people have to choose between the incompatible values implied 
by different models. 
Unlike CT, RMT has been tested in studies of individual cognition to try to 
demonstrate the presence of the four RMs (see 2.3.2 above).  Like CT, RMT has 
been used to provide powerfully insightful thick description in the anthropological 
field (Fiske, 1991).  So RMT is exposed to the same challenge as CT: on the one 
hand, the taxonomy frequently seems to oversimplify the infinite variety of the 
real world, on the other, when the theory is broadened to admit proliferating 
combinations of the RMs its explanatory power is diluted.  Equally, it is inevitably 
difficult to demonstrate in the field the presence of combined RMs and opposed 
RMs as well as the RMs themselves. 
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2.3.6 Relational models manifested at the social level 
Fiske concentrates his presentation of the RMs as phenomena occurring at the 
individual cognitive level: much of the empirical work to support the theory tests 
phenomena at this level (Haslam, 2004 provides an overview).  There is also 
empirical work at the group and organisational level (Haslam, 2004, pp. 37-44), 
but there is little analysis of social level phenomena using RMT.  This is not 
because Fiske does not think this an appropriate use of RMT (Fiske, 2008).  Rather, 
Fiske makes clear by drawing support from similar typologies in social theory that 
he sees the logic implied by each RM as constantly and ubiquitously manifested in 
social phenomena.  So much so that he generates a matrix mapping the four RMs 
onto various social domains such as war, property rights, distributive justice and 
the world of work (Fiske, 1992, pp. 694-696)20.  
As described above, Cultural Theory also extrapolates a small set of relational 
principles onto different social domains to generate a matrix of the logical 
arguments that each principle will deploy within each domain (Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998).  Chapter 3 explains how a synthesis of these two matrices has been 
used to provide the framework for the empirical studies in this thesis. 
2.3.7 Relational Models Theory and the climate change debate 
Subsequent to Fiske‘s original anthropological research, RMT has not been used to 
analyse societal level phenomena21.  What differences can be expected between 
an analysis using RMT‘s typology and Thompson and Rayner‘s analysis using CT? 
A noteworthy feature of Thompson and Rayner‘s approach is the conscious 
exclusion of the so called ‗fatalist‘ worldview from the analysis of the debate.  
TEW (pp93ff) regarded fatalism as a passive worldview, with only Hierarchism, 
Egalitarianism and Individualism having an active role in policy making.  This 
approach is justified by the fatalist‘s view that policy is pointless.  TEW try to 
account for the role of fatalism as providing a reservoir of potential recruits for 
active worldviews. 
RMT does not differentiate between the four RMs in this way.  The only suggestion 
is that Market Pricing may not be fully present in some societies (Fiske, 2004b, p. 
                                            
20 The matrix is readily accessible at subscribing academic libraries via 
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/99/4/689/. 
21 Section 3.1.3 discusses the levels of explanation that this thesis seeks to address, 
following Doise (Doise, 1986). 
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15).  The different forms of exchange embedded in each RM all have a role to 
play.  What role will Equality Matching, the nearest equivalent RM to fatalism,  
play in the climate change debate?  Section 1.3.2 showed how the Commons 
Dilemma plays a central role in the debate.  The logic of the dilemma follows that 
of Equality Matching, namely that carbon emitters are unwilling to give up their 
emissions without certainty that they will get reciprocal action from others.  
Cultural Theory may be partly right in so far as the Commons Dilemma works 
negatively, discouraging effective policy.  Yet the Commons Dilemma can hardly 
be described as passive in this debate, so one of the opportunities of this thesis 
will be to examine whether integrating the Equality Matching model into the 
analysis provides a better analysis than Cultural Theory‘s exclusion of fatalism. 
2.4 Detailed mechanics 
The broad shape of both RMT and CT offers many parallels to much prior theory 
and feels plausibly consonant with much daily experience.  Yet the cold detail of 
the theories inevitably leaves loose ends unresolved and begs new questions.    
1. Are there really only four ways of thinking relationally?  The theories are 
underspecified in respect of how the RMs on the one hand and the 
worldviews on the other combine with each other and interact with other 
individual cognitive and social processes.   
2. The internal structure of the hypothesised variables – four distinct unipolar 
RMs, or the 2x2 Grid/Group matrix of worldviews (together, in each case, 
with some form of disengaged position) - begs questions as soon as 
attempts are made to map it onto the infinite variety of social phenomena. 
3. Although the four RMs appear to map readily onto the 2x2 matrix of CT, at 
least one RM, Equality Matching, shows significant differences from its 
pair, the ‗fatalist‘. 
4. There are also differences between CT‘s Individualist worldview and the 
Market Pricing RM.  The RM underemphasises the importance of free 
agency to the model – a necessary condition of the MP model is that 
individuals should be free to gain the benefit proportional to their efforts.  
Instead RMT focuses on the exchange system within Market Pricing and 
seems to lose some of the human relating in the process. 
5. Both theories hypothesise a non-social relationship, for CT the ‗hermit‘ and 
for RMT asocial and null relationships.  Although both theories do provide 
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accounts of these disengaged positions, both leave unanswered questions 
with respect to the status of this outside position viz-a-viz the four main 
positions. 
These five issues are discussed below. 
2.4.1 One, few or many: how many rationalities? 
Both CT and RMT claim to evade the snares of dualism, and both draw strength 
from the parallels observed in categorisations proposed in prior theory especially 
amongst some of the classics (Verweij, 2007).  This reasoning is both powerful and 
problematic.  Prior theory can only provide circumstantial evidence and 
corroborative detail.  The repeated appearance of similar patterns in past 
analyses of social relationships feels impressive and convincing.  Yet if we précis 
this as ‗all these theorists across history have observed (similar) social relations 
and come up with similar analyses: it cannot be a coincidence‘, then it sounds less 
impressive.  In addition, the similarities are only partial.  Durkheim proposes a 
binary distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1984 
Book 1, Chs 2 & 3).  Weber resolved upon a three-way split for the forms of 
leadership, traditional, legal and charismatic (Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1978 Part 
1, Section 3).  There are some theorists whose 4-way classifications do feel 
particularly close to RMT, such as Udy and Polanyi (see account in Fiske, 1992), 
but there are many theories with only passing resemblance. 
Inexact parallels may be tempting, but both RMT and CT claim an absolute status 
to their 4-way taxonomies22.  Each parallel that is not a perfect match therefore 
demands reconciliation.  There are theories not cited by RMT and CT which, by 
virtue of their subject matter, also demand integration; yet, when they seem 
irreconcilable, they provide evidence against the rigid structures proposed by RMT 
and CT.  For example, Dunbar‘s social brain hypothesis (1998, 2003) sets forth a 
well supported developmental account of sociality, matching cognitive capabilities 
to the size of social group.  He argues for as many as six stages in terms of group 
size (Dunbar, 1998), and argues for mental development based upon levels of 
                                            
22 As noted in 2.2.1 Douglas (1999) advocated a softer version of CT that avoided this 
absolutism.  Yet this is probably only politically astute nuance: Douglas still regarded the 
four worldviews of Cultural Theory as fundamental and distinguished them from other 
possible worldviews by the simple observation that no other worldviews could be seen to 
have achieved any longevity. 
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intentionality.  Emerging from similar theoretical roots, namely hypothesising 
evolved individual cognitive capacities, RMT should be able to integrate Dunbar‘s 
hypothesis if it is to justify its overarching ‗framework‘ claims.  Yet it will not be 
straightforward to reconcile Dunbar‘s theory, based upon intentional complexity, 
and RMT, based upon exchange relationships. 
Parallels in other theory, therefore, do suggest that cognitive processes argued for 
by RMT (and by implication CT) fit into the same jigsaw as cognitive processes 
implied or hypothesised by other theory.  However, they tend to suggest that RMT 
and CT are wrong to claim framework status as if their postulates have 
overlordship as organising principles. Theories that claim both to provide 
exhaustive analyses and to hold a higher status to other theory inevitably provoke 
a hostile reaction.  As noted above Fiske has presented RMT with a diplomatic 
modesty that disguises the fact that its claims are no less ambitious than CT23.  It 
also helps that RMT sits comfortably alongside much individualistic psychology and 
evolutionary theory, complementing rather than competing with others.  CT takes 
the field in competition with the likes of Marx and Adam Smith (TEW Ch8 and 
p35), offending the followers of both. 
Thompson (2008) is now much more explicit that his unit of analysis is a way or 
relating or organising relationships, as opposed to a simultaneous analysis of the 
individual and society.  Unfortunately the impression of deterministic stereotyping 
of individual people engendered by TEW 1990‘s presentation of the theory has 
done lasting damage.  Even in a seminar launching his latest book (on 11 
December 2008), Thompson was criticised first for attacking a straw man (voiced 
along these lines: ―of course there are plural rationalities: who would doubt 
that?‖) and then for having the temerity to cut the plurality off at three, four or 
five oversimplified caricatures of the individual participants in the social realm 
(―there‘s infinite variety out there‖). 
Both TEW and Thompson (2008) propose variety from within the CT schema, by 
mapping out 4x4 matrices of how each worldview interacts with the others.    
These interactions are of course important.  Yet the true source of infinite variety 
                                            
23 The claims of RMT are bold: ―With this set of four models, the relational models theory 
provides an integrative framework for a great deal of research and theory across core 
social science disciplines‖ (Fiske, 1992, p. 717); but advanced with diplomatic modesty 
―There is much work ahead..  and the final shape of the theory remains to be determined, 
but here is something to build on‖ (p717). 
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can be expected to emerge from the interaction of the schema – whether framed 
in RMT or CT terms – with other elements of the mind, society and the physical 
world: 
 at the individual level, with other cognitive and affective 
mechanisms such as in-group/out-group categorisation (e.g. 
Tajfel, 1982), essentialism (Hirschfeld, 1998), agency 
attribution (Heider & Simmel, 1944); 
 at the social level, the formation of groups (Tajfel, 1982), social 
influence (Asch, 1956) and the internalisation of power 
relationships (Elias, 2000; Foucault, 1977); 
 at the level of the physical world, the flow of contingent 
events. 
With respect to group and societal level phenomena it is possible to anticipate 
how the relational logic of RMT‘s models could be used to explain the formation of 
groups and the exercise of power.  CT‘s account claims that interaction between 
the mind and the outside world, in the form of social and physical events can 
create sufficient ‗surprise‘ to force a shift from one worldview to another.  The 
theory stresses that it is actually the shifting, perpetual imbalance between 
competing worldviews that will frequently prompt such events: just as the 
irrational exuberance of rampant free-market individualism engenders a crash and 
subsequent calls for more egalitarian arrangements and/or stricter regulations by 
the authorities, alongside schadenfreude amongst the fatalists (Thompson & 
Taylor, 2010)24.  CT does recognise the importance of intergroup dynamics in 
driving the different worldviews to define themselves in contradistinction to one 
another(Thompson, 2008). 
At the individual cognitive level, interaction within the mind between different, 
possibly competing processes, has not yet been addressed by RMT.  The in-
group/out-group dynamics manifested when RMs or worldviews compete are not a 
subset of the worldview schemas or the RMs.  The bonding and hostility observed 
                                            
24 By focussing single-mindedly on the dynamics hypothesised within the CT schema, the 
theory justifies much of the criticism aimed at it. The approach encourages CT theorists to 
helicopter above the anthropological field as if it were a closed system, giving the 
impression that change is a kind of Brownian ebb and flow, not an act of will on the part 
of subjects within the system.  Necessarily its proponents know that there is more to the 
mind and sociality, but by claiming overlordship the theory fails to engage on equal terms 
with other theory. 
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by Tajfel (1982) in the minimal groups or Sherif (1966) at Robbers Cave needed no 
worldviews to form opposed categorisations.  Rather, it seems more likely that the 
motivations generated by social identity formation help to drive adherents of a 
particular worldview, or indeed those applying a particular RM, to define their 
positions in contradistinction to one another.  This suggests, as indicated earlier, 
that RMT will need to place its models within a wider framework such as a 
cognitive toolbox (Gigerenzer, 2008) or theory of mental modularity (Sperber, 
1996). 
Similar difficulties to those above emerge from RMT‘s and CT‘s accounts of the 
structure underlying their proposed taxonomies. 
2.4.2 Diagonals, horizontals and verticals 
Haslam and Fiske (1999) argued that the RMs were unipolar categorical 
representations.  By contrast, CT is hypothesised as a 2x2 matrix derived from two 
underlying dimensions, Group and Grid.  For RMT, therefore, there should be no 
underlying structural connection between any one RM and another. For CT, the 
egalitarian worldview is connected to the individualist worldview in that both are 
‗Low Grid‘, just as the fatalist is connected to the individualist in that both are 
‗Low Group‘: by implication there should be no overlap between the fatalist and 
egalitarian worldviews and the hierarchist and individualist worldview25. 
Both theories seem to oversimplify.  Recapitulating the diagram of cultural 
theory, but this time with the associated RM‘s added, helps to illustrate this: 
                                            
25 Thompson‘s (1982) expansion of CT into 3 dimensions, mentioned in 2.2.3, enables him 
to suggest  that each worldview has some common ground with each of the others. 
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               Figure 2-3: Cultural Theory: 2x2 illustration with Relational Models 
The logic of the relations addressed by both the RMs and the worldviews allows 
connections to be drawn between the different quadrants across verticals, 
horizontals and diagonals (for simplicity the RMs are used as reference points 
below): 
 (horizontal, left to right) on right hand side, the rules governing AR and CS 
relationships are appropriate for within-group relationships.  On the left 
hand side, the rules governing EM and MP relationships are appropriate for 
exchanges between strangers.  In the absence of trust derived from shared 
group membership, tit for tat equality, do-as-you-would-be-done-by, is the 
safest default mode of interaction (EM).  Communality emerges from 
shared adherence to the rules of EM relationships.  Alternatively, though 
not part of one‘s own group, if the ‗other‘ is willing to abide by the rules 
of an external yardstick, exchange can be benchmarked against this 
external measure.  Communality is temporarily conferred by mutual 
acceptance of the external measure (MP). 
 (vertical, top to bottom) on the top, EM and AR relationships require a 
rigid adherence to rules.  Exactly one man one vote; a Colonel is senior to 
a Major, whatever the circumstances.  On the bottom, there is greater 
fluidity.  Participants to MP market exchange are theoretically free to 
negotiate according to whatever each needs to get from the transaction at 
the particular time.  Members of a CS community determine shares 
according to the group needs of the moment. 
Fatalist Hierarchist/Bureaucrat 
High Grid, Low Group High Grid, High Group 
Equality Matching (EM) Authority Ranking (AR) 
  
Individualist/Entrepreneur Egalitarian 
Low Grid, Low Group Low Grid, High Group 
Market Pricing (MP) Communal sharing (CS) 
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So far, this really only maps out the expectations of the ‗Group‘ and ‗Grid‘ 
dimensions: but the diagonals also appear to have shared properties: 
 (diagonal 1) the EM relationship has some of the characteristics of a CS 
relationship, once it is accepted that the shared community or group is 
‗humanity‘.  The ‗other‘ may be a stranger, but there is a shared 
membership underpinning the equality expected in interactions between 
the parties.  Each of EM and CS is focussed upon achieving equality, 
eliminating difference.  By contrast, MP and AR are interested in measuring 
and maintaining differentials26.  EM can thus become CS according to the 
group context – one man one vote for all citizens of country X, excluding, 
in varying contexts, some races, women, the underage, or the 
unpropertied. 
 (diagonal 2) moreover, MP and AR are intimately connected.  Much 
political theory analyses a balance, and pendulum swing between, free and 
regulated markets.  Neither the CS commune nor an untrusting EM society27 
is expected to sustain an organisation or state of any magnitude.  MP also 
requires that its system or currency be underwritten by the authority (AR) 
of the state28.  This seems to take us back to Mary Douglas‘ original 
formulation of a ‗Centre‘ combining MP and AR and ‗Border‘ combining EM 
and CS (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
                                            
26 This assertion requires some expansion since it contradicts the CT concept of ‗Grid‘: the 
individualist, because Low Grid, is not interested in maintaining differentials.  This is 
correct in one way – the individualist certainly believes in social mobility and progress 
rather than conservative preservation of the status quo.  However, the individualist 
expects different inputs to be matched by different outputs – greater effort or investment 
will reap proportionately greater rewards.  The individualist has simply changed the 
currency of the input from pre-existing status, group-membership or birth to work and 
property. 
 
27 Verweij (2007) usefully cites Banfield‘s ―The Moral Basis of a Backward Society‖ as 
providing a powerful example of how, in the absence of trust, co-operative endeavour 
becomes nearly impossible because of the EM refusal to countenance any participant 
happening to gain more than another from the shared project. 
 
28 It is possible that some common properties shared by different RMs could be accounted 
for by reference to common properties shared by the underlying mathematical scales cited 
by Fiske (1991, 1992).  Indeed, if as suggested by Fiske, the mathematical scales do play a 
role in the development of the cognitive processes represented by the RMs then the inter-
connections between the mathematical scales suggest that the RMs cannot be as 
independent of each other as Haslam & Fiske‘s (1999) research claims. 
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What this suggests is that, although the four RMs may be in some way cognitively 
‗basic‘, their co-existence means that they are so deeply and culturally embedded 
that disentangling them is always likely to be an imperfect exercise. 
2.4.3 The fatalist worldview and Equality Matching model 
CT treats the low group high grid position as that of a passive subject of forces 
beyond his/her control: 
―People who find themselves subject to binding prescriptions and are excluded 
from group membership exemplify the fatalistic way of life.  Fatalists are 
controlled from without.  Like hierarchists, their sphere of individual autonomy is 
restricted.  They may have little choice about how they spend their time, with 
whom they associate, what they wear or eat, where they live and work.  Unlike 
hierarchists, however, fatalists are excluded from group membership in the group 
responsible for making decisions that rule their life‖ (TEW p7) 
This is fundamentally different from the Equality Matching RM.  This RM is an 
active exchange which constructs relationships.  It is ‗low group‘ in the sense that 
it does not presume shared group membership beyond the assumption that a 
counterparty could play by EM rules.  By achieving an EM exchange commonality is 
established and the foundations of a possible in-group are laid.  If the 
counterparty does not play by EM rules the relationship will evaporate into an 
asocial or null reaction.  
As suggested in 2.3.6, the inclusion of the Equality Matching RM, with this more 
active characterisation, may have greater explanatory power in an analysis of the 
climate change debate than CT‘s exclusion of it. 
2.4.4 Individualism 
In later elaborations of the Market Pricing Model, Fiske (2004a) focuses on the 
importance of abstract symbols when MP relationships are instantiated.  The 
reference to an external yardstick of value reifies the relationships through all the 
trappings of market exchange, currencies, indices, rates etc.  Can this model be 
present in less developed societies?  In contrast to the clear-cut structure 
expounded in the early version, Fiske has become less sure: 
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―Many people have suggested that Market Pricing, in particular, is not innate, or 
that if it is an innate, socially specialised capacity, it has little or no inherent 
motivational force unless this is culturally fostered during development or early 
adulthood.  My hypothesis is that MP is currently in the process of being 
assimilated into cognitive and motivational proclivities: It is becoming a mod 
(Fiske, 2004b, p. 15)‖. 
This is as unsatisfactory as CT‘s denial of fatalism‘s active role in societal 
struggles.  It also appears to derive from the same source: relating through the EM 
and MP models is an expression of individual engagement with others external to 
the self.  By contrast AR and CS, parallel to the High Group worldviews, express 
relationships within the group from which the self gains identity.  Although EM and 
MP use fundamentally different principles for the exchange – strict equality (EM) 
versus proportional equity (MP) – the fact that they both effect a relationship for 
the individual against, in some sense, the group may mean they are hard to 
separate. 
2.4.5 Null relationships and the hermit 
As set out above both CT and RMT hypothesise a disengaged position from which 
no relationship with others or with society takes place.  The status of these begs 
questions in each theory.  For CT, how does its two dimensional structure account 
for something outside itself?  For RMT, do null or asocial relations imply a two-step 
cognitive process: first a categorisation that a relationship is or is not social, then 
second, if social, a categorisation between the four RMs?   
Fiske (1992) explicitly argues that the RMs emerge in children‘s individual 
cognitive development in the order CS, AR, EM and then MP.   This would not be 
the order in which relationships would develop.  Only EM functions as a model for 
initial relationships between strangers or groups that have never encountered one 
another29.  Tit-for-tat does appear to be the default minimal relationship between 
individuals (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).  The model seems to be a first step away 
from asocial or null relationships.  If the EM model breaks down – one party does 
                                            
29 Societies can have well developed customs of hospitality for travelling strangers which 
might suggest a degree of fellowship, even shared humanity, that goes beyond the EM 
model.  Yet these can be interpreted as notionally based on the EM model – you would 
want the same treatment if travelling yourself: the reciprocation does not have to be 
direct, and Fiske cites the Kula ring as a prime example of EM (1992, p. 702).  The customs 
also exist following myriad successive previous interactions, and hence are not the first 
form of relationship. 
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not reciprocate – it appears likely that relationships would revert to asocial or 
null.  On the other hand, if the EM model prospers it appears likely that the 
parties would begin to implement the CS, AR and even MP models in appropriate 
contexts.  This would suggest a very different scheme to the 2x2 matrix.  
Again, because this account suggests a layering of the different RMs or worldviews 
then untangling the different models is likely to be an imperfect exercise. 
2.4.6 Detailed Mechanics - conclusion 
This section has brought to the fore difficulties that each of Cultural Theory and 
Relational Models struggles with.  CT sometimes offers ‗worldviews‘ as a lens 
through which people make sense of the social world.  RMT sometimes emphasises 
the quasi-grammatical role that the RMs play in forming the sense we make of 
relationships.   Once it is accepted that the forms of relationship can combine or 
develop in opposition to one another, the theories are both confronted with the 
likelihood that the worldviews or RMs are somehow distorted in that process.  The 
view through an egalitarian‘s ―lens‖ is subtly different when the egalitarian feels 
the authorities might be on his side compared to when he is a radical 
revolutionary.  The EM relationship a divorced couple might form, (―it‘s your turn 
to have the children‖) after the collapse of their CS interactions may well be 
different from the EM relationship of neighbouring adults taking turns on the 
school run. 
Each of the issues raised in this section on ‗detailed mechanics‘ shows that 
distilling and isolating a pure form of each core worldview or RM in every situation 
will be an imperfect exercise. 
2.5 Conclusion 
2.5.1 Justifying a pluralist account 
Throughout this chapter, the tensions between the pluralists‘ goal of establishing 
patterns in the infinite variety of social relating and the risk of producing a 
shallow reductionist account too easily confronted with confounding examples has 
been evident.  The review of both Cultural Theory and Relational Models Theory 
encourages us to expect that: 
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 individuals and societies produce in tandem relationships and the 
interpretation of those relationships 
 this production, and reproduction, is a recursive and reflexive process, 
producing a layering of forms that may have made it impossible to unravel 
fully the constituent parts, both at the level of individual cognition and at 
the level of social organisation. 
However, both CT and RMT successfully provide support for the idea that there is 
‗regularity‘ (TEW p xiii) to the variability we encounter, that there may be a 
limited number of possible solutions (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961, p. 10), and 
that plurality produces a ‗constrained relativism‘ (Verweij, 2007) rather than 
random chaos.  
2.5.2 Defining the unit and level of analysis 
Both CT and RMT make either the worldview or the RM the unit of analysis.  This 
presents challenges when neither theory has successfully isolated four, five or any 
number of worldviews or RMs.  Yet it also presents the opportunity to skirt around 
the problem of explaining phenomena at the individual level and at the social 
level. Section 2.2.4.5 noted that this approach has similarities to social 
representations research. 
Trying to demonstrate the reality of the RMs after assuming that they are the unit 
of analysis appears to be circular, but this weakness is no different from 
methodological individualism‘s assumption that the collective is only the sum of 
the individuals or indeed the circularity of constructionist self-reflections.   
2.5.3 Way Forward 
This analysis of CT and RMT has flagged up numerous loose ends.  This thesis is not 
claiming to address all of these.   Rather, the objective is to address two issues 
identified within CT and to extend the application of the relational framework 
offered by RMT. 
For CT the lack of any suggested mechanics is a weakness.  RMT hypothesises 
cognitive processes that account for how individuals think relationally, ie how 
processes akin to CT‘s worldviews are instantiated within individual thinking.  A 
further issue for CT is the exclusion of the so called fatalist worldview from the 
analysis of the climate change policy-making process.  The fatalist worldview in 
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fact appears to be central to the climate change debate, expressed daily in the 
logic of the Commons Dilemma.  By connecting the fatalistic worldview to the 
logic of the Equity Matching RM, the thesis expects that it will be easier to show 
how it has such an influence in the debate. 
Although one aim is to address perceived weaknesses in CT, a further aim is to 
extend the application of RMT to social level phenomena.  Chapter 3 explains how 
this thesis has synthesised a matrix of arguments within the climate change 
debate based on the matrices offered by both CT and RMT.  This matrix has then 
been used to provide an account of media coverage of the debate and also of 
focus group discussions.  It has also formed the basis for questions put to 
individuals in a survey.  The thesis argues that taken together the arguments in 
the matrix form four coherent Standpoints within the debate. 
2.5.4 Research Questions 
The research questions generated by this review are: 
1. Does this matrix provide a plausible account of the climate change debate? 
2. Does an account that integrates the Equality Matching model have 
advantages over the account provided by Thompson and Rayner? 
3. Does this account offer an answer to the question ‗Why has so little been 
achieved?‘? 
Going beyond these specific questions, the empirical studies will be used to 
explore further some of the weaknesses identified in both CT and RMT. 
 
 
 
107 
 
Chapter 3 Defining the Standpoints, and the 
methods to assess them 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter has four parts: 
 Part 1 provides a general discussion of methodological issues 
 Part 2 justifies the choice of empirical methods used to assess the validity 
of a typology of climate change arguments based upon Relational Models 
theory and set out at the end of the chapter.  Chapters 4 to 6 include more 
detailed accounts of the specific procedures adopted 
 Part 3 links the typologies of Cultural Theory and Relational Models 
reviewed in Chapter 2 to a proposed typology of ‗Standpoints‘ taken in the 
climate change debate  
 Part 4 sets out the steps taken in generating a matrix of the arguments 
that constitute these Standpoints 
 A brief conclusion follows 
 
The early stages of this research included a pilot media content analysis and three 
pilot focus groups.  In general, these have not been treated as part of the 
empirical material analysed for the thesis.  However, the lessons learnt from 
these pilot exercises informed the organisation of the subsequent empirical work.  
In particular, the pilot media content analysis supported the view that newspaper 
articles provided good proxies for the public debate over climate change.  The 62 
articles analysed in the pilot analysis are scheduled at Appendix B.  References to 
individual articles in the pilot take the form #p1, #p2 etc. and can be identified in 
the Appendix. 
3.1 Justification of the methodological approach 
3.1.1 Where is ‗the debate over climate change‘? 
This thesis proposes that there is an underlying pattern to the arguments deployed 
in the climate change debate.  To examine this claim, the empirical units of 
analysis must be the component parts of the arguments themselves.  Examples of 
arguments might be: 
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 ―Arctic ice is melting very rapidly: climate change is much worse than 
previously thought‖ 
 ―The science is so confusing, one just doesn‘t know who to believe‖ or 
 ―Nuclear power will be essential in the fight against climate change‖. 
 
These arguments take place in many settings, from intergovernmental conferences 
to dinner table conversations to individual reflection and decision-making.  This 
suggests a number of sites at which to observe and analyse them: 
 
1. Participant observation of the arguments at the intergovernmental 
conferences and other public arenas 
2. Analysis of the debate in written media, to include sources actively taking 
part and taking sides in the debate, and sources aware of the debate going 
on around them, potentially impinging on them, but not expressing active 
advocacy.  As argued below, these media provide an effective proxy for 
the argument put forward in many parts of the public sphere 
3. Analysis of focus group discussions in which arguments are constructed and 
discovered by participants, as proxy for the natural discussions taking place 
in small groups 
4. Analysis of attitudes:  Zaller and Feldman (1992) treated attitudes as the 
outcome of individuals‘ reasoning using a range of considerations felt to be 
relevant to the particular context.  As such attitudes can serve as a proxy 
for the arguments individuals hold, or have held, inside their heads. 
 
Identifying the ‗arguments‘ and their component parts as the empirical units of 
analysis is important.  This approach offers a reconciliation of the different 
methodological traditions of the different theoretical frameworks upon which the 
thesis draws (3.1.2 below) in particular between traditions focussing on the 
collective and those focusing on the individual. 
 
The approach is similar to that adopted by research using Social Representations 
Theory (SRT).  Bauer & Gaskell (1999, p. 167) state that ‗Representations are 
embodied in communication and in individual minds, shared in a way similar to 
language‘.  This thesis does not explicitly use SRT, but in seeking to analyse the 
‗arguments‘ within the debate it follows the same path in addressing phenomena 
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that exist simultaneously at the social and the individual levels.  This is discussed 
further at 3.1.3 below. 
3.1.2 Methodological traditions 
Three principal theoretical frameworks were discussed in Chapters 1 & 2: attitude 
theory, Cultural Theory (CT) and Relational Models Theory (RMT).   Each of these 
has traditionally adopted different research methods: 
 
 When applied to social issues, attitude theory, including PC Stern‘s Value 
Belief Norm model, has utilised survey data to poll individual attitudes 
(Christie & Jarvis, 2001; Dietz, Stern, & Guagnano, 1998; Kaiser, et al., 
2005; Witherspoon, 1994).  The unit of analysis is an attitude, so it is 
attitudes that are sampled and measured.  A particular attitude can then 
be examined in relation to explanatory variables such as socio-demographic 
data and other attitudes.  The implicit units of analysis are often the 
hypothesised deeper lying attitudes or values, typically detected through 
factor analysis, but these are not the units for empirical data collection.  
 
 The research tradition of CT is ethnographic anthropology (Douglas, 1996; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  The unit of analysis is cosmologies (Douglas, 
1996), ‗ways of life‘ (Thompson, et al., 1990), solidarities (Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998), or ways of organising socially, (Thompson, 2008).  Empirical 
evidence of these hypothesised entities at the social level can only be 
suggestive.  Consequently, the theoretical framework has been deployed to 
provide a ‗thick description‘ (Geertz, 1973) of various social fields such as 
consumerism (Douglas & Isherwood, 1996), environmentalism (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982 Ch 6), Millenarianism (Rayner, 1982), or a local authority 
planning deliberation (Thompson, 2008 Ch 1).  These studies have not 
constituted formal field research in the sense of deliberate data gathering 
followed by analysis, but other work by Cultural Theorists has (e.g. Jaeger 
et al., 1993 in the Swiss Alps).  Most typically, the CT framework has been 
applied to pre-existing data (Adams, 1995 Ch 7 & 8) or to generally 
reported phenomena, such as the climate change debate (Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998). 
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 Like CT, RMT emerged from anthropological field work (Fiske, 1991).   
Research then moved to tests of individual cognition as described in 
section 2.3.2.  Fiske and Haslam‘s studies analysed subjects ratings of their 
own relationships with others (Haslam, 1995a; Haslam & Fiske, 1999); later 
research has also included subjects‘ ratings of hypothetical 3rd party 
relationships described in vignettes (Houde et al., 2004). As discussed in Ch 
2, the theory has been applied to organisational settings where 
ethnographic methods have been deployed (e.g. Connelley & Folger, 2004) 
but the theory has not yet been widely applied to social issues.  In the 
existing research expressed thoughts (such as word associations and 
attitudes) or observed behaviours, such as ritual exchanges, have been 
used as the empirical units of analysis.  The hypothesised underlying 
models, the RMs, being different ways of thinking about relationships, are 
treated as cognitive tools structuring cognition and as such are the 
theoretical unit of analysis.   
 
This thesis draws on the methodological traditions of all three frameworks.  
However, this lays the project open to challenge: is the thesis providing 
explanations of individual thinking or of phenomena occurring at the social level? 
3.1.3 Levels of explanation 
Following the approach of Social Representations Theory (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), 
this thesis takes as self-evident that the ‗arguments‘ it is analysing exist at both 
the level of individual thinking and the level of social sense-making.  Bauer & 
Gaskell go on to argue that this demands multi-method analysis, suggesting (1999, 
p. 177) ‗observations for behavioural habits, questionnaires, free associations or 
interviews to explore individual cognitions; group interviews for informal 
communication; and documentary or mass media contents for formal 
communication‘. 
This contrasts with theoretical approaches that lay down a hard dichotomy of 
divergent epistemological commitments between methodological individualism 
versus collective level analysis.  This division was recognised by Mary Douglas: as 
discussed in section 2.2.5, in its purest form CT rejects the methodological 
individualism implicit in attitudinal surveys (Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999), and much 
of CT‘s research is interpretative analysis of societal level phenomena.  By 
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contrast, attitude research inevitably studies individual level phenomena, which 
may be aggregated to determine ‗public opinion‘. 
Doise (1986) takes a similar approach to Bauer & Gaskell in articulating different 
levels of explanation.  The notion of just two levels (individual and societal 
implied above) simplifies the four level schema (intra-personal, inter-personal, 
‗positional‘ – similar to inter-group – and ideological) offered by Doise.  However, 
he did recognise a divide between his first two levels, the usual domain of social 
psychology, and the intergroup/ideological levels typically investigated by 
sociology but increasingly ventured into by social psychologists (Doise, 1986, Ch4).  
Doise, like Bauer & Gaskell, sees explanation at one level informing explanation at 
other levels.  He also emphasises that social psychological explanation can only be 
partial: instead of testing ‗if A, then B‘, research will only ever identify conditions 
and interacting variables that influence the likelihood of B, if A. 
The very premise of social psychology is that the boundaries between phenomena 
at individual and societal levels are permeable: the problem is that we do not 
have the epistemological basis for carrying phenomena observed at one level over 
to explain phenomena observed at another.  In practice, of course, the boundaries 
become very blurred: researchers using Cultural Theory have assumed that the 
posited ‗worldviews‘ are present in some way in individual cognition and have 
analysed attitudes and behaviour as indicator variables for the presence of 
worldviews at the individual level (Dake & Thompson, 1993; Gastil et al., 2005).  
Paul Slovic‘s (1987) psychometric paradigm of risk perception explored how 
contextual variables – such as socially generated representations of new 
technologies – impact individual attitudes to risk. 
Consistent with these previous boundary transgressions, this thesis does not claim 
to offer a causal mechanism to explain how social level phenomena directly 
influence individual level phenomena, or vice-versa.  Instead, the claim is that 
there is a relationship of similarity between the phenomena at the two levels.  
Fiske (1992) proposed a pattern of cognition present at the individual level which 
assumed a typology of four Relational Models.  He went on to suggest that this 
pattern was also observable in societal level beliefs and institutions across a range 
of domains.  This thesis examines whether this pattern is observable at the 
societal level in the domain of the debate over climate change.  It also uses a 
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survey to examine whether this pattern is observable in individual responses to 
climate change arguments.  
The thesis eschews identifying the ‗arguments‘ it analyses specifically as Social 
Representations.  Typically SRT research pays particular attention to the 
establishment of common sense understandings of new concepts (Bauer & Gaskell, 
1999; Doise et al., 1993; Farr & Moscovici, 1984): it emphasises the role of existing 
societal level groups and institutions in the communication process.  In respect of 
the climate change debate, discourse analysts have similarly focussed on how 
vested interests, whether the scientific research community or the fossil fuel 
industry (Carvalho, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2010; Oreskes & Conway, 2008) have 
influenced emergent representation of the issues (Shackley & Wynne, 1996).  
These processes are compatible with this thesis‘ claim that there is an observable 
pattern in the arguments used and that this pattern reflects the pattern suggested 
by Relational Models Theory: but the actions of vested interests or pre-existing 
groups and institutions in communicating and shaping representations (or 
arguments) are not the object of the research. 
3.1.4 The methods adopted: focus on what is said over what is done 
To analyse how a society ‗debates‘ climate change and also what individuals 
within the society contribute to the debate, it is necessary to select empirically 
observable proxies as evidence.  These proxies could be what societies and 
individuals say and what they do. 
What people say is only part of social responses to climate change.  What people 
do matters, and just as attitudes are imperfect predictors of behaviour (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, pp. 155-156) debate and its conclusions do not predict practice.  
What people say about the environmental impact of behaviour does not convey 
the same information as data on actual car purchases, the number of flights a 
nation is taking or trends in the proportion of electricity generation coming from 
renewables.  Yet, Chapter 1 has demonstrated that the challenge with climate 
change is to ask why has so little been done?  Why does environmental concern 
not translate into effective public policy (Helm, 2010), or into changed individual 
consumption behaviour (Christie & Jarvis, 2001; Jackson, 2005)?  The fact is that 
very little is done.  Unless one dismisses most of what is said about climate 
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change as rank hypocrisy or irrelevant musing, then to analyse the debate requires 
a focus on what is said and written. 
 
Nevertheless, restricting the formal analysis to what is said and written is a 
narrower subsection of the totality of social responses of which practice forms an 
important part (Bauer & Aarts, 2000, pp. 20-22).  Analysis of the debate must 
remain informed by the context of practice, both in the form of legislation or 
regulations enacted and in the form of data on consumption behaviour.   
3.2 Justification of specific methods adopted 
This section looks at the specific methods used to address the four ‗sites‘ of the 
climate change debate identified above in 3.1.1.  
3.2.1 Participant observation 
Participant observation can extend across protest marches ‗against‘ Climate 
Change or ‗against‘ government green taxes, NGO and Transition Town meetings, 
airport extension planning permission hearings, to advocacy speeches and debates 
on public platforms such as university lecture halls.  Globally, the UNFCCC process 
seeks to formalise the debate: I attended UNFCCC working group sessions in Bonn 
in April 2009 and Barcelona in October 2009.  Such sessions are fascinating, but 
the events are intractable for formal analysis – partly because so little is achieved 
at them, partly because they have taken on the tone of well rehearsed ritual.   It 
is obvious that any meaningful negotiations take place behind closed doors, much 
to the annoyance of excluded parties (Environmental News Bulletin, 2009). 
Much of the discussion at UNFCCC working group meetings comprises levels of 
detail that are far removed from the core issues.  Debates might comprise the 
Chair devoting half an hour to get 194 parties to agree to remove a square bracket 
from a sentence in a drafting document, only for one party to reopen the issue 
and demand the bracket be put back in.  The mere existence of this process is of 
course interesting, informative and readily open to criticism (as outlined in 
Chapter 1).  Informative too is the ritual rhetoric on the floor which sees (inter 
alia): 
a) Spokespeople for indigenous peoples and for the Small Island States 
describing the impact of changing climate on their homeland 
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b) The Bolivian delegate stating that developed world historic CO2 emissions 
constitute a debt that needs to be repaid to third world countries 
c) The Indian delegate lambasting the EU for straying from the agreed 
principles of common but differentiated responsibility 
d) An OPEC country delegate insisting his country be compensated for the 
economic consequences of reduced oil consumption 
e) The US delegate from the then new Obama administration promising cuts 
(i) smaller than generally advocated and (ii) benchmarked against present 
emissions rather than the 1990 benchmark most delegates use as the 
comparator 
f) Many delegates ‗insisting‘ that any measures must be founded on ‗sound 
science‘. 
All of the above are received respectfully by the other delegates, with no 
immediate expression that some of these positions (b-e) are unacceptable to some 
of the represented parties.   Attendance at the Stansted Airport Expansion 
planning enquiry during 2008 revealed a similar process.  Even within the 
adversarial format of a planning enquiry, an Inuit spokesperson called to testify to 
the impacts of climate change on the Arctic was heard respectfully, and largely 
unchallenged.  Again, the process is informative; despite extensive pro-
environmental lobbying the enquiry found in favour of expansion largely because 
the regional plan previously approved by central government held precedence 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008).  The decision had 
already been taken. 
The arguments in these environments can be simplistically divided into two 
groups: the first are ritual, rhetorical positions that were also found to be present 
in pilot media analysis and focus groups.  The second are so buried under layers of 
reflexivity and awareness of counter-arguments that they are difficult to 
disentangle.   Reflecting these considerations, participant observation has been 
used to provide much guidance and insight in the conduct of this research, but the 
events themselves have not been used as objects of separate analysis. 
3.2.2 Analysis of print media 
Silverstone (1999) answered his own question ‗Why Study the Media?‘ in part by 
claiming that the media re-presented the texture of experience and reproduced 
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common sense.  While acknowledging that his manifesto emphasised the 
importance of all media, including advertising and visual imagery, his arguments 
provide considerable justification for privileging the print media as a proxy for the 
public debate. 
 
Potential written sources could include newspaper, internet or academic articles 
as well as books and internet discussions.  This excludes secondary written 
material in the form of transcripts of oral media such as radio, television or focus 
group discussions.  There are advantages and disadvantages to each source 
(examples referring to numbered items are taken from the pilot media sample 
listed in Appendix B): 
 Newspaper and magazine articles on global warming are frequently reports 
about other people‘s arguments: for example the publication of new 
scientific findings (e.g. #p3, the ―plankton effect‖), the performance of 
musicians at Live Earth (e.g. #p50).  This is reported in the form of factual 
information (‗news‘) without the writer expressing an opinion.  Necessarily 
the fact that a topic is news at all has meaning, but the mediated form of 
many of the arguments identified in the debate must always be borne in 
mind. 
 News and magazine articles are frequently about multiple topics.  An 
article about politics may include extensive references to climate change 
arguments but the author‘s selection of material and the nuance of 
expression are frequently driven by the presentation of the political story 
(e.g. #p23 on US differences with Europe). 
 Internet articles, which are frequently newspaper columns or opinion 
pieces distributed through the author‘s personal website, are often pieces 
of ongoing arguments with specific individuals or interest groups (e.g. 
many of George Monbiot‘s columns in The Guardian are available on 
www.monbiot.com as blogs).  Such material self-evidently constitutes a 
part of the public ‗debate‘, providing a wealth of links between underlying 
values and arguments about climate change.  However, the pieces are also 
situated in an infinitely regressing argumentative context.  This lineage 
cannot be pursued ad infinitum, and drawing the line somewhere 
inevitably loses some meaning.  Selection of authors for analysis would also 
be arbitrary. 
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 Internet discussions create the same difficulty in research as Internet 
articles.  Individual blogs are often short rants directed not at an original 
article but specific issues or interest groups tenuously connected to the 
topic.  On the one hand the material is a ―goldmine‖ (#p 52) on the other 
the typical brevity of such pieces multiplies the risk of over-interpreting 
the context and the values and arguments ‗taken for granted‘ by each 
author.  Formal textual and argumentation analyses (Toulmin, 2003) of two 
blogs (BBC, 2007; BBC & Rowlatt, 2006) were carried out. These are not 
separately reported but were used to inform the eventual media content 
analysis conducted. 
 Natural science academic articles form an important component of the 
debate.  The formal content of natural science articles is normally less 
significant to this thesis than the context: for example Hansen et al. (2007) 
clearly wrote to create debate and to prevent the consensus solidifying at 
a position the authors found much too cautious.  Others such as Rahmstorf 
(2006) and von Storch (2006) slugging it out in Science seem to be keeping 
the flame of personal animosity alive as much as publicising new research.  
The sustained commitment of each to consistently opposed views on future 
sea level rises hints at the expectation of this thesis that values help to 
constitute facts, but the content of individual academic articles will not 
demonstrate this. 
 Sociological academic articles commonly target a similar level of analysis 
to this thesis:  for example Pielke (2004) analyses the response to Bjorn 
Lomborg‘s book ―The Skeptical Environmentalist‖  (2001).  Such articles 
can inform the thesis but it would be difficult to make them the object of 
the analysis without tying the argument into knots.  Other social science 
articles intentionally do constitute part of the debate (e.g. Prins & Rayner, 
2007a; 2007b) but their dual objectives of both analysing the debate and 
forming part of it suggest that they too should inform the research rather 
than be the object of it. 
 Economics and politics academic articles commonly subsume the challenge 
of climate change within policy issues, such as how to allocate the cost of 
negative externalities, or how to achieve international agreements.  
Harrington and Morgernstern (2004) document the trend away from 
―Command-and-Control‖ regulatory policies towards economic incentives.  
Economist W. Nordhaus (2007) argues the case for taxation as the best 
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instrument for fighting global warming.  Much of the literature is a dry 
analysis of which policy instruments are efficient or effective, ignoring the 
importance of political feasibility that Goulder and Parry (2008) identify in 
determining choice of policy instrument.  Carter (2007, p. 340) stresses the 
political difficulties of ‗eco-taxes‘ and reprises Blair‘s oft-quoted remark to 
the House of commons Liaison Committee: ―How many politicians facing.. 
a potential election.. would vote to end cheap air travel‖ (Blair, 2005 
Q133).   Financier George Soros said ―you need .. a tax on carbon 
emissions.  But that is politically unacceptable‖ (Moyers, 2008).  Helm 
(2010) describes carefully how the better route of taxation is supplanted 
by policies like trading schemes and technology subsidies that are open to 
capture.  These detailed arguments for and against policy instruments 
rarely surface in the mainstream media: what does emerge is the reaction 
to those policy instruments.  The Sun‘s response to the Stern review lays 
bare the political infeasibility of global warming taxes (Sun, 2006).   
 Books could provide rich material, in particular because they tend to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of an author‘s argument, identifying 
(most of) the contextual and ideological factors leading towards the 
conclusion.   However, the authors of most relevant books (e.g. Booker & 
North, 2007; Lawson, 2008; Monbiot, 2007; Porritt, 2005) do also write 
newspaper articles: their views can be captured for detailed textual 
analysis in shorter and more manageable form. 
The considerations listed above demand considerable caution in the use of written 
material.  Nevertheless, the practical advantages of using electronically stored 
written material sourced from the news media are considerable.  The news media 
frequently carry views and arguments of those setting the UK agenda, whether 
they be politicians (Tony Blair writing a guest editorial in the Sun (Blair, 2006)), or 
government advisers like Lord Stern (2009b) or Jonathan Porritt  (2008b).  Their 
arguments can be captured both directly and indirectly, as well as arguments from 
those commentators such as Monbiot or Lomborg who have an influence on the 
agenda.  Section 4.4.4 justifies the claim that the media sample used is indeed 
adequately ‗representative‘ (Bauer & Aarts, 2000) of the debate as a whole. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 explain how the coding matrix used to analyse the media 
sample was developed. 
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3.2.3 Focus Group Discussions 
Chapter 1 identified that climate change is widely recognised as a significant 
problem, but one that is long term and that is not yet forcing significant change 
upon UK inhabitants.  In day-to-day life it is a problem people can easily avoid 
‗making sense of‘.  Yet exploring how people make sense of the subject is a stated 
objective of the thesis.  Focus Groups offer the opportunity to get people to make 
sense of the issue in discussion.  They generate sense-making beyond that held by 
the individual participants and are more than the sum of their parts (Cronin, 2001; 
Gaskell, 2000).  Further, the sites of the debate clearly include the conversations 
prompted by extensive media coverage of the topic.  Focus Groups offer the most 
accessible proxy for these conversations.  The Focus Group transcripts were 
analysed using the same Coding Matrix as for the media articles. 
Focus-groups inevitably have their drawbacks.  The group dynamics, and the 
degree of intervention by the facilitator, necessarily influence the ‗sense-making‘ 
they achieve (Cronin, 2001; Flick, 2006, Ch15).  There are also many choices to be 
made in establishing a focus group in respect of who is recruited and how the 
discussion is moderated, all of which have an impact upon the ‗sense-making‘ 
achieved by the group.  Section 5.1 assesses the impact of the choices made on 
the outcome of the focus groups. 
3.2.4 Individual Attitude Survey 
Fiske‘s formulation of RMT is at the individual level.  Respecting this, the thesis 
uses a survey to assess whether individuals use Relational Models to make sense of 
the climate change debate.  The method, detailed in Chapter 6, is to measure 
levels of agreement to arguments about climate change similar to those in the 
matrix used to code the content analyses.  If individuals do use the Relational 
Models to make sense of the debate, the pattern of their responses should suggest 
that the Relational Models coherently account for the arguments addressed. 
Section 6.2.3 describes how the survey method adopted is different from both the 
surveys used by Cultural Theorists (Dake & Thompson, 1999; Gastil, et al., 2005) 
and also those used by attitude researchers (Stern, 2000b; Stern, et al., 1986).  
Specifically, the approach adopted does not treat the Relational Models as if they 
were somehow fixed worldviews attributable to each respondent (the approach 
adopted within Cultural Theory) nor as deep-lying values (the approach adopted 
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within PC Stern‘s Value-Belief-Norm attitude framework).  The survey is not 
designed to predict views on climate change based upon assigned worldviews, 
value orientations or indeed Standpoints. 
3.3 The typologies in Cultural Theory, Relational Models and 
this thesis 
Chapter 2 described the similar typologies proposed by Cultural Theory (CT) and 
Relational Models Theory (RMT).  These typologies seek to encapsulate the 
different ways we make sense of the social world.  CT focuses on how this sense-
making is expressed in organisational structures at the social level.  RMT proposes 
a typology of cognitive categories at the individual level which are also 
manifested in social domains.  Both theories see their typologies as being 
expressed in diverse social domains, such as property ownership, attitudes to 
nature and justice.   
The debate over climate change traverses many of these domains.  This thesis 
examines whether a typology based on RMT is manifested in the climate change 
debate. 
Both RMT and CT argue that there is a foundational logic to each of the four 
‗types‘ within their typologies.  Applying this logic within particular social 
domains, both theories have been used to generate a matrix analysing how each 
‗type‘ is manifested in diverse domains (Fiske, 1992, as discussed in 2.3.5; 
Thompson & Rayner, 1998, version provided at 2.2.7).  The researchers have 
drawn on three sources in generating these matrices: 
1. Theoretical extrapolation of the logic of each ‗type‘: for example, by 
asking how would a Relational Model founded on reciprocity be expressed 
in the domain of distributive justice? 
2. Prior typologies with a partial fit to the theory‘s own typology, such as 
Durkheim‘s solidarities or Udy‘s forms of recruitment (section 2.4.1) 
3. Case study evidence of contested social issues, where divergent 
standpoints can be mapped on to the theory‘s typology, or can be used to 
illustrate the applicability of the proposed typology. 
 
This thesis proposes its own matrix to analyse how the Standpoints implied by the 
four Relational Models can be expected to be manifested in the climate change 
120 
 
debate.  The generation of this matrix follows the same approach as above, but 
emphasising Step 2 first, ie starting with the prior matrices already generated 
within RMT and CT.   The empirical evidence drawn upon for Step 3 is described in 
3.4 below.  Having generated this matrix of Standpoints, the thesis then uses it: 
a) As part of a coding frame to carry out a content analysis of media articles 
and focus group discussions 
b) As a checklist for the questions used in an attitude survey. 
3.4 Generating a matrix of Standpoints in the climate 
change debate 
Generating the matrix used in this thesis took the following steps: 
A. Matrix in Appendix C: Based on prior theory, as per Step 2 above.  
The foundation is an amalgamation of the CT and RMT matrices: for the 
purposes of the exercise, the 4-way typologies of the two theories are 
assumed to map exactly on to each other, ie the Communal Sharing RM 
onto the Egalitarian worldview, Authority Ranking onto Hierarchist, 
Equality Matching onto Fatalist and Market Pricing onto Individualist.  
Chapter 2 has already suggested that the RMs will not map exactly onto the 
worldviews – after all, CT often leaves ‗Fatalist‘ out of the matrix entirely.  
Domains addressed by other typologies were also added.  As in Step 1 
above, the assumed logic of each Standpoint was extrapolated to suggest 
the ‗Argument‘ that the Standpoint would take in each domain.  The 
matrix consists of 4 Standpoints X approximately 50 domains. 
B. Matrix in Appendix D: The exploratory pilot content analysis offered 
a list of domains present in the debate over climate change – e.g. 
‗Adaptation‘, ‗Alternative Energy‘, ‗Consequences‘ etc.  This effectively 
plays the part of Step 3 above by using empirical data.  Using material 
from ‗A‘ above, and following the same procedure of extrapolating the 
logic, the matrix then captures the Arguments each Standpoint uses to 
address individual domains.  Necessarily this is exploratory and tentative at 
this stage.  The individual Standpoints do not have an identified Argument 
for every domain.  The pilot media sample was then cross-referenced to 
the cells in the matrix to identify instantiations of the individual 
Arguments, where this was possible.  The results of this exercise are 
included in the Appendix.  The matrix has also been cross-referenced to 
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significant examples in some of the advocacy literature – e.g. the Stern 
Review (2007).  This matrix is 4 Standpoints X approximately 90 domains 
derived from the pilot coding frame. 
C. Provisional Coding Frame:  The coding frame from the pilot analysis 
formed the basis for the coding frame for the main content analysis.  The 
codes were re-organised so that existing codes, as well as some additional 
theory-derived codes, were attributed to the four Standpoints.  This 
generated a sub-section of the overall coding frame for the four 
Standpoints, with 127 different RM codes as shown in the table below. 
 
 
       Table 3-1 Number of Relational Model codes in coding matrices 
 Although coding was intended to be confirmatory, new codes proliferated.  
 Eventually a revised, cut down coding matrix was produced with 51 ‗RM‘ 
 arguments as shown above 
The final presentation of the RM codes in the exact matrix form below is an 
organisation applied after the fact.  The arguments within the final matrix 
are largely the same as those within the revised version.  However, the 
opportunity to simplify the presentation of the arguments by allocating 
them to eight principal domains for each Standpoint had not been 
immediately recognised.  Therefore this final matrix of codes was 
reapplied to the texts: in effect the texts have been analysed twice, 
separately, with two different coding frames.  A review to reconcile the 
two exercises provided a check on the reliability of the coding. 
D. General thematic codes (not separately listed):  A large number of other 
codes were retained (examples: ‗Catastrophe‘, ‗Consequences, Impacts, 
Effects‘ or families of codes such as: ‗Natural Objects and Events‘ with 
child codes such as ‗Glaciers‘, ‗Ozone‘ or ‗Storms, severe weather‘. 
Provisional  Revised  
    codes Matrix 
Communal Sharing 25 12 
Authority Ranking 36 13 
Equality Matching 23 14 
Market Pricing 43 12 
Total 127 51 
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E. Final coding matrix (Appendix E): The following table provides the 
matrix of 46 Relational Model codes used in the Content Analysis for both 
media articles and focus groups: 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The thesis argues that the pattern of arguments in the climate change debate 
should reflect the four Relational Models.  The three empirical methods adopted 
seek to assess whether this is the case at each of the societal, interpersonal and 
individual levels.  Chapter 4 addresses the societal level by applying this coding 
matrix to media content.  Chapter 5 addresses the inter-personal level by applying 
the matrix to focus group interviews.  Chapter 6 addresses the individual level by 
using arguments from the matrix in an attitude survey.  Chapter 7 discusses how 
successfully these three studies answer the research questions set out in Section 
2.5.4. 
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Chapter 4 Media Content Analysis    
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 3 included a justification for using a content analysis of news media.  This 
chapter provides a detailed account of the methods used.  It comprises the 
following sections: 
4.1 Justifies narrowing ‗news media‘ to UK national newspapers for the   
content analysis 
4.2 Describes the corpus construction and sampling method 
4.3 Comments on the increase in newspaper coverage over time 
4.4 Provides an outline description of the whole sample 
4.5-9 Analyses the content of this sample using the Standpoints of the 
four Relational Models in turn 
4.10 Asks whether the sample manifests the four distinct Standpoints of 
Relational Models Theory 
4.11 Examines interaction and overlap between the Standpoints 
4.12 Asks whether there are other themes in the sample that do not fit 
into an analysis based on the four Relational Models 
4.13 Conclusion. 
 
References to articles in the sample are by #number, i.e. #1, #2, #3...etc.  In 
addition references to articles in the pilot sample are also by #number, as follows, 
#p1, #p2, #p3 etc.  Appendix F schedules articles from the main sample: each 
article can be traced from the details in the Appendix through the Nexis database.  
Appendix B schedules articles from the pilot sample.  Since the pilot sample 
helped to build the coding frame, references to the pilot are restricted to Chapter 
3 and section 4.1 of this chapter which justify the method adopted. 
4.1 Justifying narrowing „news media‟ to UK national 
newspapers for the content analysis 
4.1.1 Criteria for defining the corpus 
The following 5 criteria have driven the definition of the corpus:  
 
 Breadth: having restricted the analysis to news sources, it has to be shown 
that the news sources used capture divergent elements of the debate,  
 Depth: despite excluding the in-depth discussions afforded by books on the 
subject (3.4.2. above) it has to be shown that the news sources used offer 
examples of extended argumentation within the debate 
 Representativeness:  practical considerations inevitably weigh heavily in 
defining the selection of a corpus from which to draw a sample.  
Nevertheless, it is desirable, within practical constraints, to optimise the 
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extent to which the corpus represents the wider public debate and the 
sample represents the corpus.  In the broadest terms, Silverstone (1999) 
argued that the media do indeed do exactly that, namely re-present the 
public debate.  Nevertheless, it is worth examining the extent to which the 
sources selected represent the debate in all its variety, and what elements 
tend to be left out. 
 Emergence: Coverage of the early representation of ideas, before their 
embedding within pre-existing social institutions and ideas can provide 
additional insight.  This process of transformation and reproduction of 
emerging ideas is central to Social Representations Theory (Jovchelovitch, 
2007, pp. 45-49). Although, as noted in 3.3.3 above, the active shaping of 
this assimilation by vested interests is not the main subject of this thesis, 
the early expression of the ideas may provide additional information about 
their nature. 
 Accessibility:  the practical advantages of selecting material from a pre-
existing database are so great that, providing the corpus achieves some 
acceptable score on the preceding four criteria, it makes sense to use such 
a database.  Shortcomings in taking this route can be patched up 
(mitigated) with supplementary material if required. 
4.1.2 Use of UK national newspapers 
The source chosen for analysis was UK national newspapers.  Do these achieve the 
necessary breadth, depth, and representativeness? 
 
―Open any newspaper and the chances are you'll find an item on climate change. 
Friday saw yet another flurry of coverage with the publication of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fourth assessment report on 
the science of climate change‖ wrote the UK‘s Chief Scientific Adviser David King 
(2007) in The Observer.   Not only the IPCC assessment reports, but plenty of new 
scientific evidence and arguments receive coverage in the UK newspapers (e.g. 
#p3, #p36, #p38, #p48).  The deliberations of the UNFCCC and G8/20 meetings 
also gain substantive coverage (e.g. # p10, #p30, #p31).  Significant developments 
in the debate over policies to combat climate change, such as the Stern review, 
are extensively covered (e.g. Blair, 2006). 
 
Many of the leading voices in the debate, both pundits and politicians, contribute 
newspaper columns; to name only two, both George Monbiot and Bjorn Lomborg 
write or have written regularly for the Guardian.  The newspapers also carry more 
philosophical ruminations over what climate change says about humanity and 
nature, and their relationship to one another (e.g. #p39).  Although more 
extended treatments of the topic can be found in news magazines there would be 
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little advantage to including them within the corpus to be analysed.  Similarly, 
there would not be any particular advantage to including local newspapers within 
the corpus.  The national newspapers‘ attempts to make the topic of Climate 
Change more meaningful to their readers encourage a focus on the consequences 
of climate change in the form of floods, storms and heatwaves.  Inevitably these 
involve local detail, whether in the Maldives (#p6), Ireland (#p32) or Oxford Street 
(#p18).  The national newspapers do balance ‗big picture‘ reviews of the issue 
with local detail. 
   
Previous analyses of the media coverage of climate change have highlighted the 
expression of both sceptical and ‗consensus‘ views on the science of 
anthropogenic global warming (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Ereaut & Segnit, 2006).  
Any excursion onto the internet blogs quickly yields pages of sceptical views 
ranged against just as much dismissive ‗consensus‘ opinion.  Newspapers too carry 
examples of both these positions, e.g. Jeremy Clarkson ridiculing climate change 
science (2006 and many other articles) or Johann Hari inveighing against climate 
change ‗deniers‘ (2005, 2007).  However, this tone, as well as sceptical views that 
are carefully argued rather than merely shouted, was not present in the actual 
pilot sample. 
 
National newspapers do appear to achieve the necessary breadth, depth and 
representativeness called for in 4.1.1.30  A further advantage to restricting the 
corpus to national newspapers is the need for corpora to be reasonably 
homogeneous (Bauer & Aarts, 2000, p. 31).   Despite the different readerships of 
the different national titles, they address the British public collectively in a way 
that specialist titles and local newspapers do not. 
4.1.3 Use of the Nexis database 
Nexis provides a readily accessible electronic database of UK newspapers.  For 
research purposes, it is not perfect.  To generate a sampling frame requires the 
number of articles carrying search terms to be counted, and reproduction of the 
sampling frame over time can require laborious reconciliations as occasional 
revisions to the database‘s filing of articles occur. Two specific issues also 
affected sample selection from the corpus: 
                                            
30 The absence of sceptical views in the pilot sample raises the question as to whether the 
national newspapers are sufficiently representative of sceptical views.  Section 4.4.5 
discusses the level of scepticism in the media and in the main media sample. 
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a) Some publications, for certain periods, have duplicate filings representing 
multiple editions, and these are not always eliminated by the facility 
within the database to ‗switch off‘ duplicates: this affects the likelihood 
that some articles are selected by random sampling. 
b) Search terms occasionally pick an article based on Nexis‘ coding of the 
content, which is appended to the article, even when the exact search 
term is not included in the article itself, but this is rare. 
 
However, reviewing the populations generated by a number of different search 
terms did not suggest a systematic bias that could undermine the exercise.  Issue 
(a) might have been significant, but when retrieving sampled articles from the 
database it is readily apparent if the selected article is one amongst duplicates, 
and this is very infrequent.  Issue (b) was not found to be significant in the pilot 
sample31. 
One particular shortcoming of Nexis cannot really be circumvented.  The 
individual publications come on stream on the database at different dates, 
starting with the Financial Times in 1982 (Appendix F provides the sampling frame 
which displays the year in which each publication comes on stream).  Fortunately, 
by the time the 1992 Rio summit was held the FT, Times, Guardian, Independent 
and Mail are all represented.  By 2000 they have been joined by the Telegraph, 
Express, Mirror and Sun.  As the sampling frame shows, even for publications on 
the database prior to 1990 the bulk of the articles in the corpus were written after 
2000. 
 
Set against these issues, the exceptional advantages of accessibility justifies use 
of the Nexis database to form the corpus.  
4.2 Corpus construction and sampling 
4.2.1 Emergence 
Of the 5 criteria mentioned in 4.1.1, only emergence is not addressed above.  The 
potential challenge of global warming only came to wider public attention in 1988 
(Mazur & Lee, 1993).  The Nexis database can therefore address the assimilation 
                                            
31 Point B above raised the concern that sometimes the term appears in Nexis‘ coding of 
the content, not in the article itself.  In the pilot sample of 51 randomly selected #‘s, this 
occurred in 3 cases: #‘s p1, #p8 and #p17.  #p1 includes the phrase ‗global climate is 
warming‘; #p8 included ‗greenhouse effect‘ and ‗reducing carbon dioxide emissions‘ ; 
#p17 included ‗greenhouse gases‘ ‗cut down gases‘ and ‗carbon tax‘.  On this basis it is 
fair to conclude that this feature of the Nexis search process does not distort the 
compilation of the corpus.  
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of the issue by the general public.  Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 below charts the level 
of interest shown by the media in the topic as it emerged. 
4.2.2 Creating the corpus and sampling frame 
A search of the Nexis database of UK national newspapers from inception in 1982 
to 31 August 2009 for all articles that included the terms ―climate change‖ or 
―global warming‖ created a corpus of 75,229 articles.  These search terms were 
chosen after some trial and error in preparing the pilot sample.  Other terms, such 
as ‗Carbon Dioxide emissions‘, the ‗greenhouse effect‘ or the ‗Kyoto Protocol‘ 
either added minimally to the scope, or started to increase the number of articles 
in the sample that were not relevant.  By way of precedent, Carvalho and Burgess 
(2005) used the search terms ‗climate change‘, ‗global warming‘ and ‗greenhouse 
effect‘.  Others, such as the IPPR, emphasise the diversity of media sources and 
necessarily opt for self-selection of the articles analysed in amongst other 
material (Ereaut & Segnit, 2006; Segnit & Ereaut, 2007). 
 
The population constituted by this corpus generated a sampling frame gridded by 
date so that each article could be identified by a unique number capable of 
random selection.  
4.2.3 Sampling and selection of articles: Sample size 
Given the interpretative nature of the exercise, and the shortcomings present in 
the corpus, there are few statistical arguments from which to determine sample 
size.  A different approach would be to increase continuously the sample size until 
saturation is reached (following Bauer & Aarts, 2000, pp. 32-34).  In this context 
saturation means that additional sample items no longer yield new thematic 
material.  The use of random sampling is employed in part to give a feel for the 
relative frequency of particular arguments and themes within the corpus, without 
claims to statistical validity.  It also gives a degree of certainty that rarer themes 
in the material have been covered:  the chosen sample size of 150 gives a 90% 
confidence that material which occurs in only 1% of the corpus units (Krippendorf, 
2004, pp. 121-122) has been captured.  For the purposes of this evaluation the 
pilot coding exercise covering a random sample of 40, albeit covering a slightly 
shorter period (1984-2007) than the main sample, provides further assurance that 
all prevalent themes in the corpus have been captured: in effect a larger sample 
of 190 articles has actually been analysed.  On Krippendorff‘s measures would give 
a 98% confidence that material which occurs in only 2% of the corpus units has still 
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been captured.   The proposed research pulls in both directions here: on the one 
hand a desire to identify themes that influence the debate suggests a search for 
dominant, in the sense of most frequent, themes.   On the other hand, a 
theoretical stance that assumes many themes are implicit and unexpressed 
encourages pursuit of rarer material.  The size of the sample was further 
increased with additional material from early years, described below. 
4.2.4 Sampling and selection of articles: Stratification 
Appendix G, summarised in Figure 4.1 below, shows that the corpus was 
dominated by material from later years.  To achieve the desired coverage of the 
emergence of the debate, an additional sample from earlier years was taken.  30 
additional articles were randomly selected, 10 from each of the periods 1984-
1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-199932. 
 
In addition to items selected from the Nexis database, the pilot sample was 
extended to achieve the ‗depth‘ of the material analysed by adding 11 opinion 
articles to the sample (in line with Bauer & Aarts, 2000, p. 33).  In general these 
were selected from articles found in earlier searches of the Nexis database or 
from internet sites: 7 came from titles covered by the Nexis database, 2 from the 
Financial Times (not included in the pilot random sample) and 2 from internet 
sites.  Not surprisingly these hand-picked pieces provided substantially richer 
analytical material than the randomly selected articles.  However, the handpicked 
articles represented 26% (by word count) of the pilot material and generated 46% 
of the codings: although richer they did not dominate the exercise.  As described 
below at 4.4.4, for the main sample, it was judged that an adequate level of 
saturation had been achieved and there was no need for supplementary material.  
Indeed, some of the challenges experienced in coding the dense, reflexive 
argumentation of these opinion pieces highlighted the difficult consequences of 
introducing more heterogeneity into the corpus (see 4.1.2 above). 
                                            
32 For the pilot, this same stratification strategy was adopted with 5 additional articles 
from each of these periods, giving a total sample of 55.  As a result of some teething 
problems when only halfway up the learning curve, 4 of the random numbers selected in 
the pilot actually failed to match a valid article number on the database, so that a random 
sample of 51 articles was analysed.  No such difficulties were encountered in the main 
sample. 
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4.2.5 Corpus and sample dimensions 
The table below summarises the number of articles present in the corpus and the 
sample by newspaper title: 
 
NO. OF ARTICLES IN CORPUS AND SAMPLE
Newspaper Title Total Sample
1982-1999 2000-2009 Total 1982-1999 Total
2000-2009
Financial Times 2474 8804 11278 12 14 26
Times/Sunday Times 2568 10948 13516 13 16 29
Guardian/Observer 3146 12817 15963 16 25 41
Independent/IoS 2735 8741 11476 6 19 25
Telegraph/ST 0 5744 5744 0 19 19
Mail/MoS 736 4562 5298 5 9 14
Sun/NoW 9 3299 3308 0 4 4
Mirror/SM 203 3163 3366 1 4 5
Express, Star/SE,SS 26 5254 5280 0 17 17
11897 63332 75229 53 127 180  
Table 4-1: Number of articles in corpus and sample 
The sample of 180 articles has in excess of 110,000 words.  The pilot sample of 51 
newspaper articles comprised approximately 33,800 words and the 11 
supplementary opinion pieces approximately 11,700. 
4.3 Increase in newspaper coverage over time 
4.3.1 Emergence of the topic 1970-2010 
A search of the Times Digital Archive and the Nexis database for the Times (1970-
2010)/Sunday Times (1986-2010) provides a clear picture of the increasing media 
interest in the topic: 
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Figure 4-1: News intensity, articles per annum, 1970-2010 
Appendix A provides a timeline for the climate change debate, identifying key 
milestones.  In 1988 Jim Hansen‘s testimony to the US Senate coincided with rising 
concern over the ozone hole as well as high temperatures and drought in the US.  
Then, the ozone hole was almost as significant a topic as climate change as the 
graph demonstrates.  Subsequently, and especially after the Earth Summit in Rio 
in 1992, interest in climate change declined.  The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the 
3rd IPCC Assessment Report in 2001 re-stimulated media interest.  In 2007, the 
aftermath of the Stern Review (published late 2006) and the IPCC 4th Assessment 
Report brought the topic centre stage, with interest peaking in 2009 running up to 
the UNFCCC Copenhagen summit. 
 
Setting these numbers against comparators for other contemporary topics serves 
to demonstrate the high relative importance of the topic as covered by The 
Times/Sunday Times: 
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Year   Search terms   No.  of  
No. of 
GW/CC/GE 
  
   
Articles Articles 
1989   Berlin Wall   270 583 
1990 
 
Berlin Wall 
 
296 440 
1990 
 
Saddam Hussein/Desert Storm/Gulf War 4185 440 
2003 
 
Saddam Hussein/WMD/weapons of mass destruction 3766 380 
2008 
 
Credit crunch/credit crisis 5350 3477 
2010 
 
Credit crunch/credit crisis 1615 2002 
2010   Budget deficit   2452 2002 
 
Table 4-2: Frequency of comparative search terms on Nexis database 
4.3.2 Emergence in different newspapers 
Emergence over the last decade in different newspapers is broadly similar: 
 
 
Figure 4-2 No. of relevant articles per annum by publication, 2001-2010 
4.3.3 Overview commentary on emergence data 
Carvalho (Carvalho, 2007; 2005) analyses the different stances taken by different 
newspapers to the issue from 1985-2003: they identify the campaigning role of the 
Guardian and the Independent, which took a lead in consciously trying to raise 
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awareness of the issue.  This continued during the middle of the last decade.  In 
recent years other newspapers appear to have been driven mainly by the salience 
of the issue within the UK political agenda – with high peaks after the Stern 
Review late in 2006 and in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit. 
 
The year 2010 falls outside the Corpus sampled for detailed analysis.  Generally 
interest declined in 2010.  Four reasons can be cited: 
 
A. In the UK there was a political consensus on climate change (e.g. ―All three 
of Britain's main political parties espouse low-carbon growth‖(Lean, 2010, 
p. 24): the election battleground was the economy, inevitably squeezing 
out other topics. 
B. The Copenhagen summit at the very end of 2009 was judged a failure (e.g. 
Porritt, 2009; Vidal, Stratton, & Goldenberg, 2009).  When so many had 
declared before Copenhagen that failure was not an option (King, 2009; N 
Stern, 2009), it was inevitable that afterwards public figures would be less 
ready to invest political or ‗celebrity‘ capital in the issue. 
C. In late 2009 leaked emails suggested that climate change scientists had 
knowingly overstated the case for anthropogenic global warming (Nature 
Editorial, 2009a).  On the one hand, this was a significant debating point, 
generating news coverage; on the other, coinciding with the failure at 
Copenhagen, it facilitated a decline in popular concern (McKie, 2010); 
―Brits so cool on warming‖ said the Sun (February 2010). 
D. Britain experienced colder winters in 2008/9 and 2009/10 as well as the 
early part of 2010/11.  Stern is clear that this first-hand evidence 
apparently contradicting ‗warming‘ has a significant impact on belief 
(Stern, 2010, 79th minute) and media references tend to support this 
(Booker, 2009; Leake, 2009).  The literature on how personal experience of 
the weather affects beliefs is discussed in section 1.7.3.2. 
 
Both the Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph and the Express group newspapers actually 
increased coverage of the issue in 2010.  Because the period lies outside that 
covered by the main sample, it has been necessary to look at these articles 
separately.  A review of the Nexis abstracts of Express group articles in March 
2010 suggests that the new mood, driven by B, C, and D above, released pent up 
frustration over climate change.  Swanson (2010) sums up the mood: ‗Where is 
your global warming now?‘  However, this cursory examination cannot suggest why 
these titles seem to express this changed mood, while others do not. 
 
An intriguing aspect of these figures charting the intensity of the climate change 
debate is that ‗Greenhouse effect‘ is initially the most frequent of the three 
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terms searched.  For a brief period in the early 1990‘s ‗global warming‘ is the 
most frequent of the three, but by 2000 ‗climate change‘ is the most frequent 
term.  In part this must reflect the fact that both the main international bodies 
for researching and discussing the issue, the IPCC and the UNFCCC, have ‗climate 
change‘ in their titles.  Yet it also seems likely that this trajectory reflects a shift 
down the causal chain from the physical mechanism (greenhouse effect) to the 
overall phenomenon (warming) to the consequences for readers (changes in 
climate).  The Focus Groups in Chapter 5 support this emphasis on the importance 
of personal relevance to individuals. 
4.4 Outline description of the main sample 
4.4.1 Descriptive coding 
Each article, as a whole, has been coded with the following descriptive 
characteristics: 
 
1. Style of content.  Was the article a news story, or a comment piece or a 
bit of both?  Was the global warming content primary, secondary or minor 
in the piece as a whole?  Eight codes, in table 4-3 below 
2. Thematic content of the whole article.  Ten different codes derived from 
the pilot sample, shown below in table 4-4, were used to identify which 
broad themes were present in each article – essentially identifying what 
was each article about.  Codes were not unique – so each article could be 
coded as including several themes. 
3. To the extent that the article was about global warming, what was the 
principal global warming theme?  Ten further codes, also in table 4-4 
below, some overlapping those in 2 above were used to identify which was 
the principal theme in each article.  Codes were unique, with only one 
theme per article. 
4. Level of scepticism or belief in the science of anthropogenic global 
warming („AGW‟).  Each article was coded to identify (on a scale from -3 
‗vehemently sceptical‘ to +3 ‗vehemently advocating the science‘) the 
attitude to the science of AGW.  The scale includes a code of ‗0‘ for an 
explicitly neutral stance.  In addition, a further 2 codes were required.  
The first captures the many articles that effectively take anthropogenic 
global warming for granted: they did not express an attitude but the 
content would be nonsensical if there was doubt about the reality of global 
warming and mankind‘s role in it.   The second captures the many articles 
that simply do not give enough evidence to attribute an attitude to the 
science. 
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Appendix F schedules all of the 180 articles and the descriptive codes attributed 
to them, together with a short phrase describing the content, the publication, 
date and length of each article.   
 
The coding process inescapably involves subjective judgement.  The whole 
descriptive coding exercise was conducted twice on separate occasions and 
discrepancies were resolved, an approach which enforces some objective 
discipline within the process. 
4.4.2 Style of content 
The table below summarises the nature of the Global Warming content in the 
articles: 
  
  
 Table 4-3: No. of articles by style of content 
 
The boundaries between news, news and comment, and comment are inevitably 
somewhat blurred.  Similarly, there is a continuum from primary through 
secondary to ‗minor or derivative‘.    Minor or derivative articles range widely.  
For example, in #19, a discussion of Margaret Thatcher‘s use of experts at 
Chequers seminars, mentions her holding such a seminar to look at climate 
change.  There are many such pieces on politics which mention climate change as 
just one amongst a list of issues (e.g. #57, #125, #133, #141).  Other articles 
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simply exist in a context where climate change is part of the contemporary milieu, 
maybe as material for jokes (#134), films (#73) or music (#83). 
 
Four early articles really were not about climate change at all, including a 
geologist‘s obituary (#20) and two articles about the weather (#2 and 4).  #1 from 
1983 is about UN plans to provide agricultural commodity price stability to 
developing world producers where climate variability may affect their fortunes: so 
it has many of the themes that will dominate the future debate, but it is not 
about climate change arising from anthropogenic global warming.   
4.4.3 Broad thematic content 
The table below summarises the broad thematic content by number of articles.  
‗Thematic content‘ codes allow for multiple themes in the article, even if the GW 
content is minimal.  ‗Principal GW theme‘ takes articles where the GW content is 
sufficiently substantial to enable a ‗principal‘ theme to be allocated. 
 
  
  
 Table 4-4: Articles by thematic content and principal GW theme 
The newspapers address the issue from several angles: 
 
 Is there a problem/what is the problem?  This is captured in science news 
and reports of the consequences of global warming.  Science news can be 
narrowly specific, such as #49 on coral diseases.  The consequences too 
can be very specific, such as the grass growing faster in Carlisle (#75) or 
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the possibility of new spiders in Scotland (#120).  There are also broader 
discussions of the science and what it means (e.g. #122, #124). 
 Given that there is a problem, what should we do about it?  Again, this can 
be specific (energy saving tips at the Ideal Home Show, #101), or broad 
discussions about whether climate change represents a policy priority when 
compared to other issues such as national security (e.g. #140, #154).  
Discussion about ‗what to do‘ sometimes focuses on actual policy 
initiatives, for example the role of nuclear in electricity generation (e.g. 
#70, #91): but very often the coverage is really about politics.  Numerous 
pieces about US politics mention climate change as a policy area (e.g. 
#151, #163, #179) but fewer are principally about climate change and the 
US role in the discussions (e.g. #16, #41). 
 Policy makers on climate change typically divide responses between 
‗mitigation‘ and ‗adaptation‘ (1.3.5, 1.3.6).  ‗What to do‘ coverage can 
also be divided between how to prevent global warming with greenhouse 
gas emissions cuts (e.g. #93 on UNFCCC talks), and how to adapt to the 
consequences of climate change, whether with flood defences (#24) or by 
having to work harder cutting the grass that is growing faster in Carlisle 
(#75). 
 A number of articles show the whole topic having been absorbed into 
different human activities: art represents and interprets climate change 
(#22, #111), consumers respond to the need to buy ethically (#76) and 
celebrities show them that ―Green is the new black, darlings‖ (#97); 
businesses and investment advisers respond to the challenges (#60) and 
the opportunities (#119, #152). 
 Roughly half of the articles evince the kind of ‗worldviews‘ that Cultural 
Theory would recognise: presumed moral imperatives appear to influence 
the opinions offered.  These can be trivial, such as efforts by pop stars to 
raise awareness of global warming (#132) through to intense discussions 
about mankind‘s place on this earth (#68, #111). 
4.4.4 Is the sample representative of the debate? 
Section 1.3 described the debate as addressing the following questions.  Against 
each one three articles which engage directly with the question are listed: 
1. Is the world getting warmer?  #28, #37, #116 
2. Is this warming anthropogenic?  Relative importance of anthropogenic and 
natural causes : #3, #17, #138, 
3. (a) What are the possible consequences of the warming? Wide variety: #82, 
#139, #157               
(b) Are these a problem?  Consequences usually presented as problems #9, 
#22,#104, 
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4. (a) Should we try to stop it?   Some say no #54, #136; most think we 
should, #168                                 
(b) Can we stop it?  Fears over not enough time #35, #128, #169 
5. What are the best policies for stopping it?  #27, #56, #137 
6. How do we share the burden of stopping it?  Developed world versus 
developing world #26; do individual actions make a difference? #76, #112. 
Not only does the sample address the breadth of the debate, it also includes 
numerous articles that consider the topic in depth.  The following give a flavour: 
 
 #7 is a Times editorial looking at environmental economics and politics 
after Margaret Thatcher brought the topic centre stage in 1988 
 #17 is an article by the editor of Nature John Maddox, entitled ―Let reason 
rule on global warming‖.  An extended look at the science and at the 
relationship between human progress and nature. 
 #43 examines how the business and political worlds are responding post 
Kyoto 
 #54 is a rant by Jeremy Clarkson, insisting ―It‘s not fair‖ on the trees to cut 
CO2 emissions. 
 #68 is an article by James Lovelock, also an extended look at the science, 
nuclear power and the relationship between human progress and nature. 
 #98 has leading business coach Sir John Whitmore discussing how the motor 
industry can become more environmentally responsible 
 #111 is a reflective look through Breughel and modern art at the 
relationship between mankind and changing climate 
 #112 considers Tony Blair‘s environmental credibility: what is it reasonable 
to ask individuals to ‗give up‘? 
 #121 Ryanair boss Michael O‘Leary attacks environmentalists 
 #136 is a rant by Richard Littlejohn about eco-loonies and the need to trust 
the market to solve social issues 
 #170 is an extended look at Transition Towns and other community 
sustainability projects. 
 
Overall, the apparent breadth and depth of the coverage of the debate suggested 
that the sample successfully represented the main elements of the debate. As a 
result, no further supplementary articles were added (see 4.2.3). 
4.4.5 Levels of scepticism 
Articles were rated for the level of scepticism expressed in them: 
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 Table 4-5: Level of scepticism by number of articles 
 
The lack of expressed scepticism is striking.  As described before, many studies 
have emphasised the media‘s role in promulgating sceptical voices (Boykoff, 
2008b; Carvalho, 2007; Oreskes & Conway, 2008).  In this sample there are two 
sceptical shock-jock style rants: #54 by Jeremy Clarkson, #136 by Richard 
Littlejohn.  There is some deliberate expression of ambivalence: #153 in The 
Express comprises a ‗for‘ and an ‗against‘ letter.  Yet a rant by the Ryanair boss 
against environmentalist hypocrisy actually engages with global warming as a 
problem by saying that we have to influence the developing world, not cut our 
own consumption.  A carefully argued piece (#17) by John Maddox, author of a 
trenchant attack on Limits to Growth (Meadows, et al., 1972) entitled ‗the 
Doomsday Syndrome (Maddox, 1972), actually accepts the reality of global 
warming while challenging the consensus policy responses to it.  This latter 
strategy is similar to that of Lomborg (2001, 2007) who avoids arguing about the 
science but aggressively challenges the policy prioritisation of climate change.  
#124 similarly attacks doom-mongering by picking up on research that suggests 
Kilimanjaro‘s glacier is not retreating: but it is saying the whole topic is more 
complex, not that AGW is untrue. 
 
Commentators whose job is to entertain are happy to suggest the science is 
nonsense: but the sample provides no evidence of any widespread expression of 
serious argument against consensus global warming science.  This was the same in 
the pilot random sample, which only had one article expressing scepticism: #p14 
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discussed a challenge to the way climate change was being taught in schools as an 
accepted fact. 
 
It cannot be denied that there are serious sceptical voices in the UK:  the 
arguments of Nigel Lawson‘s (2008) ‗Appeal to Reason‘ are frequently repeated in 
print by his journalist son Dominic.  The TV programme ‗The Great Global 
Warming Swindle‘ (Durkin, 2007) stirred up plenty of attention.  One letter to the 
Sunday Express (#138) demonstrates the impact on the public of apparent 
controversy over the science.  People are confused: 
 
―Both sides can't be right, so isn't it time for someone independent to start doing 
some serious research into all this to establish the truth as a matter of urgency?‖ 
 
However, in terms of quantity sceptical voices are a drop in the ocean.  The vast 
majority of coverage accepts without challenge, advocates strongly or simply 
takes for granted the consensus position.   
 
4.5 Different Standpoints in the sample 
4.5.1 Outline of the next four sections 
Section 3.4 set out a coding matrix generated from applying the four Relational 
Models (Communal Sharing, Market Pricing, Equality Matching and Authority 
Ranking) to the eight domains, namely: 
 
1. The foundational principle of the RM, 
2. The approach taken when applying the RM to the issue of climate change, 
3. The RM‘s implied analysis of the economics of climate change, 
4. The attitudes towards nature typical of the RM, 
5. The RM‘s understanding of the relationship between Man and the natural 
world, 
6. The kinds of knowledge and wisdom privileged by the RM, 
7. The attitudes towards other people typical of the RM, 
8. And lastly, the RM‘s outlook when faced by the issue of climate change. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, each RM encourages particular arguments, or premises, 
in each domain from which to debate climate change.  Taken together these 
arguments form a Standpoint within the debate.  Each cell in the 4x8 matrix 
potentially represents a distinct argument or collection of arguments. The next 
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four sections consider whether and how each of the 3233 potential ‗arguments‘ are 
represented in the sample. 
4.5.2 Interaction between the Standpoints 
There are challenges to distilling the essence of each Standpoint.  Most 
importantly, the Standpoints are not offered as stereotypes existing in isolation.  
The arguments offered by one Standpoint are commonly advanced against the 
arguments of another.   Many participants in the debate will be seen to employ 
the arguments of more than one Standpoint.  Sections 4.6 to 4.9 somewhat 
artificially separate out the Standpoints.  Subsequent sections consider the 
interactions between them.  
4.5.3 Arguments within the sample 
Appendix H takes the coding matrix and populates it with article numbers from 
the sample where the relevant argument has been identified.  This is not a 
comprehensive exercise: some cases are left out, while some of the inclusions are 
perhaps borderline.  For example, in the domain of ‗Attitude to Others‘, the 
Standpoint of Communal Sharing emphasises helping the needy, but not every 
mention of developed world assistance to the developing world nor every mention 
of obligations to ‗our children‘s children‘ is included.  Given the interactions 
between Standpoints mentioned above, some cases are clear cut statements of an 
argument, others are not: self-assertion of individual freedom (a foundational 
principle of Market Pricing) regularly blends with rejection of uncompensated 
impositions by authority (an argument of Equality Matching in the domain of 
‗Attitude to Others). 
 
The populated matrix identifies 531 arguments in 142 out of the 180 newspaper 
articles in the sample.  50 articles have ‗CS‘ arguments identified; 70 have ‗MP‘ 
arguments; 95 articles have ‗AR‘ arguments identified and 57 ‗EM‘ arguments.  
The subjective nature of this exercise should discourage reading too much into 
these numbers.   However, since the national media pays particular attention to 
the words and deeds of governments and politicians it should not be surprising 
that the AR Standpoint is more in evidence: governments are less prominent in the 
focus groups (Ch5). 
 
                                            
33 32 is the number of cells in the matrix: expanding the logic of some generated 46 
arguments in the matrix in Appendix E. 
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4.6 Standpoint of Communal Sharing 
4.6.1 CS1: Communal Sharing: foundational principle 
The foundational principle of CS is one of equality within the group, especially 
when faced by a shared challenge.  The very existence and constitution of the UN, 
and subsidiary bodies such as the UNFCCC, represents a global aspiration to fulfil 
this principle. The foundational principle of equality makes combating climate 
change a human rights issue, as #26, #40 and #86 identify.   Within the sample, 
this idea of ‗all being in it together‘ can be expressed quite blandly: 
#35: 
―It is going to affect every person on earth.‖ 
 
In the face of the challenge, we must all pull together (#8): 
―[Lord Cledwyn] said that vigorous international co-operation was needed if the 
potential catastrophe threatened by global warming, acid rain and damage to the 
ozone layer was to be avoided.‖ 
 
#87 expresses the principle in more fully developed form with Simon Hughes 
setting out his political priorities: 
―And a greener Britain, because uncontrolled climate change is the biggest challenge 
we face. Scientists differ in whether they think we have 10 years, or 30 years, to put 
in place the energy infrastructure that will make possible a sharp reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions. Some think it may already be too late. But we have to try, 
not only for our own sake and our children's, but for the sake of the poorest and most 
vulnerable communities everywhere in the world.‖ 
4.6.2 CS2: Communal Sharing: approach to climate change 
CS2.1: We can all do our bit 
Since ‗we are all in it together‘ the CS Standpoint insists that ‗we can all do our 
bit‘ to combat climate change: 
#112: 
―At a press conference last night, Mr Blair said: "There's a massive amount individuals 
can do. In this building we have energy efficient lightbulbs now, we get all our 
sources of energy from renewable sources, we have been putting down the 
temperatures, we do recycling on a very large scale." 
 
Or #145: 
―SCOTTISH SUN DOES ITS BIT 
YOUR No1 Scottish Sun is printed using paper that's 80.6 per cent recycled. 
Paper is shipped from Norway to cut down on carbon emissions from flights. 
We're committed to renewable energy with power at our new Eurocentral print plant 
coming from 47 per cent landfill and 14 per cent hydro.‖ 
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The Standpoint also emphasises the importance of the mother earth on which we 
all depend.  For James Lovelock this obligation to the environment transcends our 
human rights obligations.  He writes in #68: 
―The Green lobbies, which should have given priority to global warming, seem more 
concerned about threats to people than with threats to the Earth, not noticing that 
we are part of the Earth and wholly dependent upon its well being.‖ 
 
CS2.2: Mankind is at fault 
As CS‘s analysis of mankind‘s relationship to nature will show (4.5.5 below), we 
must all take responsibility for the land upon which we depend.  Mankind, which 
Lovelock describes as ‗like a planetary disease‘ (#68), is at fault: 
#9: 
―A tidal wave of guilt over the destruction of the environment is sweeping the 
Netherlands.  The Dutch have concluded that their country's neat, green appearance 
belies a harsher reality of polluted water, contaminated land and poisoned wildlife.‖ 
 
This attribution of responsibility lies at the heart of CS‘s economic analysis. 
4.6.3 CS3: Communal Sharing: economics 
Section 1.3.6 on Sustainability argued that the environmental impact of human 
economic activity is a function of the size of population, the level of affluence 
and the technological efficiency of the activity.  This is expressed in the equation: 
 
  I = PAT 
 
For CS, to reduce environmental impact I, society must reduce the levels of 
consumption implied by A.  For CS this matters, because there must logically be a 
limit to how much CO2 we can put into the atmosphere, just as Malthus argued 
that there must be a limit to how much we consume because logically resources 
must run out eventually.  Joe Rogaly, writing in #34 sets out the case: 
―Some of us fear that further industrial development, particularly in India and China, 
will so clog up the atmosphere that, in a century or two, global warming will be the 
least of our problems. We dispute the proposition that the ability of capitalism to 
create ever higher mountains of material goods will be of lasting benefit to the 
human species. We prefer giant Redwoods to John Redwood... 
... We wonder whether every new product, from every busy laboratory, adds to or 
subtracts from life's difficulties.‖ 
 
#92 suggests the same: 
―It's a tenet of almost religious faith that humans are sawing away at the branch 
they're sitting on.‖ 
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As does #97: 
―it is just not acceptable to jet off to Barcelona for a hen weekend, or fly to Paris 
when Eurostar is so much kinder to the environment‖. 
 
Which means, according to #41: 
―if the government is serious about global warming, it must aim to get people to cut 
their consumption of energy.‖ 
4.6.4 CS4: Communal Sharing: attitude to nature 
Cultural theory states that the egalitarian worldview endorses the ‗myth‘ of 
‗Nature Fragile‘ (Section 2.2.2).  This idea is frequently expressed, e.g. by James 
Lovelock in #68: 
―climatologists warn a four-degree rise in temperature is enough to eliminate the 
vast Amazon forests in a catastrophe for their people, their biodiversity, and for the 
world, which would lose one of its great natural air conditioners‖. 
 
Or in a description of new coral diseases in #49: 
―‘These are the little cries and whispers which, when you look at the ocean carefully, 
and really think about what is going on, begin to affront you with the dangers that lie 
ahead,‘ said Prof Porter. ‗As we went back through our data, we saw an alarming 
trend.‘ ― 
4.6.5 CS5: Communal Sharing: relationship of mankind to nature 
Yet the CS Standpoint on nature is almost inextricably intertwined with the 
presumption that mankind is destroying nature.  It is often taken as a given that 
our ―planet is wracked by devastation from pollution and poison‖ (#22).  Again 
Joe Rogaly develops the idea fully in #34: 
―The side-effects, the gargoyle faces, of seemingly infinite economic growth arouse 
suspicion in many of us. For some it is the traffic jam, or the juggernaut lorry; others 
wonder about strange new illnesses, the consequences of carefree prescribing of 
antibiotics, the air breathed from the walls of contemporary offices, the effect of jet 
travel on the biosphere, factory farming, genetic engineering, the rays from 
cathodes, and just about every new wheeze thrown out by the ever-expanding 
scientific invention machine.‖ 
 
#42 is an extended discussion of the problem of forest fires, typically started by 
humans: 
―The home of the Yanomami people, the largest remaining forest tribe in northern 
Brazil, is being destroyed around them. Wild animals that escape are seen running 
down roads, the only places not burning. Firefighters fear being bitten by poisonous 
snakes.‖ 
4.6.6 CS6: Communal Sharing: knowledge and wisdom 
Clearly, these examples are arguing that our behaviour is sheer folly.  Indeed, in 
destroying our environment we are destroying our own closeness to the earth and 
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all the knowledge that intimate relationship gave us.  #26 emphasises the wisdom 
of indigenous peoples: 
―Much of the coca is grown by Indians, whose accumulated knowledge of 
environmentally friendly and sustainable agriculture has been ignored.  'The Maya, 
the Incas, the pre-Incas, the Aztecs and other ethnic groups had solved problems that 
the technologies of the north are still working on, or have failed to solve.‖ 
 
While #170 bewails the developed world‘s ignorance: 
―We have farmed for 600 generations yet most of us have forgotten how to grow 
food‖. 
 
This article is a long discussion about the Transition Town movement, which seeks 
to foster a return to decentralised community projects and local self-sufficiency, 
consciously wanting to reconnect with nature: 
―supplying our needs in the future will also need considerable movement in the other 
direction: dispersal of both livestock and humans around the country, not least so 
that all that human manure can be put back on the land.‖ 
4.6.7 CS7: Communal Sharing: attitude to others 
Broadly the CS Standpoint to other people is captured in the foundational 
principle of equality.  There is an imperative to help those within the community.  
The community may be global, so that the developed world has a duty to the 
developing world (e.g. #24, #26, #169); the community may be future 
generations, our children‘s children.  The Bishop of Stafford expressed this in 
extreme terms (#158): 
"In fact you could argue that, by our refusal to face the truth about climate change, 
we are as guilty as [the abusive Austrian father who kept family members locked in 
his cellar] is - we are in effect locking our children and grandchildren into a world 
with no future and throwing away the key.'' 
 
There are clearly important implications if we do not treat the whole of humanity 
as our ‗community‘.  If we treat some of humanity as lying outside the 
community, they become ‗they‘, or truly ‗others‘: we have no obligations to 
them.  Section 4.9.7 examines where this leads. 
4.6.8 CS8: Communal Sharing: outlook 
From the CS Standpoint, the Outlook can be broken down as follows: 
 
CS8.1 It will be a catastrophe; the weak and our children‘s children will 
suffer, unless we act. 
CS8.2 Therefore, co-operative action is logically the right thing to do, and/or 
CS8.3 Acting to prevent catastrophe is a moral imperative. 
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Visions of apocalypse are rife: ‗the planet is dying‘ (#104); Queen Beatrix of the 
Netherlands warns in #9: 
―the earth is slowly dying and the inconceivable - the end of life itself - is actually 
becoming conceivable.‖ 
 
#112 brings together CS8.1 and 8.2: 
―Environment Minister Ian Pearson said: ‗All countries need to urgently agree a global 
deal. People are already being affected. If we don't act now, millions more will 
suffer.‘ 
Greenpeace's Stephanie Tunmore said: ‗This is a glimpse into an apocalyptic future. 
Time's running out.‘ 
Catherine Pearce, of Friends of the Earth, said: ‗Climate change is no longer just an 
environmental issue - it is a looming catastrophe threatening global security and 
survival.‘‖ 
 
These are good examples of what Cultural Theory identifies as the egalitarian 
worldview‘s tendency to ‗compress‘ time by treating now as a pivotal moment 
(Section 2.2.7, figure 5). 
 
CS8.3 brings us back to the foundational principle, for example in the quote from 
Simon Hughes, #87 in 4.6.1: 
―Some think it may already be too late. But we have to try, not only for our own sake 
and our children's, but for the sake of the poorest and most vulnerable communities 
everywhere in the world.‖ 
 
4.7 Standpoint of Market Pricing 
4.7.1 MP1: Market Pricing: foundational principle 
According to Relational Models Theory, in Market Pricing ―social transactions are 
reckoned as rational calculations of cost and benefit‖ (Haslam, 1995b, p. 43).  On 
this account, the foundational principles of market pricing are first the reliance on 
an objective standard or currency of value, and second the rationality of the 
calculation of worth according to the standard.    On this basis, #51, might be 
expected to capture the essence of market pricing.  In this article the bookmakers 
price the odds on what will cause the end of the world (global warming is a long 
shot compared to nuclear war or an asteroid impact). 
 
However, this account misses a step.  The Standpoint first and foremost is an 
assertion of individual freedom, and of the right of private interests to reap the 
benefit of their own efforts.  The maintenance of a ‗standard‘ or currency 
facilitates the allocation of rewards proportional to individual contribution and 
effort, consistent with the principles of equity.  
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Therefore, assertion of the individual right to choose is central to the Standpoint: 
#112: 
―Tony Blair tried last night to restore his green credentials by announcing that he 
would offset carbon emissions from his and his family's holiday travel. 
Downing Street made the concession after the two lobby briefings yesterday were 
dominated by Mr Blair's insistence that he had no intention of cutting back on 
personal flights‖ 
 
Even this quote can be seen to exist as an argument against the CS point of view 
that the individual should make sacrifices for the greater good.  However, 
asserting naked self-interest is just bad manners, unless coupled with the 
justification of resisting unwarranted restrictions.  #92 captures this with a 
description of those denying the reality of climate change: 
 
―To call that truth into question is to align yourself with the kind of person who 
thinks it's fun to run over snow leopards in a Hummer‖. 
 
In the context of climate change, the foundational principle of MP is therefore 
expressed more often in its rejection: 
#33: 
―World interests are too important to allow progress to be sunk below the apparently 
conflicting interests of different groups of countries‖ 
 
Or #98: 
―Some think that the environment is the Government's problem, yet when it suggests 
controls on speed or fuel usage, they protest‖ 
 
This makes it much easier to express the MP Standpoint less as a selfish assertion 
of the right to choose than as an explicit rejection of government infringement of 
liberty; e.g. Richard Littlejohn writes in #136: 
―Socialists have only ever had a passing acquaintance with the concept of individual 
liberty and low taxation... 
...The job of politicians is to ensure that we have a reliable supply of electricity. How 
we choose to use it is entirely a matter for us.‖ 
 
4.7.2 MP2: Market Pricing: approach to climate change 
Cultural theory argues that societies select risks that reinforce the prevailing 
worldview, or at the very least do not challenge it.  The individualist worldview 
will therefore either deny outright the existence of anthropogenic global warming, 
or it will reject responses to the problem that inhibit individual freedom.  On this 
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basis, the right thing to do is to allow people, relying on their ingenuity, to adapt 
to the environment as it changes.   Section 4.4.5 showed that outright denial is 
rare.  Instead, the Standpoint emphasises the need to trust individual rationality, 
and the need for society to facilitate individual efforts to thrive.  This approach 
follows Adam Smith‘s reliance on human rationality and goodness and on the 
operation of the ‗invisible hand‘ (as outlined in section 1.6.5).  Littlejohn goes on 
in #136: 
―People are aware of their responsibilities to the planet, and most try to conserve 
energy and recycle as much as possible‖. 
 
In 1991, #9 suggested what laissez-faire meant in the business arena: 
―The environment plan will continue to rely more on voluntary "covenants" with 
industry to reduce con-taminants than on legal norms‖ 
 
Generally, however, the greater complexity of the problem is recognised.  An 
editorial in the Financial Times spells out the approach, again setting MP against 
the context of government intervention, in #7: 
―There is a respectable economic case for spending money on environmental 
protection.  It rests on the need to counteract what economists call external 
diseconomies, or the additional costs borne by society that are not paid for by 
individuals or firms as they legitimately pursue their private interests.  But here is 
the rub: the discrepancy between private and social costs that gives rise to pollution 
and other forms of disamenity has been used to justify the enhanced role accorded to 
the state in the 20th century - that same state whose regulations Mrs Thatcher has 
been so anxious to roll back‖. 
 
Unsurprisingly, MP‘s diagnosis of the problem is one of ‗market pricing‘.  Society 
needs to facilitate individuals in making the rational choices they will naturally 
make by pricing into energy consumption the ‗external diseconomies‘ or negative 
externalities.  #11, #56, #157 express this argument, as does a blithely optimistic 
#43 from 1998: 
―One of the most intriguing aspects of the Kyoto legacy will be the emergence of a 
global market for carbon dioxide emissions. This gives companies and countries the 
flexibility to reduce emissions when, and as, it is most cost-effective for them to do 
so. So excited are its proponents that a UN conference gathers in London next month 
to try to hammer out the rules of the game even before the concept is agreed at 
Buenos Aires.‖ 
 
4.7.3 MP3: Market Pricing: economics 
Economic policy preferences 
The economic analysis underlying the approach of the MP Standpoint emphasises a 
preference for policy that facilitates individual decision making.  This manifests 
itself in two specific ways: 
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 A strong preference for marketable instruments such as emission permits 
(e.g. # 43, #56, #81, #137, #165, #177)  
 A commitment to economic growth (in contrast to CS‘s assertion of limits 
to growth).   #7, #23 and #110 record advocates of economic growth in 
priority to environmental protection.  Part of the logic for this is presumed 
economies of scale (#121): 
―Mr O'Leary still claims Ryanair is the greenest airline in Europe. He said the company 
had halved its carbon emissions per passenger in five years by spending EUR10 billion 
on a fleet of new Boeing 737-800s and by ‗packing in the passengers on all the 
flights‘‖. 
 
Another part of the logic is that economic growth enfranchises the poor in 
developing countries, helping them to help themselves.  Section 1.3.6 identified 
commentators arguing strongly that concern over global warming should not be 
used to deny economic growth to developing countries but the instrumentalist 
argument, that only with growth will the developing world be able to adapt, is not 
made explicitly in the sample.  However, the right to economic growth in 
developing countries is taken as given (#33): 
―Countries such as China and India with large populations and rapidly developing 
economies...  ...have the right to develop their economies for their own benefit.‖ 
 
Individual economic behaviour 
More central to the MP Standpoint is the expectation that rational economic 
behaviour means defending your own interests.  Helm (2010) draws attention to 
the industry rent-seeking encouraged by emission permit trading systems and the 
policy capture that inevitably chases technology subsidies.  From the MP 
Standpoint, this is normal behaviour, occurring regularly (e.g. #44, #67, #86, 
#92, #105, #106, #110).  As Helm pointed out, it is often successful (#150): 
―However, the headline grabber was unleashed by the Ofgem boss, Alistair Buchanan, 
when he said that because carbon emission permits are given away free, and that the 
cost of those permits is already factored into our higher energy prices, it equates to a 
whopping £9bn windfall for electricity producers between now and 2012, when the 
current phase of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) ends.‖ 
 
The MP approach does not so much advocate a particular course as a guiding 
philosophy: the rational, self-interested individual should make the most of the 
prevailing environment (#43):  
―Having fought hardest to prevent a deal being reached, the US car industry was the 
first sector to react when agreement was struck, in spite of a rear-guard attempt by 
oil-producing nations to kill it off. US car-makers, trailing initiatives announced 
before Kyoto by their Japanese competitors, lost no time in stressing their plans to 
develop low emission vehicles‖. 
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4.7.4 MP4: Market Pricing: attitude to nature 
This philosophy underpins the MP Standpoint‘s attitude to nature.  Unlike CS, the 
MP Standpoint does not emphasise humanity as part of nature: nature is external 
and ‗other‘.  Either we can put the natural world to our purposes and make the 
most of it, treating it as a potential cornucopia; or we can recognise the 
challenges it poses and adapt to it, recognising the power of nature.  Common 
sense dictates, ‗If you can control nature, do; if you cannot, adapt to it‘. 
 
Writers often emphasise that the natural greenhouse effect is vital to life (#17 & 
#28 make this point explicitly): it is part of the benign nature we can rely upon.  
More generally, the idea of a cyclical nature simply providing the background 
against which we should get on with our lives is very strong (e.g. #46, #54, & 
#138).  Some rare out-and-out sceptics take this to the extreme.  First, #153: 
―If global warming is happening, it is a natural phenomenon.  When the Earth heated 
up at the end of the last Ice Age, was this caused by Neanderthals driving their 
children to school and flying to Australia for their holidays?  No!‖ 
 
Second, #124 identifies the rational response of just getting on with it: 
―The majority of reasonable people will say this is just the weather. One day it's hot, 
the next cold - that's how it always has been. All this global warming is just 
cobblers.‖ 
4.7.5 MP5: Market Pricing: relationship of mankind to nature 
The attitude to nature described in the previous section encompasses mankind‘s 
relationship to it.  Because it is ‗other‘, we should adapt it to our purposes, or 
adapt to it if we have to.  Adapting to a warming world, the British have the 
opportunity to make more wine (#102) or to grow coconuts (#82).  We can make 
the most of the need to move to more renewable energy by building the Severn 
Barrage (#167).  The agricultural revolution represents a powerful lesson in 
adaptation.  #48 laughs at Paul Ehrlich, who: 
―even predicted that there was only a 1 pc chance of humanity surviving until the end 
of the century. The concept of food mountains never entered anyone's head‖. 
 
John Maddox, then editor of nature and a strong believer in technological progress 
(see Section 4.4.4) expects mankind to mitigate the consequences of global 
warming (#17): 
―On one crucial point, for example, it is said that American influence in the world 
will be undermined by the collapse of US agriculture caused by global warming. Yet 
the most elaborate study of that issue, by a group of US agronomists which appears in 
this week's Nature, concludes that crop production and grain exports could be 
maintained but at considerable cost chiefly that of increased irrigation. That 
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conclusion depends on the increased efficiency of photosynthesis, as does (sic) carbon 
dioxide concentration increases. No allowance is made for crop improvements likely 
to be engineered by biotechnogologists (sic).‖ 
 
By extension, the environment to which the rational actor adapts goes beyond the 
natural world to encompass the social world.  Section 4.7.3 saw the US car 
companies adapting to the (albeit brief) expectation of emission curbs following 
the Kyoto treaty: #5, #150 & #166 both discuss businesses reacting to the 
regulatory environment.  #97 discusses Marks & Spencer‘s ethical marketing drive, 
while #119 and #152 both discuss the response of the investment community to 
the challenges of global warming. 
4.7.6 MP6: Market Pricing: knowledge & wisdom 
From the MP Standpoint, market forces represent the most effective means of 
achieving rapid adaptation to constantly changing circumstances.  The market 
captures and expresses the combined knowledge of its participants to facilitate 
this adaptation.   
#136: 
―Conservatives are supposed to put their faith in the power of the market. It's the 
market which is delivering cleaner petrol and cars which pollute less. It's motor 
manufacturers such as BMW taking the lead in recycling old vehicles‖. 
 
Wisdom is to recognise both mankind‘s ability to adapt and the market‘s.  Some, 
like Richard Littlejohn, see no limitations to this.  #136 continues: 
―If they were really determined to tackle a looming energy crisis, they'd sanction the 
building of new nuclear power stations, which have virtually unlimited, renewable 
capacity and won't harm the environment. 
Once again, the market will see to that. Babies with three heads are bad for business, 
so safety would be paramount‖ 
 
The wise response is to take advantage of the opportunities (as suggested above in 
4.7.5): growing the grapes or plants (#90) warmer temperatures allow, or 
marketing the products environmentally concerned consumers desire. 
 
The market‘s wisdom is also self-reflexive, treating the market itself as part of 
the environment to which it adapts.  #152 discusses ethical investment funds: 
―The risk then is over-valuations and volatile peaks as debate rages, for example, 
over biofuels. ‗It's best to wait,‘ says Davies.‖ 
 
Or (still #152): 
―‗[Impax Environmental Markets fund is] higher risk as it is in shares,‘ explains 
Coates, ‗but it has proved a star because its choices are very business-specific and 
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thorough, for example in the area of solutions to the fall-out from climate change 
such as desalination technology.‘‖ 
 
#98 rejects the assumption that ―Technology will solve our problem‖, and few 
actually subscribe to Littlejohn‘s extreme statement of the Standpoint.   
Nevertheless, past technological successes seem to justify the confidence that we 
will find a solution. The Malthusian Cassandras have always been wrong before, 
particularly over the agricultural revolutions (#44): empirically, we should 
conclude they will be wrong again (#34; section 1.3.6).  The MP Standpoint may 
be motivated by future possibilities, but its wisdom is backward-looking: not only 
in the empiricism of scientific method but also in the economic understanding of 
revealed preference (section 2.2.4.1).  The logic of adaptation also emphasises 
adaptation to the known changes in the environment that have already occurred.  
So it should be no surprise that markets tend to overshoot: empirically, it is 
sensible to expect past trends to continue.   
 
Markets do overshoot, and the MP Standpoint is ready to learn lessons from such 
experience.  Coupling a recognition of the fallibility of markets to the wisdom of 
other Standpoints encourages a compromise.  In 1988, #7 criticised the CS 
assumption of ‗Limits to Growth‘ for not understanding the logic of markets, but 
goes on to assert the need to intervene when markets are deficient: 
―By failing to grasp the way market forces worked in commodities such as oil, it 
[‗Limits to growth‘] detracted from its call for co-operative action to cope with other 
problems that were not amenable to pure market solutions - notably the global heat 
trap now being created by the use of so-called greenhouse gases‖. 
 
Yet the MP Standpoint can make sense of this: knowing your limitations is adaptive 
wisdom in itself.  Using intervention to get an emissions permits trading system up 
and running is a necessary but temporary deviation.  Of course, there are plenty 
who prefer to emphasise the failings of rational self-interest.  Littlejohn‘s faith 
that three-headed babies are bad for business does not convince those who 
remember the cover-ups of Big Tobacco (Oreskes & Conway, 2008), Thalidomide 
or the Ford Pinto (Lee & Ermann, 1999).  As noted in 4.7.3, business interests, 
rationally pursuing their own interests, regularly subvert intended policy 
objectives (e.g. #150, #177, (Helm, 2010)).  The wisdom of the market has its 
limitations (#109): 
―As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz puts it, ‗They argued for a new 
religion: market fundamentalism as a substitute for the old one, Marxism.‘  Without 
consulting the Russian people, the International Monetary Fund forced on Russia 
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‗shock therapy‘, a form of regulation-free turbo-capitalism more extreme than 
anything ever tried in any democracy.‖ 
4.7.7 MP7: Market Pricing: attitude to others 
In the most extreme form, the laissez-faire approach of the MP Standpoint places 
no emphasis on relating to others.  The social world is part of the environment the 
rational individual is adapting to.  The only concern about others emerges if they 
impinge on the individual‘s self-determination.  However, the expression of this 
argument in the samples is rarely self-assertive: it usually takes the form of 
Equality Matching‘s complaining objection to uncompensated impositions. 
 
As part of the environment, wisdom dictates that you assume everybody else is 
always acting in their own self-interest: hence Senator Inhofe‘s assumptions that 
grant-grabbing climate researchers are motivated to exaggerate climate change 
threats (Inhofe, 2003).  Jeremy Clarkson assumes governments and scientists are 
only in it for themselves in #54: 
―And in a year they'll be on the news again saying the Internet is dissolving the 
stratosphere and that we'll all be dead in a week if nothing is done. That way, they'll 
get more, bigger grants and governments will rub their hands together, knowing they 
can introduce a computer tax ‗for the good of mankind‘‖. 
 
Treating others as part of the environment inevitably leads to differential pricing 
of individual lives.  #71 discusses the 2004 tsunami: 
―Finally, the sad truth is that the affected countries aren't rich. They don't have a 
huge command over the world's economic resources. Even if everyone can see the 
human tragedy, financial markets can tell relatively quickly that, apart from those 
most directly affected, there is not going to be a major economic tragedy. It's almost 
as if investors have said: ‗Thank God it wasn't New York or London‘‖. 
 
Once again, (see 4.7.1), good manners – essentially the interaction with other 
Standpoints – discourages overly forceful expression of the individualist position.  
Instead the deliberately ill-mannered shock-jocks, if we stretch the definition to 
cover Clarkson and Littlejohn, make strutting individualism a form of 
entertainment. 
4.7.8 MP8: Market Pricing: outlook 
#112 is a Guardian article reporting on Tony Blair's response to public calls that he 
should offset emissions from his private travel.  This article is in fact reporting 
reversal of Blair's previous stance, but it rehearses the foregoing debate by saying: 
 "The prime minister's declaration that he wasn't going to lead by example on the 
issue of holiday flights was reported under the headline, "Carry on flying, says Blair - 
science will save the planet"". 
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The final quote defines both the wisdom and outlook of the Market Pricing 
standpoint. 
 
To adapt requires technological innovation: just as the agricultural revolutions 
transcended perceived limits (#48), we will have to find new energy sources, from 
the quasi-sublime like nuclear fusion (#124, #159 - although the latter actually 
refers to ‗fission‘) to the ridiculous (#108): 
―BRAINBOX David Penfold reckons he has solved the world's energy crisis by finding a 
new fuel - Cadbury's Caramel.‖ 
 
More generally, the MP Standpoint sees a future of opportunity (#79): 
―Instead of travelling abroad, Britons will enjoying better weather and a healthier 
return on their investments by buying holiday properties at home‖. 
 
Or the Daily Telegraph, nominating Richard Branson for an award in the 
‗Environment‘ category of ―Morgan Stanley Great Britons of 2007‖ before asking 
(#140):  
―What about the people at Climate Change Capital who set up the first $1billion 
private sector climate change fund to make money out of saving the world's pollution 
problems?‖ 
 
The MP Standpoint likes to regard itself as tough-minded: adaptation equals 
getting on with it.  However, overconfidence in technology encourages 
anthropocentrism.  We ignore the fact that nature adapts to us too.  #48, 
discussing futurology, looks at past predictions: 
―The paper's pundit also anticipated a society free of germs, a dream that grows ever 
more distant in this day of antibiotic-resistant superbugs‖. 
 
4.8 Standpoint of Equality Matching 
4.8.1 EM1: Equality Matching: foundational principle 
The foundational principle of EM is reciprocity.    Typically understood in the 
primitive terms of blood feuds and an eye-for-an-eye, its manifestation in 
everyday modern life is more mundane and can be overlooked.  As with MP, the 
EM Standpoint treats the outside world, and the people in it, as ‗other‘.  Unlike 
MP, its stance is defensive, rather than self-assertive.  If I give something to the 
community or to you, what do I get in return? 
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Policy to fight climate change has to recognise that people respond in this way.  
Putting up the cost of motoring must be compensated for by improving public 
transport: the individual should be no worse off in terms of cost or convenience 
(#95, #98), while government should reinvest increased green tax revenues to 
deliver benefits to the public (#39).  The simple commonsense of reciprocation is 
very appealing.  Arguing that cars going slowly or standing in traffic cause more 
emissions by taking longer to arrive, Jeremy Clarkson says (#54): 
―People caught speeding should be given bonus points on their licence and car tax 
discount for helping to prolong the life of the planet. 
My daughter thinks this is a great idea. But then she would because, of course, she's 
five. Our rulers, sadly, aren't that grown-up.‖ 
 
On the international stage, the desire for reciprocity is central to negotiations 
(#43): 
―The US Senate has warned it will not ratify any deal that does not include matching 
commitments for big, fast-growing developing countries, such as China.‖ 
4.8.2 EM2: Equality Matching: approach to climate change 
The desire for reciprocity, and this self-defensive stance, manifests itself in 
several different ways: 
EM2.1. ‗What‘s in it for me?‘  The rants of Jeremy Clarkson and Richard 
Littlejohn frequently veer from brash self-assertion to peevish 
complaining (#54, #136)  
EM2.2. ‗I‘m doing my bit: so don‘t expect me to do more until others are doing 
their fair share.‘ 
EM2.3. Viewed from the outside, EM2.1 and 2.2 create ―The Commons 
Dilemma‖.  It makes no sense for the self-interested individual to make 
sacrifices without certainty of reciprocation from the rest of the 
community. 
EM2.4. Nimbyism: why should there be wind-turbines blocking my view? 
 
Appendix H provides a list of articles manifesting these arguments.  Here are some 
examples: 
 
EM2.1. #136: ―The Government already raises the thick end of £30 billion a 
year through 'green' taxes virtually none of which gets spent improving 
the environment...  Look at how Ken Livingstone has converted the 
congestion charge into a climate levy with a planned £25-a-day fee for 
bigger cars to drive on roads we have already paid for several times 
over‖ 
The logic of needing there to be a self-interested reason to justify 
action leads to the following argument: #68:  ―It may take a disaster 
worse than last summer's European deaths to wake us up‖. 
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EM2.2. Individuals usually only stress the ‗I‘m doing my bit‘ part: #112: ―David 
Cameron reports how he is in-stalling solar panels and a wind turbine in 
his west London home‖ 
In negotiations the ‗I‘m not ready to do more‘ element can be more 
explicit: #16: ―Timothy Atkeson, assistant administrator at the US 
Environmental Protection Agency, said ―the American people have gone 
to the well twice already this year'' for the developing world and it was 
matter of political judgement if they would be willing to go again. He 
said that the US share of a recent doubling of the World Bank's capital 
had cost the US $ 10bn and increases in the International Development 
Association's funding had cost it millions more.‖ 
EM2.3. #67:   ―The manufacturers' organisation EEF accused the Government 
of forcing up the cost of manufacturing and driving investment and jobs 
overseas. Martin Temple, EEF director general, said: ‗Tougher UK 
targets mean higher costs for UK manufacturing but no environmental 
gain. Our European partners are taking a more relaxed approach, even 
in some cases allowing emissions to rise.‘‖ 
EM2.4. #170: a Community Supported Agriculture scheme experienced 
―unsupportive neighbours, such as one who complained about the 
appearance of polytunnels on the hillside and forced the CSA to secure 
retrospective planning approval‖.   
4.8.3 EM3: Equality Matching: economics 
The EM Standpoint contributes a number of arguments to the economic debate.  
First there is the diagnosis of the Commons Dilemma identified above.  In 
addition: 
EM3.1. The Standpoint vigilantly identifies lack of reciprocation by others.  
‗I/We are hard done by because of you/them: I/We must be 
compensated. 
EM3.2. The Standpoint generates the ‗polluter pays principle‘. 
 
An example of EM3.1 occurs in #150 (quoted in 4.7.3 above), where the 
dysfunctional ETS‘s windfall profits for the electricity companies, at the public‘s 
expense, justify the argument for a windfall tax to recover the money.  A more 
intense example, reprising arguments made on the floor of the UNFCCC meetings 
by the Developing World (3.4.1b), is given in #26: 
―Everyone knows about the foreign debt, but what is the ecological debt? This, they 
say, has been accumulated during the 500 years that the region has served as a 
source of genetic material, providing thousands of species that have contributed 
enormously towards the world's stock of food, drink, medicines, chemical and 
industrial material. The progress of the industrialised countries was based on the 
deforestation and exploitation of natural resources in their own and developing 
nations.  More recently, they say, the debt has been increased by the export to 
developing nations of pesticides and herbicides often banned in their countries of 
origin, leading to thousands of cases of poisoning; by toxic waste dumping; and by the 
reluctance to transfer advanced environmentally friendly technology.‖ 
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The justice of this claim is appealingly simple, and EM claims to fair treatment are 
often imported into CS arguments.  Provided individuals or nations are treated as 
part of the community, they are entitled to equality, and it is hard to deny them 
the ‗Equality Matching‘ that the EM Standpoint demands.  Similarly, the oft 
repeated principle of the ‗Polluter Pays‘ (manifested in numerous articles, see 
Appendix H) has a common-sense appeal co-opted by most of the other 
Standpoints. 
4.8.4 EM4: Equality Matching: attitude to nature 
Cultural Theory claims that Fatalism, the counterpart ‗worldview‘ to the EM 
Standpoint, manifests the myth of ‗Nature Capricious‘.  Nature is arbitrary, 
unpredictable and uncontrollable.  Like MP in regarding the natural world as 
‗other‘, EM emphasises the threats it presents rather than MP‘s opportunities.  
Instead of getting on with it and adapting, the EM response is one of resignation to 
suffering. 
 
Grafting the logic of EM onto this fatalism generates an interesting contradiction, 
one that is embodied in our idea of fate meaning that ‗It is written‘.  We can see 
nature not as arbitrary but as delivering a cosmic reciprocal justice.  #22, 
describing a play, moves through the CS analysis of mankind‘s guilt to an EM 
denouement (my italics): 
―Pax tells the story of five angels descending to earth through a hole in the ozone 
layer to find a planet wracked by devastation from pollution and poison. They arrive 
with a message for humanity, but few people are willing to hear or understand them: 
at the end the angels wreak vengeance with wind, smoke and sound before leaving 
with a warning.‖ 
 
A book review in #99 presents the same CS into EM pathway (my italics): 
―Fragile Earth…  like almost every news story of 2006, presents horrifying images of 
the changes in our planet wrought by climate change and relentless human 
development. The wages of sin, as the Bible says, are death. They are also floods, 
droughts, tsunamis, wrecked forests and hurricanes. Future historians, according to 
contributor Guy Dauncey, will write about this as the Age of Fossil Fuels. That's if we 
survive‖. 
 
Attribution theory stresses the human need to attribute causal responsibility for 
events (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995, Ch4): the chaos of natural phenomena is 
more bearable if we can read meaning into them in this way. 
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Even so, the fatalistic sense of human powerlessness in the face of chaos 
encourages media comment on global warming to compile lists of dire 
consequences: plagues of locusts and rat infestations (#35) or ―avalanches, 
landslips and floods‖ brought on by the ―insidious encroachment of global 
warming‖ (#60).  Unsurprisingly, it is the two articles that delve back into the 
pre-enlightenment era that truly capture this mood: 
#111: 
―In the Renaissance, falling temperatures cast a blanket of snow over Europe. It was 
the Little Ice Age - and people were terrified the Earth would freeze over... 
...The year 1565 saw the coldest winter anyone could remember. The world turned 
white, birds froze, fruit trees died, the old and young faded away. It was a shock - 
and a foreboding. This seemed to be more than just a cold winter. The climate was 
perceptibly changing, and that is what Bruegel's snow scenes eerily record.‖ 
 
#117: 
―Global warming: fears and forecasts 
SIR - Samuel Pepys wrote in his diary on January 21, 1661: ‗It is strange what weather 
we have had all this winter; no cold at all, but the ways are dusty, and the flyes fly 
up and down, and the rose-bushes are full of leaves, such a time of the year as was 
never known in this world before.‘‖ 
 
The EM Standpoint finds foreboding in strange weather, where the MP Standpoint 
sees natural cycles that in due course science will figure out.  Taking it in our 
stride, chaos can be the butt of jokes (#116): 
―Winter heads for record as the weather goes balmy.‖ 
 
4.8.5 EM5: Equality Matching: relationship of mankind to nature 
Emphasising the uncontrollable power of nature, the EM Standpoint sees 
mankind‘s attempts to control nature as futile.  The Thames Barrier ―offers only 
short-term respite‖ (#24); firefighters make no progress battling forest fires, so 
that locals ―are pinning their hopes on rain‖ (#42).  The review of predictions 
made in 1928 (mentioned in 4.7.8 above) laughs at hopes ―that we would be able 
to ‗control‘ the weather‖ (#48). 
 
Discussion of plans to build a barrage to protect Venice captures the mood best, 
again by harking back to the past (#47): 
―By swamping plans in a further tide of consultation, it shows that in all the many 
years of talk, things have moved little further on from a century past when Lord 
Byron wrote with prophetic fatalism: ‗Oh Venice, Venice, when thy marble walls are 
level with the waters there shall be a cry of nations o'er thy sunken halls.‘‖ 
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4.8.6 EM6: Equality Matching: knowledge and wisdom 
The EM Standpoint encourages the view that it is pointless to try to tackle Climate 
Change (EM6.1 in the RM Matrix), as well as emphasising the logic of the Commons 
Dilemma (EM6.2 in the RM Matrix).  The two are closely connected as this section 
will show.  Daily experience gives us the knowledge that it is simply too difficult 
to solve the problem of global warming.  In #16 the then West German 
environment minister complains: 
―In solving sulphur dioxide emissions from large combustion plants, West Germany 
had spent 25bn deutschmarks in five years on fitting chemical scrubbers. ‗But I am 
criticised because we are now fixed into the existing coal power stations until the 
end of the century.‘‖ 
 
The contradictions of green consumerism fill Tanya Gold‘s diary of a week 
attempting life as an ‗ethics girl‘ (#76).  Living an environmentally concerned life 
in the modern world is challenging (#97): 
―However, [Tony] Juniper speaks to me from Stansted airport having just arrived off 
a plane from Amsterdam. What? ‗I've attended a meeting of FOE International,‘ he 
confesses. ‗And there was no alternative to flying. Like everyone else in the country, 
I face harsh realities.‘‖ 
 
Ryanair chief Michael O‘Leary spells out the wisdom of the Commons Dilemma 
(#121): 
― ‗I listen to all this drivel about turning down the central heating, going back to 
candles, returning to the dark ages...  ...You can do that if you want to. But none of 
it will make any difference. It just panders to your middle-class, middle-aged angst 
and guilt.  All the bloody tree planting in the world isn't going to make up for our 
emissions. We have to think of bigger ideas. It's the Russians, the Chinese and the 
Indians we have to influence.‘‖ 
 
Historically, the wisdom of EM might have encouraged passivity in the face of 
forces one cannot control.  However, rather as the MP individualist refrains from 
asserting himself too boorishly so as not to seem ill-mannered, EM fatalists 
probably find it too pathetic to express resignation.  Instead they have to choose 
between either adapting and enjoying life while they can, as in Breughel‘s day 
(#111) when cheerful skaters braved freezing temperatures, or blaming others 
rather than fate (below). 
4.8.7 EM7: Equality Matching: attitude to others 
EM7.1  Envy: it‟s just not fair.  And who are you to boss me around? 
Often wallowing in self-defensiveness, the EM Standpoint asserts ‗I‘m doing my 
bit‘ and seeks to pin the blame on others.  What might have started as an MP 
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defence of liberty spews out in the ranting of envy.  The Daily Star prints a column 
of text messages it receives (#118): 
―My heart bleeds 4 robbie "Poverty Aids Global warming" Williams! Give up ya millions 
+ work 4 charity!‖ 
 
Littlejohn‘s hard-headed rationalism descends into demagogic defence of the 
little man (#136): 
―But they resent lectures about individual behaviour from Old Etonian politicians. An 
extra two grand on a Mondeo may not matter to a multi-millionaire like Goldsmith, 
but it's a huge chunk of change from the average family budget.‖ 
 
The loathing of government is not so much because it infringes on liberty, as that 
it‘s just unfair (#178): 
―Legions of ethnic monitoring officers, climate change co-ordinators, five-a-day food 
inspectors and re-cycling tsars, most on handsome index-linked pension schemes, 
have added hugely to town hall running costs without improving core services one 
iota.‖ 
 
EM7.2  Why don‟t they solve it? 
Blaming others, the EM Standpoint also waits for others to solve the problem. 
There is no alternative to the car until ‗they‘ improve the public transport system 
(e.g. #41); there is no alternative to flying (e.g. Tony Juniper above in #97) 
because the modern world is made that way.  This extends the idea of it being too 
difficult for ‗me‘ to do anything about while expecting someone else to save ‗me‘ 
from the consequences.  4.4.5 quoted this excerpt from #138: 
―Both sides can't be right, so isn't it time for someone independent to start doing 
some serious research into all this to establish the truth as a matter of urgency?‖ 
 
The writer sees no obligation on himself to explore the actual scientific research 
done. 
EM 7.3 Blaming others 
Frequently, blaming others is a more generalised rejection of any personal 
responsibility.  #121 reprises the common trope of complaining about China: 
"They keep opening more and more coal and oil-fired power stations". 
4.8.8 EM8: Equality Matching: outlook 
Nature is chaotic and unpredictable.  Can we really hope to predict what is going 
to happen?  #3: 
―Only a decade ago, in the wake of the disastrous harvests and droughts of 1972 in 
the Soviet Union and sub-Saharian Africa, the consensus was equally determined that 
we were heading for a new ice age.  So why the sudden change, and can we place any 
more faith in the latest set of forecasts?‖ 
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All voters are capable of adapting an EM mindset: they want something back in 
return for taxes or significant change.  Having promised the electorate improving 
lifestyles, policies to address climate change confront difficult political realities.  
#41: 
―If Labour wishes to be truly green, it must risk upsetting public opinion; something 
that so far, it has shown itself very reluctant to do.‖ 
 
Byron laments mankind‘s powerlessness when foretelling the end of Venice (4.8.5 
above).  4.6.5 refers to #42‘s discussion of forest fires.  Often caused by man, man 
is powerless to stop them, and is left helplessly hoping for the fates to bring rain.  
From EM‘s pessimistic Standpoint, such problems are just too difficult to solve.  
#42: 
―The fires that are already burning cannot be put out‖. 
 
4.9 Standpoint of Authority Ranking 
4.9.1 AR1: Authority Ranking: foundational principle 
The foundational principle of AR is reliance on, and sustenance of, the existing 
social order or system.  Cultural Theory and Relational Models Theory tend to 
encourage an understanding of AR that invokes traditional, paternalist hierarchies, 
or structured institutions like the army or civil service.   However, the logic of AR 
can be applied to maintaining any social order.  CS Communitarians look to the 
authorities to maintain the purity of the community and to ensure that members 
do work for the community‘s goals.  MP free marketeers expect the law of 
contract to be enforced; the EM self-defensive shout ‗what‘s in it for me?‘ quickly 
turns to ‗where‘s the government when you need them?‘ in harder times.  For this 
reason, we should expect it to be difficult to disentangle Authority Ranking from 
Market Pricing.  The motivating drive of AR is to maintain the existing order, 
which in the Western world means free markets and the pursuit of economic 
growth.  For AR genuine ‗limits to growth‘ represent obstacles that need to be 
managed.  To sustain the existing system in a changing world requires 
pragmatism, a balance between unrestrained pursuit of self-interest and 
community needs. 
 
AR1.1: The importance of established institutions 
Protecting the existing system demands control of threats.  The Standpoint of AR 
emphasises the role of established institutions in assessing and controlling the 
163 
 
risks.  It robustly rejects the CS diagnosis of generalised ‗over-consumption‘ 
precisely because to accept this justifies calls for a social revolution.  Expressing 
this Standpoint, the press carry reports of governments and leaders setting up 
meetings, summits and conferences, attending them and planning more meetings.  
#169 exemplifies this never-ending process: 
―Leaders attending the G20 meeting in London plan to gather again in the summer for 
a special summit on tackling climate change, The Independent on Sunday can reveal. 
The new summit - which is being called on the initiative of President Barack Obama 
as part of a US drive to get a new international agreement on tackling global warming 
- is to take place alongside the annual G8 gathering of world leaders on the island of 
La Maddalena off Sardinia.‖ 
 
From the AR Standpoint, the CS approach is irresponsible and achieves nothing 
(#7): 
―With hindsight the Club of Rome did a great disservice to the environmentalist cause 
with its doom-laden utterances in the mid-1970s.‖ 
 
This is a task for government, and institutions like the UN and its offshoots the 
UNFCCC and IPCC.  The Stern Review specifically took the argument away from 
the campaigning fringe to announce that this was a task for government: further, 
by breaking the task down into manageable ‗wedges‘ (Pacala & Socolow, 2004; 
Stern, 2007, Ch 8) this was a task that could be successfully addressed.   Leaders‘ 
pronouncements frequently reassure the public as to the credibility of these 
established experts (e.g. Porritt on the Stern Review and the IPCC, #106; or Blair 
promising that he, Bush and Merkel were on the case, #114). 
 
AR1.2: The need for government 
Occasionally the AR Standpoint is advocated more forcefully, with clear 
statements of the societal need for government to bring order to chaos.  #65: 
―We must be able to trust in the laws of our land‖. 
4.9.2 AR2: Authority Ranking: approach to climate change 
The AR Standpoint‘s insistence on the role of established institutions leads it to 
emphasise the role of accredited experts, ‗sound‘ science and management by 
numbers and targets (this is covered within knowledge and wisdom below).  The 
AR Standpoint‘s insistence on the role of government in addressing climate change 
leads to an emphasis on restrictions and regulations.  #17: 
―The most urgent need is for an international convention to regulate the production 
of greenhouse gases (luckily the CFCs are already regulated by the 1987 Montreal 
Convention, intended originally to safeguard the ozone layer).‖ 
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As with the other Standpoints, use of regulation to protect the environment is felt 
to be plain common sense.  Precedents testify to the effectiveness of regulation:  
#61 describes regulations that protected swans: 
"There was a reduction in the population because large numbers were being poisoned 
by picking up lead weights, which made them ill and unable to eat properly. But lead 
has now been banned for 10 years and we are seeing a return in the mute swan 
population."  
 
The urge to regulate can be powerful:  AR‘s pragmatic recognition that 
unrestricted self-interest is dangerous mandates precautionary regulation.  #160 
reports a scientist worrying over an industrial gas used in the manufacture of flat 
screen TV‘s.  Even though the facts offered in the article suggest the risks posed 
are minimal, it concludes:   
―But Prather argues that as the gas is not controlled in the same way as other 
greenhouse gases, companies may be careless with it.‖ 
 
Like #17, #35 also uses the success in regulating CFCs to argue for the same 
approach to climate change: 
"It is important to get restrictions on the emission of these gases.  We've shown we 
can do it with the ozone layer but it is much harder with greenhouse gases because 
people like driving their cars.‖ 
 
As shown in 4.8.8, governments do not like imposing on the electorate, because 
the electorate objects to fussy regulations – often decried as ―elf‘n‘safety‖ 
(#136).  #55 suggests an answer: 
―The solution is to target policy. Sometimes this will mean regulations or standards, 
such as catalytic converters.‖ 
 
By regulating what producers can produce, governments can nudge consumers 
towards greener behaviour.  Regulation forces producers to innovate in order to 
deliver greater efficiency.  Critically, it does not prevent people doing things but 
asks them to do things differently: consumers still get to drive and light their 
homes, while producers are encouraged to make ‗better‘ cars or ‗better‘ power 
stations (#159).  Governments only seek to influence what will be defined as 
‗better‘ in the future.  #135: 
―Cars that run on petrol could be scrapped in a package of green measures from both 
the opposition parties.  The Lib Dems' said that by 2040 vehicles would run on 
‗hydrogen fuel cells, improved battery technology or other new technology not yet 
developed‘‖. 
 
Governments also use taxation to influence behaviour.  The next section looks at 
two strands of argument: first, arguments over which policy instruments are best, 
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taxation, tradeable instruments or other solutions; second, the use of policy to 
‗nudge‘ consumers and producers into greener behaviour while not changing the 
fundamental nature of the economy. 
4.9.3 AR3: Authority Ranking: economics 
AR3.1: Which policy instruments? 
Section 3.2.2 argued that much of the specialist economics literature focuses on 
debating the relative merits of regulation, taxation or tradeable permits as policy 
tools to address climate change.  Helm (2010) described business interests‘ push 
for tradeable instruments and technology subsidies in preference to other tools.  
The lobbying process, and its success, is evident in the sample as documented in 
Section 4.7.3 above. 
 
As described throughout this Chapter, each Standpoint has its own particular 
approach to the problem of climate change, and its own economic diagnosis.  As a 
consequence each Standpoint has its own policy preferences.  But the EM, CS and 
MP Standpoints do look to the AR Standpoint to enforce their own preferred 
approach (discussed further below at 4.9.8).  The AR Standpoint logically has some 
of its own policy preferences: centrally administered taxation would appeal if it 
were not so difficult to implement.  Some of the other policies that fit with the AR 
Standpoint are also considered under ‗ecological modernisation‘ below.  But, 
setting aside its own natural preferences, the Standpoint is also obliged to assess 
the merits of all the competing policies and pragmatically to seek the 
implementation of the best of them.  All of the following examples include not 
just policy advocacy but an awareness of the constraints of feasibility governing 
policy options: 
 
a) The option of ‗green‘ taxes to reduce fossil fuel demand is frequently 
discussed in the sample34 .   
b) As described earlier, the EM and MP Standpoints tend to oppose taxes, 
often splenetically (#121, #136, #143).This reinforces the argument 
(3.2.2) that green taxes are very difficult for politicians to implement (#41, 
#55, #159, #177). 
c) Unsurprisingly, since it is the perceived ‗unfairness‘ of taxation that 
challenges the politicians, the perceived simple fairness of the ‗polluter 
                                            
34 E.g. #9, #11, #27, #39, #41, #55, #56, #64, #65, #106, #121, #135, #136, #143, #149, 
#150, #159, #161, #177. These articles plus #165 make up the 20 noted in Appendix H. 
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pays principle‘(4.8.3) makes taxes such as congestion charges (#41, #55) 
or air travel duties (#65, #106, #121, #135) more comfortable 
suggestions. 
d) The polluter pays principle would suggest taxing fossil fuels proportionate 
to CO2 emissions.  Yet as soon as political feasibility adulterates this simple 
objective, critics can accuse politicians of inconsistency.  Fears of poor 
pensioners dying in the winter cold discourage politicians from taxing 
domestic energy.  Naturally, they also want to sidestep ‗the public vitriol‘ 
poured on the power companies (#150) by avoiding direct responsibility for 
domestic energy prices.  Striving for these divergent goals results in clear 
anomalies when fossil fuel taxes are compared to other taxes (#39, #41, 
#55). 
e) The specialist debate in the economics literature over the comparative 
merits of tradeable permits and taxation barely features in the sample.  
Only #55 addresses the comparative merits.  Even this article actually pays 
more attention to the political story of Michael Portillo‘s alleged conflict of 
interest in acting as a consultant for a US energy firm while advocating a 
permit policy. 
f) Instead, the sample suggests that a debate that might have been alive in 
2000 when #55 was written is soon over.  #‟s 165 and #177 see the 
political contest shifted to a debate over whether emissions permits should 
be issued free or auctioned; indeed, #177 has critics of Obama‘s climate 
change bill attacking it as a ‗hidden energy tax‘.  Tax as a policy tool is off 
limits. 
 
AR3.2: No fundamental change to the nature of the economy: „business as usual‟ 
 
The AR Standpoint addresses the environmental impact equation I = PAT either by 
looking at P, population, or by looking at T, technology.  In 1992, John Major was 
comfortable with saying that population control was a key policy for protecting 
the environment, claiming (#30): 
 
―If the baby boom continued it would destroy the planet‖. 
 
By 1992 the strength of this argument is already fading.   The huge disparity in per 
capita emissions between the developed world and the developing world, and the 
role of historic emissions in the cumulative stock of CO2 give moral weight to the 
developing world‘s insistence on developed world assistance rather than lectures 
(#26).  In addition, increased understanding of the relationship between affluence 
and demographics (United Nations, 2004) has quietened the fear of infinite 
population growth, refocusing instead on developed world senescence: at the 
same time it reinforces arguments for fostering economic development in 
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countries where population growth remains a challenge, since increased 
affluence, and concomitant female education, is the surest way of reducing the 
birth rate. 
 
The AR Standpoint is also committed to maintaining  the exisiting political and 
economic order, and therefore must continue to target economic growth.  #7, 
#34 emphasise our commitment to economic growth, #112 and #136 the 
commitment to free consumer choice, and #11 the commitment to encouraging 
businesses by not imposing unjustified restrictions.  As described above, 
governments have also given up fighting the resistance to the tax instruments that 
many agree would be the most appropriate policy tools.  It must be business as 
usual. 
 
AR3.3 Ecological Modernisation 
 
As a consequence, the AR approach is to achieve the same objective – a growing 
but sustainable economy - by different means.  It has to accept the Market Pricing 
solution of targeting the 'T' in PAT' not the 'P', such as: 
 
g) nuclear power is a source of energy which does not generate greenhouse 
gases.  It also appeals to the centralising tendencies of the AR Standpoint 
as a ‗big project‘ technology requiring close government supervision.  
Nuclear power has held a central place in the UK ever since Margaret 
Thatcher focused on climate change to justify investment in nuclear (#7) 
and levied the non-fossil fuel obligation to do so (#161).  Numerous 
articles35 all discuss the role of nuclear in combating climate change.  
Several assert, like #91 ―The only viable alternative now is nuclear.‖  
Others offer the CS critique that nuclear represents a vain attempt to 
avoid reducing excess energy consumption, e.g. #86: ―For the Labour Party 
to become credible on the environment, they must take the lead and 
impose legislation to cut emissions now and not look to nuclear power as a 
panacea for climate change.‖ 
h) carbon capture and storage (‗CCS‘) is a classic end-of-pipe technology 
which is favoured because it avoids the need for complete replacement of 
the existing energy generating infrastructure.  CCS means that not just the 
existing power stations are protected (provided the technology can 
actually be retrofitted), but also the whole market infrastructure from the 
coal mine onwards.  As the German environment minister pointed out in 
1990 when discussing the end-of-pipe solution implemented to stop Sulphur 
Dioxide creating acid rain (#16), the disadvantage of retrofitted 
                                            
35 E.g. #7, #8, #11, #13, #68, #70, #86, #91, #124, #135, #159 #161  
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technology is that it locks you still deeper into old technology.  CCS is an 
extremely conservative approach, which is perhaps why the media find the 
topic boring.  Despite Nicholas Stern‘s view that successful CCS technology 
is essential to combat climate change (N. Stern, 2009a), only 3 articles 
discuss it (#159, #161, #165). 
i) Economic activity necessarily wastes energy in achieving its different 
objectives, whether travelling from A to B, manufacturing a consumer 
good, converting sunlight into edible food or storing and making available 
the sun‘s energy as light and heat when it is dark or cold.  Necessarily, 
there will always be scope to save energy by achieving the same objectives 
while using less energy.  Many articles36  recognise steps to improve energy 
efficiency as necessary when addressing climate change.  However, #27 
has EU ministers suggesting that ―energy-conservation measures are 
unlikely on their own to lead to an adequate reduction in CO2 gases‖ while 
#32 says: ―It is foolish and dangerous to pretend that the motor car will 
ever be ‗clean‘. Indeed in the past any improvements in the efficiency of 
the internal combustion engine have been negated by the rapid growth of 
road traffic.‖ 
 
What nuclear, CCS and energy-efficiency measures have in common is that they 
pragmatically build on the status quo, and avoid a revolution: 
#95: 
  ―As Josephine Rogers points out: "We cannot realistically expect to de-invent the 
car, but we can and must re-invent the car.'' Personal transport devices need to do 
300 miles on a small tank of hydrogen, which means efficiency - and the easiest route 
is weight reduction.‖ 
 
Similarly, in #112, Tony Blair exhorts us all to be more efficient; ―There‘s a 
massive amount individuals can do‖ while insisting that there is no way consumers 
should be asked to travel less: ―I'm not going to be in the position of saying I'm not 
going to take holidays abroad or use air travel, it's just not practical,‖ and ―It's 
like telling people you shouldn't drive anywhere.‖ 
 
Not content with avoiding radical change, the AR Standpoint sometimes pushes 
the case for ‗ecological modernisation‘ harder.  This argument stresses the 
economic opportunities for green growth: not only do we not have to curb growth, 
but tackling global warming actually gives us the chance to grow even faster 
(#39): 
―Not only would carbon emissions fall, but so would the price of employment, 
creating hundreds of thousands of jobs across the EU.‖ 
 
                                            
36 E.g. #12, #16, #31, #33, #39, #43, #91, #95, #101, #106, #112, #119, #135, #136, 
#143, #150, #161, #165, #170 #177  
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#169 records how ecological modernisation, a ―green new deal‖, was (and is) 
seen as a way out of the financial crisis of 2008.  Maintaining the status quo, a 
foundational principle of the AR Standpoint, reinforces the commitment to 
economic growth and confidence in technological progress that was the hallmark 
of the MP Standpoint.  #159 captures the interaction: 
―regulation can spur markets to innovate and adopt cleaner technologies.‖ 
 
4.9.4 AR4: Authority Ranking: attitude to nature 
Section 4.6.4 showed how the CS Standpoint emphasised the close relationship 
between man and nature.  Societies often see their own country as in some way 
sacred.  In contrast, Sections 4.7.4 and 4.8.4 showed that the EM and MP 
Standpoints both tended to treat the natural world as ‗other‘ and separate. 
 
In this respect, the AR Standpoint is closer to CS.  Characters like ‗Cornwall‘ or 
‗Kent‘ in Shakespeare‘s plays remind us that feudal lords are treated as 
synonymous with their territory. #149 brings this concept into the modern world: 
 ―Conservatives parties, with their identity tied so closely to that of their nation...‖ 
 
This aspect of the AR Standpoint might be expected to find expression in nostalgic 
and romantic longing for a natural, more traditional era.  Such sentiments are 
hard to disentangle from the arguments advanced by the CS Standpoint for getting 
back to the land (#170) or reconnecting with the traditional wisdom of indigenous 
peoples (#26, 4.6.6).  Tradition (#9) and heritage (#65) do feature in accounts of 
nature in the sample: but these examples really only reinforce the impression that 
the AR Standpoint on nature is all about the relationship between man and nature, 
not about nature itself. 
4.9.5 AR5: Authority Ranking: relationship of mankind to nature 
The AR Standpoint‘s conservatism manifests itself in seeing society, and 
government, as having a duty of stewardship of the land.  The Standpoint‘s 
pragmatism demands that you look after the homestead.  #7 and #14 both show 
how significant Margaret Thatcher‘s speech to the Royal Society in 1988 was in 
setting out a ‗Conservative‘ concept of environmental stewardship.  Mrs 
Thatcher‘s own recollection in 1990 of the speech combines with her view of the 
work of the IPCC: 
―I remember saying in my Royal Society speech that we had a full repairing lease on 
this Earth. With the work done by the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change, 
we can now say that we have the Surveyor's Report and it shows that there are faults 
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and that the repair work needs to start without delay. The problems do not lie in the 
future—they are here and now—and it is our children and grandchildren, who are 
already growing up, who will be affected‖(Thatcher, 1990). 
 
There are clearly elements of CS argument here, but the pragmatic tone conveys 
the central message that this task manageable (#124): 
―Global warming is nasty, but it is a long-term problem. We need to do something 
now for the sake of the centuries ahead. All is not (yet) lost.‖ 
 
Good stewardship necessarily decries waste, but on the instrumentalist grounds of 
inefficiency more than as an absolutist condemnation of excess (#119): 
―An early conservationist himself, President Roosevelt promoted the efficient use of 
natural resources and he would have despaired at the way in which the profligacy of 
America's future generations has brought the world to the brink.‖ 
 
To be a good steward of the land, the authorities need information: data on what 
has happened in the past, a planned target to work towards, and monitoring of 
the ongoing success in achieving that plan.  #72: 
―Seventy-five per cent of the most threatened mammals, birds and amphibians live in 
an area covering just 2.3% of the Earth's surface, and roughly half of all flowering 
plant species and 42% of land-based vertebrates exist in 34 "hotspots", a four-year 
study by 400 scientists has found...     ...The new study builds on a 17-year-old theory 
by the British scientist Norman Myers, who argued that with limited financial 
resources governments and conservationists should prioritise by protecting the small 
total land areas which account for a very high percentage of global biodiversity.‖   
 
The same piece includes quotes from Russell Mittermeier, president of 
Conservation International: 
―This new assessment underscores the value of the hotspots concept for defining 
urgent conservation priorities...    ...We must now act decisively to avoid losing these 
irreplaceable storehouses of Earth's life forms...    ...We now know that by 
concentrating on the hotspots, we are not only protecting species, but deep lineages 
of evolutionary history.‖ 
 
This article captures several features of the AR Standpoint: 
a) The need for the efficient deployment of resources. 
b) (As with MP) the instrumental value of nature in its ‗storehouses‘. 
c) A sense of duty to the ‗lineages‘ of the past, demanding their preservation 
into the future. 
d) The importance of information in formulating efficient and effective plans 
of action. 
 
It is the last of these that dominates the AR Standpoint‘s policies to deal with 
climate change.  Mankind measures the natural world in order to domesticate and 
control it.  To manage the transition to more sustainable ‗green‘ economic 
growth, good information from creditable sources is essential. 
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4.9.6 AR6 :Authority Ranking: knowledge and wisdom 
AR6.1: Official targets and management by numbers 
The AR Standpoint seeks to ‗predict and provide‘ the right CO2 concentration in 
the atmosphere.  Wide ranging data providing proxies for historic CO2 
concentrations and temperatures are compiled.  Ever expanding forms of data 
monitoring actual concentrations and temperatures are collected.  Costs are 
estimated for different mitigation and adaptation strategies.  This exercise in 
management by numbers pervades the sample37.  Unsurprisingly, much of the 
discussion of targets focuses on planned reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.  
The news angle on targets varies widely: e.g. the story can be that targets are 
perceived to be being missed or watered down (e.g. #67, #137, #166). 
 
Targets and cost estimates have a clear rhetorical value: how else will we manage 
to prevent climate change?  #106 on the Stern Review: 
―The government hopes the review will gain traction in the US because it focuses on 
the economic case for change. Sir Nicholas's analysis warns that doing nothing about 
climate change will cost the global economy between 5% and 20% of GDP, while 
reducing emissions now would cost 1%, equivalent to £184bn.‖ 
 
The problem with numbers and targets is that if people say them often enough 
and confidently enough, they start to believe they are really predictions not 
aspirations.  #30 reports on the 1992 Rio summit (my italics): 
―The first [landmark treaty], on climate change, will halve the growth of pollution 
levels from exhaust gases and other toxic emissions and aim to keep the level of 
carbon dioxide at this year's rate by the year 2000.‖ 
 
Or #165 (my italics): 
―Mr Obama said on Tuesday that the US would "engage vigorously" in climate change 
talks and pledged, despite the financial crisis, to stick to plans to reduce emissions 
sharply by 2020. He has said he will set annual targets that would reduce emissions to 
their 1990 levels by 2020, and 80 per cent below by 2050.‖ 
 
AR6.2: The importance of experts and sound science 
The AR Standpoint privileges the idea of ‗sound science‘ and the views of experts 
with positions in recognised, established institutions38  Reference to ‗Experts‘ 
clothes predictions and opinions in credibility, either by reference to plenty of 
                                            
37 E.g. #1, #8, #9, #12, #16, #23, #24, #27, #30, #39, #40, #42, #43, #66, #67, #70, 
#72, #97, #106, #114, #137, #150, #157, #165, #166, #167, #177, #180. 
38 E.g. #3, #5, #6, #7, #8, #11, #15, #24, #26, #28, #34, #40, #47, #52, #60, #62, #66, 
#72, #80, #87, #92, #106, #128, #157, #172, #175, #180. 
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numbers generated by impressive sounding institutions, even in the most narrowly 
applied fields (#60): 
―A 1996 model of snowfall in the European Alps created by the Centre for Snow 
Studies in Grenoble in France calculated that at an altitude of 1,500 metres in the 
French Alps, a rise of 1.8C would reduce the period of snow by 20 per cent in the 
north and by 40 per cent in the south, with the greatest impact in the Maritime Alps‖ 
 
Or just in general terms (#62: my italics): 
 ―GLOBAL warming is set to continue for at least a century even if greenhouse gas 
emissions are slashed,‖ experts say.  Scientists believe global warming is melting 
polar ice and blame greenhouse gases produced by factories, power stations, coal 
fires and cars.‖ 
 
This inevitably leads on to the question of what the role of the scientist is.  
Leading meteorologist Jim Hansen (#128) has been challenged for becoming a 
campaigner (Pielke, 2010) as opposed to merely providing data to elected policy 
makers.  #172 provides a good example of how a scientist with an apparently 
narrow specialism is nevertheless assumed to then have greater credibility when 
talking about policy: 
―Stuart Haszeldine, professor of sedimentary geology at the University of Edinburgh, 
said: ‗We now have to take the first big steps on the path to emission reductions.‘‖ 
 
Unfortunately privileging ‗science‘ in this way promises a sense of certainty, of 
rationally justified action: 
 
#7 on Thatcher:  
―But she laid emphasis this week on the need to ensure that policy ‗is founded on 
good science to establish cause and effect.‘‖ 
 
#11, quoting then Environment Secretary Nicholas Ridley: 
―Imposing extra cost burdens has an effect on industrial competitiveness.  If we in 
this country unilaterally took all the action, sensible or half-baked, that we are urged 
to take on the flimsiest scientific evidence, we could easily price ourselves out of the 
world markets.‖ 
 
The problem is you can never be certain, and you can always do more research.  
#28, from 1991, comments on some of the difficulties associated with the 
satellite data that went on to form part of the evidence for Mann‘s iconic hockey 
stick graph (Henson, 2006, p. 216).   #180 describes the Imperial College branch 
of the Grantham Institute effectively trashing earlier work by the UNFCCC: 
―The UNFCCC had commissioned a series of studies to address the estimated costs of 
several adaptation measures but it was under pressure to produce results in a short 
time period and the studies were not fully reviewed by outside experts, Professor 
Parry said. 
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‗Many of the previous estimates, it would be fair to say, were based on back-of-the-
envelope calculations. In fact, one person said they were written on the back of a 
metro ticket. We think these numbers are underestimates ... they don't stack up,‘ 
Professor Parry said. 
 
The authors of the report said that the costs of adapting to climate change begin to 
soar after other sectors of the economy not dealt with by the UNFCCC are taken into 
consideration. They include tourism, energy and manufacturing. The sectors the 
UNFCCC did deal with were treated in only a partial manner, the report says.‖ 
 
Stripped of the decisive authority and cloak of creditable authority, sound science 
starts to lose its rhetorical value.  This is a recipe for inaction.  In the article on 
the Venetian lagoon barrage, decisions await still more research (#47): 
―Venetian campaigners, understandably, feel frustrated.  ‗We don't need more 
doctors at the bedside of the patient,‘ fumed Professor Paolo Costa, former Minister 
of Public Works. ‗The best doctors have already been consulted.‘‖ 
 
4.9.7 AR7: Authority Ranking: attitude to others 
The AR Standpoint‘s attitude to others depends upon whether others are deemed 
to be part of the community or outside it.  Outsiders pose a potential threat to 
the community; insiders merit the protection of the authorities. 
 
AR7.1:  Others as insiders 
Society has the same obligations of stewardship towards people as to nature 
(#40): 
"These people have a right to their land. It would also be a loss to the world of a 
culture and a language. We are doing so much to save animals and plants from 
extinction. How can we tolerate the extinction of a nation?" 
 
‗Noblesse Oblige‘, and public figures have a duty to lead by example (#112): 
―‘What you need is cultural change. What you need is people to change their view 
about the environment and to change their behaviour, and I think that starts at the 
top,‘ Mr Cameron says. 
 
Celebrities as well as politicians are expected to show green leadership (e.g. 
#97).  This same argument behoves the developed world to lead the developing 
world by example (e.g. #33). 
 
AR7.2:  Others as Outsiders 
Developed world aid to the developing world can be looked at from a much more 
pragmatic Standpoint.  #24 spells out the security risks of climate change: 
―City authorities, as well as governments, needed to prepare for sea level rises and 
new systems should be set up to pass information, expertise, and possibly financial 
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aid from the developed to the developing world, said Dr Kelly. This was the only way 
to avoid the nightmare of millions of refugees fleeing from low-lying coastal cities in 
countries lacking the resources to defend them.‖ 
 
Garrett Hardin, who formulated the ‗Commons Dilemma‘ (1968, see section 1.3.8) 
foresaw this.  His later work included ‗Lifeboat ethics‘ (Hardin, 1974), advising 
nation states to achieve self-sufficiency and then defend their borders.  It is not 
just the fear of environmental refugees that raises concerns.  The fear of ‗peak 
oil‘, the dependence on Russian gas, and the threat this poses to our way of life is 
foremost in many minds (e.g. #91, #109).   #154 provides the best example: 
―Sir, Lord Lawson's analysis of the climate change debate may - or may not - be 
correct. However, his analysis ignores a far more urgent imperative, energy security. 
Irrespective of the long-term effects of climate change, the oil crisis is here and now. 
Even if the price of oil falls in the short term it is a virtual certainty that high prices 
with all their negative consequences for our economies will keep recurring. There 
may be no lack of available oil and gas; the problem is most of it is in the same place 
under the control of nations that have more to gain from high prices than increased 
output.  
Next time Lord Lawson volunteers to write an article for you, invite him to address 
this more pressing issue, and he might save not only our civilisation but the planet as 
well.‖ 
 
Isolationist national self-sufficiency is one response.  Its limitations are recognised 
by a member of the Transition Town movement (#170): 
―We had built our own house, and were growing our own food, but this was only going 
to be sustainable if I am prepared to sit at the gate with a shotgun.‖ 
 
4.9.8 AR8: Authority Ranking: outlook 
#66 captures the AR vision of the future, one in which the established institutions 
grasp the nettle and manage the risks society faces: 
―Sir David King, the government's chief scientific adviser who led the team behind the 
report, said: ‗The impact will be really enormous. We can mitigate this if will act 
responsibly with our global partners but it is important to act sooner rather than 
later. The longer we put it off the more it will cost‘.‖ 
 
Yet the AR Standpoint has an implicit role in all of the outlooks.  Section 4.9.1 
observed that the other 3 Standpoints all look to AR to ‗enforce‘ their own vision 
for the future.  The function of authority is to manage the future, in essence to 
sustain our own ‗reality‘ or outlook. 
 
The CS Standpoint combines with the AR Standpoint in #98: 
―If we don't self-regulate, something will regulate us. Legislation or devastation?‖ 
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Ecological modernisation builds preservation of the status quo onto the 
foundations of the MP Standpoint‘s confidence in human progress.  Repeating the 
quote from 4.9.3, #159 captures the interaction: 
―regulation can spur markets to innovate and adopt cleaner technologies.‖ 
 
The EM Standpoint defines the logic of the Commons Dilemma.  It also justifies the 
Byrd-Hagel resolution of the Senate that forbids US emissions cuts without 
reciprocal cuts from developing countries, noted in #43 (United States Senate, 
1997).  To invert the quote from #33 (4.6.1), for different national leaders, the 
‗conflicting interests of different groups of countries‘ have so far been more 
‗important‘ than ‗World interests‘.  There is ‗no environmental gain‘ in being the 
only national leader to force cuts on one‘s own people (#67, 4.8.2). 
 
The AR Standpoint‘s tendency is to centralise.  Devolved power and local 
initiatives dilute control and give no guarantee that centrally defined targets can 
be met.  AR will favour big solutions like nuclear power (see 4.9.3) as well as 
grand transport modernisation projects.  #65 includes a suggestion to create a 
new terminal to a greater London Airport in the Severn estuary, linked by a 
―310mph Transrapid Maglev‖ train.  
 
It seems that AR‘s centralising authorities can always be seduced by MP‘s 
technological promise of growth, AR‘s conservatism intoxicated by the excitement 
of innovation. Pragmatism demands first that society does respond to a changing 
environment and second the prosperity to keep society‘s members content: MP‘s 
optimistic outlook seems to promise the only way out of the conundrum.  The 
dirigiste scheme for a ‗super airport‘ for London echoes a grand design from 
across the channel (#171): 
―PRESIDENT Nicolas Sarkozy yesterday announced a multi-billion-pound plan for a 
Greater Paris which would extend all the way to the English Channel. 
 
The French president unveiled the plan after 10 of the world's leading architects, 
including Lord Rogers, presented blueprints aimed at creating a sprawling city over 
the next 20 years - to become the world's most sustainable metropolis in the wake of 
the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.  
 
Mr Sarkozy singled out a proposal by the French architect Antoine Grumbach to 
extend the city to the Channel port of Le Havre via Rouen along the Seine, 
maximising the green possibilities of the river and with a fast rail link.  
 
The idea was mooted by Napoleon Bonaparte, with whom Mr Sarkozy is often likened 
and who once ex-claimed: ‗Paris-Rouen-Le Havre: one single city with the Seine as its 
main road.‘‖ 
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4.10 Does the sample manifest the four distinct Standpoints 
of Relational Models Theory? 
4.10.1 Common Sense 
Many of the arguments identified within the 4x8 matrix are rather banal: 
a) It is clearly true that since everyone in the world shares the same 
atmosphere, and the atmosphere has no boundaries, ‗we are all in it 
together‘ as the CS approach emphasises (4.6.2).   It is also self-evident 
that humans do damage the environment, with consequences for other 
living things as well as the habitability of affected places (4.6.5). 
b) It is also inevitable that, in a market economy, energy prices need to rise if 
demand for fossil fuel energy is to be reduced, whether or not such higher 
prices are treated as reflecting the true ‗cost‘ of consuming that energy 
(4.7.2).  Furthermore, the value placed on individual freedom of choice by 
the MP Standpoint (4.7.1) is widely shared. 
c) The logic of Hardin‘s Commons Dilemma is simple and inescapable.  It is 
irrational for individuals to curb their own energy consumption voluntarily 
if 6bn other people are doing the opposite.  This is particularly true when 
there is no prospect of a reward in this life or indeed the next in the form 
of a ‗better‘ world for our grandchildren, ie one with materially lower CO2 
concentrations.  Worse, it is unfair for society to insist that individuals 
show such forbearance without the promise of some reciprocation (4.8.2). 
d) How could society address a challenge such as climate change without 
careful monitoring of the stock of atmospheric CO2 and the flows of CO2 
emitted and absorbed?   Isn‘t it essential that this data be credible?  How 
could the world address a global challenge other than through an 
authoritative institution, such as the UN, configured to achieve co-
operation between all nations?  Pragmatism demands that we accept the 
economy of today as the starting point, and gradually manage a transition 
to a less emissions-intensive economy (4.9 throughout). 
 
These arguments are banal, but they are all, in a sense, true.  All represent a 
common sense response to the challenge of climate change.  For this reason 
individual articles frequently make use of arguments based on more than one 
Relational Model.  Participants in the debate are not locked into a narrow, 
stereotypical worldview that only uses the eight arguments identified with that 
RM.  As Fiske argued, the RMs are basic, and all individuals typically have 
relationships that can be categorised into each of the four RMs: therefore all 
individuals can and do access the arguments driven by the logic of each RM. 
4.10.2 Conflicting arguments 
However, in their purest form, the arguments of the different RMs encourage 
conflicting policies, as expressed in their different approaches: 
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 CS emphasis on limits sees ‗cutting back‘ as an imperative: we don‘t just 
need to emit less CO2, we need to reduce our total consumption.  CS sees 
climate change as symptomatic of much wider problems: #34 provides a 
litany of human evils, describing nature as a ‗damsel in distress‘; #68 by 
Lovelock expounds the Gaia hypothesis, with mankind as a ‗planetary 
disease‘; consistent with most of the Transition Town movement (e.g. 
Chamberlin, 2009), #170 conflates climate change with Peak Oil in arguing 
for local sustainability.  The ‗deep green‘ (#34) arguments of these 
expressions of the CS Standpoint are not compatible with the arguments of 
the other 3 Standpoints. 
 MP confidence in human progress is justified by past success: Malthus and 
his disciples like Ehrlich have been routed (#48) and science will save the 
planet (#112).   Calling for consumers to restrain themselves ―just panders 
to your middle-class, middle-aged angst and guilt‖ (#121), while 
regulation and taxation are a misguided imposition on the individual when 
the rationality of the market will actually deliver the greenest economy 
(#136).  These arguments explicitly rebut the CS and AR standpoint 
arguments: at the same time, MP‘s optimistic confidence that we should 
make the most of changing environments rejects EM‘s pessimistic 
resignation. 
 EM echoes MP‘s rejection of governmental tax and regulation:  
environmental concern is elitist nonsense that takes from the little man 
and gives him nothing back in return (#54, #136).  Just as the EM 
Standpoint experiences the self as being at the mercy of the elite, so it 
sees mankind as being, ultimately, at the mercy of nature (#47, #111). 
The EM Standpoint generates the Commons Dilemma because self-defence 
requires one to make no concessions without certainty of reciprocation.  So 
EM too rejects the prescriptions of the CS and AR Standpoints, as well as 
MP‘s optimism.   
 As described throughout 4.9, the AR Standpoint pragmatically rejects the 
extreme expression of both the CS and MP Standpoints.  At the same time, 
AR sees EM‘s isolationist pessimism as irresponsible.  Climate change is a 
problem but a manageable one (#124) if we act responsibly (#66).  This 
means relying on the expertise of sound science (#7), and regulatory 
intervention to curb the excesses of the market (#159): the correct 
response is not revolution but a modernisation of the status quo (#169). 
 
The four Standpoints, when argued in contradistinction to each other (as 
anticipated in 2.2.7), no longer express a common sense position that most people 
would agree with. 
4.10.3 Conclusion: four distinct Standpoints 
Section 4.10.2 lays out how the Standpoints emerge as distinct positions.  The 
analyses in 4.6-4.9 justify the view that the matrix of arguments built on the logic 
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of each RM does provide a sound framework with which to interpret the debate.  
The arguments identified in the matrix are manifested in the sample. 
4.11 Interaction and overlap between the Standpoints 
Chapter 7 will address in greater depth whether the observable interactions and 
overlaps between the Standpoints can tell us anything about the underlying 
structure of the four RMs: in particular Cultural Theory‘s Grid/Group account and 
Relational Models Theory‘s independent RMs diverge on this question of structure 
(Verweij, 2007).  This section will briefly reflect on some interactions and 
overlaps that emerged in 4.6-4.9. 
4.11.1 No Stereotypes: the use of arguments from multiple Standpoints 
Section 4.10.1 argued that many of the arguments represent common sense.  
Different Standpoints often co-opt the common sense arguments of the others.  
The ‗polluter pays‘ principle is an example of this.  Based on the logic of the EM 
Standpoint (4.8.3) it influences the policy preferences argued for from the AR 
Standpoint (4.9.3).  Further, the retributive justice implied by ‗the polluter pays‘ 
appeals to the CS Standpoint.  For CS, polluters are ultimately outcasts, forfeiting 
the protection of the community they have damaged.  Lovelock envisages that all 
mankind will become outcast and ―suffer the pain soon to be inflicted by our 
outraged planet‖ (#68). 
 
The obligations of the developed world to the developing world frequently 
manifest CS arguments (4.6.7).  The starting point may be recognition of the 
whole world sharing the challenge: but in #24, developed world aid sounds  
almost like protection money, an AR response to an EM threat: 
―City authorities, as well as governments, needed to prepare for sea level rises and 
new systems should be set up to pass information, expertise, and possibly financial 
aid from the developed to the developing world, said Dr Kelly. This was the only way 
to avoid the nightmare of millions of refugees fleeing from low-lying coastal cities in 
countries lacking the resources to defend them.‖ 
 
4.11.2 Interaction between Standpoints 
Further disrupting the idea that Standpoints advance narrow, stereotyped 
arguments, Section 4.9.8 explained how each of the other Standpoints looks to AR 
to enforce its own approach.  Just as businesses achieve policy capture, the 
market based MP Standpoint successfully orientates policy to be market friendly 
even when the AR diagnosis is one of market failure (4.9.3).  AR‘s commitment to 
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the status quo is in effect a commitment to the pursuit of economic growth.  Yet 
the CS Standpoint still fights for government to impose the CS vision (#112): 
―Mike Child, Friends of the Earth's climate campaigner, said last night: ‗There are no 
technological fixes to dramatically reduce carbon dioxide emissions from flying. If 
Tony Blair is serious about climate change he needs to curb the rise in air travel. He 
could also set a (sic) example by flying less. Offsetting his personal emissions while 
allowing UK emissions to increase is simply not enough.‘‖ 
 
Even Jeremy Clarkson, staunch EM defender of the little man in ridiculing 
government efforts to fight climate change, happily demands government 
intervention to stop car companies charging customers for model recall costs 
(#54). 
 
The AR Standpoint itself uses CS logic to justify the need for government 
intervention, #12: 
―THE FINAL report from last year's major United Nations-backed conference in 
Toronto, concerning global warming, began by describing this environmental problem 
as 'an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate 
consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war.' 
 
The conference concluded that cuts of greater than 50 per cent in the main 
greenhouse gas, carbon di-oxide are now needed to stabilise the climate, with 20 per 
cent cuts within 15 years as 'an initial global goal.'‖ 
 
4.11.3  Overlap between Standpoints 
Cultural Theory‘s hypothesis of a Grid-Group structure underlying the four 
worldviews suggests that overlap between the ‗Standpoints‘ might be expected.  
Just above, the interaction between the CS and AR Standpoints could be regarded 
as an expression of the same group solidarity protecting the community in each 
case.  Similarly, the Standpoints that are closest to ‗low group‘ worldviews, MP 
and EM, clearly overlap in their rejection of imposition on the individual by the 
government or by CS‘s scaremongering (4.7.7, 4.8.7).  Superficially the difference 
is one of tone, with MP self-assertive and EM self-defensive.  Chapter 7 will discuss 
this further. 
 
Overlap between the AR and EM Standpoints, which would reflect Cultural 
Theory‘s  ‗High Grid‘ worldviews, is expressed in EM‘s expectation that others, ie 
‗the Authorities‘, should do something about the problem (4.8.7).  AR‘s 
expectation that societies‘ members know their place and willingly subject 
themselves to the solutions identified by authority finds less overt expression in 
this democratic age. 
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Overlap between the MP and CS Standpoints, which would reflect Cultural 
Theory‘s ‗Low Grid‘ worldviews, tends to be obscured by the antipathy between 
MP‘s commitment to growth and CS‘s assertion of ‗Limits to Growth‘.  However, 
#170‘s long account of Transition Town initiatives is replete with optimistic 
examples of individual and local can-do activists, for example: 
―The cafe where we met, Honest Foods, had a policy of sourcing food locally. Law [of 
Transition Town Brixton] asked for a word with the chef, said he knew someone with 
a vast crop of pears in their garden, and asked if the chef would be interested in 
buying them? Without hesitation, the chef said yes. I was impressed.‖ 
 
CS‘s emphasis on local community does away with the need for MP‘s market 
clearing house.  Word of mouth matches people with resources with people with 
needs.  Yet both Standpoints are striving for optimisation through individual 
initiative. 
 
There is also overlap between the Standpoints that do not correlate within the 
Grid-Group structure.  The tight relationship between AR and MP has already been 
observed (4.9.3, 4.9.8), while CS‘s prophecies of catastrophe seem to justify EM‘s 
pessimistic fatalism in bringing guilty mankind its just deserts (4.11.1 above).  This 
division into two camps echoes the early version of Cultural Theory that described 
a structure of Centre and Border (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) as anticipated in 
2.4.2. 
4.12 Are there other themes in the sample that do not fit into 
an analysis based on the four Relational Models? 
4.12.1 Articles with no Relational Models identified 
38 articles had no RMs identified in Appendix H.  Although the table did not seek 
to be exhaustive, it is worth looking at the content of these articles.  21 of them 
had content that was either coded ‗Unassigned‘ or ‗Minor or Derivative‘ in 4.4.2.  
Of the remaining 17, nine are relatively factual reports of new scientific research, 
and two are articles with relatively undeveloped coverage of climate change.  The 
remaining six, # 89, #93, #131, #142, #147, #177, did not have unusual themes: 
the film Ice Age, a UNFCCC interim meeting, a complaint that the Cabinet had too 
many lights on in a photograph, a report on a dystopian play, an article about 
warmer temperatures affecting skiing holidays, and finally a piece suggesting that 
there are more important issues for politicians to be concerned with that their 
own expenses. 
181 
 
 
 In each of these one or more codes from the RM matrix could have been stretched 
to fit: but several of the articles are good examples of a problem encountered 
throughout the analysis.  Newspaper reports of other people‘s opinions frequently 
veil the arguments:  CS prophecies of catastrophe are implicit in a post-
apocalyptic play, but a review panning the piece may simply not advance those 
arguments. 
4.12.2 Other themes: objects, events and activities 
Section 3.4 described the exploratory coding process used on the pilot media 
sample.  Many codes were used for specific objects (e.g. glaciers, ozone), events 
(storms, conferences), technologies (nuclear, wind power) or human activities (air 
travel, polluting).  These are the ‗contents‘ of the physical and social world, 
adduced as needed within the arguments identified in the RM coding matrix.  They 
are not really arguments in themselves. 
 
This is also true of human dimensions included in the codes: different times (past, 
present or future), and different places (e.g. USA, China) or place categories (e.g. 
local/global, developed/developing world) may all be endowed with value in 
argument.  Reference to ‗the planet‘, in 32 articles, almost always carries the 
subtext ‗we must save the planet‘, although not when mentioned by the Sunday 
Times‘ astrologer (#148).  But these ideas are building blocks for arguments, not 
arguments themselves. 
4.12.3 Other themes: arguing about arguing 
Sections 4.6 to 4.11 picture the different Standpoints contesting how the debate 
should be defined.  There are different ways of describing this contest, and a 
number of the codes used identify some of those different descriptions.  Often the 
contest is seen as being about priorities, human or political (e.g. #7, #14, #34, 
#110, #159, #168, #169), or about needs (e.g. #54, #65, #68, #77, #109, 
#170).  Within the sample, participants in the debate inevitably attack the 
irrationality of other positions (e.g. #98, #104, #112, #124, #136, #155): both 
CS and MP are accused of quasi-fundamentalist extremism (e.g. #121 and #92 
respectively).  Other articles make a point of stressing the complexity of the 
problem and the lack of simple solutions (e.g. #42, #98, #109, #150).   The 
contest is not just about who is morally right, but who is right in their definition of 
the problem. 
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Yet this contest over what is the most important priority, or over what the correct 
diagnosis is for the phenomenon of global warming, is precisely what the previous 
sections have been describing. 
4.13 Conclusion: the value of an analysis based on Relational 
 Models 
Fiske‘s (1992) account of Relational Models proposes that each Model addresses a 
particular social issue with a different logic.  The solutions to social issues will 
vary with the logic applied. Since we can all access the four models, we can all 
appreciate the arguments derived from the logic of each Standpoint. 
 
There are certain domains where culture, sometimes our nature, has clear 
expectations about which model ‗should‘ be applied – CS within the family, EM 
amongst playground children, AR in an army, and MP on the trading floor39.  But 
there are many domains where our relationships with counterparties are 
composite and varied: in these cases, how do we know which logic to apply?  
Generally, according to Fiske (2004a, 2004b), culture provides the answers.  With 
newly emerging domains, such as climate change, there is clearly scope for 
competing visions to fight over which logic will come to be the cultural norm. 
 
This analysis does demonstrate that the debate can usefully be categorised into 
arguments deriving from the logic of the 4 Relational Models.  Going beyond 
Cultural Theory‘s analysis, the inclusion of the EM Standpoint emphasises the tight 
grip the Commons Dilemma exerts over the behaviour and reasoning of individuals 
and individual nations.  The AR Standpoint, trying to rise above EM‘s ineffective 
fatalism, seeks to take charge of the problem.  Much work has been done, with 
impressive IPCC reports and economic analyses such as the Stern Review.  Why has 
so little been achieved? 
 
The answer provided by this analysis is not new, but it sheds new light on why we 
are so stuck.   The CS Standpoint and the MP Standpoint look to the AR Standpoint 
to enforce their approach (4.9.8).  The AR Standpoint accepts the CS diagnosis of 
‗limits‘ while remaining committed to MP‘s economic growth.  The AR Standpoint 
balances between recognising the need for change, while seeking only to re-invent 
                                            
39 Necessarily even this statement oversimplifies: many families are patriarchal, 
playground children can have strong communal bonds in resistance to authority etc. 
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the status quo.  Both main UK political parties depend on an electorate likely to 
make the EM plea ―What‘s in it for us?‘ if they push for faster, more dynamic 
change.  As a result, both stay suspended between the two positions: 
 
The Conservatives in #159: 
―it is too easy simply to state that the choice between the environment and the 
economy is always a false one. [Cameron] also needs to make the hard choices.‖ 
 
Labour in #41: 
―If Labour wishes to be truly green, it must risk upsetting public opinion; something 
that so far, it has shown itself very reluctant to do.‖ 
 
Chapter 7 discusses some of the different views as to where this leads. 
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Chapter 5  Focus Groups       
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter has seven sections: 
 
1. Focus group purpose, precedents and procedures 
2. General Description 
3. Focus group coding methods 
4. Relational Models analysis: London Group 1 
5. Relational Models analysis: the other focus groups 
6. Focus Groups: discussion 
7. Conclusion 
 
The general description in Section 5.2 characterises the content of all of the 
groups without reference to the Relational Models framework.  Each of the focus 
groups has been analysed using the RM framework, and Section 5.3 explains how 
this has been applied.  Section 5.4 shows this detailed analysis applied to London 
Group 1 (LG1).  The similar analyses of the other 5 focus groups are included in 
Appendix J.  Sections 5.5 and 5.6 set out what these analyses show. 
 
References to passages in the focus groups use the line numbers in the NVivo file 
for each group, e.g. LG1.460 or SG1.182.  The line number is the opening line of 
any passage referenced.  For ease of analysis, the focus group transcripts were 
divided in to four segments, labelled A, B, C and ‗RMQs‘ (explained in 5.3.2).  
These divisions were somewhat arbitrary but facilitated review of the content.  
Names of participants have been changed to fulfil the promise of anonymity. 
 
5.1 Focus group procedures 
5.1.1 Purpose of the focus groups 
The focus groups were convened to replicate informal elements of the climate 
change debate.  The objective was to generate examples of lay persons 
negotiating with others whether the topic was important, and collaboratively 
making sense of the problem and its implications.  Chapter 3 explained that the 
focus groups aimed to capture examples of the debate at the inter-personal level 
to compliment the social and individual levels addressed respectively by the 
media analysis and the survey. 
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5.1.2 Focus group recruitment 
Six focus group interviews were held between 25th November and 14th December 
2009.   The subject of climate change was then highly topical with the UNFCCC 
‗COP 15‘ meeting in Copenhagen running from 7th to 18th December. 
 
The first two focus groups (SG1 and SG2) were recruited from graduate and 
undergraduate students at the London School of Economics.  Participants received 
£30 although one obtained a course credit instead.   The remaining focus groups 
were recruited by a market research agency, SAROS Research.   SAROS was paid a 
fee, and participants in the two groups held in London (LG1 and LG2) received 
£40, while participants in the final two groups, held in Manchester (MG1 and 
MG2), received £3040. 
 
Participants had been pre-screened by answering a short attitude questionnaire.  
This comprised responses on a 5-point Likert scale to four statements each 
representing a core position of one of the four Relational Models. These were: 
 
A. There has always been climate change. We will use technology to adapt to 
changes as we have always done. 
B. We consume so much that we are ruining our planet. We need to cut back 
to avoid catastrophic climate change. 
C. There's no point in the UK doing anything about climate change, when 
countries like China are growing so fast, so I don't see why I should be 
asked to pay higher taxes or give up things to stop it. 
D. We do need to act on climate change, but that doesn't mean a revolution: 
it means governments taking appropriate action. 
 
  SAROS also obtained data on newspaper readership.  The intention was to select 
participants in a way that ensured a spread of views within the groups.  In very 
general terms this was achieved, but attendance at the groups was quite low and 
the screening data has not been used within the analysis. 
 
                                            
40 Previous pilot focus groups were assembled by snowball; one of 16 & 17 year olds; one 
of London-based finance professionals, and one of London-based mothers of young 
children.  The selection method adopted, using a recruitment agency, reflected a desire to 
avoid the homogeneity experienced in these pilots.  The choice of splitting between 
London and Manchester also targeted greater diversity: practicality dictated only choosing 
two locations.  The inclusion of two student groups was driven by cost considerations, but 
also provided a contrast to the externally recruited groups. 
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The Student and London Focus Groups were each held at the London School of 
Economics in either a small class room or ‗common room‘ setting.  The 
Manchester Focus Groups were held in a meeting room at the Novotel in central 
Manchester.  In London a student was present to provide administrative support 
but this proved largely unnecessary and was not repeated in Manchester.  All 
meetings took place in the late afternoon or evening. 
5.1.3 Previous focus groups discussing climate change 
These focus groups sought a fairly general discussion from participants, in contrast 
to some studies which have a specific purpose, such as the identification of 
prevalent climate change ‗icons‘ (O‘Neill & Hulme, 2009).  The procedures 
adopted here were also relatively simple, whereas other studies are often more 
elaborate, using, for example, reconvened focus groups (Bickerstaff, et al., 2008) 
or even quite extensive series of discussions including the generation of visual 
material and written reports (Kasemir et al., 2000; Stoll-Kleeman, et al., 2001).  
Other studies anchor the sense-making within a particular community (Marx, et 
al., 2007, in this case Ugandan farmers), or are structured as workshops where the 
impact of introducing new information is monitored (O‘Neill & Hulme, 2009), or sit 
within a sequence of procedures where group participants are also interviewed or 
provide survey responses (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007). 
 
An advantage of many of the approaches above is that they make a virtue of the 
specificity of each focus group, e.g. by giving it a specific purpose, or a specific 
location.  A challenge for any focus group is that the design and setting inevitably 
influence the specific discussion that emerges: even with the insight offered by 
contrasts between groups (in this case, for example, between larger groups and 
smaller groups, student and non-student groups, or London groups versus 
Manchester groups) it is difficult to determine the impact of specific factors such 
as the format or, indeed, the timing coinciding with the UNFCCC meeting in 
Copenhagen.  The general tone of the discussion in these groups, and the absence 
of any demand for concrete conclusions, may have encouraged a consensus type 
acceptance that climate change is a problem (discordant views could be 
considered impolite) coupled with a detachment from any engagement with what 
society, or participants as citizens, are going to do about it.  Bickerstaff and 
others captured this problem of determining what generates the discourses in the 
group very clearly:  
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―[The] reflexive recognition of the gap between a sense of moral obligation and 
behaviour may in part have been stimulated by the artificial context of the focus-
group discussions …. It may also be attributed to a complex mix of factors including 
habit, self-interest, and, in various respects, a sense of powerlessness. This typically 
resulted in a tendency to delegate the responsibility to institutional actors.‖ 
(Bickerstaff, et al., 2008, p. 1320) 
 
These limitations need to be borne in mind while assessing the outcomes of these 
focus group discussions. 
5.1.4 Conduct of focus group interviews 
All six focus groups were conducted in the same way.  A consent form (Appendix I) 
was either circulated or read out at the start and all participants gave written 
consent.  After introductions, as facilitator I asked everyone to think of three 
images or ideas that first came to mind at the mention of ‗climate change‘.  I also 
asked what if anything ‗climate change‘ meant to them personally.  The opening 
discussion typically involved participants taking turns in responding to these.  I 
then emphasised that participants no longer needed to take turns.  As facilitator I 
sought to ensure that all groups at some stage addressed the following issues: 
 
 Whether participants were convinced that there was such a thing as 
manmade global warming, 
 How participants felt about increases to energy prices designed to 
discourage their own consumption, 
 How participants felt about money from those price increases being used 
to help developing countries modernise their own energy infrastructure or 
adapt to climate change impacts, 
 What participants expected the UNFCCC Copenhagen summit to achieve. 
 
Towards the end of each focus group I asked participants to respond to the 
statements used in the recruitment screening.   
All focus groups lasted between 85 and 92 minutes except for LG2 which lasted 73 
minutes. 
5.1.5 Focus group numbers and levels of participation 
The table below identifies the number of group members and the amount they 
each participated.  Participation was measured by word count as a percentage of 
the total. 
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Table 5-1: Focus Group members' level of participation 
Averaging five participants the groups were generally smaller than the six to eight 
of ‗traditional‘ focus groups (Flick, 2006; Gaskell, 2000, p. 49).  However, it is 
noticeable that in the four groups with more than four members one or more 
participants were relatively quiet.  Quiet participants were typically the youngest 
in the groups (Suzy, Tracy, Derek and Bill).  Most groups had some dominant 
individuals so that moderation was required to ensure contributions from the 
quieter members.  The level of facilitator intervention equates to ‗medium level‘ 
on Cronin‘s (2001) range from low to high level moderation. 
 
Flick (2006) distinguishes between groups that refine individual opinions through 
discussion and challenge and groups that co-construct shared solutions or shared 
understanding of an issue.  These groups achieved a bit of both.  All but one group 
developed momentum of their own so that they can be judged to have reached 
the ‗performing‘ stage demanded by Gaskell (2000); as such it seems fair to 
conclude that the small size of the groups did not inhibit the refinement of the 
individual opinions or the development of some level of shared understanding.  
LG2 required greater moderation, partly to motivate discussion, partly to prevent 
deviation.  Although LG2 appeared to be a particularly disparate set of individuals, 
the group still developed a shared tone to their discussion even though the 
discussion was a little shorter than the other five. 
5.2 General description 
5.2.1 Voicing their own opinions 
The topic of climate change, especially when debated close to an event like the 
COP15 meeting, is familiar to many people.  Even without the organising influence 
of the facilitator‘s agenda, many of the same arguments emerge naturally within 
the groups.  Yet participants do not appear to parrot well worn clichés garnered 
LG1 LG1 LG2 LG2 MG1 MG1 MG2 MG2 SG1 SG1 SG2 SG2 
Name % Name % Name % Name % Name % Name % 
Facilitator 18% Facilitator 25% Facilitator 15% Facilitator 9% Facilitator 17% Facilitator 12% 
Miranda 9% Emma 18% Clare 6% Bill 7% Amber 19% Careen 17% 
Nigel 19% Mary 14% Derek 4% Jim 23% Hilda 29% Digby 26% 
Peter 22% Solomon 14% James 38% Jayne 17% Mercy 16% Hanif 12% 
Suzy 2% Tim 29% Miles 23% Laura 16% Keith 20% Millicent 33% 
Simon 13% Troy 12% Piers 26% 
Tracy 3% 
Walter 13% 
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from the media.  Participants express (a) their own lack of confidence that 
anything would come out of the COP15 process, (b) their own sense of the 
insignificance of their own consumption, (c) their own objections to being told 
what to do, (d) their own indignation at other people‘s unnecessary consumption, 
and (e) their own commitment to restraining their environmental footprint: 
 
a) Jim Basically, I think [Copenhagen]‘s just like for all the senior people from 
all the countries it‘s just a nice week out for them 
Laura It‘s a bit of lip service going on (MG2.1559) 
b) Hanif because I just feel like even if I did do something it would just be 
overshadowed like by the millions in China who didn‘t do anything and you can‘t 
really blame them (SG2.652) 
c) Miles I don‘t like being told what to do, I don‘t like these, these, sort of 
orders through the media, you know, I don‘t like being told by Bob Geldof to 
give money to charity I don‘t like being told by climate change people that I 
need to recycle, for, if, it‘s my choice to recycle.  If it really, if there was really 
that much convincing argument for it I believe there would be more stringent 
control on how people recycle, think there would be a legal obligation to do 
such things, there would be a limit on how far people can drive there would be 
a limit on on things like that, and if if the arguments were conclusive enough, 
then..( MG1.481) 
d) Emma … it‘s ridiculous having these massive cars and of course they are big gas 
guzzlers these huge jeeps and I just think that is ridiculous (LG2.495) 
e) Clare I might be different because I‘m a woman and have got the motherly 
instinct and I‘m thinking about saving the planet, for the future, do y-, that‘s 
probably just me.  And I think anything I do I think oh I can‘t do that I shouldn‘t 
do, you know, not use the car as much because of what‘s going to happen.. 
(MG1.624) 
 
Clare, in (e), does go on to describe herself as a ‗sponge‘ (MG1.630) absorbing all 
the media advice, but she has digested the media messages and reproduced them 
as her own values guiding her own actions. 
5.2.2 Responding to an intractable problem 
The groups are all too clear that the problem is almost intractable.  At its most 
dispassionate, this insight is expressed from the Standpoint of the ‗detached 
observer‘. Freed from anthropocentric bias, participants occasionally follow 
James Lovelock (2006) or John Gray (2006) in taking the view that mankind simply 
is not up to the challenge: 
James But, it‘s again, it‘s the mentality of the er, everyone fighting their little 
corner, isn‘t it, you know, as nations, and rather than saying, actually this is 
way beyond national interest, this is, this is, you know it‘s like little green 
men looking in, at the idea of like racism or different peoples fighting each 
other, and like what are you talking about you‘re all humans ...what are you 
doing? (MG1.1309) 
 
More often though, this intractability brings on a sense of powerlessness (see 
Bickerstaff, et al., 2008, quoted in 5.1.3 above)  The problem is just too difficult.  
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From this Standpoint participants tend to complain:  they don‘t know who to 
believe about the science, they don‘t like being told what to do, and it‘s 
impossible for them to reduce their carbon emissions unless the government puts 
alternative technologies in place – they still need to travel, to eat and to heat 
their homes. 
 
Yet feeling powerless is uncomfortable, and participants are often happier to 
assert their own agency, their own independent choices: 
 
Troy I think it‘s the telling for me, I‘ve, there‘s a person I work with who tells 
you‘ve got to do this you‘ve got to do that and [sod?] off. [agreement] cos 
that‘s the kind of person I am, but if they were to try a different form of 
persuasion, I mean I do all the you know recycling and I take the bike instead 
of car and so on, but there‘s particular reasons for me doing those things, and 
it‘s not necessarily because I‘m super-green and I‘m going to save the planet 
[Clare agreeing throughout], but you know [like?] I said switching the lights off 
that makes economic sense to me I mean  [agreement] you can‘t leave the tap 
running when you‘re brushing your teeth, again: cash saving!  [laughter]  
 
Miles Er, that‘s it!  I‘ll do things that are green purely if they benefit me.  And it, 
that sounds really bad, but, phrew, like you say, turning the lights off and, and 
I used to cycle to work when I lived, when I worked in Sale I‘d cycle to work 
purely because it kept me fit and I didn‘t have to pay for petrol, driving.  
Same with the turning the lights off, it. If, it inevitably benefits me as well, 
so, you know, in that selfish sort of respect being green helps me more than it 
does the planet, and it sound, it sounds really bad but you know, I recycle 
purely because there are recycle bins there so it‘s easy to, but if it meant 
having to separate all my own recycling and then take it to a separate bin I 
wouldn‘t bother. (MG1.337) 
 
It is intriguing to see how good manners appear to temper this bullish self-
assertion.  Neither whingeing about how unfair and difficult it is, nor brashly 
saying ‗I‘ll do what I like‘, feels comfortable when discussing an issue which self-
evidently calls for positive co-operation. 
5.2.3 Grounds for hope: government action 
One alternative is to hope for government action, and the groups generally 
converge on this solution. 
 
Miles‘s comments above, in which he assumes that if the problem were as bad as 
some people say the government would already have addressed it, encapsulates 
this eventual reliance on government.   Most of the time Miles voices self-interest 
and his comments above show his impatience with the idea of acting for the sake 
of the planet rather than himself; so he responds to the idea that the developed 
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world should help the developing world to reduce their pollution by saying ‗but 
that‘s far too noble‘(MG1.1303).  But when James suggests, above, that ‗everyone 
fighting their little corner‘ cannot work, Miles sets out a solution which is 
essentially the process that the UNFCCC is trying to achieve: 
 
Miles In which case there should be some kind of global ‗right, this is what has to be 
done‘ imposed, er, a percentage of your GDP goes towards a mass pot which is 
then pumped back out to the to the countries which it which needs it most, so 
if there‘s countries in, in say Indonesia where the infrastructure is  
 
Facilitator  That is what they‘re trying to do, kind of, 
 
Miles Is it?  Well in that case, then, yeah (MG1.1315) 
 
As will be seen throughout the focus groups, the issues are relatively simple.  The 
structure of the ‗Commons Dilemma‘, and the need for centrally co-ordinated 
action to address it, is easy to grasp.  Just as easy to grasp is how difficult this co-
ordination is to achieve, as James‘s image of the little green men looking down on 
the battle of vested interests reveals. 
5.2.4 Grounds for hope: technological solutions 
Another alternative is to hope, or possibly expect, that technological advances 
will address the problem.  Just as Miles assumes that the government will do 
something if the issue gets really serious (5.2.1 above), so others assume that 
when the need is great enough technological innovation will accelerate to meet 
the need.  Most groups at some point ‗assume‘ that there will in due course be 
technology such as new jet fuels or ultra-efficient solar panels.   
 
Troy, in MG1, and Digby, in SG2, illustrate this hope for technological solutions: 
Troy The technology is out there, somewhere, it‘s just.  All technology‘s out there 
somewhere it just takes one bright spark to actually find it. (MG1.1547) 
 
Digby it‘s alright that I‘m not like planning my lifestyle around not flying because 
they will invent new types of jet engine that will reduce the fuel consumption 
of planes and reduce the emissions from planes and make it more sustainable 
to fly, and you know maybe one day they‘ll invent that plane from Planeteers, 
Captain Planet, that‘s you know solar powered and we‘ll be all set (SG2.518) 
 
Clearly Digby is also acknowledging that wishing the problem away with 
technology is too glib, and one of his fellow group members Millicent forcefully 
rejects the idea that we should hope technology can maintain current lifestyles 
(SG2.884).  Yet the reliance on technology saving the day is often present in the 
meetings, explicitly or implicitly. 
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5.2.5 Doing what you can 
Another response is to do what you believe is right.  You know that it may be 
pointless, but your conscience dictates that you do the right thing. 
Laura    Yeah.  As long as I can feel comfortable in myself, that I know that I‘ve, I‘ve 
done what I can within my powers, erm, and if, you know,  if I‘ve managed to 
influence the kids, influence my husband, my mum, my dad, whatever, you 
know because they‘re of a generation as well that they didn‘t always 
recycle..(MG2.392) 
 
This sense of a moral imperative seems to be particularly strong for women, and is 
often connected to concern for the fate of one‘s children (Jayne MG2.112; Laura 
MG2. 123/354; Clare MG1.624).  The men also understand the relevance of family 
in increasing awareness (e.g. Piers MG2.437), but in MG1 James matches the other 
men in the group by stating his moral imperative as an assertion of his own 
agency: ―I‘m not waiting to hear what the the erm result of Copenhagen is to 
decide what I‘m going to do‖ (MG1.1773). 
5.2.6 Scepticism 
The media articles confounded the conventional analysis that claims the media 
obscures the scientific consensus by portraying an open scientific debate; this 
standard analysis goes on to claim that vested interests on both sides drive the 
media coverage.  Instead 4.4.5 showed that the sample very rarely deviated from 
describing a scientific consensus. 
 
By contrast, the non-student focus groups show that participants feel uncertain 
about the science.  In Manchester Miles, Derek and Troy (MG1) and Bill (MG2) 
express various levels of scepticism, while in London Emma and Tim (LG2) both 
say they are confused by all the different reports.  Nevertheless, Nigel (LG1.212) 
probably does speak for most participants when he says that ‗deep down most of 
us know‘ there is a scientific consensus.  Although participants do mention natural 
cycles and sunspots, the confusion they reference most is all the conflicting advice 
about what ‗they‘ should do about it, about what human activities need to 
change: is recycling good or bad, are pets really bigger emitters than cars, are 
cattle farts the biggest problem?  So resigned confusion precedes even engaging 
with the dilemma of whether one‘s own individual actions matter. 
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5.2.7 Distrust of government 
The focus groups were held with the parliamentary expenses scandal fresh in 
people‘s minds.  A lack of confidence in government and authority suffuses much 
of the non-student group‘s discussions, eg: 
Emma You see, I think people have just lost faith in the government.  Nobody trusts 
what we‘re told any more (LG2.749). 
 
The groups can see that this gives them a problem if the eventual solution relies 
upon government intervention: 
Mary Mm, no definitely, but it‘s kind of  you know we say we don‘t have any faith in 
government and I‘m sure that they feel the same and I‘m sure that there‘s lots 
of the people that live in China that would really like to do something but, 
there aren‘t government resources to do so.  It‘s, you know, I think it go[es], 
it‘s not diminishing responsibility but I think it‘s like you do have to put a lot 
of faith in the government and hope that they do the right thing (LG2.931) 
5.2.8 The student groups 
The two student groups offer some contrasts to the other four.  Some of the 
students are familiar with the policy debates over climate change.  In SG2 
Millicent often reproduces environmentalist discourse, advocating social justice 
and attacking multinational corporations.  She expresses these views as central to 
her own identity as a ‗global citizen‘ (SG2.331).  Other students are familiar with 
the economic arguments and some are prone to advocate market solutions in a 
way that is absent from the other groups. 
 
At the same time most of the students have not experienced the world as a 
constraint on their hopes and plans in the way that the other participants have.  
Temporary cost constraints are a function of being a student, and do not restrain 
their dreams of travelling the world irrespective of the environmental 
consequences of air travel (e.g. SG2.514).  In the other groups, participants 
express resentment of government interference and taxation, and the challenge 
of living in the modern world on limited means is experienced as often difficult 
and even stressful.  For the students, these perspectives have little resonance yet. 
5.2.9 Overall tone 
Even these few extracts show that the groups have no difficulty engaging with 
many of the different arguments that constitute the ‗climate change debate‘.  
Generally the discussions follow the same trajectory.  First a balance between 
recognition that there is a problem and varying degrees of reluctance to see one‘s 
own lifestyle affected.  Then the acknowledgement that something has to be 
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done, with the developed world obliged to take a lead and regulations needed to 
change behaviour. 
 
The groups only varied in the intensity with which the different arguments were 
voiced.  LG2, for example, was dominated by a more despairing tone, and 
constant resentment towards government and other people.  MG1 was more 
confidently self-assertive, while MG2 demonstrated a balance with two women 
expressing a strong, stable sense of duty to act responsibly and two men more 
suspicious and complaining. 
5.3 Focus groups: coding method 
5.3.1 Focus group transcription 
I transcribed each discussion using either two or three recordings for each group.  
These transcriptions were loaded onto the NVivo database, along with the media 
articles discussed in Chapter 4 above. 
5.3.2 Focus group coding 
The focus group transcripts were coded in parallel with the media articles using 
the same coding frame.  Chapter 3 sets out the development of the coding frame. 
 
For ease of analysis, each transcript has been divided into four sections, ‗A‘, ‗B‘, 
‗C‘ and ‗RMQs‘.  This latter section covered the part of the focus groups devoted 
to the specific statements shown in 5.1.2 above.  These statements necessarily 
imposed a ‗Relational Models‘ framing to the debate and so needed to be 
separately identified from sections where participants were free to frame the 
debate in their own terms.  The table below indicates the relative size of the 
sections, based on word count: 
 
Table 5-2: Focus group sections, relative size 
With the exception of the London groups the ‗RMQ‘s section came last, and 
generally was the shortest.  The other three sections are typically of similar 
LG1 LG1 LG2 LG2 MG1 MG1 MG2 MG2 SG1 SG1 SG2 SG2 
Name % Name % Name % Name % Name % Name % 
A 26% A 41% A 27% A 29% A 24% A 20% 
B 34% B 28% B 28% B 26% B 32% B 38% 
RMQs 21% RMQs 22% C 28% C 30% C 32% C 35% 
C 19% C 9% RMQs 17% RMQs 15% RMQs 13% RMQs 7% 
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lengths, with the divisions drawn at a point where there was a significant change 
in subject.41. 
5.3.3 Focus group coding approach 
Section 3.4 set out the development of the coding frame.  A provisional set of 
Relational Models codes (3.4 E) was applied.  Subsequently, the final matrix of RM 
codes was applied, in effect repeating and checking the coding process. 
 
Shown below are two short passages from the transcripts and an explanation of 
the RM codes applied. 
5.3.4 Focus group coding: example from LG1 
In the following extract, LG1.460, Walter responds to the facilitator‘s question 
‗Who‘s responsible and who should therefore be doing something about it?‘: 
 
Walter I think, I think the advanced industrial countries have for hundreds of years 
pumped this CO2 into the atmosphere, now when they can afford to decrease 
the amount that they‘re doing the expanding countries like China and India 
etc. etc.  they say well listen you‘ve done it for hundreds of years and now 
your stop us from progressing.  So you‘re either going to pay for it or else 
we‘re going to continue.  And unless you‘re serious about this and unless you 
can prove to the world population that climate change is a matter that‘s going 
to be so serious that we‘ve all got to pull together.. well I can‘t see them 
getting any sort of agreement.  So I think it‘s up to the advanced countries to 
take a lead in this, because they have the money and they have the means to 
solve the problem.  Some of the other countries, they.. haven‘t anything to 
give never mind that they‘re more or less in the firing line. 
 
Walter uses the logic of different Relational Models applied to several domains in 
this piece: 
 
 CS 1: the idea of the whole world sharing the problem, ‗we‘ve all got to 
pull together‘ 
 CS 7: with respect to other people there is a need to look after the most 
needy; this overlaps with 
 AR 7.1: the obligation of the rich world to look after the developing world: 
‗it‘s up to the advanced countries to take a lead in this, because they have 
the money and they have the means to solve the problem‘. 
 MP 3: the need for economic growth is a given, as is China and India‘s right 
to ‗progress‘. 
                                            
41  During the analysis the sections were used to review how participation, content and 
tone developed across the course of the discussion.  Beyond this the sections do not have 
particular salience other than as an organisational device. 
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 EM 1: the notion of ‗turn taking‘ that is central to the Equity Matching 
model is expressed in the clear idea that it is now China and India‘s turn to 
expand economically:   the advanced world has had its turn at pumping 
‗this CO2 into the atmosphere‘ and now they must reciprocate by allowing 
the developing world its turn. 
 EM 3.2: furthermore, following the ‗Polluter Pays Principle‘ the developed 
world is ‗going to pay for it‘.  Finally, 
 EM 2.3: embedded within the piece is the Commons Dilemma.  You‘ve got 
to do your part ‗or else we‘re going to continue‘. 
 EM 8: because this game of chicken is so hard to resolve, a pessimistic 
conclusion is seemingly inevitable: ‗well I can‘t see them getting any sort 
of agreement‘. 
5.3.5 Focus group coding: example from SG2 
This short extract, SG2.182, occurred while participants were still exploring what 
climate change ‗meant to them personally‘: 
Digby Um, I think that‘s part of what I was talking about earlier that it‘s more 
complicated than just the earth is getting hotter that‘s bad, it‘s our fault. It‘s 
like there is an element of eventually global warming would d- besides the 
fact it would make it impossible for humans to live on the earth would correct 
itself and life itself would continue on the world and the world would cool 
back to its normal temperature; we wouldn‘t exist any more, so, that‘s more 
the issue, that if the climate completely changes on the planet it will be 
difficult for us to exist um, no-one really addresses that it‘s just put sort of a 
way of like save the pandas, save the polar bears, and other cuddly things. 
 
Millicent I think it will be difficult for people without access to power and, and money 
and adap- adaptive capacity to survive..... 
 
Digby That‘s a.... 
 
Millicent ... but I think that the elite will be ok [laughs]. 
 
 
This passage has a simpler range of Relational Models arguments: 
 CS 2.2: Digby notes the argument that ‗mankind is guilty‘ in his opening 
sentence. 
 EM 4: the Equality Matching understanding of nature as ‗other‘, and 
potentially hostile to mankind, also fills his account. 
 CS 4: nature as fragile is briefly captured by the polar bears and pandas, as 
a contrast to the EM framing of nature as ‗other‘. 
 CS 8.1: the CS outlook, that global warming will lead to catastrophe, 
dominates Digby‘s argument. 
 AR 7.1, 7.2: Millicent‘s belief that ‗the elite will be ok‘ expresses Authority 
Ranking‘s understanding that the group looks after its own (insiders) while 
neglecting the rest (outsiders).  
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 ―Detached observer‖: the extract also recognises the independence of the 
planet‘s future from our own fate just as James‘ little green men did 
(5.2.2). 
5.3.6 Spread of each code 
Identifying the presence of an RM argument can be a relatively disciplined 
process, and if necessary evidenced with the reasoning illustrated above.  It is 
harder to avoid being rather arbitrary when determining how widely to spread the 
attribution of an individual code across the text.  In example 2 above, the CS8 
code was applied to the whole of Digby‘s speech, but the CS 2b code, for 
mankind‘s guilt, was only applied to the first sentence and the CS4 code, for 
nature fragile, to the last three lines (from ‗if the climate changes..‘).    
 
The spread of the coding matters, since the analysis in this Chapter makes 
reference to the amount of text coded with a specific code.  Generally speaking, 
the attribution of codes has been spread broadly rather than narrowly.  This needs 
to be borne in mind when reading the coverage data below:  to give an overall 
impression of the content the proportion of the text coded with AR, CS, EM and 
MP codes respectively has been calculated.  This data can only be treated as 
indicative, not precise. 
5.3.7 Overall picture 
The table below provides the word count for each group‘s transcript, alongside 
the percentage of the word count coded with AR, CS, EM and MP codes 
respectively. 
Total % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Words AR CS EM MP no RMs
LG1 14,684 18% 24% 44% 21% 32%
LG2 11,626 19% 29% 55% 13% 29%
MG1 16,942 23% 28% 41% 36% 29%
MG2 15,886 13% 21% 48% 18% 29%
SG1 13,133 22% 18% 40% 30% 31%
SG2 15,426 24% 33% 34% 30% 28%
Lowest Highest  
                  Table 5-3: Focus groups, % coded by Relational Model 
To clarify what this table means: in LG1, 18% of the transcript (by word count) is 
coded by any one, or more, of the 12 AR codes set out in the RM matrix in 
Appendix E.  Some of the words coded with an AR code may also be coded with a 
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CS, EM or MP code, so that these can overlap.  The right hand column therefore 
identifies how much of the transcript has not been coded with any RM code 
(therefore the horizontal total, including passages with no RM code, will exceed 
100%) . 
 
Some general comments are useful at this point: 
 
 AR:  the media articles often reported the doings of politicians, the expert 
role of scientists and also proposed emissions targets, all coded with AR 
codes.  Aside from moaning about politicians and MP‘s expenses, these 
topics are less prevalent in the focus groups. 
 CS: typically CS arguments were stronger at the start of the groups.  Asking 
participants what ideas came into their mind, or what ‗climate change‘ 
meant to them personally, tended to prompt images of floods and polar 
bears as well as raising concern for the world we were leaving to our 
children.  SG2‘s higher figure for CS codings reflects the role of one vocal 
Masters student, Millicent, who described herself as a ‗an activist on global 
issues‘ (SG2.34). 
 EM: for all of the groups, EM arguments were more prevalent than any 
other RM.  The EM arguments present cover all of the eight domains, but of 
particular importance are EM arguments about other people.  Participants 
frequently blame, reject or criticise others:  America does not do enough 
to combat climate change (MG2.1450); politicians bossing is both 
unacceptable and ridiculous because there is so much conflicting advice 
(LG2.143, 757); and 4x4 drivers (LG2.454), greedy politicians and ‗nimbys‘ 
(MG1.853) are all at fault. 
 MP: as noted at 4.11.3, MP arguments and EM arguments frequently 
overlap.  Participants could be quite candid in saying they make their 
purchasing decisions based on cost, but this might be expressed as an EM 
defensive ‗that sort of paradox makes me feel a little helpless‘ (SG1.1103) 
or an MP assertive ‗I‘ll do things that are green purely if they benefit me‘ 
(Miles at MG1.346).   As with the media articles (4.7.1), good manners 
seem to temper this self-assertion – Miles says of his own self-assertion 
‗that sounds really bad‘ (MG1.346) – which may lessen the frequency of 
expressed MP arguments.  
5.4 Relational Models analysis: London Group 1 
Each of the groups has been coded using the Relational Models matrix.  This 
section provides a detailed analysis of London Group 1 using the Matrix.   The six 
different groups repeat many of the same arguments, so to keep this chapter to a 
manageable size the similar analysis for each of the other groups has been 
provided in Appendix J.  Section 5.5 summarises this.   
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5.4.1 London Group 1, outline 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used by the different participants: 
 
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
Miranda 11% 20% 45% 29% 15% 33%
Nigel 26% 20% 47% 56% 14% 11%
Peter 41% 20% 11% 49% 36% 26%
Suzy 6% 20% 19% 35% 58% 6%
Simon 24% 13% 15% 51% 30% 25%
Tracy 4% 12% 34% 45% 0% 43%
Walter 14% 31% 25% 65% 30% 15%
* % of participant speech, excluding facilitator
Highest in column: Highest RM for individual Both Highest
 
Table 5-4: London Group 1, participants % coded by Relational Model 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used in the different sections of the focus group: 
 
 
Table 5-5: London Group 1, sections % coded by Relational Model 
5.4.2 LG1 A 
The opening passages of LG1A express CS arguments – it is a problem, and 
participants care about it – as well as EM arguments that recognise the Commons 
Dilemma and a general despair about the challenge, thus: 
LG1.116 
Nigel Well I feel that I‘m part of a wealthy country, you know part of the western 
world we‘ve got too much, we‘re given and expect too much (CS 3 excess 
consumption) 
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded 
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs 
LG1 A 26% 10% 28% 40% 21% 31% 
LG1 B 34% 27% 25% 54% 24% 28% 
LG1 RQMs 19% 20% 21% 52% 20% 24% 
LG1 C 21% 13% 20% 25% 20% 48% 
LG1 18% 24% 44% 21% 32% 
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LG1.135 
Miranda Yeah I agree with you really that we do have a responsibility all of us to do our 
bit  (CS2.1 we can all do our bit) 
 
LG1.150 
Tracy I‘m quite mixed really because on the one hand if I don‘t do things that are 
environmentally friendly I do feel really guilty so I‘m always washing up my 
recycling stuff turning lights off all the time but on the other hand I feel like 
it‘s quite pointless because places like America and China when they‘re told to 
reduce their CO2 emissions they just  ignore it.  They don‘t do anything.  So I 
feel like it‘s a bit pointless compared to them. 
(CS2.2 „guilty‟, EM 2.2 I‟m doing my bit, 2.3 Commons Dilemma, 6.1 
it‟s pointless, 6.2 logic of the Commons Dilemma, 7.3 others not doing 
anything) 
 
Although various speakers complain about confusing information and 
untrustworthy politicians, AR arguments do surface: 
 
LG1.213 
Nigel Well we hear, you know, in our lifetimes we probably hear a thousand 
different opinions by a thousand different articles but er I think deep down 
most of us know that the body of world body of scientists the majority do have 
more or less the same viewpoint that the world is warming up that there is 
obviously er kind of deviant ideas to that on the other extreme but erm I think 
we know that er you know it is heading in a certain direction 
(AR1.1 primacy of established institutions, 6.2 role of experts and 
sound science) 
 
But then the role of business is recognised, introducing MP arguments: 
 
LG1.250 
Peter Business or politics or a mixture of the 2.  If you think of George W who no 
longer is there but he was certainly didn‘t encourage anything environmentally 
friendly because of the whole oil issue which essentially comes back to 
business and money.  ... Which interestingly  enough was his business as well. 
(MP1 private interests, 7 expecting others to pursue their interests) 
 
This sets the tone for the remainder of LG1A, with quite a bit of EM criticism of 
the Americans and some participants expressing confidence that in this country or 
Europe people are more aware and will do more about it, a generalised statement 
of EM2b‘s self-serving bias ‗I‘m doing my bit‘.  The EM criticism stretches to the 
role of business, offering a favourite conspiracy theory: 
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LG1.395 
Simon    I think, going back quite a way, lightbulbs there is and has been invented the 
indestructible lightbulb.  Never came to the Market.  Why?  Commercialism... 
 
Peter Yeah, exactly 
 
Simon   ... and I think the same will happen.  There‘s always going to be the commercial 
or capitalist company, government, country that says, Ok, poor little 
[indistinct] over there it‘s costing them £500 pounds a year to do this but we 
can get £1000 a year out of it  so tough luck, we‘ll go off and do it and you 
know and just worry about themselves and not really care what‘s happening.  I 
think unfortunately the world we‘re in is a very capitalistic world.  Or the 
world we understand. 
(EM 7.2 why don‟t they solve it?, 7.3 blaming others; MP 7 others 
pursuing private interests) 
 
This idea that commercial interests suppress technology captures the spirit of the 
EM Standpoint:  there‘s an assumption that somehow others could solve it if they 
wanted to, but instead they do not.  As a result, unfairly, the little guy suffers the 
cost.  This conspiracy thinking surfaces in other groups (MG1.1565; MG2.477).  
However, just as Miles in MG1 assumed that the government could solve the 
problem if it had to, embedded in this conspiracy theory is the technological 
optimism that assumes that the technology will be there if we really need it. 
 
Brought back by the facilitator to the question of what might encourage people to 
use more environmentally friendly cars, Suzy (414), Simon (423) and Peter (433) 
all take the view that people will continue to buy bigger cars for as long as they 
can afford them, and that the government putting up the price is unlikely to 
change that (MP7 expecting others to pursue their own interests).   The section 
then digresses, ending with some bland remarks on electric cars and about 
whether it is easy to find places to charge them up. 
5.4.3 LG1 B 
This section starts with Walter‘s speech in 5.2.4 above.  With a couple of 
facilitator‘s prompts the first part of this section debates (a) whether participants 
are happy to pay higher taxes to help the developing world and (b) whether 
participants let environmental considerations influence their behaviour, or 
whether they see others taking the environment into consideration.  The passage 
below illustrates well how the group moves back and forth through the RM 
arguments: 
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LG1.558 
Nigel I‘d – you know - personally like to see flights rationed one day, you know.  I 
would feel annoyed if I was knowing people were taking 20 flights a year 
perhaps.  You know.  City breaks all over Europe, and Middle East or whatever, 
and er.   You know.  I personally take one or two flights a year for holidays, 
erm, I know its relative, some people who probably don‘t fly at all would say 
well you‘re taking one or two flights that‘s one of two flights too many, erm, 
but I think there can be some rational debate and some kind of, you know, 
together with lots of things and then agree almost some kind of agree kind of 
recommended or kind of quota and anything beyond that perhaps should be 
rationed erm one day.  You know.  I can‘t see how anyone, you know, I‘m 
thinking of future say 10 15 20 years‘ time I think I do think that rationing will 
take place on flights and then onto other things that are to do with you know 
erm that could be dangerous for the environment, so 
(AR2, rationing; CS 2.1 we can all restrict our flying, 3 
overconsumption as dangerous to the environment; EM 2.2, I‟m doing 
my bit by not flying too much, 7.3 other people fly too much) 
 
Simon   Unless there‘s alternative fuel 
 
Nigel Yeah there probably is.  Technology‘s coming on thick and fast now and it‘s 
probably just round the corner but erm you know so yeah. There will, it will 
happen I‘m sure it will. 
(MP5, man adapts; MP8 technology can provide a more positive 
outlook) 
 
Peter.  Yeah.  I think that‘s probably more applicable for business usage than the 
occasional person going on their... 
 
Miranda Yeah 
 
Peter. ...summer holiday every year.  I think most people would say, no I still want 
my holiday. (MP1 self-assertion) But then some businesses I‘m sure could be 
more efficient with how they plan their business trips or you know or perhaps 
you‘re right you know that a business should have to pay an extra corporation 
tax if they have more than however many people go on business trips a year or 
you know they should try and you know stay two days and have two meetings 
rather than flying back and going back a month later for another one.  Or you 
know there are ways that you can make people think smarter if they were 
going to be taxed, but I think it should be above a you know rationing level 
perhaps  
(AR2, rationing, 3.3 belief in greater efficiency, 7.1 helping others to 
behave better; EM 7.2 why don‟t businesses or governments take these 
sensible steps?, 7.3 blaming others for the problem; MP 2 use of price 
signals to change behaviour, 5 man adapting behaviour, 6 being 
„smarter‟ is understanding the how the market works, 7 expecting 
others to behave as rational economic agents) 
 
Simon   Including politicians  .... flying for no reason whatsoever... 
 
Peter Yeah! No absolutely.  [agreement, laughter] [indistinct] 
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Walter But that‘s what we‘re doing.  And I do the same.  We‘re looking at other 
people and saying now you could save a little here and you could save a bit 
there, but ourselves no we‘ll still have our holiday and we still have our flight.  
[Agreement!] 
(EM 6.2 the logic of the Commons Dilemma,7.2 why don‟t others do 
better „save a little here‟, 7.3 blaming others, MP1 I‟ll do what I want 
to do: but also implicit is CS2.2 we are all at fault). 
 
The group goes on to discuss behavioural change, raising smoking and seat belts as 
examples of behaviour that used to be socially acceptable now being 
unacceptable, and even decimalisation as an example of something resisted but 
now socially acceptable (789).  Change happens: future energy shortages will 
prompt technological developments (707) just as advanced teleconferencing will 
obviate the need to fly (718).  Peter best captures the view that people like their 
freedom to do what they want: 
 
LG1.773 
Peter I think that people would still rather find an alternative way than not do what 
they like doing.  So if it‘s an alternative fuel that doesn‘t emit as much, and 
they can still fly then they would rather do that than not fly 
(MP 1 doing what I want, 5 adapting, 7 others behaving as rational 
economic agents) 
 
As the debate develops EM logic begins to dominate: participants accept the logic 
that they may have to pay more or possibly to be rationed.  Yet the weakening of 
communal bonds (CS), the break down in trust in institutions (AR), means that 
participants want to be sure that if they pay or give up something that this is 
reciprocated (EM): they want transparency and certainty that it makes sense for 
them: 
 
LG1B.801 
Walter You have to be sure that the money‘s being well spent [all talking] 
(EM 1 reciprocity, 2.1 What‟s in it for me?, 3.1 we must be 
compensated) 
 
Peter In the current world I don‘t think it will be people‘s priorities, will it?  It will 
be let‘s sort ourselves out first. 
(EM2.1 What‟s in it for me?) 
 
Simon Yeah.  I mean. Whenever there‘s a disaster in the world we all put our hands 
in our pocket and we give whatever we want to give erm, but we still have the 
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same problems.  Look what‘s just happened up in the north of England.  I 
mean those poor people are [agreement] washed out, whatever, and  what 
have we done about it?  Nothing.  What can we do about it? 
(CS 7 helping needy  others, EM 8 pessimistic outlook, it‟s all too 
difficult). 
 
Peter Well he‘s promised some money hasn‘t he but even then it‘s a drop in the 
water if you think he gave to all these banks a year ago 
 
Miranda Yeah 
 
Simon   That again.  There‘s another thing.  We own all the banks, and can‘t get a 
penny loan off them.  [laughter] 
 
Peter Let‘s not go there! [laughter] 
(EM 7.1 „It‟s not fair‟, 7.3, blaming others) 
Simon   It‘s the same sort of thing.  Why should we give out we don‘t, if we‘re going to 
be taxed and we get Benefit, that‘s fair enough  [others agreeing ] But if 
we‘re not going to get the Benefit, or not the perceived Benefit 
 
Walter   Well then, that‘s just to say, well, Good Luck on us we live in the right 
country, but tough luck on you live in the Maldives or somewhere [others 
agreeing] 
(CS 7, looking after the needy, 8 moral imperative; EM 1 reciprocity, 2 
what‟s in it for me?, MP1 I‟ll do what I want, 5 adapting to 
circumstances, 7 others can fend for themselves) 
Simon   So it‘s down to selfishness again 
 
Peter The Maldives are lovely though [laughter] 
 
Yet participants are fully aware that this is not really sustainable: Walter (858) 
says ‗if you live in a society you‘ve got to accept some rules‘ (AR1a, 1b, 2).  The 
dilemma between these positions leads back to the question of how behaviour 
changes. A topic prevalent in several of the groups (LG2.409/1024; MG2.120) 
emerges, that of the socialisation of children.  Groups assume their own 
generation‘s consumption habits are incorrigible, but that there has to be hope 
that today‘s children will know better (915).  The group revisits smoking and seat 
belts as examples of how changed behaviour becomes ingrained, with Tracy (938) 
suggesting that actually such change can happen quite rapidly. 
5.4.4 LG1 RMQs 
Responses to the first statement42, which sets out an MP vision, focus on the 
impediments to technological development.  Essentially, these are EM arguments: 
                                            
42 The Relational Model questions are set out in 5.1.2. 
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the politicians ought to be able to drive this (EM7.2) but there isn‘t the political 
will (999, 1053).  Nimbys (EM2.4, 996) also get mentioned as impediments. 
 
The second statement, ‗We consume so much that we are ruining the planet.  We 
need to cut back to avoid catastrophic climate change‘, sets out a CS vision.  
Miranda agrees with the statement, and roundly condemns modern consumerism:  
―It‘s like people just buying so stuff that, half of it they don‘t need‖ (CS 3 
overconsumption).  However, others question the word ‗catastrophic‘ (Peter 1085, 
Nigel 1111).  Walter expresses the dilemma clearly: 
 
LG1.1135 
Walter If you agree with the first statement, that Man will discover a new fuel or a 
different fuel or many different fuels then you disagree with the second one 
because you say they won‘t allow it to become catastrophic. 
 (MP 5 man adapting, 8 faith in technology giving a positive outlook). 
 
Miranda and Walter fully understand the Commons Dilemma expressed by the EM 
vision statement. Walter (1189) says if the politicians cannot sort out an 
agreement it doesn‘t matter what individuals do and Miranda (1194) responds ―But 
that‘s their job, isn‘t it.  That‘s their job to do that.  It‘s our job to do our bit I 
think‖ (AR 1.1 established institutions, 1.2 need for government; CS 2.1 we can 
all do our bit, 8.3 moral imperative). The group then gets a bit side-tracked from 
discussing recycling to debating plastic versus paper bags. 
 
Finally the AR vision statement encourages the group to reprise their EM view that 
there isn‘t the political leadership to deal with the problem.  ―There‘s no-one in 
the forefront that is credible that‘s actually driving this‖ says Simon (1267). 
5.4.5 LG1 C 
The facilitator picks up a mention of Copenhagen and asks what participants think 
will happen there.  Instinctive EM responses come first:  ―all the politicians are all 
flying over‖ (1312 i.e. why can‘t they teleconference?  EM7.3); ―I really don‘t 
think the whole world will ever agree‖ (1354, EM8, EM 6.2).  Peter follows this last 
comment with the prescient suggestion that it will need the larger nations to sort 
out something in a smaller forum (AR1), which is essentially how the US and China 
tried to resolve COP 15 (Environmental News Bulletin, 2009).  As often within the 
focus groups, the underlying structure of the problem is simple, even familiar, and 
people are easily capable of grasping the issues and the options. 
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So participants find it easy to define why it is so difficult to make any progress.  
Because ‗we‘, humanity, are unlikely to solve it, most of the focus groups come to 
the same conclusion, that it will take an external shock to achieve change.   This 
‗otherises‘ the responsibility for doing something about it (an EM argument) at the 
same time as relying on the MP argument that once the situation changes, we will 
just have to adapt to it.  First Nigel and later Simon express this: 
LG1.1405 
Nigel I know that I‘ll be crying my eyes out if there is an oil crisis and no petrol 
around but I think you know that‘s what this the Western world needs, I really 
do to you know knock some sense into the politicians from America and Europe 
and China. 
LG1.1568 
Simon Unfortunately there must of there has to be a disaster of huge proportions to 
make people sit up. 
 
The group throws back and forth the CS determination that everyone‘s got to do 
their bit (e.g. 1427) against the EM objection that this is hard to take if others do 
not do their share (e.g. 1443).  The AR Standpoint offers two solutions.  First, 
there is the idea that it is responsible to lead the way, something that other 
groups identify, sometimes reluctantly, as a duty of the better off or of the 
developed world (LG2.386/969; MG2 1465).  Second, there is the idea that faced 
with a crisis people will accept the need for government to take greater control 
over their lives.  But when this is raised, the obvious objection is immediately 
apparent.  Individuals will still want to pursue their private interests: 
LG1.1479 
Nigel In a ideal world we need a communist run world not on a Soviet Union Lenin 
Trotsky Stalin type way but a kind of Danish or Swedish version of Communism.  
You know, clever people running what could be a more just system, and that 
probably will take hold one day, probably not in our lifetimes, but you know, a 
kind of more regulated way, you know, call it Communist call it what you 
want, really, but there will be a new name for it but it won‘t be the rampant, 
er, you know capitalism that we‘ve had from you know America and Europe 
the last 100 years 
(AR 1.2 need for government, 2 regulation, 6.2 expertise, 8 we must 
manage the future; EM 7.2 why don‟t they solve it?) 
Simon Unfortunately there‘s greed involved but when there‘s greed you get 
capitalism. 
(EM8, pessimism; MP 1 private interests, 7 others behaving as rational 
economic agents). 
In the final stages of the group two particular arguments are returned to.  First, 
Nigel uses the idea that experience tells us that social change does happen – this 
time using the example of the Thames getting cleaned up – to express optimism 
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that in the long term there will be behavioural change (1549).   Simon on the 
other hand repeats the view that ―there has to be a disaster of huge proportions 
to make people sit up‖ (1568). 
5.4.6 Does the Relational Model framework account for all of the arguments in 
LG1? 
The analysis above shows that the RM framework accounts for many of the 
arguments used in LG1.  But table 5.3 in 5.3.7 shows that 32% of LG1 has not been 
coded with any Relational Model codes. 
 
This should not be surprising.  Participants inevitably digress, and some content is 
less an argument than statements of (supposed) facts, for example about the 
weather.  The RM framework does not account for statements like ―A lot of the 
estate agents in central London have got electric cars‖ (448) nor the rather 
nostalgic discussions about the weather in the old days voiced in other groups.  To 
assess whether the RM framework accounts for content where participants are 
making arguments about the ‗rights and wrongs‘ of climate change, the transcript 
was analysed into five different categories: 
 
A. Discussion about climate change with value-based43 content 
B. Discussion about climate change with exclusively factual content 
C. Discussion not about climate change, with value-based content 
D. Discussion not about climate change, without strongly value-based content 
E. Facilitator content. 
 
The table below analyses, by word count, how much of the content in each of the 
above categories has been coded with one or more RM codes: 
                                            
43 ‗Value-based‘ is taken to reflect discussion both about how things should be (end-states) 
and also how things should be done (instrumental values) following Rokeach (1973), but it 
is also extended to cover evaluations of other people.  Much of the group discussions takes 
the form of criticising other people‘s conduct.  Since the thesis argues that people often 
let their values influence their view of the facts the boundary between value-based and 
factual content is inevitably blurred.  Even the nostalgic discussions about weather in the 
old days could be construed as a value-based metaphor for how life generally has changed 
for the worse. 
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        Table 5-6: London Group 1, level of coverage by Relational Model codes 
The area requiring further investigation, ‗A‘ category content not coded with an 
RM code, is highlighted in yellow.  NVivo allows for this content to be easily 
isolated for inspection, and it does not contain arguments that cannot be 
accounted for using the RM framework.  Rather, this content typically represents 
the borderline cases to be expected in an analysis of this kind.  Indeed, during the 
original coding process, codes for ‗Maybe CS; Maybe AR...etc.‘ were used to mark 
some borderline instances.  Of the 849 words identified above, 319 had been 
coded with such a ‗maybe‘ code.  Other content, on reflection, probably should or 
at least could have been coded with an RM; however, the intention was not to 
force the arguments into the RM framework.  Lastly, the coding into categories A 
to D was spread widely, i.e. passages rather than individual sentences tended to 
be coded.  The RM coding, although sometimes broad (see 5.3.6) was more fine 
grained: inspection of some passages suggests that if done sentence by sentence 
some of the Category A content would be recategorised. 
 
The exercise above is necessarily imprecise, but it does support the contention 
that the RM framework successfully accounts for the arguments used in the 
debate.  
5.5 Relational models analysis: the other focus groups 
5.5.1 Appendix J 
Each of the other focus groups has been analysed in the same way as LG1.  Section 
5.2 above sets out the prevailing themes and arguments across the groups without 
using the Relational Models framework, but it is clear that the arguments 
identified there will fit the framework. 
 
 5.2.2 has examples of the groups finding the problem ‗intractable‘ 
essentially captured by the EM Standpoint‘s argument that it is all too 
Coded Coded with Total 
with an RM no RM 
A Category content 8681 849 9530 
B Category content 185 698 883 
C Category content 557 625 1182 
D Category content 0 430 430 
Facilitator 571 2088 2659 
Total 9994 4690 14684 
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difficult, and that their own actions are insignificant, a ‗drop in the 
ocean‘. 
 5.2.3 describes how groups often complain about the government but 
usually conclude that eventually we will have to look to the government to 
solve the problem.  This derives from the AR Standpoint‘s argument that 
we must rely on established institutions guided by authoritative experts 
 5.2.4 notes that the groups either explicitly or tacitly assume that ‗science 
will save the planet‘ (Media Article #112) at various points in the 
discussion.  This epitomises the MP Standpoint‘s optimism and empirically 
reasonable view that people do adapt to the changing environment and use 
their ingenuity to do so. 
 5.2.5 provides examples of participants feeling that they should consume 
responsibly even if this makes little difference of itself.  Both Piers 
(MG2.493) and Millicent (SG2.927) express the CS Standpoint‘s view that 
individual actions become meaningful in the context of the community or 
group.  The tiny ‗drops in the ocean‘ become the ocean. 
5.5.2 Equality Matching 
Figure 13 in 5.3.7 highlights the strong, sometimes dominant, influence of 
arguments made from the EM Standpoint in all 6 focus groups.  This is true in 
almost all the individual focus group sections.  The following analysis, drawn from 
Appendix J, shows how the participants express almost the full range of EM 
arguments in just one section, LG2A: 
 
 EM1, reciprocity:  ―Tax the car but put that money into subsid subsidising 
transport or something like that.‖ (Tim 263). 
 EM2.1, ‗What‘s in it for me?‘: ―I don‘t want to be conned by the politicians 
on the basis of using this as a general excuse for higher taxation and 
taxation of this that and the other‖ (Tim 78) 
 EM2.2, ‗I‘m doing my bit‘: ―And I think as much as you try and do your 
part, like you know we recycle, and, you know‖ (Mary 100) 
 EM2.3c, Commons Dilemma: ―but the problem is that people are not united 
because you‘ve got some countries that want to do it but not others I mean 
China doesn‘t do it very much.  And then I mean, even just on a local 
thing, you know you‘ll have people with, some houses will turn their 
heating down and others won‘t care.  So it‘s very hard, you know, if you‘re 
doing it to subsidise people who don‘t care, and it‘s the same globally‖ 
(Emma 338) 
 EM2.4, Nimbyism is a quite specific topic which is not mentioned by the 
group.  Nimbys are attacked elsewhere, e.g. MG1.859, MG2.520. 
 EM3.1, we‘re hard done by, and so must be compensated.  This precise 
argument is made in LG2B (597): in Section A the first part is voiced by 
Solomon‘s references to the hard time ‗genuine people‘ suffer while trying 
their best (121, 139) while Tim‘s demands for fair, reciprocated taxation 
express the demand for compensation (83, 239, 260). 
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 EM3.1, polluter pays principle, ―I say that may be fair, that may be fair if 
there‘s an issue that, say, cars, planes and what have you are contributing 
drastically. that may be fair to tax it to reduce it‖ (Tim 242) 
 EM4, unpredictable nature: ―I mean you know they say the world‘s getting 
warmer and then last year we had a very cold spell which was much colder 
than it had been the year before, so it‘s just sort of it just contradicts.  
And then you have your dry summer and then the very wet summer‖ 
(Emma 159) 
 EM5, people at the mercy of unpredictable nature: ―the weather is like 
really erratic, and I think that‘s sort of worrying problem cos there‘s no 
predictability.  You know you can‘t like people that get their houses 
flooded, you know every year now and you know they can‘t plan for that 
because they don‘t know when it‘s going to come, you know, they don‘t 
know when it‘s when the wet,  bad weather‘s coming cos it‘s not seasonal‖ 
(Mary 182).  
 EM6.1, all too difficult: ―Um, and I think all the recycling and things I think 
we get a lot of mixed messages and, you know, we‘re told what we should 
and shouldn‘t do.  And then, a couple of months later in the paper they 
tell you that it you know, perhaps you shouldn‘t have done that‖ (Emma 
90) 
 EM6.2, logic of the Commons Dilemma: ―It‘s been going on for such a long 
time, and some countries and some people just dig their heels in and 
won‘t, you know, won‘t budge, but then I think on a local level it‘s a real 
hard thing to police, because you can‘t just you know go round making 
people recycle or making people do certain things that will help their 
area‖ (Mary 370). 
 EM7.1 ―Stop bossing me around‖: ―I think we get told too much [as it is] 
what we should and shouldn‘t do‖ (Emma 290). 
 EM7.2 ‗Why don‘t they solve it?‘: ―I do think we should be looking at it a 
bit more deeper.  Scientists should be out there.  Um [pause] not an 
individual but quite a few of them. In different parts of the area‖ (Solomon 
222) 
  EM7.3 Otherisation, blaming others: ―I think what I hears, was, um, the 
coloured bottles, they get taken to China.  Why they spending so much 
money um? Sending it over there when we can do something over here‖ 
(Solomon 119) or ―the taxes should be on people that have like one or 
more, more than one car, or you know, people that take you know Ryanair 
flights to go away for the weekend, do you see what I mean, like the taxes 
on things like that should be higher things that are unnecessary.‖ (Mary 
252).  It is worth noting that both of these complaints also rely on CS 
rejection of other Standpoints.  Solomon rejects the authorities‘ attempts 
to organise recycling and argues that our community can do better here; 
Mary rejects the free Market by attacking overconsumption. 
 EM8 Outlook: the discussion does not really consolidate into an overall 
outlook until later in the meeting, when, for example, both Emma and Tim 
emphasise that they have lost all faith in government (749ff). 
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This analysis dramatises how stuck many people are with the arguments that flow 
from the EM Standpoint.  When trust in institutions is at a low ebb, and without a 
sense of communal obligation, people tend to ‗relate‘ to others using the direct 
and simple EM model of reciprocation.  They seek the transparency (Fiske, 2004a) 
that EM offers. 
5.5.3 Does the Relational Model Framework account for all of the arguments in 
these five focus groups? 
Section 5.4.6 described the use of broad categorisations of the content to provide 
a check that the Relational Models matrix had provided an adequate account of 
the value-based arguments over climate change in LG1.  Appendix J applies the 
same analysis for each of the other five groups.  In four of these groups the RM 
matrix accounted for 90-95% of the content categorised as ‗value-based‘ 
arguments over climate change.  In SG1 the RM matrix failed to account for 15% of 
the content.  Reviewing this material provided similar explanations to those in 
5.4.6; although neither coding method could be applied with absolute precision, 
the ‗value based‘ content was coded quite broadly – perhaps capturing a whole 
piece of speech by a participant whereas the RM coding might have more precisely 
left off a sentence.  SG1 has some quite general, even bland, discussion about the 
alternatives to international travel, or levels of public concern about extreme 
weather in Australia.   Much of this was coded as ―maybe an RM‖, and over 50% of 
the ‗value-based‘ material not coded with a specific RM argument from the matrix 
is actually coded as ―maybe‖. 
 
The principal reassurance that the RM coding matrix provides an effective tool for 
the analysis of the focus group content has to lie in the reader‘s perception of the 
analysis itself.  Is it rich enough, insightful enough?  But this coverage test does 
provide some support that the RM framework is comprehensive and embraces the 
whole of the debate. 
5.6 Focus groups: discussion 
5.6.1 What do the focus groups show? 
The focus groups reveal the following: 
 Climate change arguments are straightforward: participants find it 
relatively easy to grasp the core issues even as they bemoan the confusing 
messages they feel bombarded with 
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 The Relational Models framework suggests different Standpoints have 
incompatible implications:  inspite of these contradictions the participants 
in the groups tend to reach a shared position on the topic 
 Participants demonstrate in their own attitudes that when the topic of 
climate change becomes personally relevant to them they can change their 
views: they also expect that others will respond in the same way. 
 Although participants generally demonstrate a sober and balanced 
judgment of the issue, they do also provide examples where common sense 
generates muddled responses, which often encourage an EM resignation 
that the problem is just too difficult.  This continues the strong influence 
of the EM Standpoint throughout the groups (see 5.5.2 above). 
 Although the problem is difficult, participants repeatedly observe that 
social change does happen. 
 And based on past experience they assume that change will require plenty 
of central or authoritarian intervention. 
 
Each of these is discussed in more detail further below. 
5.6.2 The impact of the focus group format on the results. 
Before examining these conclusions it is worth reflecting upon how the focus 
group format may contribute to the emergence of these results.  Section 2.4.2 
suggested that the Equality Matching Model had particular relevance for 
exchanges between strangers, whereby tit-for-tat exchange can facilitate the 
establishment of a relationship.  Grice (1975) argued that conversations, or ‗talk 
exchanges‘, are founded upon a presumption that participants are observing a 
‗cooperative principle‘ whereby some minimum standards are expected: the to 
and fro of these focus groups, between participants without much at stake within 
the subject at hand, might then be expected to constitute a performance of EM 
exchanges.  While relating to their fellow participants on an EM basis, speakers 
might find EM arguments more accessible. 
 
(Marx, et al., 2007)However, the conversational process might well see a 
sequential development from EM exchanges towards a consensus of views within 
the group as they become a group rather than pure strangers.  Miles‘ mood at the 
end of MG1 is typical when he says ‗[I] feel it‘s been pretty conclusive really‘ 
(1790), even though throughout his has tended to embrace quite different 
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arguments from the other members (see Appendix J5.1).  But by performing 
something akin to a Communal Sharing exchange of developing a shared position 
on the topic, this does not mean that CS arguments become more prevalent in the 
discussion.  5.3.7 identifies that CS arguments are stronger at the start of the 
group. 
  
Grice also suggests that there are expectations as to the quality of contributions 
to conversation, e.g. relevance and sincerity.  In contrast to the status accorded 
to expert scientists in the media sample, within focus groups affective or 
experiential evidence appears to count for more that statistical facts (Marx, et 
al., 2007), and these groups are no exception (see Appendices J1.2 and J2.2). 
 
As noted in 5.1.3, Bickerstaff and others (2008) point out that the situation of the 
groups is artificial.  They found that for a topic such as climate change 
participants inevitably saw this as requiring institutional action: within the 
detached focus groups it is easy for participants to express disengagement or lack 
of agency, and also to focus on the lack of confidence felt in the institutions upon 
which they have to rely.  Section 5.5.2 showed how all of these essentially EM 
arguments found expression in the focus groups.  Blaming the government as an 
‗outgroup‘ is easier than arguing vigorously with your fellow, (i.e. ‗ingroup‘) 
participants. 
 
5.6.3 Climate change arguments are straightforward 
Many of the participants find it very easy to grasp the essential arguments 
surrounding climate change.  They can grasp the implications of over-
consumption, and they can engage with the Commons Dilemma.  Nearly all 
recognise the need, eventually, for governmental regulation.  This may stop short 
of sophisticated discussion of marketable instruments and emissions trading 
schemes, but these are merely means to achieve an objective they usually 
endorse at some point in the discussion. 
  
The passage in MG1 where Miles works out for himself the solution proposed by 
the UNFCCC (quoted above in 5.2.3) vividly illustrates the relative simplicity of 
the issues.  The Commons Dilemma of competing interests is easy to understand.   
Participants also find it quite easy to envisage solutions provided that: 
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A. They can frame the solution as win-win rather than foundering on 
competing interests; in effect ‗win-win‘ sidesteps the dilemma, 
B. They can frame the problem definitively without scientific uncertainty, or 
finally 
C. They temporarily suspend the experience of real world constraints. 
 
A is the argument for ecological modernisation.  B is illustrated more often in the 
negative: participants constantly express the feeling of powerlessness that all the 
conflicting advice induces. Certainty seems to be a prerequisite for decisive action 
– a reaction of necessarily adapting to known and certain changes in the 
environment; uncertainty engenders passive resignation.  C is also more often 
illustrated in the negative:  participants bewail the lack of alternatives.  When 
they believe in limitless possibilities, as SG2 does when the group envisages an 
almost infinite improvement in the generating capacity of solar panels, solutions 
seem easy. 
5.6.4 In spite of the contradictions, people reach the same conclusions 
Although the overall tone of the groups varies, they typically reach the same 
resolution.  The CS and EM Standpoints can only be reconciled through imposition 
of AR measures, i.e. regulation, environmental stewardship and ‗telling people‘ 
what to do based on sound science44.  This resolution mirrors the structure of the 
UNFCCC process, except that the latter is better described as a resolution 
between the competing visions of the CS and MP Standpoints. 
 
While participants can follow the arguments through to this conclusion, time and 
again the EM Standpoint shakes their trust: many are reluctant to surrender to 
restrictions or costs imposed by authorities they do not trust, and based on expert 
science they are unclear about.  Their belief that they will get nothing in return 
violates the EM Standpoint‘s sense of justice. 
 
Further, all participants live the Commons Dilemma, in the sense that all 
participants live on a commons landscaped by modern consumption habits and 
supply chains.   It is then almost a matter of mood, personality and contingent 
circumstances whether or not one feels excited by opportunity (nothing will stop 
SG2‘s Millicent going to Africa) or crushed by too much choice (LG2) and the 
                                            
44 Other than the students, the groups assume this is achieved by imposing price increases 
or restrictions, not by emissions trading and solutions based on Marketable instruments. 
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ubiquitous impossibility of reconciling ‗living well‘ (comfortably) with ‗living well‘ 
(morally). 
5.6.5 Personal relevance brings about change 
Douglas & Wildavsky‘s (1982) original formulation of Cultural Theory proposed a 
Centre that combined the AR and MP equivalents (hierarchist and individualist) 
and a Border.  Thompson & Rayner‘s (1998) Cultural Theory account of the climate 
change debate portrayed a competition between egalitarian (CS) and individualist 
(MP) arguments to capture the AR ‗status quo‘ to form the Centre.  The account 
explicitly excluded the fatalists (EM). 
 
Such an analysis clearly cannot account for these focus group participants, who 
frequently experience the problem as ‗all too difficult‘ (EM6.1).  Living on the 21st 
Century developed world ‗common‘, they want to be able to travel to where they 
want to travel even though good manners tempers the strength with which they 
assert this.  At the same time, when they have direct contact with Australian 
bushfires or think about how the world may be when their own children or 
grandchildren are grown up, they believe something needs to be done. 
 
The average citizen, on the Border, can now respond in two ways when the issue 
gains this personal salience.  The focus groups suggest they do a bit of both: 
 
1. Logically, voluntary restraint makes no difference, so they may indeed feel 
that it is ‗all too difficult‘; they can either express this assertively, 
rejecting constraints by others and proud of their own agency (MP), or 
they can blame others and bewail the lack of alternatives while carrying 
on as before (EM). 
2. If the personal relevance of anticipated environmental consequences is 
strong enough, then the group identity of all being in it together flows 
from this and, morally, voluntary restraint feels necessary, irrespective of 
efficacy (CS).  But participants recognise that we need a ‗smack in the 
face‘ (MG2.535) to create this personal relevance. 
 
Going to the next stage, each of the MP, EM, CS Standpoints is likely to look to 
government to address the problem according to its own prescription.  From the 
MP Standpoint, this demands the AR Standpoint‘s commitment to ‗business as 
usual‘, to preserving the status quo if possible and adapting to changes (MP5) as 
they occur.  From the EM Standpoint, powerless individuals look to those in power 
to look after them (AR7.2).  From the CS Standpoint, the authorities need to 
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impose regulations (AR2) so that individual voluntary actions are built on with 
involuntary ones. 
 
So it is perfectly possible to experience the personal relevance of climate change, 
Australian bush fires for example, or Hurricane Katrina, and remain committed to 
adaptation and Market solutions.  Indeed, the MP Standpoint prides itself on being 
tough-minded: being ‗Scared to Death‘ (Booker & North, 2007), amidst prophesies 
that today‘s fires and floods are only the beginning, is irrational.  The Focus Group 
reviews find that individuals are reluctant to voice the bull-headed optimism that 
such media pundits relish.  When group participants do, the blindness of the faith 
that it will turn out alright is all too plain, as when geography teacher Troy 
(MG1.225) suggests that nature always has a way of balancing things out, and 
maybe there will be a volcanic eruption to cool things down if global warming goes 
too far. 
5.6.6 Common sense has its limits 
Troy‘s benign volcanic eruption is a useful caution: the common sense of the focus 
group members has its limits.  They do muddle up some of the concepts as well.  
Environmental activist Millicent (SG2.120) is clearly confused about the 
relationship between the ozone hole and global warming, and other participants 
elide the two issues (Peter and Simon LG1.91/101).  
 
Participants also reference the 2004 tsunami as being in the same category as 
climate-induced natural disasters.  They know this is not strictly correct, but they 
nevertheless feel that these disasters have a similar meaning (SG1.1001; MG1.441; 
MG2.558).  This is really a case of the availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982a), which the participants most obviously display when they talk about the 
weather.  This is a further case of personal relevance generating the meaning that 
phenomena have for people.  Inevitably common sense then deviates from a 
scientific determination of the implications of the same events. 
 
This divergence is particularly obvious when the discussion turns to the role of 
agriculture.  Participants simply cannot grasp the idea that ‗population X 
affluence = more livestock = more emissions‘.  The idea that ‗we should all 
become vegetarians‘ (SG2.298) seems so preposterous that common sense flies out 
the window.  ‗So should we be getting rid of the pets not the cars?‘ (MG2.1073) 
typifies the response: asked to change too much and people simply think it is 
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absurd.  The dominance of the EM Standpoint convinces them that radical changes 
(1) are too difficult, and (2) mean that they will give up something for nothing. 
5.6.7 Accounting for social change 
Yet, empirically, change does happen.  This is frequently acknowledged in LG1, 
but also gets recognised elsewhere (e.g. people are less likely to litter now, 
MG1.677).  Participants have a conventional, AR-based, view that other countries 
need to be educated (LG2.922), and that the next generation needs to be 
socialised to be less wasteful than our own generation (SG1.1006; MG2.345).  
Quite apart from again reaching for an AR solution, this response is almost the 
ultimate ‗otherisation‘.  Both our generation and the developed world are unable 
to do anything about climate change, but perhaps others may do better.   
 
In MG2, Piers takes the view that the climate is not going to change soon enough 
to affect them: the threat has no personal relevance (439/464).  From this EM 
Standpoint (‗What‘s in it for me?), it is easy to see why participants are ready to 
leave the problem to the next generation. 
5.6.8 Predicting how society will tackle climate change 
Participants also implicitly recognise that each Standpoint has its own explanation 
for how society, and the other people in it, behaves.  From the MP Standpoint, 
responding to the ‗smack in the face‘ is not an expression of communal identity 
but rather self-interested adaptation to changing circumstances (MP5).  
Participants see that the behaviour of society mirrors that of people.  The logic of 
the Commons Dilemma applies internationally at the COP15 meeting as much as it 
does to participants‘ own consumer choices.  At the national level, until London 
floods, politicians will not have been smacked in the face and nothing will happen 
(MG2.728). 
 
The focus groups suggest that the personal relevance that will bring about change 
in response to global warming is the experience of new environmental constraints, 
the smack in the face that floods might represent.  This is an EM, defensive, 
response, not an MP individualist grasping new opportunities.   Policy advisers 
speaking on climate change emphasise the need to be optimistic (Sachs, 2008, 
Ch14; N. Stern, 2009a, Ch 10).  The nay-sayers must be resisted and a positive 
future promised because fear-inducing messages do not work.  Clearly, fear 
inducing messages do not work in a social environment where trust in expert 
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messages is so low, and when the personal relevance of the consequences of 
climate change seems so remote.  But the focus groups‘ understanding of personal 
relevance suggests that only (credible) fear-inducing messages will work, 
eventually.  Logically, this requires a change in the social environment, and 
possibly the physical environment too.  Chapter 7 will consider further exactly 
what this means. 
5.6.9 Results of other focus groups 
Many of these findings have much in common with the barriers to engagement 
that  Lorenzoni and others (2007) found in their groups45.  Their list included, inter 
alia, the following (p450-451 – their text in italics): 
 
 ‗Uncertainty or scepticism‘: see 5.2.6 and 5.6.3 for emergence of these in 
the groups here 
 ‗Distrust in information sources‟: see 5.2.7, as well as the confusion of all 
the conflicting views (Appendix J5.2) echoing ‗lack of knowledge‘ 
 ‗Externalising responsibility and blame‟: there is plenty of blaming 
America or China in these groups; see also 5.2.3 on expecting the 
government to solve it, although this is balanced by the repeated 
expression of loss of trust in government, not only in respect of the 
information given but in the likelihood they will do anything (5.2.7, 
echoing ‗lack of political action‟).  Within these focus groups this 
‗externalising‘ goes further: participants frequently take the view that only 
some ‗external‘ shocks ( e.g. extreme weather events) will be enough to 
spur mankind into action (5.4.5). 
 „Technology will save us‟: see 5.2.4 
 ‗Climate change is a distant threat‟: ‗not in my lifetime‘ is a common 
refrain in the groups (e.g.  MG2, Bill, Piers).  Although often countered by 
concern for one‘s children (e.g. LG1 Miranda; MG1 Clare; MG2 Jim, Jayne) 
this still places the personal relevance at one remove: Walter (LG1) 
explicitly says we seem to be happy to leave them with the problem. 
 ‗Fatalism‘ (see 5.2.2) 
 ‗“Drop in the ocean” feeling‘: the groups constantly identify the structure 
of the Commons Dilemma, and the insignificance of their own 
                                            
45 It should be noted that these authors generated their list from a multi-method study 
that included focus groups and interviews with group participants. 
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consumption, as a major barrier (see 5.4.2, 5.4.4): but they are also 
capable of turning it on its head.  Millicent in SG2 points out that the drops 
in the ocean are the ocean (5.5.1), and Amber counters the argument that 
there is no point herself turning the lights off by asking what if everyone 
left the lights on (Appendix J1.2) 
 „Lack of action by business and industry‟: this is most obviously expressed 
by the campaigning Millicent in SG2, but others castigate big business too 
(e.g. LG1: Miranda, Simon) and the non-Student groups are rarely far away 
from moaning about ‗bankers‘. 
 „Reluctance to change lifestyles‟: the difficulty and cost implications of a 
green lifestyle are debated exhaustively in the groups.  SG1, SG2 and MG1 
all conclude that for some things you just have to fly.  This links to ‗lack of 
enabling initiatives‟: MG1 joke about the state of the bus services in 
Manchester. 
 
That these 6 groups echo so many of the findings in other studies should be no 
surprise.  As discussed in 5.6.3, the arguments are largely a matter of common 
sense. 
5.6.10 Focus groups: conclusion 
The conclusion to the focus group analysis accords with the conclusion in Chapter 
4 to the Media analysis.  Fiske‘s (1992) Relational Models Theory suggests that all 
individuals will be able to access and make use of the four models.  The group 
participants do that; although some tend to favour the arguments flowing from a 
particular Standpoint, no one is clearly refusing to endorse any of the arguments 
from each of the other Standpoints. 
 
Fiske (2004b) goes on to suggest that culture prescribes which Model is 
appropriate to a particular context.  As a relatively novel problem, it is clear that 
participants can see ways in which all four Models might be appropriate bases 
from which to address the challenge. 
 
The analysis based on the Relational Model matrix provides a rich and effective 
account of the participants‘ debate.  The focus groups vividly illustrate the power 
of the Equality Matching model.  Sadly they also seem to validate the pessimism 
that forms its outlook. 
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Chapter 6 Analysis of Survey Data 
     
Chapter Outline 
This chapter has 7 sections: 
 
1. Purpose of the surveys 
2. Survey procedures 
3. Outline description of the results 
4. Multivariate Analysis 1 
5. Multivariate Analysis 2 
6. Individual use of multiple relational models 
7. Discussion. 
 
Three internet surveys of individual attitudes towards different arguments about 
climate change were conducted.  In the first, testing the functionality in a pilot 
survey, 101 respondents were recruited by snowballing. Two further surveys were 
conducted with respondents recruited through different paid agencies.  The 
combined 578 responses from these two surveys are used in this analysis. 
6.1 Purpose of the surveys 
6.1.1 Introduction 
The surveys were originally set up to provide examples of individual reasoning 
about climate change.  Relational Models Theory proposes that individuals use the 
4 different RMs to address social issues.  Following the methods adopted in many 
other surveys and discussed below, individuals were asked to respond to 
arguments within the climate change debate.  Individuals‘ responses were 
analysed with a view to mapping the underlying patterns, specifically to identify 
the level to which individuals tended to favour arguments expressive of specific 
RMs. 
 
A conventional survey might have hypothesised that the 4 Relational Models are 
latent factors driving individual responses.  The indicators for the latent factors 
are derived from factor analysis of prior surveys designed to generate a set of 
scale indicators that can be reused in subsequent surveys (e.g. Gastil, et al., 2005)  
However, RMT clearly anticipates that individuals utilise multiple RMs when faced 
with social issues.  Furthermore, Fiske argues that the prevalent culture will 
prescribe which RM should be used in a given context.  Climate change is a 
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contested issue.  So it is likely that individuals may still be uncertain which RM 
they prefer to apply, or that they are expected to apply.  Previous surveys found 
that individuals tried to frame the issue in terms of other, familiar issues such as 
the ozone hole or pollution.  Applying such familiar, but ill-fitting frameworks, can 
lead to misconceptions (Kempton, 1997; Leiserowitz, 2005).  We should expect 
therefore that individuals will take time to resolve how to frame the issue, and 
which RM would be the most appropriate to apply when making sense of the 
challenge of climate change. 
 
These considerations will exert divergent influences on individuals‘ responses.  On 
one hand, RMT argues that individuals‘ responses will demonstrate a clear pattern 
of adherence to one or more Relational Models and rejection of others as 
inappropriate to the issue; on the other, the theory anticipates a more 
complicated picture in which individuals entertain conflicting arguments based 
upon different RMs while they have not resolved the issue.  Previous surveys have 
demonstrated the dissonance in peoples‘ views (e.g. Christie & Jarvis, 2001; Ipsos-
Mori, 2008) and these internal inconsistencies may well be repeated.  Zaller and 
Feldman (1992) argued that people do hold conflicting positions on important 
issues.  Yet this does not have to mean that people‘s views are incoherent, as 
Christie and Jarvis (2001) concluded.  RMT suggests people are likely to be 
consistent in their inconsistencies – if they favour arguments based on one RM, 
they will probably favour other arguments based on the same RM even though they 
may also agree to conflicting arguments based upon other RMs.  To reflect these 
considerations the analysis of the survey seeks to confirm some of these 
expectations (spelt out more clearly below). 
6.1.2 Levels of explanation 
Chapter 3 justified the selection of the three empirical methods used in this 
thesis.  The media sample and focus group interviews were taken as proxies for 
the climate change debate at the societal level and inter-personal level 
respectively.  The survey has been used to address individual level reasoning in 
the climate change debate: the survey statements are taken as proxies for the 
considerations that Zaller and Feldman (1992) argued lie behind people‘s attitudes 
to important issues. 
 
Chapter 2 addressed the difficulty faced by this thesis, along with the many 
previous theories, in arguing that societal level shared understandings of 
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phenomena are present or mirrored in individual level reasoning about those 
phenomena.  It is necessary to assume that this is the case, without being able to 
propose a mechanism whereby this is achieved.  Further, the methods used to 
address the different levels necessarily differ and are often felt to be 
incompatible. 
6.1.3 Psychometric tests 
Chapter 2 identified the competing traditions to be found in research into public 
understanding of risk.  Risk can be treated as the real probability of outcomes in 
the physical world; alternatively, it can be treated as an attitude, whereby 
individuals believe and feel, or perceive, something to be a risk (Slovic, 1987).   In 
the former, risk is assessed using the natural sciences and is treated as susceptible 
to objective measurement46.  In the latter, risk perceptions are treated as 
susceptible to biased individual responses, and/or societal construction.  
Individual attitudes are tested using psychometric testing.  Societal influences on 
what issues are treated as risks are investigated through diverse methods such as 
media analysis or case studies.  
 
These different traditions make different assumptions regarding the nature of risk, 
and hence the appropriate methods with which to analyse risk.  These three 
surveys are psychometric tests of individual responses to arguments typical of the 
climate change debate.  Just as the thesis cannot offer a mechanism to connect 
the individual level and societal level phenomena at the theoretical level, at the 
methodological level the thesis avoids reconciling the competing commitments of 
the different traditions (see section 2.2.5). 
6.1.4 The objects under investigation 
This ‗evasion‘ is important.  Other surveys, by researchers using Cultural Theory, 
aim to show that ‗worldviews‘ in some way determine specific attitudes such as 
risk perceptions.  Dake and Thompson (1999) sought to show worldviews driving 
consumer preferences, and compared measures of ‗cultural bias‘ (p422) to 
household behaviours.  More recently, Kahan and colleagues have used surveys to 
attribute worldviews to respondents and then to examine whether risk perception 
appears to be driven by worldviews (Gastil, et al., 2005; Kahan, et al., 2007).  
                                            
46 For example, the IPCC‘s assessments base predictions of future climate change, and the 
risk of particular scenarios materialising, upon a wide variety of physical science data 
(IPCC, 2007).  
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Leiserowitz (2006) too used elements of Cultural Theory within a collection of 
independent variables to explore factors underlying risk perception and policy 
preferences. 
 
This survey takes a different approach.  Selecting arguments from the climate 
change debate that are representative of the different Relational Models, it 
assesses whether individual respondents find that these arguments represent 
coherent ‗Standpoints‘.  The survey only has questions connected to the climate 
change debate.  Therefore the survey does not use independent questions to 
attribute a worldview, or dominant Relational Model, to each individual and then 
compare this to attitudes to, or risk perception of, climate change.  The key 
question underlying the survey is the extent to which individuals may have 
coherent Standpoints in respect of the specific topic of climate change. 
6.1.5 Survey research questions 
The survey questions themselves represent statements typical of arguments found 
within the media content and focus group interviews.  In addition several 
statements drawn from other surveys were added.  The question sets are used to 
address the following research questions: 
 
A. Do the survey responses form coherent Standpoints based upon the 
Relational Models? 
B. The Media analysis and the Focus Group interviews both emphasise the role 
of the Equality Matching Standpoint: is this evident in the survey? 
C. Do individuals entertain multiple Relational Models? 
 
Questions A & B are addressed by three separate multivariate analyses. Attitude 
surveys sometimes use factor analysis to infer latent variables such as 
environmental values or behaviours (e.g. Dietz, et al., 1998; Stern, et al., 1999).  
Others proceed without the factor analysis but develop indicator variables to 
generate scale measurement of such implied factors (e.g. Stern, et al., 1986).  
Although this thesis proposes that in some sense individuals use Relational Models 
to make sense of the world, the purpose of the survey is not to show that the RMs 
exist independent of the context to which they are being applied. This chapter 
describes both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the survey 
responses that explore whether the responses are organised along the relational 
logic of the four different RMs. 
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The value of these analyses is twofold: in part they situate this survey alongside 
previous research, in part they do provide tentative conclusions that a more finely 
tailored survey might be able to develop.  However, the patterning of responses is 
more clearly illustrated and communicated by a cluster analysis and this forms the 
central part of this chapter. 
 
Question C has been addressed through answers to 12 questions which forced 
respondents to choose between different statements based upon Relational 
Models. 
6.2 Survey procedures 
6.2.1 Respondent selection 
Two marketing agencies were used to recruit respondents over the internet from 
their pre-existing contact base.  Saros Research is a typical market research 
agency, delivering focus group and other feedback material principally to 
corporate clients (www.sarosresearch.com).  Maximiles is a web-based shopping 
aggregator, running reward programmes.  The company claims a UK survey panel 
of nearly 1m panellists (www.maximiles.co.uk).  Both agencies were paid for the 
recruitment.  Saros participants were offered participation in a prize draw with 3 
£100 prizes drawn for 150 participants (run in accordance with the Market 
Research Society‘s code of conduct).  Maximiles‘ panellists are rewarded with 
points on their loyalty account. 
 
Both agencies ran the survey in mid-October 2010, obtaining their respondents in 
a matter of days.  Maximiles originally made a screening error in sending out their 
invitation to participate, resulting in the first respondents, approximately 100, all 
being men. They extended the survey beyond the contracted 250 to compensate 
but the final male/female split in their survey was 60:40.  The Saros gender split 
was the reverse. 
 
The online survey was hosted by the Institute of Social Psychology at the London 
School of Economics and so could be monitored on a continuous basis. 
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6.2.2 Survey format 
Appendix K provides a copy of the survey as presented to Saros‘ respondents.   
The survey did not allow respondents to proceed without completing each page, 
and respondents could not go back to previous pages. 
 
After the opening research consent form and explanation of participants‘ rights, 
respondents proceeded to 41 statements using a standard 7-point Likert scale 
(1=Disagree very strongly; 2= disagree strongly; 3= tend to disagree; 4= neither 
agree nor disagree; 5= tend to agree; 6= agree strongly; 7= agree very strongly). 
 
The second part of the survey paired 24 of the earlier statements and asked 
respondents to choose the one closest to their own opinion.  Finally, respondents 
were asked to imagine two specific possible challenges in the future and to choose 
one of three policy options that they thought would work best in the UK.  The first 
was ‗a shortage of key materials, energy and foodstuffs‘; the second was potential 
‗[migration] from the hardest hit areas to less badly affected countries, including 
Britain.‘ 
 
The survey concluded with five demographic questions and an invitation to 
comment: 61 out of 578 respondents left comments, ranging from ‗very 
interesting‘ to long diatribes. 
6.2.3 Representativeness of the two internet surveys 
Sourcing the survey respondents through agencies probably provides a more 
representative sample than snowball or student registers, but membership of the 
agencies‘ panels is a filter in itself and panel members then choose to participate 
or not, providing opportunities for self-selection bias (Alreck & Settle, 1985, Ch3). 
 
Quite apart from the initial gender screening error by Maximiles, the motivations 
of the panels run by the two different agencies are likely to be different: the 
people who put themselves forward for paid market research and focus groups are 
likely to differ from those interested in shopping loyalty reward schemes.   Apart 
from gender, the other noticeable demographic difference between the samples is 
that the Saros set is more urban than the Maximiles set (see below).  However, for 
some response variables ‗Source‘, i.e. which survey group a respondent belongs 
to, is statistically significant when analysing variances in responses.  Usually 
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gender, age or education has a greater effect, but ‗Source‘ sometimes remains 
significant even when controlling for other respondent characteristics. 
 
The differences between the two samples indicate that they are not fully 
representative of the population as a whole: we cannot make generalised 
conclusions about the proportion of the population that would agree with, e.g. 
Q13 ‗I‘m fed up with being lectured by all sorts of public figures about what I 
should do to combat climate change‘. 
 
However, the main purpose of the survey is not to make such generalisations but 
to identify repeated patterns of responses, but to explore the patterns of 
associations across the responses.  The analysis therefore concentrates on the 
combined sample of 578 responses.  A comparison between the results for the two 
samples is given. 
6.3 Outline description of the results 
6.3.1 Introduction 
This section provides descriptive data for the survey. 29 of the 41 questions in the 
first part of the survey have been coded in Appendix L according to the Relational 
Model matrix used in the Media and Focus Group analyses47.  This shows that the 
Arguments identified in the qualitative studies are well covered by the survey 
questions, but it also makes clear that some of the questions carry elements of 
more than one RM and may prove ambiguous.  As will be seen, some questions are 
more successful than others at capturing the intended essence of the Relational 
Model.   Subsequently these questions are referred to as the 29 Relational Model 
questions to distinguish them from the other 12 questions, discussed below. 
 
This section briefly outlines the demographics of the survey respondents and then 
provides descriptive statistics for the responses to each of the 41 questions in the 
first part of the survey.  A more detailed discussion of these, along with the full 
question wording, is provided at Appendix M.  
                                            
47 Section 3.2 explains how the Relational Model matrix was created in successive stages of 
refinement.  The survey questions were formulated after most of the coding of the media 
articles and focus groups had been completed but before finalisation of the matrix.  The 
coding exercise shown in Appendix L, applying the final matrix to the survey questions, 
serves to check that the survey covers the final set of arguments specified therein.  
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6.3.2 Demographics 
Appendix N schedules the demographics of the 578 respondents, in total and 
analysed between the two different surveys.  These can be summarised as follows 
(figures in brackets are percentages): 
 There are 314 men and 264 women (54:46)  
 279 respondents were less than 46 years old, 299 were over 45 (48:52) 
 296 had a full college degree or higher educational qualification, 282 
stopped education either at school or before completing a degree (51:49) 
 345 reported a household income of up to £40,000; 233 reported higher 
income (60:40) 
 269 said they lived in a big city or the suburbs of one; 226 said they lived in 
a smaller urban environment and 83 in a rural one (47:39:14). 
 
The only differences between the two surveys that stand out upon inspection are 
gender (see above, Saros 38:62; Maximiles 60:40) and a more urban concentration 
in the Saros sample (60:29:11).  Crosstabulations of the demographic variables do 
not reveal other noticeable concentrations in either of the two surveys. 
 
6.3.3 Level of agreement to ‗Relational Model‘ Statements 
The descriptive statistics are summarised in the following table: 
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  Relational model based questions   Descriptive statistics
Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Extreme 
Agreement
Extreme 
Disagree't
AR 1: Cutting waste & efficiency will help alot 5.32 1.081 13% 1%
AR 10: Need to reduce world population 5.19 1.252 19% 1%
AR 18: Need targets based on sound science 5.04 .991 7% 1%
AR 24: Problem for governments not individuals 3.44 1.353 2% 8%
AR 29: Need the UN to create co-operation 5.02 1.127 11% 1%
AR 32: Need strict regulation on consumption 4.41 1.289 6% 3%
AR 36: Politicians and scientists have a key role 5.27 1.043 13% 1%
Average AR score 4.81 10% 2%
CS 3: There are limits 4.62 1.411 9% 3%
CS 7: Not fair to leave to future generations 5.45 1.244 24% 1%
CS 23: UN etc will be gradulist, and not enough 4.71 1.071 6% 1%
CS 25: Major change in consumption/lifestyle 4.97 1.260 11% 2%
CS 27: We're all human; rich must help poor 5.13 1.200 16% 0%
CS 37: Helping environment is right thing to do 5.86 1.070 35% 0%
CS 41: Need to accept lower economic growth 4.81 1.276 11% 1%
Average CS score 5.08 16% 1%
EM 9:CC threats are unpredictable:so uncontrollable 3.83 1.334 3% 4%
EM 13: I'm fed up with lectures about CC 4.04 1.648 8% 7%
EM 19: Other's won't do much, so I won't 3.31 1.454 2% 12%
EM 21: Fuel expensive already, so no more taxes 4.83 1.699 21% 5%
EM 26: I don't trust govt to solve CC 4.95 1.229 14% 0%
EM 33: I'm more likely to act if it saves me money 5.25 1.136 15% 1%
EM 38: Country must look after own citizens first 4.39 1.395 7% 3%
Average EM score 4.37 10% 5%
MP 6:Science will solve CC; no need to change 2.98 1.238 1% 12%
MP 11: Need to empower everyone to make a diff 5.11 1.075 10% 1%
MP/AR 16:Govt incentivise techno innovation 5.13 1.208 15% 1%
MP 17: Econ growth essential to help enviro 4.34 1.150 2% 3%
MP 20: As climate changes we'll adapt 4.42 1.159 3% 2%
MP 28: Empower people to save energy 4.97 1.018 9% 1%
MP 35: Fut generations better placed to address CC 4.24 1.170 2% 3%
MP 39: Higher prices to encourage innov/efficiency 3.06 1.454 1% 20%
Average MP score 4.28 5% 4%
 
Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics for statements based on Relational Models 
Appendix M discusses this data:   a detailed consideration of the statements, and 
respondents‘ attitudes to them, indicates how sensitive to the precise wording of 
the statements many of them are.  Some, such as AR1, offer bland statements of 
common sense which are easy to agree with.  Others, such as CS7 and CS37 are 
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framed in terms of a morality few seem to want to argue with and these 
statements show the highest level of agreement: by the opposite token, some 
statements such as EM19 or MP6 seem to be too brazen, and respondents feel 
uncomfortable asserting those arguments strongly48.  
 
The greater difficulty is that some statements prompted anomalous responses, 
either because they expressed composite arguments whereby respondents might 
agree with one part but not the other (e.g. AR24, CS23 or EM26) or alternatively 
they introduced issues, such as high fuel prices (EM21), population control (AR10) 
or trust in government (EM26), that had powerful resonance beyond the topic of 
climate change.  Still others such as MP17‘s assertion that ‗economic growth is 
essential to give us the means to solve the world's environmental problems‘ seem 
to engender an ambivalence respondents do not resolve.  Accordingly in some of 
the following analyses some of the indicators have been omitted: these are clearly 
identified in each analysis. 
6.3.4 Level of agreement within each Relational Model statement set 
The table below indicates the average of the mean scores for each statement set: 
scores above 4 therefore record a greater tendency to agree with the statement, 
below 4 indicates a greater tendency to disagree: 
Mean Scores Maximiles Saros Full survey
AR questions 4.80 4.86 4.81
CS questions 5.06 5.12 5.08
EM questions 4.45 4.16 4.37
MP questions 4.29 4.25 4.28
 
 Table 6-2: Level of agreement with sets of Relational Model statements 
The difference in mean scores between the different surveys is statistically 
significant for the EM questions (t=2.309; p=0.02) but not for the others.  
6.3.5 Level of agreement with the remaining 12 statements 
The table below provides descriptive statistics for all of the other questions: 
                                            
48 The tendencies will reflect a degree of social desirability bias (Alreck & Settle, 1985, 
Ch4), although much of the methodological literature concentrates on the bias operating 
with responses to an interviewer, when concern for appearances might be stronger 
(Fowler, 2008, Ch6). 
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Statements not based on Relational Models   Descriptive statistics
Miscellaneous statements Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Extreme 
Agreement
Extreme 
Disagree't
Misc 2: The threat of GW probably exaggerated 3.87 1.544 3% 9%
Misc 5: I don't know who to believe 4.19 1.434 5% 5%
Misc 12:People worry too much about environment 3.13 1.426 2% 15%
Misc 14: It's a scientific fact  that CC manmade 4.43 1.502 8% 5%
Misc 22: People will only act when selves affected 5.31 1.027 13% 0%
Averages N/A: polarity of 14 reverse of 2,5,12
Likely level of impact from CC by 2050
Impact 8: Unlikely CC catastrophic for UK 3.83 1.317 3% 5%
Impact 31: CC catastrophic for some countries 4.83 1.351 13% 1%
Impact 34:CC in other countries will knock on to UK 4.49 1.205 5% 1%
Averages N/A: polarity of 8 reverse of 31, 34
Have/will others/you taken steps to reduce impact 
on environment
on enviroment?
Actions 4:Last 5 years people I know have reduced 4.49 1.201 3% 1%
Actions 15:Next 5 years I expect others will reduce 4.47 1.078 3% 1%
Actions 30: Last 5 years I reduced 4.89 1.183 8% 1%
Action 40: Next 5 years I will reduce 5.00 1.126 11% 1%
Average 4.71 6% 1%
 
Table 6-3: Descriptive statistics for statements not base on Relational Models 
The clearest message from these answers is that people are not particularly 
sceptical.  This accords with other recent surveys (e.g. Poortinga, et al., 2011; 
Whitmarsh, 2011).  A reliable scale can be created based upon Statements 14, 31 
and 34 and the reversed responses to 2, 5 and 1249 where low scores indicate 
scepticism and high scores denote belief in AGW.  Mean score on this scale, 
referred to below as ‗ScepticsBelievers‘ is 4.43, and the Cronbach‘s alpha is 
0.872. 
6.3.6 ‗Market Pricing‘ statements represent two opposed positions 
The MP Statements present a more heterogeneous pattern than the previous three 
groups.  Appendix O shows a correlation matrix for the eight MP Statements, 
revealing two distinct groups (6, 20, 35 in the first; 11, 16, 28 in the second), and 
two Statements (17, 39) less closely correlated than the others. 
  
                                            
49 Statement 8 correlates highly with the other statements, but logically people could 
regard AGW as serious while disagreeing with this Statement, so it has been omitted from 
the scale. 
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Although MP6 provoked the highest level of disagreement out of all the RM 
Statements, while on average respondents tended to agree with MP20 and 35, 
these three Statements all positively correlate (average co-efficient is 0.342, all 
p<0.01); likewise Statements 11, 16, and 28 (average co-efficient 0.396, all 
p<0.01).  These two groups, when combined as composites, are negatively 
correlated (-0.257, p<0.01).  The first group expresses a laissez-faire philosophy: 
we should ignore climate change because we can deal with it as and when we 
have to.  The second group expresses MP‘s confidence in individual efficacy in a 
different way: it takes the challenge seriously but emphasises the importance of 
empowering individuals to deliver solutions.  Subsequent discussion will refer to 
these two positions as ‗MP Laissez-faire‘ and ‗MP Empower‘.   
6.3.7 Why is the Market Pricing Standpoint ambivalent? 
This ambivalence to the Market Pricing Standpoint surfaced in the Media analysis 
(sections 4.7.5, 4.7.6).  Market Pricing argues that we should adapt nature to our 
purposes, but also adapt to changes in nature if we have to, and the Standpoint 
combines this proactive and reactive relationship to nature (as for example in 
John Maddox‘s discussion of climate change, #17).  Section 1.3.5 also identified 
the blurred distinction between mitigation and adaptation.  Mitigation may be 
trying to prevent future problems, but it is an adaptation to the changing outlook, 
an outlook largely determined by extrapolating (empirically observed) past 
changes into the future.  From the Standpoint of MP, all action is adaptation to 
changing circumstances based on rational assessment of the circumstances.  The 
Focus Groups frequently argued despairingly (see 5.6.6) that only a smack in the 
face would be enough to get mankind to believe that circumstances had changed 
enough to force man to adapt.  The MP Standpoint casts this more positively (as in 
Statement 20: ―As the climate changes we will adapt accordingly‖) but the logic 
of adaptation is the same. 
 
Given this understanding of the Market Pricing Standpoint, it follows that the 
Standpoint offers divergent responses depending upon what the circumstances are 
judged to be. If one believes AGW is a serious problem, the hard-headed approach 
is to deal with it head-on.  If one believes either that it is nonsense, or that the 
jury is out and we do not yet know enough about AGW, then the rational response 
is to expect future generations to address the problem if and when it materialises.  
Following Cultural Theory, it may be the case that a strong believer in mankind‘s 
technological progress is less likely to believe AGW is a problem because of the 
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confidence that we will adapt when necessary.  Surveys have shown that 
individualist ideology is predictive of greater scepticism about AGW (Gastil, et al., 
2005; Leiserowitz, 2006).  But, since the survey does not independently determine 
ideology, this is not the question here.  Rather, the question is, if one thinks AGW 
is real, how can this be assimilated within the types of argument favoured by the 
Standpoint.  On the other hand, if one does not think it is real, how is that 
alternative point of view assimilated?  Fiske (2004b) argued that culture prescribes 
which RM to use in which circumstances: but these studies show that the RMs 
themselves also prescribe different responses to different circumstances. 
6.3.8 Survey limitations 
These opening observations indicate that that the survey will have difficulty 
unpicking the role of the Relational Models in the response set.  Cultural Theory 
suggests that the RMs, like worldviews, will influence how individuals define the 
context (the issue of climate change) towards which the tested attitudes are 
directed.  The survey shows that the definition of the context influences how 
individuals respond to the problem.  This circularity necessarily proves difficult to 
unravel, given that the survey provides no test to identify the RMs 
independently.50 
 
The survey would have benefited from item analysis and progressive refinement of 
the question set.  A number of statements appear to combine the logic of more 
than one RM, or to embed the rejection of a different RM, multiplying the factors 
that may underlie individual responses to particular statements.  The interaction 
between the statements is discussed further in section 6.7.  
6.4 Multivariate Analysis 1 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 above explained that the survey was not constructed to yield 
independent factors for the 4 Relational Models.  However, three multivariate 
procedures have been applied: 
 An exploratory factor analysis investigates the factors underlying 
respondents‘ beliefs about the challenge of climate change, without 
assuming these to be organised according to the RMs. 
 A confirmatory factor analysis tests whether a framework based upon the 
RMs does capture some of the variation in the responses. 
                                            
50 Independent in the sense of being independent of the climate change debate 
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 The initial descriptions of the data suggest that there is plenty of ‗noise‘ in 
the survey: for this reason a cluster analysis serves to communicate a 
clearer account of the patterns in the responses. 
 
Section 6.4 covers the factor analyses while section 6.5 reports the cluster 
analysis. 
6.4.1 Exploratory factor analysis (‗EFA‘) 
An EFA of the 29 questions based on the Relational Models is presented in 
Appendix Q.  The Appendix provides a commentary on all five factors in the 
model, but this analysis focuses on the first two.  The first represents what could 
be termed a ‗Mainstream‘ view of climate change and the potential solutions to it 
(that it is/isn‘t a real threat, and it is/isn‘t something that society will have to 
prioritise).  The second represents a response that we should/shouldn‘t ‗Reject 
and ignore the issue‘.  
 
Using alternative models in the EFA typically reveals these same two factors, but 
additional factors over and beyond the first two depend upon the precise 
specification of the model being tested.  The two statements addressing the use 
of prices to tackle climate change (EM21 and MP39) typically reveal a factor for 
endorsement/rejection of higher prices (as in Factor 3 here), but different 
specifications (e.g. different numbers of factors) vary considerably the pattern of 
statements with which these indicator variables combine to reveal latent 
variables.  The factors revealed are also highly sensitive to changes in the set of 
indicator variables selected from the 41 survey statements: for example the 
‗Action‘ statements (4, 15, 30, 40), when included, reveal a factor essentially 
about action.  The review in 6.3 of the Relational Model indicator variables found 
that many of them combined climate change arguments with other ideas: hence, 
they are likely to complicate the factor analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, the analysis offers two clear conclusions.  First, latent variables do 
not emerge separately in line with the 4 RM Statement groups, using EFA.  Second, 
two particular factors suggest a level of complexity underlying attitudes to the 
challenge of climate change and the division between those engaging with it and 
those not.  The two factors demonstrate that level of belief in the phenomenon of 
AGW, in the sense of a uni-dimensional rational judgement as to whether the 
phenomenon is real, oversimplifies the divisions within the response set.  The first 
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two factors, one giving a level of commitment to a ‗mainstream approach‘, the 
other giving level of adherence to ‗rejecting and ignoring‘ the issue, are not part 
of one dimension but are distinct.  After extraction, the model rotation is 
designed to identify distinct factors with a clear interpretation: the oblique 
rotation applied here allows factors to correlate, but these first two factors are 
only weakly (negatively) correlated.   This demonstrates that respondents can and 
do take diverse combinations of positions on the two factors.  Reviewing the items 
with high factor loadings, it is clear that this continues the picture revealed in the 
focus groups.  People understand the issue, can agree with the need for collective 
action (the first factor): at the same time, as individuals, they resent imposition 
by the group upon themselves (the second factor).  The two positions go beyond 
simple belief in the phenomenon and are inherently relational, leaving 
respondents with the moral challenge of the Commons Dilemma. 
6.4.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
CFA provides a test of the thesis‘ argument that individual‘s views on climate 
change may be organised into coherent standpoints consistent with the logic of 
the Relational Model.  A range of diagnostic statistics can be used to assess the 
extent to which a proposed model represents a good fit to the data.   
Bartholomew et al. (2008) explain that test statistics for CFA models that evaluate 
a model against a criterion of perfect fit can be highly sensitive, leading to the 
common use of Fit indices to assess closeness of fit.  The analyses below use 2 of 
these indices, for which Bartholomew et al.‘s evaluation is consistent with the 
‗rules of thumb‘ proposed below: 
   
 RMSEA – ‗A rule of thumb is that RMSEA ≤ .05 indicates close approximate 
fit, values between 0.05 and 0.08 suggest reasonable error of 
approximation, and RMSEA ≥ 0.10 suggests a poor fit‘ (Kline, 2005, p. 139). 
 CFI – ‗A rule of thumb for the CFI and other incremental [indices] is that 
values greater than roughly 0.90 may indicate a reasonably good fit of the 
researcher‘s model‘ (Kline, 2005, p. 140). 
 
In order to build the model for the CFA , some of the issues already identified 
within the response set need to be considered.  Section 6.3 explained that an 
initial overview of the survey responses revealed: 
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 Several of the survey statements were, with hindsight, imperfectly worded 
and yielded anomalous responses 
 The survey revealed a clear split in the MP arguments where some of them 
implied belief in the phenomenon of AGW and some implied scepticism. 
 
Reflecting these considerations, two analyses are presented in Appendix R: 
 The first, based on the 4 Relational Models, uses 26 out of 29 Relational 
Model statements (this is referred to below as 4RM 26 indicators)51 
 The second, based on 5 Relational Models, replaces the single MP model 
with the two ‗MP Laissez‘ and ‗MP Empower‘ versions of MP and uses 20 
out of the 29 Relational Model statements.52 
The table below provides the fit indices and χ2 for these two models: 
Variables in the model RMSEA:    90% confidence CFI χ
2
df p
Low High
4 RMs, 26 indicators 0.090 0.086 0.095 0.735 1,675.5 293 <0.001
5 RMs, 20 indicators 0.065 0.060 0.071 0.902 555.6 160 <0.001  
Table 6-4: Fit indices for Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
The indices for the first model indicate that it is not a bad enough fit to reject the 
model53; the indices for the second model suggest the model is a reasonable 
approximation. 
 
These analyses provide some support, albeit modest, for the view that a 
framework based upon the Relational Models does capture some of the variation in 
the responses:  this support suggests that a more refined question set could well 
support the hypothesis that individuals‘ views on climate change can usefully be 
summarised within Standpoints based upon the Relational Models.   
 
                                            
51 The 26 indicator model omits AR10 and CS3, which are both general, relatively 
pessimistic statements, that are not actually about climate change, and also MP17, which 
by arguing for the importance of economic growth can be agreed to even by people who 
believe strongly in the phenomenon of AGW (see Appendix T on the responses to Q52). 
52 This model omits the three statements left out of the previous models, as well as AR24 
(which combines 2 different propositions), EM21 and MP39 which introduce the topic of 
high prices which seems to prompt particular reactions of their own, and EM26, 33 and 38 
each of which advances a proposition which can be agreed to by many with divergent 
views on the overall phenomenon of AGW. 
53 Further caution needs to be attached to this first model (but not the second), in so far 
as the high correlations between the factors call into question their discriminant validity.  
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The implication of both the factor analyses is that people‘s views in the debate 
reflect presumptions about the moral order as captured by the four relational 
models. 
6.4.3 The status of the Relational Models as ‗Latent Variables‘ 
It is important to stress that the use of Factor Analysis of any kind need not imply 
that the inferred latent variables represent something ‗real‘.  This view is 
contentious:  Borsboom and others (2003, p. 203) argue ‗that a consistent 
interpretation of [theory] models requires a realist ontology for latent variables‘.  
Hand (2004) rejects both this approach and its opposite extreme (operationalism) 
to argue that latent variables can be used for both representational and pragmatic 
purposes.  The approach taken here is closer to Hand‘s, treating the measures of 
association as convenient, and meaningful, summaries of individuals‘ responses. 
 
This issue touches the heart of the thesis.  As argued previously, it proposes no 
mechanism whereby the representation of climate change arguments at the social 
level is linked to their representation at level of individual cognition.  The more 
modest target is to establish whether patterns of arguments based on the 
Relational Models can be identified, while remaining agnostic as to ‗what‘ the RMs 
actually are. 
6.4.4 The meaning of scale scores for the Relational Models 
For this reason scale scores have been generated for the Relational Models without 
arguing that they are more than composite representations of a tendency to agree 
with statements based on a particular RM.  Appendix M explains how the scales 
are constructed; section M8 within that Appendix summarises the results.  Within 
this thesis, the scales are only used in the analysis of the dichotomised statements 
in section 6.6. 
6.5 Multivariate Analysis 2 
6.5.1 Why use cluster analysis? 
The purpose of cluster analysis is ‗simply to describe the data in a convenient 
way‘ (Hand, 2008, p. 105).  The aim of the survey, as discussed in section 6.1, is 
to reveal the patterns of arguments used by individuals when reasoning about 
climate change, and cluster analysis offers a convenient way to reveal those 
patterns.  Classification of responses by a cluster analysis offers a less statistically 
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demanding way of capturing the patterns in those responses; it makes fewer 
assumptions about the level of measurement and data quality. Hence it is 
probably more appropriate given the limitations of the survey questions. 
6.5.2 Outline of the Cluster Analysis 
The Cluster Analysis shows a clear divide between those variables that imply that 
Anthropogenic Global Warming (‗AGW‘) is both real and something we can and will 
do something about (A), and those that do not.  In this it echoes the finding of the 
EFA (6.4.1).  Further, this latter cluster falls into two different main groups.  The 
first of these is about whether climate change is an important issue (B); the 
second captures a level of overall pessimism (C).  
 
The division into two persists whether or not the question set includes those 
statements (Misc 2, 5, 12, 14 and Impact 8, 31, 34 – see 6.3.5) that explicitly 
express belief or scepticism in both the existence and the seriousness of AGW, but 
do not express a view on what we should do about it or whether we should do 
anything at all.  For completeness, Appendix S presents a cluster analysis of all 41 
Statement variables.  The analysis shown overleaf omits these statements, leaving 
the 29 Relational Model statements together with the 4 ‗Action statements and 
‗Misc 22‘57.  Below is a dendrogram illustrating the analysis: 
 
 
                                            
57 Misc 22 is: ―In reality, people will only do something about climate change when they 
start to experience it directly‖.  This differs from the other 4 miscellaneous statements 
which specifically address respondents‘ level of belief in climate change.  The Action 
Statements and Misc 22 are all ‗relational‘ in the sense that they consider what 
should/will be/has been done by people in response to climate change. 
238 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Cluster analysis of responses to 34 Statements 
In the dendrogram, ‗V‘ numbers correspond with the Statement number. 
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6.5.3 Five distinct ‗approaches‘ 
Within Group (A) there are three separate strands: 
 Moral commitment: in the green zone, this combines Statements 7 and 37, 
along with 30 and 40. Section 6.4.5 highlighted the strength of agreement 
with the first two, which express the moral imperative of doing something 
about climate change: these connect closely to the second pair, which 
expresses personal commitment to reduce one‘s own impact on the 
environment. 
 Mainstream approach: in the red zone, this combines AR1, 29, 36, 18 and 
MP Empower 16, 28, and 11.  This group engages confidently with the 
issue.  Critics would argue that this approach represents ‗Business as Usual‘ 
relying on efficiency and existing institutions.  Advocates look to the 
energy of individual innovation and the competence of authoritative 
expertise. 
 Radical Change: in the yellow zone by contrast to the Mainstream 
approach, Statements 23, 25, 41, 32 and 27 all assume that there has to be 
significant change to the status quo: a more efficient Business as Usual 
simply will not be enough.  Noteworthy is the fact that AR32, the demand 
for strict regulation to consumption, clusters here with 4 ‗CS‘ Statements. 
 
Within Group (B) there is one overall response: 
 Reject and ignore: in the blue zone, Statements 6, 9, 13, 19, 20, 21, 35 
and 38 all, in different ways, reject climate change as an issue, reject 
possible policy responses to it, or take the view that we should simply 
ignore the problem.  This group combines most of the EM Statements with 
the 3 MP Laissez-faire Statements. 
 
Group (C) gathers a more heterogeneous collection of Statements, but they do 
have a common thrust: 
 Pessimism: in the purple zone, Statements 3, 10, 22, 26 and 33 suggest 
that either climate change is not the real issue or, even if it is, that it is 
nothing to do with ‗me‘.  CS 3, stating the limits to human progress and 
AR10 asserting the need to reduce the world‘s population express a 
Malthusian pessimism that treats AGW as a symptom of a wider issue.  
Statements 22, arguing that people will only act when directly affected 
themselves; 33, arguing that ‗I‘ will behave pro-environmentally when it 
saves me money; and 26, which has no confidence in the government 
dealing with climate change, all imply the view that humanity is not going 
to do much about climate change. 
6.5.4 Other statements 
Five Statements are not accounted for above: 
 Other’s behaviour:  Statements 15 and 4 express views on whether others 
act pro-environmentally.  These sit on the edge of the Group (A): they 
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accept the reality of climate change and that we need to do something 
about it, but they borrow much from the EM view of ‗other people‘ in 
judging that others will have a lower propensity to act than ourselves. 
 Market solutions: as noted above, many people react very strongly against 
the idea of higher prices.  MP Statement 39 lies at the fringe of Group (A) – 
it necessarily treats AGW as real and proposes a solution - but it actually 
correlates most strongly (and negatively) with EM21 which rejects higher 
fuel taxes and sits at the heart of the ‗reject and ignore‘ cluster (-0.611, p 
<0.01)58. 
 ‗Not my job’: Statement 24 was identified earlier as a composite – first, 
stating that climate change is something for governments to deal with 
implies acceptance of AGW as an issue; but the Statement also rejects the 
role of individuals, and this seems to be the dominant element, putting the 
Statement in Group (B) clustered alongside ‗reject and ignore‘. 
 Need for economic growth: sitting next to the idea of ‗not my job‘.  On 
the one hand, Statement 17 appears to express a version of ‗Business as 
Usual‘ equivalent to ignoring the problem: but it also sits next to the 
pessimistic CS3 ‗there are limits‘.  MP17 has weak but telling correlations 
with the AR (+0.091, p<0.05) and CS (-0.115, p<0.01) composite scores.  
The pragmatic AR response to AGW knows that economic growth is 
probably necessary: the more morally committed CS Standpoint cannot 
escape the view that economic growth is core to the problem.  That the 
statement sits next to ‗Not my job‘ suggests the position is best 
encapsulated by ‗It‘s too difficult to change‘. 
 
6.5.5 Interactions between the different Relational Models 
The picture presented by the cluster analysis accords with that found in the Media 
analysis.  First, the difficulty of disentangling the Standpoints (see 4.5.2) has been 
repeated, so that the cluster analysis actually reveals a collection of approaches 
that synthesise arguments from different Relational Models.  Second, similar 
interactions and overlaps between the RMs emerge (4.11): 
 
 Mainstream Approach is quite closely associated with the Moral 
Commitment of CS‘s insistence that we all need to pull together; 
optimistically it looks to MP‘s confidence in mankind‘s adaptability and 
individual initiative for solutions, and, conservatively, it relies upon AR‘s 
privileging of expert opinion and resistance to radical change.  The overlap 
                                            
58 Cluster analysis is sensitive to the valence of the question.  Reversing the logic of MP39, 
and then including it with the other 33 statements, creates a variation on the analysis 
presented above.  The two statements that consider the use of higher prices (reversed 
MP39 and EM21) form a distinct group on their own: the rest of the analysis remains largely 
unchanged. 
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between CS and AR is noted in 4.11.3, while 4.9.3 emphasises the tight 
relationship between AR and MP. 
 Yet the overlap between CS and AR is weaker in the cluster analysis than 
between AR and MP.  Most of the CS arguments cluster within ‗Radical 
Change‘.  Section 4.11.2 looked at examples in the Media of how the 
different Standpoints look to capture the AR Standpoint to impose their 
vision.  Thus the MP Empower Standpoint, within the Mainstream approach, 
has largely captured a conservative policy response.  The radical policy 
response of strict regulation on consumption (AR32) clusters with the CS 
arguments for Radical Change. 
 The ‗Reject and ignore‘ cluster combines the EM and MP Laissez faire 
Standpoints.  Section 4.11.3 points out that similar findings in the Media 
analysis reflect Cultural Theory‘s account which says that ‗low group‘  
worldviews will reject imposition by the group on the individual: section 
2.4.4 argues that this close overlap may make the EM and MP Standpoints 
hard to separate.  This is discussed further in 6.7.7. 
6.5.6 Conclusion to the multivariate analyses 
These three analyses help to make clearer the links between the Relational Models 
and respondents‘ attitudes to the challenge of climate change: 
 
 The Exploratory Factor Analysis demonstrates that the Relational Models do 
not emerge independently as latent variables in line with the RM 
Statements, but, also, that two distinct factors underlie the dilemma of 
the challenge of climate change.   
 The Confirmatory Factor Analysis provides tentative support for the view 
that a framework based upon the Relational Models does capture some of 
the variation in the responses:  this support suggests that a more refined 
question set could well support the hypothesis that individuals‘ views on 
climate change can usefully be summarised within Standpoints based upon 
the Relational Models. 
 The Cluster Analysis sheds light upon how arguments derived from different 
Relational Models combine to form identifiable, distinct approaches to the 
challenge of climate change.  Furthermore, these approaches sit within 
two overall responses to the issue, as also found in the EFA. 
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On the one hand, the analyses do provide support for the view that the patterns in 
the responses reflect the logic of the Relational Models.  On the other, the 
discussion in the foregoing sections explains how arguments from different RMs 
combine to form two overall approaches.  For all the complexity and uncertainty, 
debate seems to condense the arguments into two sides: Standpoints combine 
with arguments from different Standpoints to form an overall approach that can 
withstand criticism and command support from as many quarters as possible.  To 
borrow the language of Cultural Theory, the different Standpoints recruit the 
arguments of the others to their cause.  In the language of social cognition, 
individuals seek to minimise the dissonance they experience when applying the 
different justice principles embedded in the different models. 
 
The analyses also show that the two main approaches to the challenge of climate 
change are not opposite ends of a unidimensional, bipolar level of ‗belief in AGW‘.  
Nor indeed are the factors that underlie these approaches first a belief in the 
phenomenon and second a willingness to act, or alternatively a cognitive and an 
affective component.  The Exploratory Factor Analysis and the Cluster Analysis 
reveal two principal elements: first a level of commitment to a mainstream 
approach, which combines both belief in the phenomenon and in the collective 
goal of doing something about it: second, doubts about the phenomenon combined 
with a level of resistance to imposition by the group on the individual.  These two 
elements are inherently relational. 
 
Section 6.6 looks at how respondents choose between different Relational Models, 
before the concluding section 6.7 discusses further the ways in which the 
Relational Models appear to have combined to form these two main approaches. 
6.6 Individual use of multiple Relational Models 
6.6.1 Introduction 
The Focus Group interviews showed that individuals were comfortable with 
entertaining the arguments of divergent Standpoints.  Similarly, within the survey, 
respondents only disagreed with five of the 29 Relational Model based Statements 
on average.  Furthermore, the Exploratory Factor Analysis shows that respondents 
can both agree with the need for a collective approach while objecting to 
demands put upon themselves for the collective.  This inevitably prompts the 
question ‗How do individuals choose between competing arguments?‘ 
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Questions 42 to 53 each take two of the 29 Statements expressing different 
Relational Models and force respondents to choose between them.  There are six 
statements for each RM.  Each RM is contrasted with each of the other three RMs 
twice. 
6.6.2 How do respondents choose between contradictory Standpoints? 
Given the close correlations between the AR, CS and MP Empower Statements that 
form Group (A) in the cluster analysis – all taking AGW to be a serious issue – we 
should expect to find individuals endorsing Statements from these different 
Standpoints.  Similarly, we should expect individuals endorsing the EM Statements 
in Group (B) to endorse the MP Laissez-faire Statements also in that Group.  This 
suggests that the interesting issues are: 
 
 Are any individuals who are most comfortable with the Statements in 
Group (A) nevertheless willing to endorse statements in Group (B) or (C), 
and likewise individuals most comfortable with Group (B) Statements 
willing to endorse Statements in Group (A)? 
 On what grounds do individuals choose between arguments within Groups A 
and B? 
 
To address these questions, two different analyses have been used.  First, the 
pattern of responses has been compared to levels of belief in AGW.  Second, 
logistic regressions examine the association between the choices made and the 
patterns of respondent answers represented by the Relational Model composite 
scores. 
 
The table below sets out how often each Relational Model was preferred within 
the 6 pairs in which each model was offered: 
 
 
          Table 6-5: Number of times Relational Models preferred in forced choices 
          Number of times Relational Model Preferred 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
Model 
AR 3 27 110 190 170 61 17 3.3 
CS 19 38 97 129 145 116 34 3.4 
EM 43 157 136 130 67 36 9 2.3 
MP 8 32 151 203 138 43 3 3.0 
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The broad picture reflects the original levels of agreement with the Statements, 
which had lower mean levels of agreement for the EM Statements. 
6.6.3 Comparing choices to level of belief 
The dichotomised Statements provide a fairly crude tool with which to assess 
whether respondents entertain multiple RMs.  By not giving respondents the 
choice of agreeing or disagreeing with both Statements they are effectively forced 
to agree to arguments expressing at least three Relational Models and most 
probably all four (87% did choose at least one statement from each Standpoint).  
However, by comparing the choices made with levels of belief in AGW it is 
possible to gain a sense of how fluid individual commitment to particular RMs is. 
 
Respondents have been classified according to their scores on the 
‗ScepticsBelievers‘ scale.  Low scorers on this scale will typically sit in Group (B), 
High Scorers in Group (A).  Respondents have been divided into 4 categories to 
highlight those lying towards the more extreme ends of the scale.  The number in 
each category is shown below: 
 
 ‗AGW Sceptics‘ (score 1-3.0)      60 
 ‗AGW Sceptics to Unsure‘ (score 3.1 to 4.2)  211 
 ‗AGW Unsure to Believers (score 4.3 to 5.9) 207 
  and ‗AGW believers‘ (score 6.0 to 7)    60 
 
The ScepticsBelievers scale is the appropriate comparator because (1) it captures 
a principle division present in the response set to the 41 Statements, and (2) it 
includes none of the Relational Model Statements that are now going to be 
analysed. 
 
Appendix T analyses each of the 12 dichotomised statements by crosstabulating 
the responses with the four categories of the ScepticsBelievers scale.  The degree 
to which the ScepticsBelievers score is associated with respondents‘ choices 
between the pairs of statement is measured by a Chi Squared test.  The results 
are summarised in the table below and discussed in 6.5.5: 
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    Summary Table for Dichotomised Arguments
Question Arguments Correlation χ
2
   % of respondents
btw original if signif*             choosing
statements First Second
if signif Statement Statement
42 AR29 v CS23 +0.419 N/A 58.5% 41.5%
43 AR24 v EM26 +0.087 N/A 30.1% 69.9%
44 AR32 v MP28 +0.213 12.3 34.4% 65.6%
45 CS25 v AR1 +0.305 57.8 44.3% 55.7%
46 CS37 v EM33 +0.195 38.6 67.0% 33.0%
47 CS7 v MP35* -0.151 170.3 66.1% 33.9%
48 EM13 v AR36 -0.414 200.9 36.7% 63.3%
49 EM38 v CS27 -0.164 49 38.9% 61.1%
50 EM19 v MP11 -0.403 90.6 22.7% 77.3%
51 MP39 v AR18 +0.207 26.2 12.6% 87.4%
52 MP17 v CS41 -0.188 43.4 36.9% 63.1%
53 MP20*  v EM9 +0.400 N/A 72.7% 27.3%
* Regular p<0.05; Bold italic p<0.01
 
Table 6-6:  Summary of the Dichotomised Arguments60 
                                            
60 *Note: MP35 and MP20 are 2 of the 3 MP Laissez faire Statements.  MP11 and MP28 are 2 
of the 3 MP Empower Statements.  MP39 and MP17 did not fit into either group.  Of the 
other RM Statements used, only AR24 and EM26, both in Q43, did not form constituent 
elements of their respective RM scales. 
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6.6.4 Logistic regressions to examine influences on the choices made 
Appendix T also provides details of logistic regressions carried out to compare respondent‘s choices between the pairs of Statements and (1) 
their scores on the Relational Model scales and (2) the demographic variables. 
Logistic regressions: Odds Ratio shows increased likelihood (+) of choosing Statement over the other (-)
Survey Question:     Q42     Q43     Q44     Q45     Q46     Q47     Q48     Q49     Q50     Q51     Q52     Q53 How
AR29 AR24 AR32 CS25 CS37 CS7 EM13 EM38 EM19 MP39 MP17 MP20 Often
Independent variables vs CS23 vs EM26 vs MP28 vs AR1 vs EM33 vs MP35 vs AR36 vs CS27 vs MP11 vs AR18 vs CS41 vs EM9 Signif
AR Score ++ -- ++ -- 2
CS Score - + -- ++ -- ++ -- ++ 4
EM Score -- ++ -- ++ ++ -- ++ -- ++ -- - + -- ++ 7
MP Empower score ++ -- -- ++ - + - + ++ -- 5
MP Laissez faire score - + -- ++ + - ++ -- 4
AGW ScepticsBelievers ++ -- ++ -- -- ++ - + - + 5
Gender (female=1) + - - + + - -- ++ - + 5
Age, 6 categories - + 1
Income, 5 categories + - + - 2
Big City --
Education 5 categories + - - + + - 3
Source (Saros=1) -- ++ -- ++ 2
+/- p<0.05 ++/-- p<0.01  
Table 6-7: Logistic regressions of 12 forced choice questions; Odds Ratios 
Odds Ratios are calculated on the basis of co-efficients within the full model, so that the impact of each independent variable comes after 
controlling for the other variables. 
Relational Model scale scores have been adjusted, where appropriate, to exclude Statements that are present in the dichotomy: e.g. for 
Q45, the regression is made against a four item AR scale excluding AR1, and a five item CS scale excluding CS25.  This is necessary to avoid 
circularity. 
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6.6.5 Summary comments on the dichotomised Statements 
The analysis in Appendix T shows that respondents are able to entertain 
Arguments from conflicting Relational Models except when strong ‗Believers‘ in 
AGW are asked to prefer Statements that imply strong scepticism of AGW. 
6.6.5.1 Choice when original Statements strongly correlated 
For several of the dichotomised pairs, the responses to the two original 
Statements, when asked individually in the first part of the survey, were highly 
positively correlated.  This would suggest that respondents might find it harder to 
choose between them.  The crosstabulations confirm that respondents found the 
choice hard in Questions 42 and 53.  By contrast, for questions 44 and 45 the 
positive correlation masks the fact that one statement demands significant 
commitment from the respondent, the other is more blandly aspirational.  As a 
result, level of belief appears to drive the choice made.  However, because the 
original Statements were positively correlated, respondents on both sides of the 
‗sceptics‘ and ‗believers‘ divide can choose either RM.  
6.6.5.2 The Authority Ranking Model 
The dichotomised statements provide additional insight into the AR Model.  First in 
the logistic regression for Q43 the two Statements, both addressing the role of 
government in tackling climate change, identify a clear distinction between the 
AR and CS Standpoints, the latter showing much lower confidence in the 
government‘s ability to address the challenge.  Respondents with high CS scores 
are much more likely to choose the EM ‗rejection‘ of government. 
 
But the AR Standpoint, in taking AGW seriously, lies somewhere between CS and 
MP Empower.  Q45 hints at a split in the AR Model not unlike the split in the MP 
Model.  The original Statement AR1, advocating cutting waste and improving 
efficiency, is more closely associated with the MP Empower position than the AR 
Standpoint.  High MP Empower scorers are more likely to choose AR1, but, forced 
to choose between the stronger commitment of CS25 and the blander AR1, higher 
AR scorers strongly prefer CS25.  Indeed, the influence of the AR Standpoint is so 
strong that it captures all of the ‗Group A‘ impact: taken individually, CS score 
and level of belief both impact the choice significantly, but, controlling for the AR 
score they do not. 
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6.6.5.3 Equality Matching, MP Empower and MP Laissez-faire 
Within the logistic regressions generally the EM score appears to have the greatest 
influence among the Relational Models , being associated with 7 choices. 
 
Question 46 pairs CS37 vs EM33 and Question 49 pairs EM38 vs CS27, and both 
produce the same results.  Both contrast a moral commitment to act for the 
environment or others against a more self-centred approach: for both, the EM and 
MP Laissez-faire Relational Models appear to have the decisive impact, and 
controlling for these level of belief in AGW has no residual influence.  What stands 
out, is that both dichotomies identify an independent influence for each of EM and 
MP Laissez-faire: they are closely associated but the one does not subsume the 
other.  Also noticeable is the fact that despite quite polarising meanings in the 
statements, the divergent moral stances do have adherents on both sides of the 
sceptics/believers divide. 
 
Question 53 contrasts the MP Laissez-faire Statement 20 with the EM Statement 9.  
High MP Empower scorers prefer the MP Laissez-faire option in this dichotomy 
which lends some support to the view that the two different MP positions might 
originate from the same overall Market Pricing Standpoint, but more work would 
be needed to reach a conclusion on that. 
6.6.5.4 The growth dilemma 
Question 52 is particularly interesting, since it goes to the heart of the dilemma 
by forcing respondents to choose between MP17 which says economic growth is 
necessary to address environmental problems and CS41 which says economic 
growth is the problem.  Even though CS scores have the dominant RM influence 
over the choice (making it much more likely that high CS scorers do choose CS41), 
even so 23 (20%) of the 115 respondents with the strongest CS scores preferred 
MP17 in this dichotomy.  People are genuinely uncertain about how to reconcile 
the conflicting objectives. 
6.6.6 Future policy preferences 
Following the first 53 questions, the final two presented a future scenario and 
asked respondents which policies they would prefer in that situation.  Each 
scenario came with a choice of 3 policies from which respondents had to choose 
just one: their choices are shown below: 
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54: Imagine that, in the future, climate change has started to have significant impacts 
across the world, creating a shortage of key materials, energy and foodstuffs.  In this 
situation, which of the following approaches in this country would work best?: 
 
Table 6-8: Policy preferences for shortages in key resources 
55: Imagine that, in the future, climate change has started to have significant impacts 
across the world, forcing many people to migrate from the hardest hit areas to less badly 
affected countries, including Britain.  In this situation, which of the following approaches 
in this country would work best?: 
 
Table 6-9: Policy preferences for climate induced migration to the UK 
These statements go beyond any simple division between ‗sceptics‘ and 
‗believers‘.  In particular, forcing a choice between policies based on egalitarian 
principles and those based on regulation breaks apart the strong correlation 
between the AR and CS positions seen elsewhere in the results.   
 
Logistic regressions for each policy preference (i.e. reducing the response set to 
each policy set against the other 2 options) are summarised in the table on the 
next page.  These emphasise how the CS Standpoint‘s egalitarian principles largely 
drown out the impact of other concerns.  The AR Standpoint‘s preference for 
regulation is statistically significant for Q55 (p<0.05) but not quite for Q54 
(0.05<p<0.1) after controlling for the role of CS. 
 
All the countries that have not been badly affected, including  
ourselves, should receive their fair share of the migrants 159 28% 
We should allow in anyone who can make a living and contribute to  
the economy 198 34% 
We should rely on the government to make the appropriate  
regulations and/or take appropriate security measures to manage  
the situation? 221 38% 
Total 578 
We all agree to rationing of key materials, energy and foodstuffs 300 52% 
We allow market forces to price scarce resources, so that prices can  
rise and people will consume less 133 23% 
We should rely on the government to make the appropriate  
regulations to control the situation 145 25% 
Total 578 
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The EM Standpoint has a significant impact in rejecting immigrants and seeking 
government control.  As would be expected, those who distrust the government 
generally nevertheless look to the government to enforce their own objectives, 
something often seen in the focus groups. 
 
   Logistic regressions: Odds Ratio shows increased likelihood (+) of choosing policy over the other(s) (-)
Survey Question Q54 Q54 Q54 Q55 Q55 Q55
Independent variables
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AR Score + -
CS Score ++ -- -- ++ ++ -- -- ++
EM Score -- ++ ++ --
MP Empower score
MP Laissez faire score
AGW ScepticsBelievers - +
Gender (female=1) ++ -- - +
Age, 6 categories
Income, 5 categories
Big City
Education 5 categories ++ -- -- ++ ++ -- -- ++
Source (Saros=1)
+/- p<0.05 ++/-- p<0.01  
Table 6-10: Odds ratios for policy preferences 
6.6.7 Conclusion 
The 12 dichotomised pairs and the two policy preference questions present a 
mixed picture.  On the one hand, in some circumstances respondents are 
relatively inflexible:  in particular strong believers in AGW are unlikely to prefer 
Statements that compromise that belief.  On the other hand, many of the less 
forceful Statements, or those with more subtle nuances, show a picture in which 
the boundaries between the Standpoints are permeable.  The next section 
explores this further. 
6.7 Discussion 
6.7.1 Points to discuss 
Section 6.1.5 set out three research questions the survey sought to address: 
 
A. Do the survey responses form coherent Standpoints based upon the 
Relational Models? 
B. The Media analysis and the Focus Group interviews both emphasise the role 
of the Equality Matching Standpoint: is this evident in the survey? 
C. Do individuals entertain multiple Relational Models? 
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In addition, the foregoing sections deferred the following issues to cover in this 
discussion: 
 
D. Is there any difference between the ‗Equality Matching‘ and ‗MP Laissez-
faire?‘ Standpoints?   This same problem surfaced in the Focus Groups and 
the Media Analysis.  This necessarily leads on to the question, is there any 
evidence that the ‗MP Laissez-faire‘ and ‗MP Empower‘ positions are 
connected? 
6.7.2 Survey shortcomings 1: question wording 
Throughout the chapter, reference has been made to the nuances respondents 
find in the question wording.  For example, Statement MP39 is fundamentally 
separated from the other MP questions because respondents focus on a visceral 
rejection of being asked to pay higher prices.  Other questions combine two 
distinct ideas: for example AR24 asserts that dealing with climate change is 
something for governments and not for individuals. 
 
A further example of this is the use of pronouns in the questions.  Five out of the 
seven EM Statements use the first person singular: only one of the other RM 
questions does this, most using the first person plural instead.  On the one hand 
the pronouns do capture important elements of the Relational Models themselves: 
on the other, continuations of this research will need to examine whether 
respondents‘ framing of the challenges as pitting self against others is driven more 
by these linguistic details than the arguments themselves. 
 
Whilst these nuances have been used to justify omitting certain questions when 
conducting the analyses, section 6.3.8 argues that the survey would have 
benefited from item analysis and progressive refinement of the question set.  
Nevertheless the multivariate analyses do succeed in getting beyond these 
limitations to enable some definite conclusions to be drawn from the patterning 
observed. 
6.7.3 A: does the survey reveal coherent Standpoints? 
The Confirmatory Factor Analysis (effectively corroborated by the successful 
generation of reliable scale scores for the Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking 
and Equality Matching Relational Models) does justify the conclusion that these 
represent coherent Standpoints.  The regression analyses in 6.6 provide some 
support for the view that CS and AR represent distinct Standpoints by showing that 
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in different contexts there are clear differences between the two.  The cluster 
analysis lends further support to this.  Further section 6.6 shows that, in different 
contexts there are clear differences between the AR and CS Standpoints. 
 
The Market Pricing Standpoint is not coherent, but arguments identified as derived 
from the MP Relational Model nevertheless form two coherent positions: 
respondents may be using the MP Model differently according to whether they 
believe in AGW or not, an interpretation supported by the CFA.  There is 
insufficient evidence to determine this.  The regression analyses provide some 
evidence separating MP Empower from AR and MP Laissez-faire from EM61. 
 
Despite identifying these differences between the RMs, the analyses also show 
that respondents‘ use of the arguments from different Standpoints combine into 
two overarching coherent ‗Approaches‘. 
6.7.4 B: Does the Equality Matching Standpoint have an important role? 
Relational Models Theory argues that the reciprocity principle underlies the 
Commons Dilemma that constitutes the social challenge posed by climate change.  
On this basis the EM Model should be fundamental to the debate.  This proved to 
be the case in the Media Analysis and the Focus Groups. 
 
The cluster analysis establishes the Equality Matching Standpoint as the core of 
the opposition to concern about climate change.  The logistic regressions also 
show the Equality Matching Standpoint as the strongest influence on respondents‘ 
choices, even after controlling for levels of Belief in AGW.  The EM arguments also 
emerge in the Exploratory Factor Analysis in Appendix Q as the key constituents of 
one of the two principal factors. 
 
This does suggest that Cultural Theory‘s exclusion of the ‗Fatalist‘ worldview 
really does not capture the dynamics of the debate.  However, to resolve this 
conclusively requires the relationship between the Equality Matching and MP 
Standpoints to be clarified.  The Cultural Theorist could argue that the ‗Equality 
Matching‘ Standpoint represented in this thesis is just another facet of the 
‗individualist‘ worldview.  This is discussed further below under ‗D‘. 
                                            
61 The low reliability of the MP Empower and MP Laissez-faire scales, both being based on 
few indicator variables, mean these conclusions should be treated as tentative. 
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6.7.5 C: Do individuals entertain multiple Relational Models? 
The broad division between those engaging with climate change as a serious 
problem, and those who do not, has been show to combine two distinct elements.  
Further, individuals on both sides combine arguments from different Standpoints.  
The two distinct underlying factors suggest that individuals‘ views on the 
challenge are inherently relational rather than simply a matter of belief in AGW as 
a phenomenon.  The AR and CS Standpoints tend to stay on one side of the 
debate, and the EM Standpoint on the other.  However, the survey shows that 
respondents can embrace the arguments motivated towards a group goal (the 
Mainstream position) while at the same time resisting the consequent demands 
the group puts upon them as individuals (see section 6.4.1), capturing the heart of 
the Commons Dilemma. 
 
The arguments preferred within different Standpoints vary depending upon how 
the issue, or the context, is defined.  For some respondents, the CS Standpoint 
can be seen to express a radical and distinct line of its own that challenges the 
diagnosis of the problem offered by mainstream views.  The MP Standpoint 
fragments into 2 components on either side of the debate, each of which the 
Cluster Analysis shows combining with the other Standpoints on the same side. 
 
The dichotomies did show the CS and EM Arguments associated with Arguments 
from the opposing Standpoint (Qs 42 and 43) and Q55 saw the EM Standpoint 
advocating the AR policy choice.  More simply, crosstabulations of different pairs 
of EM and CS Statements show plenty of respondents expressing some level of 
agreement with both (just taking the pairs nearest each other in the list: 23% of 
respondents agree with both CS7 and EM9, 11% with EM19 and CS23, 49% with 
EM26 and CS27 etc.).  The point of the RM Standpoints is that they express 
alternative but fundamental principles of right and wrong that individuals are 
happy to use in appropriate contexts.  Respondents readily agree to the 
Arguments of different RMs when they find them appropriate to the context: 
strong CS Respondents therefore can embrace EM Arguments.  The social dilemma 
is that the prevailing culture provides conflicting definitions of the challenge and 
gives conflicting guidance as to which model applies to the challenge. 
 
Chapter 2 claimed that individuals use combinations of Relational Models to 
address social challenges.  At the same time, Cultural Theory argues that the 3 
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engaged worldviews produce fundamentally different approaches.  This survey 
offers some support to both accounts.  Section 6.4.1 argued that the two key 
factors emerging in the EFA resembled two core, and contradictory, responses to 
the challenge of climate change found in the focus groups. 
 
The early version of Cultural Theory proposed a ‗Centre‘ and a ‗Border‘.  The 
interactions between the RMs can be highlighted by considering which of them 
forms the ‗Centre‘ and which the ‗Border‘.  On one interpretation, the AR and MP 
Empower combine to form a Mainstream Approach at the Centre, with the CS 
‗Radical Change‘ and the EM/MP Laissez Faire ‗Reject and Ignore‘ as reactive 
positions outside the mainstream.  An alternative interpretation would have the 
failure of the UNFCCC talks, and the continuation of Business as Usual, as 
evidence that the de facto centre is the Reject and Ignore Approach.  The 
Relational Models in effect create an in-group, and from within that in-group 
participants privilege their perspective as the ‗Centre‘, borrowing whatever 
arguments they need from other positions, and treating opposing positions as 
outsiders on the ‗Border‘. 
6.7.6 Believers and Sceptics 
The EFA demonstrates that a key division in the response set goes beyond simple 
levels of belief in climate change with two distinct factors appearing to underlie 
the division. Section 6.4.1 argued that there is an important relational component 
to the two factors. Nevertheless, factor scores for those factors correlate strongly 
with the ScepticsBelievers scale (the ‗Mainstream factor, 0.650, p<0.01; the 
‗Reject and ignore‘ factor -0.519, p<0.01).  The split into two factors shows that 
the rationalist account (which would state that the Mainstream position and the 
Reject and Ignore position should sit at two ends of one dimension) is inadequate: 
an alternative account is Cultural Theory‘s assertion that ‗worldview‘ will drive 
assessment of risk: believers in the collective believe in the threat of AGW; 
emphasis on the individual discourages belief in AGW.  The survey results are 
compatible with this latter view, but without separately identifying ‗worldviews‘ 
cannot be used to test this assertion. 
6.7.7 Surveying the debate 
Cultural Theory emphasises that each of its four worldviews finds expression in 
‗contradistinction‘ to the others (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 306).  This analysis 
suggests that individuals use Relational Models to respond to the particular 
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context provided by a specific issue by using combinations of some RMs at the 
same time as rejecting others.  The challenge revealed by the survey responses is 
that even the simplest statements already appear to embed a dynamic interplay 
between different positions rather than the assertion of a static view.  The study 
is a study of a ‗debate‘, and many of the Statements are arguing both for a 
position and against another.  The survey is therefore an imperfect tool for 
disentangling the RMs, while proving effective in illustrating both their inter-
relations and their complexity. 
6.7.8 D: Equality Matching, Market Pricing (Empower) and Market Pricing 
(Laissez-faire) 
The cluster analysis below, restricted to the EM and MP Statements62, usefully 
pictures the relationship between these two Standpoints: 
 
Figure 6-2: Cluster analysis of Equality Matching and Market Pricing Statements 
There are four sections: 
 Green:  resistance to price rises sets EM21 and MP39 (reversed here) apart 
                                            
62 This analysis excludes the ‗anomalous‘ EM26.  See 6.3.4. 
256 
 
 Yellow: the heart of the Reject and Ignore approach combines the EM 
Statements that explicitly ‗reject‘ climate change/global warming with the 
three  MP Laissez-faire Statements 
 Red: each of EM38, MP17 and EM33 recognise that society will (as opposed 
to should) take steps to deal with climate change but take a defensive 
stance 
 Blue: each of the three MP Empower Statements argue that society should 
take those steps and take a progressive stance. 
 
The survey is neither fine-grained nor subtle enough to resolve the relationship 
between the two. The EM and MP Standpoints appear to be two faces of the same 
individualist coin:  which face the person shows is context dependent.  If resisting 
the direction society is moving in, the individual response takes a fatalist, 
defensive, EM stance: moving with society, the individual response takes a 
progressive stance.  Chapter 7 discusses why these divergent positions generate 
different moral principles. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The survey unpacks the division between those engaging with the challenge of 
climate change and those who do not, by showing that this division combines two 
separate elements.  These elements combine both rational judgments as to the 
reality of the phenomenon of climate change as well as relational arguments 
regarding the balance between collective goals and the demands such goals place 
upon the individual. 
 
The results can also be interpreted in a manner which provides some support for 
an account based on the Relational Models and the view that the survey responses 
do form coherent Standpoints based upon the Relational Models (question A, 
6.1.5).   Further, the Equality Matching Standpoint, as in the other two studies, 
appears to have a major role in individual reasoning about climate change 
(question B).  Lastly, there is some limited evidence that individuals do support 
multiple RMs (question C), although this is overshadowed by the difficulty 
respondents have in reconciling their individual needs with their acceptance of 
the logic of a collective goal, like the focus group participants. 
 
The survey results also reveal significant problems in disentangling the Equality 
Matching and Market Pricing Standpoints.  This was also true in the first two 
studies, and is addressed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion       
Chapter Outline 
The chapter has eight sections: 
1. Reintroduces the climate change debate and the theoretical framework 
adopted to analyse it. 
2. Reprises the results of the three studies looking at how successful the 
framework (based on Relational Models Theory) is in providing an account 
of the climate change debate. 
3. Compares this account with that of Cultural Theory. 
4. Considers issues arising in the structure of the four Standpoints. 
5. Looks at implications for our understanding of sustainability and the 
‗I=PAT‘ equation for determining environmental impact. 
6. Revisits the approach of utilitarianism and attitude theory. 
7. Addresses some of the difficulties associated with determinism and 
pessimism. 
8. Conclusions. 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 The debate over climate change 
―Human pressure on the Earth‘s ecosystems and climate, unless mitigated 
substantially, will cause dangerous climate change, massive species extinctions, 
and the destruction of vital life-support functions‘ (Sachs, 2008, p. 6). 
Every December, the members of the United Nations meet at a ‗Conference of the 
Parties‘ under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  The 
premise is that Sachs‘ assessment of the future is correct.  Many disagree.  
Counter-arguments are usually empirical: humanity has prospered.  There are 
more of us, we are more affluent and more technologically advanced, and, looking 
across recent millennia, progression on all of these dimensions has accelerated.  
We should expect this to continue63.  Further, there have always been doomsday 
fears.  Judging from their past accuracy, we should ignore them: 
                                            
63 One slight caveat to this statement is the expectation that population growth will 
eventually level out (United Nations Development Programme & Leiserowitz, 2007). 
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―In 1975, Nigel Calder, a former editor of the New Scientist, wrote that ‗the 
threat of a new ice age must now stand alongside nuclear war as a likely source of 
wholesale death and misery for mankind‘‖(Booker & North, 2007, p. 333)64.     
However, the depth and breadth of the IPCC‘s scientific evidence predicting 
dangerous climate change is now impressive.   On the assumption that fears over 
climate change are real, then not enough is being done to prevent it.  ―Why has so 
little been achieved?‖(Helm, 2008).  Szerszynski & Urry‘s complaint (2010) that 
the social sciences have not contributed to understanding the debate demands 
that we do more to answer Helm‘s question.  This thesis aims to provide one 
answer, and at the same time to contribute to the social psychological 
understanding of human values. 
7.1.2 The theoretical framework 
Much of the current social psychological literature examines individual 
engagement with the challenge of climate change, and the psychological and 
social barriers to that engagement (section 1.7).  One way of framing this enquiry 
is to focus on how prevailing values may constitute such barriers.  Mary Douglas 
initiated Cultural Theory‘s influential explanation of human values, including how 
societies select risks, proposing that societies were guided by four possible 
worldviews.  Michael Thompson and Steve Rayner have been at the forefront in 
applying this approach to the risk of climate change.  The many criticisms of CT 
include its simplistic stereotyping of individual worldviews and the apparent 
determinism of an account which suggests a society‘s members cannot avoid the 
value judgements and risk assessments derived from the prevailing worldview.   A 
specific weakness identified here is Thompson and Rayner‘s deliberate omission of 
one of the four worldviews, the ‗fatalist‘, from their analysis of the climate 
change debate.  The nature of CT‘s framework makes this implausible. 
                                            
64 Booker and North have a point when comparing the newpaper coverage of the fears of a 
new ice age that were prevalent in the early 1970‘s, with the present media coverage of 
global warming.  However, two of the most influential voices in today‘s debate (James 
Lovelock and Stephen Schneider) were even then clearly spelling out the opposing 
anthropogenic impacts from fossil fuels on the atmosphere, the cooling effect of aerosols 
and the warming effect of carbon dioxide (Fellgett & Lovelock, 1971; Rasool & Schneider, 
1971).  Intriguingly, at that time Stephen Schneider was one of the main prophets of the 
imminent ice age, suggesting global cooling of 3.5° over 50 years, based on the conclusion 
that the exponential impact of aerosols would outweigh the greenhouse effect.   Booker 
and North‘s dismiss climate science as pointless because of these flipflops;  Lovelock (and 
Fellgett) are convinced that we must take the precautionary approach to these risks, 
whether warming or cooling.  These responses to the always incomplete scientific data 
seem to be matters of creed more than rational judgement. 
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Alan Fiske‘s Relational Models Theory has similar anthropological origins to CT.  
RMT is an account of individual social cognition based on four categories of social 
exchange.  This offers the possibility of a better account of individual engagement 
with ‗worldviews‘, because Fiske is able to trace close links between the four 
Relational Models and human values.  Starting at the individual level presents a 
more dynamic picture than starting at the societal level.  The logic of the four 
different categories of exchange also provides a solution to CT‘s exclusion of 
fatalist worldviews from the analysis of the climate change debate.  One of Fiske‘s 
Relational Models, Equality Matching, has close parallels to the fatalist world 
view.  Its logic is the same as that of the Commons Dilemma, and it can 
successfully fill an important gap in CT‘s analysis. 
7.1.3 The research questions addressed in this thesis 
Each of RMT and CT use their schemas to generate matrices of moral arguments in 
different social domains.  This thesis synthesises these into a single matrix of 
arguments over climate change (Appendix E).  Three studies are used to address 
the following research questions: 
1. Does this matrix provide a plausible account of the climate change debate? 
2. Does an account that integrates the Equality Matching Model have 
advantages over the account provided by Thompson and Rayner? 
3. Does this account offer insight into Helm‘s question ‗Why has so little been 
achieved?‘? 
7.2 The three studies 
7.2.1 Media content analysis: 
7.2.1.1 Media content analysis: procedure 
180 UK national newspaper articles were randomly selected from the Nexis 
database.  These were analysed using a general coding frame and a Relational 
Model coding matrix.  As described in detail in Chapter 3, the coding matrix was 
distilled from the theoretical literature and the pilot analysis work.  As an 
interpretative exercise it follows the lead of Thompson & Rayner (1998)‘s use of 
Cultural Theory: what is different is the formal application of a defined coding 
frame to a random sample. 
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7.2.1.2 Media content analysis: outcome 
The analysis was necessarily interpretative and therefore not easily susceptible in 
any strict sense to reliability tests.  However, the sample was coded twice, 
separately, for Relational Model content with the differences requiring 
reconciliation.  Material not accounted for within the Relational Model matrix was 
reviewed to determine whether the matrix was failing to account for significant 
moral or value-based arguments within the climate change debate. 
Chapter 4 used the matrix to generate a ‗thickly descriptive‘ interpretation of the 
sample material: this justified the view that the Relational Models are indeed 
manifested in the climate change debate and that the Standpoints categorise the 
arguments effectively.  Furthermore, all of the 46 arguments identified in the 
Relational Model matrix were well represented in the sample Appendix H. 
7.2.1.3 Sceptical voices infrequent in the media content 
There is an extensive literature documenting the role of vested interests in 
fostering ‗sceptical‘ opinion in the media, particularly in the US (Oreskes & 
Conway, 2008) and opinion polls (Ipsos-Mori, 2008; Leiserowitz, et al., 2011) 
suggest many of the public remain unconvinced by the ‗consensus‘ science.  
Contrary to the view that the media have fostered confusion in the name of 
‗balance‘, the random sample reflected an overwhelming endorsement of the 
consensus position on the science 4.4.5; the debate rages over what to do about 
it. 
7.2.1.4 Authority Ranking the dominant Model in the media content 
The prevalence of the AR Standpoint in the sample stems from two main reasons.  
First, the national media devote much space to the words and deeds of political 
leaders at home and abroad.  With political leaders keen to offer reassurance 
alongside solutions, and keen to sustain the systems that have placed them in 
power, it is unsurprising that the Authority Ranking Standpoint‘s preference for 
‗Business as Usual‘ appears frequently in the sample.  Second, qualified expertise 
acts a gatekeeper for the voices admitted in to the media.  Section 4.9.6 notes 
the weight accorded to established expertise: professors with narrow specialisms 
are nevertheless encouraged to opine on the broad social issues of the climate 
change challenge.  The conservatism of this reliance on expertise proven through 
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lengthy steps of qualification and on scientific procedure honed over many 
generations is a hallmark of the Authority Ranking Standpoint. 
As the Focus Groups also show, once the problem of global warming is 
acknowledged and accepted, it is hard to avoid solving the Commons Dilemma 
except by recourse to centralised authority.  The media accepts the consensus, 
and accepts that government should be doing something about global warming.  
That still leaves plenty of scope for argument over what the government should be 
doing, and whether or not the ‗Central Authority‘ should be international.  
7.2.1.5 Role of Equality Matching, and why so little has been achieved. 
As anticipated in Chapter 2, the Equality Matching Standpoint offers a powerful 
explanation of why ‗so little has been achieved‘.  In a Commons Dilemma it makes 
no rational sense to disadvantage yourself individually when achieving no benefit 
to either yourself or the common good.  Not only do individuals manifest this RM 
in their justifications for not doing anything, but political leaders also resist 
unilateral national emissions cuts for the same reason.  The sample provides good 
examples of both. 
7.2.1.6 Interaction between Relational Models 
Chapter 1 discussed the different diagnoses available to explain the challenge of 
global warming.  The most common diagnoses are captured by the equation ‗I = 
PAT‟.  Competing Standpoints argue over whether to reduce ‗I‘ (environmental 
impact) by reducing population (P) or affluence (A), or by improving technological 
efficiency (T).  A focus on affluence and excess consumption manifests the 
Communal Sharing Standpoint‘s concern over human and natural limits:  a focus 
on technological innovation manifests the Market Pricing Standpoint‘s confidence 
in human possibilities and the opportunities offered by the natural world. 
Both the CS and MP Standpoints require the ‗Central Authority‘ to intervene to 
endorse and enforce their diagnosis and prescription, and the media 
representation of the debate carries many examples of the two vying for that 
endorsement in the sample.  Currently the Authority Ranking Standpoint has 
largely abandoned its tendency to diagnose overpopulation as the problem 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, see also 4.9.3): preserving the ‗Business As Usual‘ of a 
market society the AR Standpoint emphasises efficiency and the elimination of 
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waste even ahead of innovation as the first steps towards a solution, endorsing a 
rather unambitious vision of technological change. 
7.2.2 Focus Group Analysis 
7.2.2.1 Focus Group Content Analysis: Procedure 
Six focus group meetings were held in November/December 2009, around the time 
of the UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen: these had between four and seven 
participants and lasted between 73 and 92 minutes.  Transcriptions of the group 
discussions were coded using the same coding frame as the media content. 
7.2.2.2 Focus Group Content Analysis: Outcome 
The Relational Model coding matrix provided a rich and comprehensive account of 
the moral and value based content of the group discussions.  As with the media 
sample, the coding exercise was necessarily interpretative and not easily 
susceptible in any strict sense to reliability tests.  An alternative method of coding 
the content was used to confirm that ‗value based‘ content addressing the issue of 
climate change was indeed covered by the Relational Model scheme and this was 
shown to be the case in all six groups. 
7.2.2.3  „Simplicity‟ of the dilemma recognised 
Although many participants bewail the confusing messages they receive, and the 
uncertainty over what they can do, the simplicity of the core structure of the 
problem is evident.  Participants recognise the challenge of consumption styles in 
the Western world, rising affluence in the developing world and likely natural 
limits.  They can anticipate, from a standing start, the necessary framework for a 
‗global deal‘ (5.2.3):  they can anticipate that 194 parties are unlikely to agree 
and that the eventual solution will require the major emitters to get together 
separately (5.4.5) as indeed took place in the creation of the Copenhagen Accord 
(Environmental News Bulletin, 2009). 
Some participants are more sceptical, but Nigel in LG1 does appear to speak for 
the others in saying that ‗deep down most of us know‘ there is a problem (5.2.6).  
Participants‘ scepticism more readily finds expression in frustration at the 
confusing messages over what should be done, and in splenetic, generalised 
distrust of the politicians as the messengers. 
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7.2.2.4 Dominance of the Equality Matching Standpoint 
Participants are smart enough to understand the issues from the Standpoint of the 
detached observer, or as one participant expressed it, from the Standpoint of 
‗little green men looking‘ down on our planet (5.2.2).  However, down on earth, 
as citizens of the global ‗Commons‘, the simplicity turns into complexity and their 
sense of powerlessness dominates: the science is confusing and the links between 
their own behaviour and climate change, or the then topical floods in Cumbria, 
too disconnected.  The EM Standpoint is already convinced that life is tough: 
unreciprocated additional constraints in the form of taxes or higher energy costs 
would make it tougher still and are resisted strongly.  These barriers to 
engagement are similar to those found in other studies (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007). 
Section 5.6.2 discusses the extent to which the strength of the EM Standpoint in 
the focus groups is a function of the focus group format.  Discussions take place 
isolated from any consequences, and this may encourage participants‘ detachment 
from the issue and tendency to look to others for solutions (see Bickerstaff, et al., 
2008). 
7.2.2.5 Interaction between Relational Models 
The dominant Relational Model dynamics are different from the media sample.  In 
the focus groups the Communal Sharing Standpoint‘s concern for future 
generations (in particular our own descendants), and for the planet in general, 
energises the discussion, as does the opposing Equality Matching‘s self-
defensiveness.  Authority Ranking is frequently introduced in order to reject it, 
the lack of trust in politicians constantly surfacing in the four non-student groups. 
However, as the discussion progresses the groups typically reconcile the CS and EM 
positions by looking to the government to do something (5.2.3), and they engage 
with many of the arguments of the Authority Ranking Standpoint.  Empirically, the 
groups can see that social change does happen (5.4.3, 5.6.5) and typically this is 
associated with government campaigns, e.g. over littering or cigarettes in LG1.  
The irony of this being the government they so distrust is also recognised (5.2.7).  
Frequently the belief that it will need government action is expressed from an EM 
Standpoint:  responsibility for dealing with the problem is someone else‘s.  Miles 
captures this in arguing that if climate change really was a problem ‗there would 
be‘ laws to do something about it (MG1).  Solomon echoes one of the letters in the 
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media sample (#138, 4.8.7) in arguing ‗Scientists should be out there‘ doing 
something about it (5.5.2), as if the IPCC did not exist. 
The logic of the EM Standpoint requires that there has to be something in it for 
you, some reciprocation, in order to act.  A feature of the discussion is how 
personal experience can generate the relevance of climate change as an issue: 
direct experience by oneself or one‘s family of extreme weather-related events, 
such as the bushfires in Australia (5.6.3), strengthens CS concern – potentially to a 
sufficient degree to make it worthwhile acting.  The theoretical benefit to the 
common good of one‘s own reduced consumption is enough of a payback, albeit 
not directly reciprocal, to motivate action. 
However, although many participants are concerned, few are willing to take 
significant action in the sense of radically reducing their environmental footprint.  
Ryan Air boss O‘Leary‘s caustic comment that most footprint reduction ―just 
panders to your middle-class, middle-aged angst and guilt‖ (#121) seems entirely 
justified when listening to participants justifying their continued willingness, or 
need, to fly.  Only rarely do participants unashamedly assert that they fly because 
they can, and it‘s cheap so they will, the empowered expression of the Market 
Pricing Standpoint. 
7.2.2.6 A smack in the face 
The groups acknowledge where their own approaches to climate change lead.  The 
problem is not personally relevant to them: there is nothing in it for them to 
change unilaterally their style of living.  A few, typically women, follow the CS 
logic of simply wanting to do the right thing, to have a clear conscience.  But 
generally, until the context changes, they will not or cannot change.  Bill in MG2 
suggests we need a smack in the face to get us to pay attention.  For the groups, 
in the UK, this means more floods: in the media sample it extends across the 
range of biblical plagues and natural disasters (4.8.4).  The logic of the Equality 
Matching Standpoint drives people‘s willingness, or unwillingness, to act.  The 
Standpoint seems determined to fulfil its own pessimistic outlook. 
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7.2.3 Survey Data 
7.2.3.1 Surveys: procedure 
Three internet surveys were run.  The first was a pilot survey recruiting by 
snowball with 101 respondents.  The second two recruited a total of 578 
respondents through two different agencies, a market research agency and a 
shopping aggregator.  The main analysis was confined to the second two surveys.  
The question set comprised: 
 41 statements about climate change, measuring level of agreement on a 7-
point Likert Scale 
 15 questions requiring respondents to choose which statement or policy 
they preferred out of either 2 or 3 alternatives 
 5 demographic questions. 
The diversity within the demographics does suggest that this method of 
recruitment was significantly better than, say, a sample drawn from university 
students.  However, there are potential biases in the sample selection that might 
well correlate with respondents‘ general outlook and hence their views on climate 
change.  Indeed, there were small but statistically significant differences between 
the response sets drawn from the two agencies.  The sample cannot be treated as 
properly representative of the UK population as a whole. 
7.2.3.2  Survey: research questions 
The analysis of the survey data was designed to address the following questions: 
A. Do the survey responses form coherent Standpoints based upon the 
Relational Models? 
B. The Media analysis and the Focus Group interviews both emphasise the role 
of the Equality Matching Standpoint: is this evident in the survey? 
C. Do individuals entertain multiple Relational Models? 
7.2.3.3 A: Coherent Standpoints? 
The clearest segmentation in the response set was between those who considered 
climate change to be a real threat requiring action, and those who did not (6.5).  
However, exploratory factor analysis showed that this division included two 
distinct factors.  The first represents what could be termed a ‗Mainstream‘ view 
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of climate change and the potential solutions to it (that it is/isn‘t a real threat, 
and it is/isn‘t something that society will have to prioritise).  The second 
represents a response that we should/shouldn‘t ‗Reject and ignore the issue‘. 
This division overshadows the coherence revealed for the Relational Models 
Standpoints.  The CS and AR Standpoints appear to line up with the first factor, or 
the ‗mainstream‘ view.  The EM Standpoint appears to be central to the second 
factor.  The MP Standpoint presents a more complex picture as discussed below.  
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis does provide tentative support for the view that 
the framework based upon the Relational Models does account for some of the 
variation in the responses and can be used to describe the patterning of the 
response set. 
7.2.3.4 A: the MP Standpoint 
The survey responses gave good support (6.5) for the hypothesis that the 
Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking and Equality Matching Models would form 
coherent Standpoints within people‘s views about the issue.  This was not the case 
for the Market Pricing Model (6.3.7): respondents split the arguments expressing 
the Market Pricing Model into two divergent Standpoints, one emphasising the 
need to empower individuals to find solutions to climate change (‗MP Empower‘), 
the other assuming that climate change was not a problem and that individuals 
should be allowed to get on with their lives (MP Laissez-faire).  However, the MP  
Model itself provides a persuasive explanation of this.  The Market Pricing Model 
emphasises human ingenuity and the need to adapt to changing circumstances or 
different contexts.  The logic of the RM will produce profoundly different 
responses according to whether an individual thinks that climate change is a 
serious problem, i.e. that the weight of evidence is sufficiently persuasive to 
assume that the circumstances have changed and that we need to do something 
about it.   Respondents‘ adherence to either the MP Empower or MP Laissez-faire 
variations of the MP Model was closely associated with levels of belief in AGW as a 
serious/not serious issue. 
7.2.3.5 B: The EM Standpoint 
The survey provided considerable support for the view that the Equality Matching 
RM is central to people‘s reasoning about climate change.  It emerged at the heart 
of one of the two key factors in the Exploratory Factor Analysis, forming a distinct 
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position of its own rather than simply a negative rejection of the ‗mainstream‘ 
view. 
7.2.3.6 C: Do individuals use multiple RMs? 
The survey provided some limited support for the hypothesis that individuals 
would make use of multiple RMs in their views of climate change (6.6).  Further, 
the two main factors behind the principal division in the response demonstrate 
that respondents can and often do hold conflicting positions.  They can embrace 
the arguments motivated towards a group goal (the mainstream position) while at 
the same time resisting the consequent demands the group puts upon them as 
individuals (see section 6.4.1). 
7.2.3.7 Interactions between Relational Models 
The two main positions in the debate seem to represent a combination of 
arguments from different Relational Models.  Consistent with the findings of the 
other two studies, a ‗centre‘ or mainstream core combines AR arguments and 
those of ‗MP Empower‘:  for individuals, concern is motivated by Communal 
Sharing arguments, and many agree with Statements arguing for radical change.  
Although on the same side of the main divide, these Communal Sharing arguments 
for change represent a separate Standpoint from the Business as Usual preferred 
by the mainstream core. 
On the other side of the divide, the Equality Matching arguments are closely 
associated with those of the ‗MP Laissez-faire‘ Standpoint.  However, the question 
set also included a disparate group of Statements that loosely express a 
generalised pessimism.  The Communal Sharing argument (Statement 3) ‗There are 
limits: we cannot go on improving everyone's lifestyle for ever‘ and the Authority 
Ranking argument (10) ‗By some means the world‘s population growth must be 
reduced‘ both imply that climate change is a symptom, not the problem itself.  
The cluster analyses place the responses to these statements closer to the EM 
position than the other AR, CS and ‗MP Empower‘ statements.  As with MP, these 
two RMs appear to have different responses according to how the context to which 
they are responding is defined. 
Fiske‘s theory (1992, 2004b) suggests that culture will prescribe which RM is 
appropriate in a given context.  We should expect, therefore, that for a contested 
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context like climate change individuals will be uncertain which to use: 
furthermore, the definition of the context – and therefore the determination of 
the right RM to use – remains unclear for many.  Is climate change a real challenge 
or not? 
7.2.3.8 Survey limitations 
A persistent problem is now emerging.  Based on Cultural Theory, and many other 
frameworks offered in the sociology of knowledge, we should expect the 
Relational Models, and the ideological Standpoints associated with them, to 
influence strongly whether respondents believe AGW to be a threat: the RMs 
should help to ‗define the context‘ to which the views being surveyed are 
addressed.  Yet at the same time, how the context is defined plays a part in 
determining which Relational Model might be the appropriate basis for addressing 
the issue.  The survey used is too simplistic an instrument to unpick this circular 
interaction. 
 
Sections 6.3.8 and 6.7.2 discuss some of the shortcomings in the survey.  Some of 
the individual Statements were imperfect indicators for the arguments they were 
supposed to capture, and the question set would have benefited from refinement. 
 
Although the analysis shows that the division of the response set reflects more 
than simply levels of belief in AGW as real issue, nevertheless high levels of belief 
correlate strongly with commitment to the mainstream view, while low levels of 
belief correlate strongly with adherence to the ‗reject and ignore‘ position 
(consistent with Cultural Theory‘s argument that ideology and risk assessment are 
linked). Although many respondents tended to agree or disagree only weakly with 
the different statements, this gives an impression of rational choice, and a degree 
of certainty, to people‘s views.  The survey design did not get behind this to 
unpack the uncertainty people feel (Whitmarsh, 2011) as much as could be 
wished. 
7.2.4 Acknowledging some problems in the three studies 
The summaries above recognise a number of limitations in the methods and 
implementation of the three studies.  To put these into context, the research 
questions set out in 2.5.4 were open ended, or exploratory, in nature.  On the one 
hand, the qualitative analyses could only yield the kind of thick description that is 
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essentially justified by the quality of insight offered in the account given of the 
debate.  On the other, some of the current difficulties in the schemas 
hypothesised by each of RMT and CT, and discussed further below in 7.4, suggest 
that the four Relational Models, or worldviews, will be hard to disentangle from 
each other.  At some level they may exist independently, but when instantiated in 
debate over a real social issue their interactions are multi-layered.  Kahan‘s 
studies successfully demonstrate the relationship between particular worldviews 
and specific risk perceptions: and the survey in this thesis also gives some support 
to the idea that individuals have coherent Standpoints that are identifiable with 
the Relational Models when it comes to arguing about the risk of climate change.  
But this is not the same as testing a falsifiable hypothesis that four Relational 
Models account comprehensively for the debate or indeed that the RMs precisely 
define the only four Standpoints in the debate. 
 
Fiske‘s elucidation of RMT has primarily been at the level of individual cognition, 
and much of the literature provides examples of how culture specifies which 
Relational Model is appropriate to which context.  This tends to emphasise how 
effective the RMs are at orientating an individual‘s social relationships.  At the 
societal level, which RM to use in respect of an issue like climate change is 
ambiguous and contested.  Synthesising the Standpoints from CT and RMT has 
improved CT‘s account of the social level debate, but it is still subject to the 
same problems in that categorising the debate into just four positions still feels 
somewhat arbitrary.  On the one hand, the studies suggest that, as a debate, the 
different arguments condense in to just two main approaches; on the other, just 
four positions oversimplifies the ‗infinite variety out there‘ (2.4.1). 
7.2.5 Consequences of the time sequence of the studies. 
The three studies covered, or took place at, different times within the debate.  
Thus, the media analysis drew from articles up until August 2009: subsequent to 
that date the ‗climategate‘ leaked email scandal cast doubt on the science of 
climate change ((Nature Editorial, 2009b) and the failed Copenhagen summit 
disenchanted the public (see 4.3.3).  The focus groups took place either in the 
immediate run up to or during the early stages of the Copenhagen summit, while 
the survey was fielded in October 2010. 
 
Generally, surveys show that the events at the end of 2009 were followed by a 
decline in concern about climate change (Poortinga, et al., 2011; Taylor, 2012).  
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More recent surveys suggest this decline has halted: the most recent 6 Americas 
survey shows a slight rebound in some measures, but not in others (Leiserowitz et 
al., 2012). 
 
Sceptical views were notably absent in the media sample (4.4.5); were present, 
but usually faded behind a consensus position on climate change over the course 
of the focus groups (5.2.6); but were more obvious in the raw opinions of the 
survey (24% disagreed with the statement ―It is now an established scientific fact 
that climate change is largely man-made‖).  It was particularly noticeable that the 
focus groups made no specific reference to the ‗climategate‘ emails even as 
participants stated that they found all the divergent opinions confusing: 
uncertainty and confusion felt as if they were an in-built, longstanding quality of 
the debate, not something that had been stoked up recently.  Other studies show 
the persistent influence of uncertainty in recent years (Lorenzoni, et al., 2007; 
Whitmarsh, 2011).  
 
It is not really possible to judge how  background policy-making events impacted 
the three studies.  The media articles necessarily often reported such events.  
That the focus groups took place at the time of the Copenhagen summit could 
conceivably have influenced participant views in a number of directions.  
Certainly it would have made the topic salient, but Copenhagen itself was usually 
introduced into the discussion by the facilitator.  Generally speaking, participant 
response to policy making is subsumed by their lack of confidence in politicians, a 
feature highlighted in sections 5.4, 5.5.2 and 5.6.9. The general social 
background, such as the context of economic crisis, would be expected to impact 
the perceived importance of climate change (see 1.7.2.2 and Downs, 1972).  This 
may be reflected in the news intensity trends in the media analysis (4.3) but is not 
clearly detectable in the focus groups or survey both of which took place after the 
onset of the credit crunch and ensuing financial crisis. 
 
Putting the 3 studies in sequence leaves an impression that scepticism has risen 
over time across the period during which the studies took place.  Yet, as Poortinga 
and others (2011) note, the overall level of scepticism in the UK is modest even 
after the shift in recent years, and the survey results in this thesis accord with 
this.  The possibility that these contextual changes over time have influenced the 
results cannot be discounted.  However, it seems likely that variance in levels of 
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scepticism between the 3 studies is more a reflection of methodological influences 
– essentially what is likely to be identified and measured by each study:  
 The media opinions seem to have been filtered by the consensus view, 
 The focus groups suggested uncertainty and resignation rather than 
scepticism, and sceptical views were moderated by the focus group 
passage towards a consensus, 
 The survey gave voice to a sceptical minority, whose online views were 
unimpeded by the social context. 
7.2.6 Role of different methods in the studies generating differing accounts of 
the debate 
The foregoing sections discuss a number of aspects in which the specific method 
of each study may influence the way the study accounts for the debate, both in 
general terms (e.g. regarding scepticism above) or in terms of the emergence of 
the Relational Models. 
 
In particular, the subject matter of the media articles and their focus both on 
political activity and on reporting expert views seems to encourage the dominance 
of the Authority Ranking Standpoint in that study (7.2.1.4).  Further, in the focus 
groups the format itself may have played a part in the strength of the Equality 
Matching Standpoint in that study (7.2.2.4).  Lastly, section 7.2.3 discusses some 
of the limitations of the survey and the impact of the survey design on the results 
and the difficulty experienced in trying to disentangle the different Relational 
Models. 
7.3 Comparison with Cultural Theory 
7.3.1 Background 
Cultural Theory argues that risks are not objective threat assessments but that 
organisations and societies choose the risks they are concerned about, and the 
risks chosen reflect the nature of the organisation or society.  Organisations and 
societies have a view of how the world ought to be, and risks are only those 
potential events that threaten this ‗worldview‘.  The theory goes further, 
suggesting that there are only four possible worldviews for societies (or 
organisations) to hold.  In its purest form the theory only makes claims about 
social phenomena, but Cultural Theorists frequently illustrate their arguments 
with descriptions of individuals stereotypical of one of these four possible 
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worldviews.  The theory has been influential: in part this influence derives from 
the simple plausibility of the stereotypical individuals.  But the theory can give no 
account for how individuals gain or use the worldviews generated by social 
structures, and this weakness has been criticised very frequently (2.2.4). 
Relational Models Theory sidesteps this problem by proposing an account of 
individual cognition which is mirrored in societal level structures.  Relational 
Models are models of social exchange, and so they are dynamic and lived or 
enacted on a daily basis.  This contrasts with Cultural Theory‘s inevitable 
emphasis on stability, on explaining how societies defend and maintain a 
seemingly rigid worldview, try as cultural theorists may to stress that tension 
between the opposing worldviews is necessarily unstable and over time, 
impermanent. 
Both RMT and CT proposed matrices of arguments associated with each of their 
four worldviews or RMs.  This thesis has synthesised sets of arguments from each 
of these into a matrix comprising arguments from four Standpoints on climate 
change (Section 3.4). 
7.3.2 The Equality Matching Standpoint 
RMT‘s Equality Matching Model naturally aligns with CT‘s ‗fatalist‘ worldview.  
However, Cultural Theory explicitly excludes this worldview from playing an 
active role in shaping societal responses to contested issues (Thompson, et al., 
1990, referred to as 'TEW' for convenience in this thesis; Thompson & Rayner, 
1998).  In CT‘s grid-group schema, fatalists passively accept the box into which 
the socially rigid grid places them. 
As a model of exchange EM is an active stance.   Daily life sees a constant flow of 
tit-for-tat reciprocation, of both favours and slights.  Furthermore, the logic of 
the EM Standpoint justifies saying ‗No‘ when an offered exchange does not 
achieve an adequate reciprocation.  Cultural Theorists are right to say that this 
negativity cannot sustain an organisation of any size or longevity (TEW), but this 
misses the formidable role that the EM position plays in blocking the social 
responses proposed by each of the other three positions.  The survey results 
particularly highlighted Ems importance to arguments for rejecting and ignoring 
AGW as a problem.  As of 2012, the EM position that requires reciprocation for 
steps taken to combat climate change is the strongest determinant of policy.  
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Unsurprisingly the media sample has several examples of this EM logic blocking 
action, at the level of nation states (e.g. #16), at the corporate level (#67) and at 
the individual level (#136).  The CT account of the debate is incomplete without 
the EM Model. 
TEW characterise the fatalists as an unattached pool from which the other three 
active worldviews can recruit (2.3.6).  The focus groups particularly bear this out.  
Participants, following the EM Model, are not ready to see anything done about 
climate change when it feels unfair, when there is nothing in it for them to submit 
to restrictions or extra costs.  Yet once they are genuinely concerned about a 
threat which might affect them, which has personal relevance, the logic of 
reciprocation justifies shifting to an Authority Ranking Standpoint.  Participants 
look to the government for protection against the now real threat, accepting 
legislation in return. 
While wrong to marginalise ‗fatalism‘ in their account, Cultural Theorists are right 
in arguing that fatalism, or Equality Matching, cannot be the basis for organising a 
long term, sustainable, society.   The EM Model demands transparency in 
exchanges, avoiding reliance on trust or the co-operation born of mutual interest.  
Edward Banfield (1958) describes how the villagers of Montegrano in Southern Italy 
live impoverished lives dominated by a complete lack of trust so that almost any 
offered exchange is viewed with suspicion.  His introduction stresses that the co-
operation and institution building which lay the foundations of modern society, 
and which we take for granted, are in fact relatively novel and unusual65.  A 
serious account of the climate change debate has to integrate the reasons why 
humanity may fail to resolve the Commons Dilemma, namely the EM logic which 
blocks co-operative policies dependent upon trust and shared identity.  Banfield‘s 
title, ‗The Moral Basis of a Backward Society‘, should serve as a warning.  Today‘s 
tit-for-tat intransigence is not the basis for a long term, sustainable society. 
7.3.3 The relationship between Man and Nature 
An important element of the Standpoint matrix put forward by this thesis is the 
arguments over the relationship between Man and Nature.  In its very earliest 
                                            
65 Montegrano is a fictitious name for a real community.  Its peasants do not actually 
subsist in an institutional vacuum.  They are subject to governmental interventions from 
the provincial capital, but this is a government they play no part in, something that is just 
an external feature of the harsh environment they live in.  Verweij (2007) drew attention 
to the insight Banfield‘s study offers to both CT and RMT. 
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form, Cultural Theory linked low-group worldviews (equivalent to the Market 
Pricing and Equality Matching RMs) with views that identified nature as separate 
from Man, and high-group worldviews (equivalent to Communal Sharing or 
Authority Ranking) with views treating Man as integrated with Nature (Ostrander, 
1982).  RMT extends this idea by treating Man‘s relationship with nature as similar 
to Man‘s relationship with other people.  The MP and EM Standpoints treat Nature 
as ‗other‘.  MP encourages investment in nature in return for which there will be 
increased opportunity, a to and fro of adapting nature and adapting to nature.  
The EM Standpoint is best characterised by pre-enlightenment attitudes to nature, 
where the difficulty of trading reciprocally with an unpredictable nature 
encouraged superstition (biblical plagues as the wages of sin, #99) or terrified awe 
(#111)(Fagan, 2008).  The other Standpoints treat nature as part of the 
community, to be nurtured (CS) or stewarded (AR). 
The focus groups show that it is only when the Equality Matching Standpoint is 
faced with the terrifying awe of nature, or perhaps the extreme weather events 
anticipated as the reciprocal consequences of human CO2 emissions, that people 
will revert to the Authority Ranking Standpoint and demand government action.  
This prospect eerily echoes the Alpine villagers begging their feudal lords to save 
them from the advancing glaciers in the little ice age (#111). 
7.3.4 Cultural Theory and Relational Model theory combined 
Synthesising CT and RMT provides a stronger account of the climate change debate 
than CT on its own.  Yet both theories fail to provide convincing explanations of 
the structure linking the four types in their typologies.  The next section examines 
what we might learn from this. 
7.4 The Structure of the Standpoints 
7.4.1 RMT and CT structures compared 
Both RMT and CT propose taxonomies of four ‗types‘.  CT treats these as a 2x2 
matrix and RMT treats them as four discrete models, but with the suggestion that 
the simpler RMs are nested within the increasingly complex RMs (Fiske, 2004b, p. 
8).  Both theories have a floating detached or ‗asocial‘ position that is not 
satisfactorily integrated into a comprehensive framework. 
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Both theories also treat one of their four types as different in quality from the 
others.  For CT, the fatalist worldview is considered passive in contrast to the 
active engagement of the other three.  For RMT, Market Pricing is considered to 
be emergent in developed societies and often virtually absent in less economically 
developed societies.  Once Fiske had named this Model ‗Market Pricing‘ this 
conclusion became almost inevitable. 
The fatalist worldview (≈EM) and MP Standpoint (≈ Individualist worldview) are 
both on the ‗low-Group‘ side of CT‘s 2x2 schema: by contrast to these two, the 
‗high-Group‘ Communal Sharing (≈Egalitarian Worldview) and Authority Ranking 
Standpoints (≈Hierarchist) are unproblematic, easily defined and demonstrably 
present in many social domains. 
7.4.2 The Individual and the Group 
Both the EM and MP Standpoints are most easily understood as expressing 
arguments of the individual, in interaction either with other individuals or with 
groups or wider society.  In each of the empirical studies, overlaps between EM 
arguments and MP arguments were evident (4.11.3, 5.3.7, 6.7.8).   The content 
analyses showed writers and speakers feeling that good manners should sometimes 
restrain the expression of both MP and EM arguments.  The extreme MP position 
(―I‘ve worked hard and I‘ll spend my money as I like) is offensive and boorish:  the 
extreme EM position (―That‘s not fair, what‘s in it for me?‖) sounds pathetic and 
whingeing.  In both cases individual expression of self-interest takes place in a 
social context, mindful of the social reaction to that expression.  Individuals 
therefore temper and disguise their self-expression and inevitably this makes it 
harder to categorise expressions of self-interest66. 
This difficulty in disentangling the Standpoints extends to the pervasive role of 
money.  Ostensibly, money as an external measure of value, and the use of 
market solutions to address climate change, both suggest that references to 
money form part of MP argumentation.  Yet for many individuals money, and not 
having enough of it, is an oppressive thing.  For them, concern about increased 
energy prices most easily finds voice in EM arguments that change is not fair, and 
that they are not getting anything in return.  For them ‗money‘ is part of the 
tough social environment they have to survive in, and their defensive, sometimes 
                                            
66 See also 4.7.1, 4.7.7, 4.8.6, 5.2.2, 5.6.3 and Appendix J3 LG2, which identify awareness 
of good manners affecting how people assert themselves against the group interest.  
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fatalistic arguments echo the EM arguments of earlier times when agriculturally 
based individuals survived in an unpredictable natural environment.  As a result 
categorising arguments about money and prices is often particularly difficult.  The 
EM fatalism even merges into CS rejection of the market society when Jayne 
complains ―You can‘t eat money, you can‘t breathe money‖ (MG2.665). 
This thesis has broadened the conceptualisation of the MP Standpoint compared to 
Fiske‘s formulation.  In part this imports aspects of CT‘s Individualist worldview.  
More generally, it is an attempt to make explicit the unstated assumption that to 
have an equity based system of value, the individual must have the libertarian 
right to enjoy unimpeded the proportional fruits of his labour and investment.  
Without this essential social element, Fiske‘s emphasis on rational calculations of 
cost and benefit measured against external standards is almost asocial.  Yet the 
necessary consequences of this wider understanding of MP is to generate a 
potential opposition between the individual and the group and to make an overlap 
with EM more likely. 
7.4.3 The defensive and assertive individual 
The logic of the EM Standpoint, based on reciprocity, and the logic of the MP 
Standpoint, based on equity, are exactly as spelt out for the RMs by Fiske.  
However, when it comes to interacting with ‗the group‘, the data in this thesis 
often show the EM Standpoint as a defensive position.  Individual citizens look for 
something in return from society to reciprocate their contribution, and are 
constantly wary of having things taken from them and getting nothing in return.  
By contrast, the MP Standpoint is commonly an assertive stance, for which society 
is potentially a restrictive hindrance to the individual‘s right to maximise 
opportunities. 
In his original formulation of RMT, Fiske references Piaget and emphasises the 
developmental sequence in which children first externalise each RM, and he 
sequences his account of the four RMs accordingly, CS, AR, EM and MP (Fiske, 
1992).  Subsequently he speculated on the possible evolution of the RMs (Fiske, 
2000, 2004b) but this misses the opportunity to consider the developmental path 
of actual relationships over time.  For Fiske a ‗fundamental tenet‘ of his theory is 
that the RMs are ‗discrete cognitive categories‘ (Fiske, 2004b, p. 19).  Haslam‘s 
studies demonstrated the ‗systematic covariation of some models as a function of 
contingent social and cultural norms‘ (Haslam, 2004, p. 30) but the overall 
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approach, defining a relationship at a particular moment through questionnaire 
responses, underplays the fluidity of actual lived relationships.  Parties to 
exchanges based on one RM will also exchange using the logic of other RMs – the 
boss at work (AR) frequently seeks to be one of the lads (EM).  Fiske and others 
have researched the misunderstandings and taboos surrounding the application of 
the wrong RM to an exchange (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, McGraw, & Kristel, 
2004) which again tends to emphasise rigidity rather than fluidity67. 
Cultural Theorist Verweij (2007) criticised Fiske for failing to isolate the four RMs, 
arguing that a scheme which could not demonstrate the clear independence of its 
four categories would not be useful.  Fiske makes very clear that instantiation of 
the RMs involves complex interactions and combinations between the RMs (Fiske, 
2004b).  His delineation of the four distinct RMs cannot avoid oversimplifying 
these.  To isolate the RMs requires fixing them at a point in time, to emphasise 
relationships rather than relating.  Looking at how the process of relating ebbs 
and flows can create a different perspective.  
Instead of concentrating on the individual‘s developmental trajectory, it helps to 
look at the lifespan of the relationship itself, or the process of relating.  Two 
strangers, or two groups that have not encountered each other, are likely to 
engage initially in EM exchanges.  If these build up trust, CS exchanges are 
possible, with the parties no longer needing transparent assurances of 
reciprocation.  Within more complex societies involving multiple parties, 
interdependence is likely to lead to power differences and AR ordering of 
exchanges.  Individuals who have been brought into the group (whether structured 
on AR or CS lines) will then have a dual position, as a group member and as an 
individual.  As individuals, they can pause to reflect on what is in it for them to be 
group members68.  From this perspective, exchanges with the group will follow 
either EM or MP logic: in EM, the individual demands fair and reciprocal treatment 
in a social contract in which the individual accepts the burdens of citizenship.  In 
MP, the individual asks society to facilitate his efforts (MP Empower) or at least 
for society not to hinder his freedom to act (MP Laissez-faire).  Typically the group 
                                            
67 7.3.1 criticised Cultural Theory for its focus on stability, and suggested RMT offered a 
more dynamic picture based on social exchange.  Yet now the RM Standpoint framework is 
criticised for failing to capture the fluidity of relating over time.  This challenge between 
specificity and generality, illumination and oversimplification, is inescapable. 
68 Clearly, a consequence of the RMs is that group members rarely stand back and question 
their membership.  Most of the time they simply follow the prescriptions of either the CS 
or AR Models.  But the underlying contract is still there. 
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or society construes the first of these exchanges within an AR logic: citizen 
submits to the burdens of citizenship in return for protection (in the form of 
policemen, doctors, traffic lights etc.).  In the second, CS logic justifies the group, 
society or the state facilitating individual effort (in the form of subsidies, schools, 
progressively freer trade and travel etc.) in the expectation of benefits from 
empowered individual effort that all can gain from. 
Fiske notes the mathematical logic underlying the exchanges, and this supports 
the developmental trajectory described above.  The initial EM and CS relationships 
both target equality, while the AR and MP relationships that imply more 
developed interaction both seek to maintain asymmetries.  This antithesis is 
similar to Douglas and Wildavsky‘s (1982) pared down version of CT into the 
border versus the centre. 
This account also offers the opportunity to integrate the ‗asocial‘ Standpoint 
floating unsatisfactorily around both CT‘s and RMT‘s schemas.  At the extremes, 
both the EM and MP modes of relating to the group (or individuals) will slip into 
asociality.  If trust builds through successful EM exchanges, CS relationships can 
follow: if trust breaks down from failed EM exchanges, asocial relationships follow 
or the minimal exchanges characteristic of Banfield‘s backward society.  
Aggressive individualists demanding empowerment by the state can also lose sight 
of the implicit social contract within MP:  a century ago they might be described 
as robber barons, now society decries stateless financiers swapping tax domiciles 
in a disconnected derivatives world of their own making.  Detached observers are 
asocial too: their licence to think freely and criticise the established order 
occupies an MP position.  Taken to the extreme, as when John Gray (2006) argues 
that mankind is not up to the challenge of global warming, the detached observer 
ends up in the asocial position of the ‗little green men‘ in focus group MG1. 
Fiske & Haslam claimed that the four RMs were discrete categories, not 
continuous dimensions: e.g. either the logic of an exchange follows EM rules or it 
does not (Fiske, 2004b; Haslam, 2004; Haslam & Fiske, 1999).   They then argue 
that culture prescribes which RM rules to follow in different domains and different 
relationships.  Across time, though, parties to a relationship build and lose trust69 
                                            
69 The example in 2.4.6 of separated couples reverting to EM exchanges provides a good 
illustration here.  Vestigial CS exchanges, even ‗trying to get back together again‘, coexist 
with bitter EM resolutions to the practical problems that have to be resolved on a week-to-
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on a continuum so that during the same period (as opposed to a precise moment 
and situation) the rules from different RMs will be appropriate to different 
circumstances.   We should therefore expect the Standpoints to overlap in the way 
that the media sample and focus groups demonstrated. 
7.4.4 The role of Equality Matching 
Interpreting both the EM and MP Standpoints as defining relationships between 
individuals and the group or society, as well as between one individual and 
another, makes it easier to understand why Cultural Theory explains societal 
phenomena using only one ‗low group‘ worldview (the individualist, ≈MP) together 
with the hierarchist (≈AR) and the egalitarian (≈CS) ‗high group‘ worldviews.  The 
arguments of the EM and MP Standpoints, when emphasising opposition between 
the individual and the group, are hard to distinguish:  ‗MP Laissez-faire‘ has 
similar consequences to EM‘s resistance to disadvantageous change.  However, the 
two Standpoints have fundamentally different responses to social problems.  Once 
the problem is taken seriously, EM will necessarily be ‗recruited‘, to use CT‘s 
analysis, into the AR Standpoint.  MP will continue to argue for independence. 
7.4.5 How to improve the theoretical framework of the RM Standpoints 
Section 7.2.4 described the research questions in this thesis as exploratory. They 
have been tested first by qualitative analyses to see whether the framework of RM 
Standpoints provides an effective account of the debate, and second through a 
quantitative analysis to assess whether the arguments used by individuals do form 
coherent Standpoints along the lines proposed by the framework. 
Section 7.2.4 anticipates that the layering of Relational Model arguments in real 
life debate makes disentangling the independent RMs almost impossible; section 
7.4.3 worries that disentangling them misses the point.    On the one hand, Fiske‘s 
quest is essential to identify and define genuinely distinct RMs.  On the other, the 
quest itself obscures the fluid process of relating over time.  However, further 
work can address important questions that have emerged: 
 A refined survey question set is needed (1) to unpack the relationship 
between the two main factors underlying responses and levels of belief 
in/scepticism about global warming, and (2) to test whether EM arguments 
                                                                                                                           
week basis.  Successful EM exchanges could establish a new CS foundation (we‘re still best 
friends); unsuccessful EM exchanges will gradually drift towards the asocial. 
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and (3) MP Laissez-faire arguments can be shown to be distinct.  In 
addition, the presumption that EM arguments will give way to AR solutions 
when climate impacts hit needs to be tested by examining whether those 
advocating EM arguments are more easily drawn towards AR solutions than 
those advocating MP Laissez-faire arguments. 
 An alternative split ballot survey is needed to test whether (1) belief 
in/scepticism about global warming or (2) an EM Standpoint plays a 
stronger role in generating the other. 
 The broader definition of the MP Standpoint used in this thesis compared 
to Fiske‘s RM needs justification.  Largely it was driven by dissatisfaction 
with Fiske‘s suggestion that MP is only emergent in developed societies.  If 
the account in 7.4.3 is correct, the MP Standpoint would have been present 
in earlier societies.  A qualitative study of pre-enlightenment textual 
material would be needed to test this70.   
Beyond theoretical interest, the value of further study is driven by the importance 
of better understanding the EM Standpoint.  It is the EM Standpoint that blocks 
resolution of the Commons Dilemma. 
7.5 Implications for understanding sustainability 
7.5.1 Reformulating ―I = PAT‖ 
Thompson and Rayner (1998) tie the three active worldviews to specific diagnoses 
of the global warming problem: the hierarchist (≈AR) blames overpopulation, the 
individualist (≈MP) attributes the problem to market pricing failures and 
deficiencies in property rights legislation, while the egalitarian (≈CS) blames 
overconsumption. The logic of improving market pricing or the legislative 
framework is to encourage technological innovation.   Once the individualist/MP 
diagnosis has been redescribed as a diagnosis demanding technological solutions, 
the three worldviews can be seen to be taking different positions on how to 
change environmental impact in the equation: 
                                            
70 This will not be straightforward.  The dominance in the Western world of free market 
philosophy follows the rejection of fascist and communist authoritarianism.  The disciples 
of Hayek (1944), Friedman (2002) and Popper (2002) ensure that CS values are under 
constant attack as (they argue) inescapably leading to authoritarian control.  In the same 
way, we should expect that radical free thinking in the past would have been suppressed 
in societies where concentrated power was the norm.  On a day-to-day basis, individuals 
may have used the logic of the MP Standpoint, but explicit written statements of it as 
guiding philosophy are likely to be rarer. 
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  I = PAT: ( P – AR, A – CS, T – MP) 
Environmental sustainability is a social problem as much as an economic one, yet 
this widely influential equation (1.3.6) is exclusively materialistic. At a point in 
time, the number of people multiplied by the material consumption ‗multiplied 
by‘ the technology employed to feed the consumption creates the impact.  But 
over time, change in any of these three factors requires co-operation and social 
cohesion.  The change in environmental impact over time is therefore a function 
of four elements: 
  ΔI = (PAT)C, 
where ‗C‘ seeks to capture the level and nature of social cohesion.  The RM 
Standpoints framework suggests relating through successful EM exchange is 
fundamental to the building of trust.  The Commons Dilemma cannot be solved 
without co-operative agreement as to what combination of population control, 
consumption restraint or technological innovation the commoners are going to 
employ.  EM intransigence, bordering on the asocial, currently determines 
international negotiating stances at the UNFCCC conferences, and as a 
consequence environmental impact is increasing over time. 
7.5.2 Building Trust 
This reformulation is helpful in getting an equation that sums up sustainable 
economics beyond a narrow materialist framing.  Unfortunately the reformulation 
leads towards gradualist conclusions similar to those of David Victor (2004).  We 
need to build trust from smaller scale co-ordination of climate change policies 
before blithely assuming a ‗global deal‘ can be struck and kept.  A particular 
problem for this trust building exercise is the issue of timescale.  Transparency of 
exchange requires short term reciprocation.  The co-operation needed will only 
bear fruit over the long term. 
These observations are not new:  Mancur Olson (1965) emphasised the conflict 
between rational self-interest and collective goals, and Onora O‘Neill (2002) has 
commented on the challenges to maintaining trust in modern society.  Others, 
such as Elinor Ostrom (1990), have studied the ways in which Common Pool 
Resources can be successfully managed.  Trust, and transparency, are essential: 
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―When resource users cannot communicate and have no way of developing trust in 
each other or in the management regime, they tend to overuse or destroy their 
resource as the [tragedy of the commons] model predicts.  Under more typical 
circumstances of resource use, however, users can communicate and have ways of 
developing trust  (Stern et al., 2002, p. 456)‖. 
 
The authors of the above quote, including both Ostrom and VBN theorist Paul 
Stern (see 1.6.1), go on to list a number of Group and Individual characteristics 
that impact the development of co-operation.  Unsurprisingly, smaller, 
homogeneous groups find co-operation easier (p488).  Such positive case studies of 
successful management of Common Pool Resources, often in geographical spaces 
that have definable boundaries, serve to highlight the unique challenge posed by 
global warming. 
7.6 Attitude Theory 
7.6.1 Pro-environmental attitudes 
Ostrom‘s work notes the importance of internalised norms (Ostrom, 1990).  The 
rational actor models used in attitude theory seek to incorporate such deep lying 
values, as, for example, in Paul Stern‘s Value-Belief-Norm model (Stern, 2000b), 
see Chapter 1. 
Rational actor models accommodate the original framing of the I=PAT equation 
very easily.  Concern for the environment (I) requires the rational actor to look at 
each of the population (P), affluence (A) and technology factors (T), to perform 
the utilitarian calculus.  Unfortunately, this framing encourages the reduction of 
the individual rational actor‘s calculation to a straight choice between impact on 
the environment and personal affluence.  Technological development and 
population levels lie outside the perceived behavioural control of the individual, 
with technology likely to become merely a means to increase individual affluence. 
Yet people clearly do have pro-environmental attitudes, and do act upon them.  
PC Stern sought to specify the deeper values that might underpin pro-
environmental attitudes and behaviour (Stern, et al., 1999).  Stern attributed 
‗biospheric‘, ‗altrusistic‘ and ‗egoistic‘ values to individuals, inferred from surface 
indicator variables.  That these values exist in some sense can hardly be 
challenged:  both the media sample and the focus groups provide plenty of 
examples where, respectively, concern for the environment, concern for other 
people and self-centred concerns are manifest.  The survey respondents express 
these collective ‗values‘ too, alongside values expressing self-interest.. 
283 
 
The origin and structure of these values remains mysterious.  Clearly they could 
also be mutually incompatible in some contexts.  The incompatibility is what 
creates the debate, and is what the media and focus group material constantly 
wrestles with.  The survey too revealed respondents committed to both collective 
and self-interested goals: but because the rational actor model accounts for 
behaviour empirically, if the actor makes a choice between mutually incompatible 
goals then somehow the actor must have resolved the incompatibility within the 
utilitarian calculus.  The actual choice made is taken to reveal the actor‘s true 
preference. 
7.6.2 Accounting for what has happened 
The rational actor model can account for many of the key elements in the climate 
change debate: 
 Uncertainty: transparent information is vital to the rational actor.  The 
lack of certainty regarding the science and the complex causal chain 
between emissions from citizens driving their cars and subsequent 
increased flooding or drought inhibits action.  All of the focus groups 
provide examples of individuals inhibited by confusion over the science.  In 
the media examples, consensus science takes lack of complete certainty 
for granted: e.g. #29 ‗the effects of climatic change are difficult to 
predict‘. 
 Accessibility: the need for trustworthy information puts a premium on 
accessibility.  As a result information gained through personal experience 
or direct relevance powerfully influences decision making.  When it‘s 
snowing outside, how can the world be warming?  The focus group 
participants frequently look to their own experiences of the weather.  For 
the media, the use of authoritative opinion encourages specialists to rely 
on their area of expertise.  Climate change become meaningful for 
birdwatchers when observing changes in numbers when counting birds 
(#115). 
 Inconsequence of one‟s own actions: the Commons Dilemma can be 
explained by Ajzen and Madden‘s ‗Perceived Behavioural Control‘.  One‘s 
own emission reductions are dwarfed by the growing emissions in the 
developing world: it is irrational to sacrifice one‘s own interests.  As Emma 
in LG2 says ‗we are a tiny country compared to somewhere like China‘. 
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 Shortening the horizon:  This necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
society must make behaving pro-environmentally in the individual‘s own 
direct short-term interest (Miles in MG2 declares: ―I‘ll do things that are 
green purely if they benefit me‖).  Society‘s strongest levers are pricing or 
shame, both potentially high currency in the utilitarian calculus.  Yet to 
motivate action, the shame or cost impacts have to hit in the near term: 
the focus groups provide several examples of participants taking comfort 
from the idea that the worst impacts will be after their lifetime.  The 
Relational Models account and the Attitude Theory account both emphasise 
the importance of personal relevance in motivating action.  The inevitable 
implication of this is that we ‗smack in the face‘ (MG2) from, for example, 
extreme weather before concern will translate into concerted action. 
 Subjective norms: Ajzen and Fishbein‘s model (1980) incorporated this 
element of shame by including subjective norms as an independent 
variable.  You do not litter because it is frowned upon more than because 
you might be fined.  Yet the attitude theory‘s analysis of individual 
calculation cannot really explain where this shame comes from, or why and 
how society gradually deems it unacceptable to litter.  An account of social 
processes, such as Elias‘ (2000) detailed analysis of the evolution of good 
manners, seems necessary to explain how the individual internalises 
societal values.  The focus groups frequently reflect upon this gradual 
process of social change, looking at smoking and littering as examples.  
With respect to current materialist life styles they assume that the current 
generation is incorrigible and only extended socialisation will change the 
next generations habits. 
 Discount rates: Can the rational actor account explain what drives a 
societal intervention or justify why a society should choose pro-
environmental action for the sake of future generations?  Why should the 
individuals who make up or lead society take these choices?  The Stern 
Review calls for extremely low discount rates to make the cost benefit 
analysis work (Stern, 2007): many challenge this (e.g. Schelling, 2000).  
They presume that future generations will be considerably better off than 
present generations, so that it is illogical, even unethical, to ask present 
generations to foot the bill for their richer descendants.  Over two thirds 
of survey respondent agreed with both Statement 7 (‗It's not fair for us to 
leave future generations with a worse environment than we have now‘) 
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and Statement 35 (‗When it‘s clearer what the impacts of climate change 
are, future generations will be better placed than us to address the 
problems of climate change‘).  Both seem to be reasonable, and morally 
defensible, positions. 
The rational actor account, to which attitude theory is closely bound, now feels 
inadequate.  First it must conjure up ‗society‘ to generate environmental 
constraints (imposed pricing or shame) to which individuals will adapt, without 
really being able to explain what will motivate society‘s individuals to do this.  
The explanations tend to resort to social values that go beyond utilitarian self-
interest.  So the rational actor approach has a similar problem at the practical 
level to the attitude models at the theoretical level: exactly where do ‗non-
utilitarian‘ values come from? 
The extreme utilitarian position can remain true to its principles by arguing that 
we should let the next generation look after itself.  Many argue that this pure 
Market Pricing position is morally right (e.g. Lawson, 2008).  Sticking to induction, 
we can rely on the evidence in the rear-view mirror, and reject the Malthusians‘ 
deductive claims that theory tells them the CO2 concentrations will eventually be 
too high.  Joe Rogaly neatly captures the Malthusian, Communal Sharing response 
in #34 of the media sample:  ―You might as well tell people on a raft on the 
Zambezi that there is no such thing as a waterfall, since the Victoria Falls has not 
yet been encountered‖. 
7.6.3 A plural values approach 
It is not enough to dismiss the Malthusian response as irrational panic as e.g. 
Booker & North do (2007).  History tells us the doom-mongers are sometimes right 
(Diamond, 2006).  Different contexts call for different approaches and this thesis 
has followed Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961) in assuming that human beings have 
been faced with recurring problems over time, and employ a limited number of 
approaches to address these different contexts.  These approaches cannot be 
collapsed into the logic of one super-ordinate approach such as utility 
maximisation.  Prioritising utility maximisation is a normative choice not a 
complete description of individual reasoning and behaviour. 
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Engaging with the Malthusian response rather than dismissing it out of hand 
requires us to take its pessimistic conclusions seriously.  The next section 
considers where this leads. 
7.7 Determinism and pessimism 
7.7.1 Background 
Cultural Theory is criticised for being deterministic (2.2.4.2).  Describing the 
social world in a way that tries to explain why the world is structured as it is 
suggests that it cannot be changed.  Further, it can be seen as defending the 
status quo and supporting prevailing power structures.  When determinism is 
accused of arguing fatalistically that the present state of affairs could not have 
been avoided (as well as cannot be changed) it is often treated as a taboo.  
Historical events and sociological phenomena derive from the interaction of 
people and the environment.  Whether we explain those events with reference to 
how societies are organised (e.g. Cultural Theory), human nature (e.g. the Bell 
Curve, (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994)) or accidents of the environment (e.g. Jared 
Diamond‘s Guns Germs and Steel (2005)), critics take such explanations to deny 
free human agency or to discriminate against disadvantaged groups. 
Pessimism too often seems taboo, especially on the subject of climate change.  
Commentators are required to provide solutions, and to say ‗Yes, we can do it!‘  
Diamond sought to answer critics of the supposed determinism in Guns Germs and 
Steel by subtitling a subsequent book ‗Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or 
Survive‘.  Diamond‘s solution is the same as the focus groups‘ conclusion, a resort 
to Authority Ranking arguments.  For him how societies choose to survive ‗involves 
the courage to make painful decisions about values‘ (p523) and the willingness ‗to 
subordinate ... individual rights to group interests‘ (p524), going on to write 
approvingly of China‘s restriction of ‗the traditional freedom of reproductive 
choice‘ (p524).  The reluctance of democratically elected governments to make 
tough choices came through in the media sample (Section 4.13). 
The belief that resorting to stronger central control is the only ultimate solution is 
commonplace.  Some political scientists  (e.g. Shearman & Smith, 2007) argue 
that problems like climate change spell out the inadequacy of democratic 
government since in their view the challenge can only be met by authoritarian 
control.  Diamond is relatively guarded in his discussion.  Others, such as Garrett 
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Hardin (1974, 1999) and Paul Ehrlich (1971), are much more explicit in advocating 
nationalistic and illiberal policies in the face of ecological threats.  Can we tackle 
the problem of climate change without resorting to authoritarian restrictions and 
international resource conflicts? 
7.7.2 Standpoints and solutions 
The Equality Matching Standpoint provides the foundational logic for the Commons 
Dilemma.  The Standpoint does not form the basis for a sustainable society.  The 
media and focus group studies both support the view that advocates of EM 
arguments, if alarmed enough by the threat of climate change, will shift to the 
Authority Ranking Standpoint.  EM will be recruited by AR (to use Cultural 
Theory‘s terminology).  The other two Standpoints will resist this.  Communal 
Sharing objects to the pessimistic and deterministic narratives because their AR 
solutions deny emancipation.   The Market Pricing Standpoint objects to the 
narratives because the solutions are illiberal.  Yet each of the CS and MP 
Standpoints are happy with government intervention provided that it targets their 
own definition of the problem. 
If you accept the consensus science, you can still take the extreme MP view and 
argue that we should expect future generations to look after themselves.  
Probably, this means trusting in geo-engineering solutions to prevent excessive 
warming.  But most people taking the extreme MP position have not really 
accepted the science and trivialise environmental concern as alarmism (Booker & 
North, 2007; Lawson, 2008).  The science indicates that there are thresholds or 
tipping points and it is the idea of these that generates alarm. 
7.7.3 Reasons for alarm 
The IPCC‘s third assessment report summarised the ‗Reasons for Concern‘ over the 
impacts of climate change in a graphic (McCarthy & Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Working Group II., 2001, p. 958).  The reasons for concern, 
divided into five categories, are plotted as coloured71 bars measuring severity 
against the increase in global mean temperature.  Referred to as the ‗burning 
embers diagram‘ the bars move from yellow to orange to red with increasing 
severity as the temperature rises.   The graphic is potentially strong propaganda 
(Revkin, 2009): an updated version shows that reasons for concern have increased 
                                            
71 The original was printed in black and white, but subsequent reworkings of the diagram 
usually use the colours that gave the graphic the ‗burning embers‘ name. 
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considerably (Smith et al., 2009).  When authors take a detached view, and 
projections are projections not policy targets designed to make a not-too-alarming 
outcome seem possible, the conclusion is that humanity will take earth well into 
the red zone (Hamilton, 2010, p. 228). 
Yet this is just to worry about global warming.  Rockstrom (2009) and others 
produced their own graphic in Nature, ‗Beyond the Boundary‘, mapping what they 
term to be a safe operating space for humanity across nine planetary systems.  
Their graphic suggests that although projected climate change will cross the 
threshold, the state of the nitrogen cycle and the level of biodiversity loss is 
already far more critical. 
Rayner‘s studies of millenarian cults led him to argue that egalitarians (≈CS) take 
a compressed view of time: we are on the threshold, the moment is now.  The 
discourse of ‗Peak Oil‘ is typically presented in these threshold terms, sometimes 
carefully reasoned (Leggett, 2005), sometimes more apocalyptically (Mobbs, 
2005).  Peak Oil is a key factor in motivating the Transition Town movement, a 
typically CS solution to environmental threats (Chamberlin, 2009).  Ehrlich‘s ‗the 
Population Bomb‘ (1971) predicted that mass starvation would start in the 
following decade.  With only one life we each have a self-centred experience of 
time: our own moment is now.  Astronomer Royal Martin Rees wrote: 
‗this century is special.  It‘s the first in our planet‘s history where one species – 
ours – has Earth‘s future in its hands, and could jeopardise not only itself, but 
life‘s immense potential‘ (Rees, 2009). 
Like Ehrlich he included food security as a real concern, and like many of Ehrlich‘s 
generation he includes our technological capacity for destruction as a further risk.  
There is the threat from biological warfare and newly emergent superbugs as well.  
Rees predicted a ‗perfect storm‘ of challenges to human prosperity emerging in 
the 2030‘s (Rees, 2003).  Yet in the meantime, more short term problems like the 
economy dominate the agenda72. 
Amidst the welter of prophecies and warnings, it is worth remembering that all of 
these factors are inter-connected.  As a result, we will almost certainly be 
surprised by the actual sequence of events.  Nevertheless, it does seem fair to 
                                            
72 Searching Nexis as in 4.3.2, articles in UK National Newspapers with the terms ‗climate 
change‘ or ‗global warming‘ numbered 2,957 in the first half of 2011.  Articles with the 
terms ‗debt/ credit/ financial crisis‘ or ‗budget deficit‘ numbered 7,056 over the same 
period. 
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assume that during this century the balance of the I=PAT equation will cross a 
threshold, and that the consequences will move society from debating alarmist 
warnings to responding to severe and present challenges, and these will be 
challenges that generate serious alarm amongst the general population.  The 
definition of the context will shift decisively to one where the majority accept 
environmental stress and its indirect effects as a present, global reality.  
Electorates will mandate governments to prioritise the issue, to make the tough 
choices currently avoided.  In other words, a social threshold will have been 
crossed alongside (albeit possibly lagging) the material thresholds.  How best 
should we manage the alarm?  What would be ‗good‘ tough choices? 
7.7.4 Restrictions without authoritarianism 
The Standpoint framework predicts that we will only cross the social threshold 
required to start acting decisively in response to climate change threats when 
those become real, not forecast73.  Even then Market Pricing adherents may well 
advocate massive geo-engineering solutions, but at some point a more purely 
Authority Ranking Standpoint will become dominant.  Shortages will engender 
restrictions.  The social challenge will be to avoid the worst horrors of 
authoritarian government. 
At points of crisis the EM Standpoint blames others.  Social Identity dynamics 
easily fuel nationalism in crises74, and centralised authorities can legitimate 
isolationist, lifeboat ethics by scapegoating outsiders.  This is the social risk to go 
alongside the risk of climate change. 
7.7.5 A good life in a difficult world 
Ehrlich and Hardin‘s solutions, the lifeboat ethics of metaphorically tipping excess 
passengers overboard, seem repulsive.  They justify libertarian fear of CS values: 
CS preaches equality, but the CS Standpoint towards others is likely to show the 
same discrimination between in-group and out-group members identified for the 
AR Standpoint (4.9.7).  Group members have no obligation towards those outside 
                                            
73 The utilitarian account can make sense of this equally well.  Remote consequences are 
discounted. 
74 Different social psychological theories all provide useful accounts.  Tajfel (1982) 
demonstrates how antagonistic nationalism emerges if we define ourselves as different.  
Sherif‘s (1966) realistic conflict theory demonstrates first how scarce resources can 
intensify inter-group conflict, and second how the solution requires the recognition of a 
shared ‗superordinate‘ goal. 
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the group, endorsing asocial relations with out-group members.  This may seem 
repugnant, but in a world of shortages, a way through the tough choices will have 
to be found. 
For the individual consumer, the choices are also confusing.  On the global 
commons, cutting your footprint by not flying does only make an infinitesimal 
difference.  So what makes a good life in a post-tipping point world? 
None of these challenges are novel.  People in many parts of the world frequently 
have to choose between their own needs and those of others:  and those who do 
not, or who are not forced to notice that they are making such choices, should 
count themselves lucky.  What varies is the specificity of the historical and 
geographical context.  It is worth repeating Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961, p. 
10):  
―...There is a limited number of common human problems for which all peoples at all 
times must find some solutions.  This is the universal aspect of value orientations because 
the human problems to be treated arise inevitably out of the human situation.  ..  While 
there is variability in solutions of all the problems, it is neither limitless nor random but is 
definitely variable within a range of possible solutions‖. 
7.7.6 Being Human not Martian 
The Standpoint of the detached observer, of the little green man, encourages 
some pessimistic conclusions.  Watching the deliberations at UNFCCC meetings, 
the process does not look promising.  It is easy to criticise, but what else can we 
do?  As Miles in LG1 works out for himself, the simple logic of the Commons 
Dilemma demands co-operation enforced, or at least enabled, by central control.  
That central control will inevitably be guided by relevant, evidence-based expert 
opinion.  So we cannot abandon the IPCC and UNFCCC processes; rather, the 
challenge is to make them credible. 
Following the logic of the Relational Models: 
 Climate change is a Commons Dilemma, and requires Commons-based 
responses, ie the ‗all-in-it-together‘ logic of Communal Sharing.  This 
requires transparency and trust. 
 This is a global commons, not the village green, so the scale of the issue 
demands delegated central co-ordination.  This requires trust in the 
central authorities. 
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 Assessment of future risks and the technological advances necessary to 
mitigate or adapt to them will rely on expert opinion.  This requires trust 
in the experts. 
 All of the above demand trust building actions, both small and large.  This 
has to be done gradually.  Chapter 1 opened with the suggestion that 
political leaders were not living up to their ambitious rhetoric in proposing 
modest emissions cuts.  Yet if gradualism is all we can achieve, we cannot 
decry gradualism as not enough.  Gradualism in trust building is similar to 
gradualism in carbon emissions reduction - some progress is better than 
none.  For emissions, we have to assume that 4°of warming is better than 
5°.  With trust, any successful steps in trust building now make it more 
likely that levels of trust will be higher when the alarm grows and the EM 
clamour for protectionist policies reaches a crescendo.  Trust building 
steps could be in the form of regional initiatives, emissions trading that 
generates bona fide overall reductions, or the individual self-restraint that 
currently seem too feeble in scope to make a difference. 
 The MP Standpoint will continue to advocate subsequent adaptation, 
eventually relying on geo-engineering.  This takes the denial of natural 
limits to the extreme. This approach needs to be anticipated and discussed 
openly now, so that in future times of alarm it will not be embraced so 
readily as a panacea. 
 The prediction that there will be a social threshold follows the millennial 
thinking of the CS Standpoint: at the moment, the CS Standpoint is accused 
of alarmism.  Yet, based on the scientific predictions, at a point in the 
future there will be genuine and widespread alarm over climate change, 
alarm mandating decisive policy responses.  The purpose of nurturing the 
social environment in the meantime is to make co-operative responses 
more likely than isolationist lifeboat ethics at such pivotal moments. 
Offering the best policies for damage limitation is not an effective manifesto in a 
political world that sees leaders elected on visionary promises of opportunity and 
possibility.  Advocates of policies based on natural limits have to maintain their 
stance, do what they can to build trust, and try to maintain influence for when 
the climate changes.  
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7.8 Conclusions 
1. The three studies provide support for an account of the debate based on 
Standpoints derived from Relational Models Theory.  The Standpoints can 
explain the debate comprehensively and in a manner that improves our 
understanding of the social psychological foundations of the debate. 
2. Synthesising the Relational Models account improves the analysis offered 
by Cultural Theory by using the Equality Matching Standpoint to explain the 
Commons Dilemma. 
3. Many loose ends remain.  Although there is plenty of scope for refinement, 
the culturally embedded nature of the Relational Models suggests that 
there will always be further loose ends.  The most useful further work will 
be to unearth the Equality Matching Standpoint as much as possible, and to 
fully distinguish it from the other Standpoints. 
4. A Relational Models based account provides salutary pointers for society‘s 
response to the challenge of climate change.
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A:  Timeline of key events and publications in the 
development of the climate change debate. 
UN/IPCC activity Scientific/environmental 
background
1896 Aarhenius
1962 Silent Spring
1968 Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons; Ehrlich's Population Bomb
1969
1970 US EPA established
1971
1972 Club of Rome 'Limits to Growth'; A Blueprint for Survival
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979 Three mile island nuclear accident
1980
1981
1982
1983 Brundtland Commission convened
1984
1985
1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident
1987 'Our Common Future';  Montreal Ozone Protocol
1988 IPCC established Jim Hansen in US Senate; Thatcher at Royal society
1989
1990 IPCC AR1
1991
1992 Adoption of UNFCCC. Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro.
1993
1994 UNFCCC comes into force
1995 IPCC AR2
1996
1997 Kyoto Protocol
1998 Mann's hockey stick graph
1999
2000
2001 IPCC AR3
2002
2003
2004 Oreskes' consensus review
2005 Kyoto protocol now in force
2006 Stern Review; Inconvenient Truth
2007 IPCC AR4; Bali roadmap Nobel prize for Gore/IPCC
2008
2009 Copenhagen COP15 UEA 'climategate'
2010 Cancun COP16
2011 Durban COP17
 
References not covered elsewhere:  Aarhenius (Henson, 2006), Silent Spring 
(Carson, 1992).  
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-2 -1 0 1 2 Un- N/A
assigned
1 72 The Times 23-Dec-86 494 Comment  P White Christmasses and 'growing evidence' of GW      P                        P       
2 1236 The Independent 6-Nov-89 764 News  P  P Digest para on 'world climate conference'/US.    P                  P               
3 1065 The Independent 15-Sep-89 516 News  P Plankton. GW may be faster than prev thought.    P                P                 
4 961 The Times 30-Jul-89 558 News  P  P  P Plankton. GW may be faster than prev thought: need sea defences    P                                 
5 937 The Independent 18-Jul-89 490 News  P Electricity privatisation; role of nuclear v-s-a-vis enviro/GW    P                  P               
6 1995 The Independent 26-Jul-90 671 News/Comment  P  P "The Maldives' fear of drowning"    P                          P       
7 1812 The Guardian 13-Jun-90 263 News  P  P  P Combined heat and power to reduce CO2    P                              P   
8 1438 The Guardian 3-May-90 80 News  P  P Fuel poverty: poor shouldn't pay for cuts to CO2    P                              P   
9 3107 The Times 16-Nov-91 549 Derivative  P British Winemaking: passing ref to greenhouse effect              P    P                   
10 3709 The Independent 10-Jun-92 409 News  P  P Rio summit: US criticsing "guilty developed world logic"    P                  P               
11 3691 The Guardian 8-Jun-92 882 Opinion  P  P General discussion about energy - a kind of science briefing      P                    P           
12 6068 The Guardian 30-Sep-96 859 Derivative  P Launch of a weather channel - passing ref              P    P                   
13 6041 The Guardian 18-Sep-96 684 Opinion/(news)  P Para in opinion piece re BP funding of 'anti GW science' lobby in US    P                  P               
14 7039 The Times 6-Oct-97 660 Opinion  P  P Rightwingers criticise how GW is taught in schools        P                  P           
15 6650 The Observer 22-Jun-97 1671 Opinion/News  P  P  P  P  P Total failure of Rio summit promises    P                  P               
16 8535 Daily Mail 21-Oct-98 422 News  P  P Digest piece.  Malaria and other dread consequences      P                        P       
17 8147 The Mirror 25-Jun-98 99 News  P  P  P  P Animals worse than households. ?Ozone/GHG confusion        P            P                 
18 7797 The Guardian 16-Mar-98 634 Derivative  P "seasons ain't what they used to be" fashion.              P    P                   
19 9934 The Independent 22-Dec-99 148 Opinion  P  P Floods.  Catastrophic failure to take GW seriously  P                    P               
20 9272 The Guardian 29-May-99 633 News  P Business news: passing ref to climate-change levy              P              P         
21 10378 Daily Mail 6-Apr-00 121 News Passing ref to DiCaprio filming on 'GW issues'              P                  P     
22 11917 Daily Mail 28-Dec-00 631 Opinion/news  P Criticism of Prescott not taking EU climate summit seriously              P        P               
23 13632 The Guardian 9-Jun-01 961 Opinion/news  P  P  P Looking forward to GWBush visit to EU.    P                  P               
24 16451 Sunday Times 4-Aug-02 890 Not relevant phrase 'climate change' in a horseracing piece              P    P                   
25 19214 The Guardian 30-Oct-03 717 Opinion  P GW as just another prophesied armagheddon      P          P                     
26 18953 The Times 18-Sep-03 304 Opinion  P comment on indigenous South American understanding of GW    P                          P       
27 19909 The Independent 10-Feb-04 354 News  P  P Wacky idea to use volcanic dust to absorb carbon    P                              P   
28 19705 The Guardian 8-Jan-04 996 Opinion Passing ref to CC ahead of a visit to Antarctica      P            P                   
29 21412 The Guardian 27-Aug-04 662 Comment  P  P Extreme weather events: incr frequency  P                            P       
30 24816 The Guardian 13-Jun-05 414 News  P Ahead of G8: comments re Russia    P                        P         
31 25051 The Observer 26-Jun-05 1121 News  P  P  P  P Corporate responses to CC    P                  P               
32 24610 The Sun 3-Jun-05 121 News  P  P Incr storms in Eire threatening tourism: need to cut back fuel use    P                P                 
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39 33355 The Independent 14-Sep-06 129 Opinion  P  P Ideals of landscape change over time    P            P                     
40 33293 The Independent 12-Sep-06 474 News  P  P Corporate/Business opportunities from CC.  Carbon credits    P                        P         
41 32439 The Times 1-Aug-06 359 News  P  P Blair & California; vs Bush on CC    P                  P               
42 36658 The Guardian 18-Dec-06 446 News  P  P CC has security implications      P            P                   
43 34608 The Guardian 25-Oct-06 585 Opinion  P  P Offsetting or technological responses  P                                P   
44 38070 Daily Telegraph 1-Feb-07 983 News  P Extensive analysis of impacts of CC on business      P                      P         
45 37459 Daily Mail 16-Jan-07 333 News  P Salmon breeding season changing    P                          P       
46 37217 The Guardian 10-Jan-07 26 Opinion  P Declaring war ok; tackling CC not ok?      P                P               
47 41008 Sunday Times 15-Apr-07 1044 News  P  P  P Business stockmarket impact of biofuels      P                      P         
48 43801 The Independent 19-Jun-07 863 News  P  P US scientists saying CC risks much greater  P                  P                 
49 45882 Sunday Times 26-Aug-07 2477 Opinion  P  P UK landscape/agriculture under threat from GW/pop'n growth      P                      P         
50 44176 News of the World 8-Jul-07 353 News Live Earth; Gore - raising GW awareness  P                              P     
51 47657 The Times 19-Oct-07 845 Opinion  P  P Business: water may be next big commodity market due to CC    P                        P         
Total random items 6 5 7 5 9 15 12 2 17 8 24 10 2 0 0 7 2 6 8 13 2 2 7 6 2 4 0
52 ESRC The Edge 12-Jul-07 1128 Opinion  P  P  P Is green tourism getting off the ground?    P                    P             
53 Independent Hari 19-Oct-07 1139 Opinion  P  P  P  P Resist siren of geo-engineering  P                        P           
54 Daily Telegraph ridley 31-Oct-00 654 Opinion  P  P  P no link from CC to extreme weather          P                          P
55 Financial Times Maddox 4-Apr-95 776 Opinion  P  P  P  P Reporting on 'Backlash against greens'        P                  P           
56 Guardian Brown 5-Dec-95 732 Opinion  P  P   P  P Political challenge of CC and running out of time    P                  P               
57 Guardian Erlichman 5-Jan-90 735 News/comment  P  P  P Environmentalists petitioning Thatcher    P                  P               
58 IEA North 24-Mar-06 1488 Opinion  P  P  P A sceptic attacks BBC's CC orthodoxy/partiality        P                  P           
59 Daily Telegraph Johnson 2-Nov-00 1004 Opinion  P  P  P ridiculing Doom-mongers and arguing CC policy          P            P               
60 Financial Times Beckerman 11-Apr-95 342 Opinion  P  P  P  P Uncertainty means no action yet        P                  P           
61 Independent Noble 20-Oct-90 271 Opinion  P  P  P We need informed debate; natural variability        P                            P
62 The Times Hamilton 20-Nov-90 1118 Derivative/comment  P Ice houses: GW and our familiar world      P            P                   
Totals selected items 0 2 1 5 6 7 3 0 10 1 3 1 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 2
Totals all items 6 7 8 10 15 22 15 2 27 9 27 11 6 2 0 7 2 7 8 16 3 6 7 6 2 4 2  
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Appendix C:  "Arguments" for each relational model from the literature 
                 Page 1 of 4 
References and notes
Field My amendments to the refs in [ ]
    RM Communal sharing Authority ranking Equality matching Market pricing Fiske 1992
              CS                AR               EM               MP
    Worldview Egalitarian Hierarchical "Fatalist" Individualist Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky ('TEW') 1990
JUSTICE
1 Distributive -Deutsch Need [commons] Winner-takes-all [Priority] Equality Equity/Proportionality Deutsch 1985 pp 38, 135
2    Fiske version Common resources By rank [priority] Equal shares Proportional Fiske 1992 p694
3 Procedural  justice Trust [Standing] Standing [Equality] Neutrality Folger et al pp 271-6 'FSB*'
4 Organisational goal Member wellbeing [due process?] member retention productive efficiency Deutsch p38-45/FSB
5
6 TIME
7 Meaning Eternal/tradition Priority to seniors Turn taking Time = money Fiske 1992 p695, adapted
8 Intergen equity (T&R*) Future>Present Present>Future N/A Present>Future Thompson & Rayner 1998 ('T&R'), p331
9 Intergen equity (variant) Eternal via future [Past &] Present > future [Present via past] Present & future
10 Time perspective Compressed/[long term] Long term [history] Short-term T&R 1998, p329
11 Precious time Running out Ancestral past/golden age Carpe diem Yours: let future look after self
12
13 SOCIAL INFLUENCE Conformity Obedience Reflexive Obligation Contract Fiske 1992 p695, adapted
14
15 POLICY FOUNDATIONS
16 Moral legitimation Traditional, "natural" Established authority Recipricocity/fairness Rational-legal Fiske 1992 p695
17 Land (occupied) Motherland 'Feudal' ownership Equal plots Capital; domesticated Fiske 1992 p694
18
19 Decision-making Unified consensus Authoritative decree One man one vote Utility calculated by market Fiske 1992 p695
20
21 Risk orientation prevention risk management commons dilemma adaptation, calculation see Fiske 1992 p696 on misfortune
22 (Un)Certainty precautionary principle  Familiarity principle [proof first] Gaskell & Allum 2001.; [vs Rayner 1992 p110]
23 Preventative meaures Act irrespective Act if effective Act if fair to all, esp you Act if certain of benefits 'Proof first' uses the logic of pre-
24 caution to say only restrict when we know
25  
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Appendix  C                 page 2 of 4 
27 References and notes
28 Field [Refs] in [] are as interpreted in this thesis
29     RM Communal sharing Authority ranking Equality matching Market pricing Fiske 1992
30               CS                AR               EM               MP
31     Worldview Egalitarian Hierarchical "Fatalist" Individualist TEW 1990
32
33 NATURE
34 Cutural theory Ephemeral Perverse/tolerant Capricious Benign T&R 1998 p284
35   Extension of CT Fragile Robust within limits [unpredictable] Robust, unlimited see Gaskell & Allum 2001
36   Extension of CT Romantic Rational Romantic Realistic/Pessimistic Rational [Ref]
37 Scream metaphor Pain/Anger Pain Anger/irritation Irritation Giddens 2008: earth's response to AGW
38 Value of nature Intrinsic [Both ]/[Inherent] [Neither?] Instrumental: exploit Connelly & Smith 2003, p26
39 Foundational goal Eco-centric System-centric Anthropocentric Connelly & Smith 2003, p26
40 Narrative of humanity Decline/fall Realising the true order No overall pattern, but Progress = rational discovery [Interpreting Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961 p12]
41 individ fates have logic
42
43 Nature > man pure > polluting Awesome/marvellous Threat Opportunity AR may treat Nature or Man as master of the other
44 Man > nature Capable of destroying Steward Survival Progressive development Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961 p12
45 wilderness pure owned/to be conquered potentially equal plots opportunity/threat; barren
46 preservation conservation [innovation] Connelly & Smith 2003, p15-16
47
48 GLOBAL WARMING
49 GW sci evidence (1) True Believer Authoritative consensus nature unpredictable = Sceptic
50 GW sci evidence (2) Deductive doom Probabilistic consensus science  too uncertain Natural cycles
51 Externalities incl unknown unknowns all knowns known knowns only [T&R; Neumayer]
52 How much 'A' in GW? All A Natural & man-made senseless question Natural
53 Consequences of GW Catastrophic To be managed no point predicting Beneficial/exaggerated NB: does not cover 'response to migrants'
54
55  
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Appendix C                 page 3 of 4 
 
56 References and notes
57 Field [Refs] in [] are as interpreted in this thesis
58     RM Communal sharing Authority ranking Equality matching Market pricing Fiske 1992
59               CS                AR               EM               MP
60     Worldview Egalitarian Hierarchical "Fatalist" Individualist TEW 1990
61
62
63 GW POLICY FOUNDATIONS
64 Policy bias, CT Egalitarian Contractarian N/A Libertarian T&R 1998, p331
65 Policy bias, RMT Egalitarian Seniority/priority Avoid unfair treatment Individual merit protected Deduced from moral legit (line 16)
66 of any individual by contractual rights and distributive justice (2)
67 Economic objective sustainability (strong) sustainability (weak) Growth [Neumayer]
68 Policy style Egalitarian Bureaucrat [Fatalist] Entrepeneur Gaskell & Allum 2001
69 Diagnosis Profligacy Population Profligate population Pricing T&R 1998 p294-301
70
71 Gains - rights Socialised Greatest good [You mustn't gain more] Private } T&R p318: but see Ch2 discusses
72 Losses - costs Private: Strict fault Least Harm [I mustn't lose more] Socialised } interchangeable logic AR/MP
73 Intergen responsibility Strong Balanced Weak Weak
74  
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Appendix C                 page 4 of 4 
75 References and notes
76 Field [Refs] in [] are as interpreted in this thesis
77     RM Communal sharing Authority ranking Equality matching Market pricing Fiske 1992
78               CS                AR               EM               MP
79     Worldview Egalitarian Hierarchical "Fatalist" Individualist TEW 1990
80
81
82
83 POLICIES
84 Discount rate Zero or -ve Technical [Stern] High [Nordhaus] T&R 1998, p331; Dietz & Neumayer [2007] p 302-7
85 Historic GHG emissions Included in calc Acknowledged (balance) { Ignored } Adapt from T&R 1998,
86 Present GHG emissions Ignored Greater good (pareto) {UNFCCC deadlock Priority rights } p 309-321, but note, as above
87 Target future emissions Developed < Developing Greater good (pareto) {Byrd-Hagel resolution Developed>Developing } interchangeable logic AR/MP
88 Mitigation costs Technology Transfer Emission permits Polluter pays should = Market - auctioned permits
89 Adaptation costs Developed world pays Emission permits fund Carbon tax Market (= insurance?)
90
91 FORM OF ACTION Local pre-emptive Global concerted Inaction - commons dilem Market instruments T&R 1998 (CS p297; MP p299, but not AR, EM)
92 Individual sacrifice Regs and restrictions Underlying logic of offset Tradeable permits For EM: analysed in this thesis as generating
93 Ostracise/penalise Caps and targets [encompasses offsets] the commons dilemma.
94 polluters AR: UNFCCC process (not pop'n control T&Rp301)
95 OTHER
96 Media of expression   } Bodily consubstantiation Operational equality - ritual {Fiske 2004
98                                                   } Ranking in space, time, force Abstract symbols, numbers {
99 IMPLICATIONS
100 Exchange transparency No secrets Rely on authority (system) Transparency essential: Rely on system/market to make transparent Derived from above in this thesis
101 Rely on trust instead else trust in custom/ritual Rely on contract and porperty law
102
103 System Realised in the family? Realised in the leader/ Realised in ritual exchangeRealised in money and contract Derived from above in this thesis
104 institutions
105 Foundational principle Group need Established Order Equal exchange Rationality & individual liberty
106
107  
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APPENDIX D: "Arguments" for each Relational Model applied to themes identified through open coding         page 1 of 3 
  RM >>>> Communal sharing Authority ranking Equality matching Market pricing
              CS                AR               EM               MP Coded at pilot item number #:
  Worldview >>>> Egalitarian Hierarchical "Fatalist" Individualist [no.]= only partial fit;[name]=other ref.
Text coding node       CS       AR      EM        MP
Apocalypse  
1 GW will be very bad because nature fragile  so we must take charge  commons dilemma  They say that, but humanity… 26, [?Blair] [58] [53,57]
2 Cassandras Oh Woe!  No good hand-wringing  Oh Woe!  Just another apocalyptic vision 16,29,59 [Stern] [19 CS?],25,55
3 Local consequences Local eco-system collapse  specific issues: specific measures Unfair distribution  Risk analysis 6,26 [56]
4 Feedback holistic system effects   3,44,48
5    
6 Adaptation Not enough/Sticking plaster  Planned responses  Every man for himself  Man has always adapted 56, 4, 6, 39,
7 Adapting to new regs Fiddling while Rome burns  Regulation changes behaviour   Regs part of the enviroment 44, 44,
8    
9 Alternative energy Ignores over-consumption  To maintain way of life  problems whatever we do  Fossil fuels exhausted>demand 60,31, 49, 11,
10 Priced externalities > demand
11 Specific technologies Green=good  Managed nature(wind,solar,wave) Local self-sufficiency (=CS?)  opportunities, innovation 44,27
12 Nuclear - issues Eco dilemma  Big problems need big solutions Last hope  opportunities, innovation 5,57,49 37, [27]
13 Biofuels - issues Good idea corrupted  Subsidy issues  Unfair distribution of consequences opportunities, innovation 49,47,46 47,
14 Other issues Maize madness  Energy Security   price distortions 47,[42]46 47,
15    
16 Argument over AGW in public sphere    Key text 36: scientist on scientists exaggerating
17 Scientific evidence Understates risks  Responsible consensus:IPCC  who to believe?  Overstates risks/what consensus? 48, 44,36,38 58,14,
18   Vested interest to science  Vested interest to science 54, 54,
19 Complexity fragile system > feedback mechs So co-ordinated response needed so it's all too diffiuclt  Fanatics oversimplify causes,solutions 53,4 14,58
20 Uncertainty Precaution principle; pessimist  Manage the measurable  Unpredictable and unmanageable Man can adapt unpredictably - optimist
21 Apocalypse (see above) Urgency  Can't afford to be pessimistic   False Prophets/exaggerated 48, [Stern] 55,14,54
22 To act or not to act Take all steps/can't afford not  Risk management  No point acting: China, too late Cost-benefit analysis 48, 40,60,58
23 Unintended consequencesTech solutions cause new probs Un-joined up gov't  so it's all too diffiuclt  so avoid distorting market 53, 33,[47] 15,[34]47
24 Should we have targets? Avoiding the issue  Essential  Need transparency  Need predictable regulatory enviro 41,47,55 30,40
25 but we need sensible/minimal regs 44,
26 Proposed targets Too low //not achieved  Realistic & effective  Unachievable  Will they be enforced? 15,19 15, [30]
27 Attributed itrrationality [Sky will fall on our heads >>]  [no leadership]  [<<headless chickens]  Head in the sand 59, 15, 53,
28 ...claimed rationality Pragmatic Realistic, empirical                54,55,58,60
29 Names called(1) Puritans; hypocrites  Not grasping seriousness; ineffective Passive: no policy impact  freemarket fundamentalists; deniers 15,22,33 [CT] 53,13
30 Names called(2) Research fund addicts  Looking for an excuse to tax us "Life's tough enough for me already" Oil industry pawns 13,15
31 Names called(3) Consumer/1st world guilt  In thrall to business   business fighting tooth and nail 10,52 19,37 19,57
32 The public are… +ve ahead of policy  need leadership  Trapped  Not taken in 58,
33 The public are… -ve addicted consumers  want cake and eat it  [opting out hermits?]  hypocritical consumers
34 Extreme weather evidence, a warning  Need forecasting, clean-up systems Oh woe!  Natural 19, 19, 31,
35 Blame   Others not doing enough (USA) 2, 13,
36 Diagnosis Profligacy Population Profligate population Pricing 57, Gray
37 The "planet", "earth" code for "fragile", vulnerable    usu sarcastically invoked 14,
38    
39    
40 Communities Small is beautiful/all in together Need organisation to meet challenge Man the lifeboats/repel boarders Open marketplace liberates/empowers [33] 33, 6,
41    
42 Conferences Mobilize; empower developing  Established forums  Chaos out of order  Talking shops 31, 15, 10,
43 nations    
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APPENDIX D: "Arguments" for each Relational Model applied to themes identified through open coding         page 2 of 3 
Text   RM >>>> Communal sharing  Authority ranking  Equality matching  Market pricing Coded at pilot item number #:
Coding               CS                 AR                EM                MP [no.]= only partial fit;[name]=other ref.
    Node↓   Worldview >>>> Egalitarian  Hierarchical  "Fatalist"  Individualist       CS       AR      EM        MP
44 Consequences Threats  Predict and manage  Diverse - almost perverse  Overstated threats; opportunities 16, 4,32,[48]16,29 [12]
45 Iconic consequences Inundation & aridity; glaciers  Seawalls and regulations  Refugees  Repeating cycles - wine in north, ice ages6,56 4, 6,               31 [38][25]
46 New consequences New dire consequences  New, cumulative local   Function of human development 16,48 38, 54,
47    
48 Climate refugees Condemnation of econom order Govts must manage security threat Lifeboat ethics  Need economic empowerment [42] 6,
49    for self-determination
50 Consumerism See "the public are…"    
51 Functions? Vanity  // Belonging  Coherence, Status marking  [  xxx exchange? ]  Right to choose 52,
52 "I, as a consumer.." want to buy ethical / [sustainable] will buy what regs allow me to  don't know what to do: too difficult will buy what I want and can afford 35, 18,35
53   like comfort and convenience  35,
54 Economics    
55 Gains- rights Socialised  Private  No excessive winners  Greatest good 44,
56 Losses - costs Private: Strict fault  Socialised  No excessive losers  Least Harm
57 Discount rate Zero or -ve  Technical (Stern)  [inapproriate tool]  High (Nordhaus)
58 Historic GHG emissions Included in calc  Acknowledged (balance)  Equal - but on what criteria?  Ignored [40]
59 Present GHG emissions Ignored  Priority rights  Equal - but on what criteria?  Pareto optimality
60 Target future emissions Developed < Developing  Developed>Developing  Equal - but on what criteria?  Pareto optimality
61 Mitigation costs Technology Transfer  Emission permits  Polluter pays but don't tax me!  Market [31] [51] 51,
62 Adaptation costs Developed world pays  Emission permits fund  Polluter pays but don't tax me!  Market
nb: UNFCCC logic is to target equal future emissions, with developed world compensating developing for historic emissions with technology/adaptation funding
63    
64 Economic objectives: planet & GDP Planet before growth  Sustainable growth  [no loss dev'd world: growth dev'ing] Growth 57, 57,
65 Business - risks  Regulatory uncertainty   enviro disruption 30, 32,
66 Business - opportunities    44,47,30
67 pressure on bus to be green    customers, investors 44,30
68    
69 Finite Resources Generalised over-consumption  S/T managed allocations  commons dilemma  human resourcefulness; market solutions57, [11]
70  L/T technological solutions   historic record; tech innovation
71    
72 Forests & living resources Natural treasure, disappearing  Manageable resource  commons dilemma  Market pricing of long term value 15,[26] [57]
73 Deforestation Wanton destruction  Resource wastefulness  Compensation, corruption  Market pricing of long term value 15,[26],5747, [47]
74 biodiversity Wanton destruction    need to avoid loss of opportunities 15,
75    
76 Global politics and relations    
77 Developing world Exploited, exposed to our pollution At fault (colonial)  [their turn now?]  Needs growth; not elitist lectures 6,57 57, 56,
78 Developing world  Needs help (post-colonial)...  ..but that help destructive  resource curse/disempowered 10, 15, 15,
79 Iconic nations "us"; sometimes Scandinavians  If only there was one.  "IPCC"  China  USA 56, 2,10,23
80 Security issues Generalised unsustainability  Climate refugees & enery security Climate refugees  Resource reliance on unstable states
81 Local v global ??  ??  ??  ?? [15] [15]
82 Governmental action    
83 Generally, governments Need to do more/the right things Are managing the problem   need to enable individuals to solve 30,40
84 Subsidies Help the needy  Enabling private sector  Inevitably distort  Distorts; inefficient [47]
85 Tax Works for the greater good  Directs transition of resource use penalises unfairly  Distorts; inefficient [20] 20,
86 Regulation Prevents destructive selfishness leadership through regulation   Distorts; inhibits innovation 30,
87 International co-operation    
88     
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APPENDIX D: "Arguments" for each Relational Model applied to themes identified through open coding         page 3 of3 
Text   RM >>>> Communal sharing  Authority ranking  Equality matching  Market pricing Coded at pilot item number #:
Coding               CS                 AR                EM                MP [no.]= only partial fit;[name]=other ref.
    Node↓   Worldview >>>> Egalitarian  Hierarchical  "Fatalist"  Individualist       CS       AR      EM        MP
89 Historic climate change is evidence of past catastrophes that could  what to plan for  [inevitability?]  that variation is natural... 4,3,48 4,48 61,25,54
90 repeat    ..and humans [will] adapt
91    
92 Existing human infrastructure/capital wrong sort in wrong place to  Build on existing, incrementally [wouldn't start form here?]  Always starting again 30,44,48 [Blair] [30]
93 face CC  or, L/T planned reorganisation  30,48
94    
95 Human priorities Environment> growth  Allocate resources effectively  What do I get in return?  Present health issues, present poverty 57, [46]
96 Maslowian analysis   Eco-concern a luxury denying the poor their turn 52,
97   Lomborg - Aids, malaria, developing country infrastructure
98 Hypocrisy and cynicism >>>>>>>>  >>>>>>>  You don't do what you're asking me to  <<<<<<<<<<< 15,
99 ..reflexive realism - look at others' actionsFuel tax protests; airport expansion "What kind of society do voters want?"  Realism - we all like our comforts All feed EM. [44,46,47]58,
100    [35]
101 Iconic evidence (1) Glaciers; polar bears  Katrina.  2003 EU heat wave  China  Medieval wine; Thames ice fairs 36,48,30 [40]
102  Aims to predict; but reactive - there must be no more Katrina's  Recent cold snaps
103 Iconic Evidence (2) Ice cores; hockey stick  Consensus of the eminent  ?Computer model sensitivity  Sun spots; Rogue Nobels and economists 36,
104    
105 Mitigation measures - general Reduce consumption  Big tech; nuclear  Shared burden (commons)  Market pricing induces... 32, [5],37 [51]
106 Preferred approaches Renewables  CCS; geo-engineering  Developing world must act too  ...tech innovation 39, 48,[53] 31, 53,
107 Preferred approaches Trees  Waste reduction, efficiency  >Byrd-Hagel  If necessary, geo-engineering 34,43 31,
108 Problems   Belated geo-engineering  27,
109 Problems Vested tech interests lobby   Corruption  37,
110    
111 Nature Cutural theory Fragile {planet; earth}  Tolerant within limits  Unpredictable  Benign, resilient, infinite 26, 39,
112 Nature > man pure > polluting  Awesome/to be respected  Man just another animal  To be harnessed and enjoyed 61, 52,53
113 Man > nature Disruptive; could destroy  Steward  Man just another animal  Progressive development 45,15 [J Gray] 39,
114    
115 New Factors new evidence It's even worse than we thought All pointing in same direction  It's chaos - who to believe?  It's not nearly so bad// no A in GW 48,3,38 38, 25,[17]18
116  Justifies determined action   It's much more complicated; don't be hasty 48,
117 Negative feedback; runaway CC   Nature resilient; man resourceful 4,3,48
118    
119 Offsets Individual Everybody doing their bit  Orderly rationing  Fair exchange// but free-riders Fatuous delusion - indulgences 35, 43,
120 Carbon Trading eg ETS Delusion; ineffective  Orderly rationing  [liable to corruption]  Market efficiency 41,43 [40] 40,43
121 Other Trees  Creates pull for efficiency   Business opportunity 43, 43, 43,
122    
123 Religious.. Adherents are Eco-nuts: GW their new religion Enslaved to worship scientific  [Afraid: "Biblical" floods, storms] Market fundamentalists 59, 19,
124 ..language Zealots blind to counter evidence order  [individual offsets: penance?]  Worshippers of tech progress 53,
125    
126 Technology Illusory solutions - denial  Requires co-ordinated planning  [suspicious?]  human ingenuity will deliver 53,57 [Blair]
127    
128 Time Running out.  For government to lead  Random; anything can happen  Enough to wait and see 56,[30] 30, 60,
129 Long term view  Balancing; discounting   Short term
130    
131 Tourism Excess consumption; enviro stressIntegrates; homogenises  Familiarity leads to trust  Wealth distribution; education 35,52 52,
132   leisure democratisation  self-expression 52, 52,
133 Travel logic Local is better - why go further? [Predict & provide infrastructure] Necessity of modern life  Mobility =freedom, and drives growth 35,52  
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APPENDIX E Coding Matrix of the Four Standpoints 
Arguments Communal 
Sharing 
Authority Ranking 
Equality 
Matching 
Market 
Pricing 
Summary Standpoint on 
Climate Change 
We consume so much that we are ruining 
our planet. We need to cut back to avoid 
catastrophic climate change. 
We do need to act on climate change, but 
that doesn't mean a revolution: it means 
governments taking appropriate action 
There's no point in the UK doing anything 
about climate change, when countries like 
China are growing so fast, so I don't see 
why I should be asked to pay higher taxes 
or give up things to stop it. 
There has always been climate change. We 
will use technology to adapt to changes as 
we have always done. 
Foundational 
Principle 
CS1 
Equality; Shared Challenge; all in it 
together 
AR1 
1.1: primacy of established Institutions 
1.2: need for government 
EM1 
Reciprocity 
MP1 
Individual freedom, private interests 
Approach 
CS2 
2.1: Can all do our bit 
2.2: Mankind is/we are guilty 
AR2 
Restrictions and regulations, 
government control  
EM2   2.1:What‘s in it for me? 
2.2 I‘m doing my bit 
2.3:Commons dilemma 
2.4: Nimbyism 
MP2 
Use the market to facilitate individual 
action, rational economic behaviour 
Economics 
CS3 
Limits 
Over-consumption 
AR3 
3.1: Which policy instruments? 
3.2:Business as usual 
3.3:Ecological modernisation 
 EM3 
3.1: Need for compensation 
3.2: Polluter pays principle 
MP3 
Need to price externalities 
Commitment to economic growth 
Nature CS4 Nature fragile Included within Nature and Man 
EM4 
Uncontrollable; 
Unpredictable 
MP4 
Nature ‗bigger‘ = benign, bountiful 
Nature & Man 
CS5 
Natural is good, pure 
Human limitations 
AR5 
Man as steward of nature 
Man‘s expertise measures nature: 
EM5 
Man powerless; 
‗the little man‘ 
MP5 
Man adapts nature, 
Adapts to nature 
Knowledge, Wisdom 
CS6 
Natural wisdom 
Human lack of understanding 
AR6 
6.1: Targets, management by numbers 
6.2: Sound science. Experts 
EM6 
6.1:It‘s pointless, too difficult.  No 
alternatives 
6.2:Logic of the Commons D. 
MP6 
Market rationality; Invisible hand 
Other people CS7 Duty to help others, those in need 
AR7 
7.1: Others as insiders, duty of care, 
instruction 
7.2: Others outsiders: threat 
EM7 
7.1: Not fair.  Stop bossing me 
7.2: Why don‘t they solve it? 
7.3: Blame others 
MP7:    Laissez-faire: 
others as rational self-interested 
agents; can fend for themselves 
Outlook 
CS8 
8.1:Catastrophic unless 
8.2: logical to co-operate 
8.3:co-operation morally right 
AR8 
We need to manage the future 
EM8 
Pessimism, It‘s all too difficult 
MP8: 
Optimism, opportunity 
Faith in technology 
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Appendix F: Main Media Sample                       Page 1 of 3 
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 TFG N/A
1 10 Financial Times 26-Jan-83 624  P  P UNCTAD support for developing countries commodities  P  P  P
2 13 Financial Times 1-Jun-83 511  P Medium range weather patterns  P  P  P
3 20 Financial Times 3-Nov-83 703  P  P  P  P Science of GW replacing new ice age  P  P  P
4 63 The Times 27-Feb-86 305  P Weather cancels rugby match  P  P  P
5 96 The Times 7-Nov-86 541  P  P  P Ozone conference with refs to GW  P  P  P
6 274 The Guardian 8-Sep-88 319  P  P Agriculural over-production; GW impacts on farming  P  P  P
7 299 The Times 30-Sep-88 624  P  P  P Thatcher's environmentalism and economics  P  P  P
8 483 Financial Times 2-Feb-89 302  P UK politics, water polution and GW policies  P  P  P
9 510 Financial Times 16-Feb-89 912  P  P  P  P  P Dutch enviro concern  P  P  P
10 822 The Guardian 15-May-89 405  P US drought attributed to GW  P  P  P
11 922 Financial Times 9-Jun-89 527  P  P  P Policy options for mitigating GW, eg Tax  P  P  P
12 1389 Financial Times 13-Oct-89 843  P  P  P  P UN GW conf; domestic energy effieicency  P  P  P
13 1412 The Times 16-Oct-89 651  P  P  P  P [split]UK politics; US report calls for GW action  P  P  P
14 1676 The Sunday Times 31-Dec-89 3271  P  P [digest incl]Thatcher's enviro concern  P  P  P
15 1922 Financial Times 1-Mar-90 80  P  P Govt funding for CC research  P  P  P
16 2168 The Independent 16-May-90 746  P  P  P US role at Norway conf  P  P  P
17 2204 The Times 23-May-90 867  P  P  P Maddox let reason rule  P  P  P
18 2264 The Guardian 28-May-90 218  P FoE new chief  P  P  P
19 2486 The Independent 17-Jul-90 583  P Thatcher, minor ref GW  P  P  P
20 2519 The Independent 28-Jul-90 553  P Irrelevant article  P  P  P
21 2660 The Guardian 14-Sep-90 668  P B Coal's non sceptic expert  P  P  P
22 2671 The Guardian 17-Sep-90 642  P  P Apocalyptic Welsh theatre  P  P  P
23 2689 The Guardian 21-Sep-90 351  P  P  P EU negs on CC  P  P  P
24 2795 The Guardian 11-Oct-90 431  P  P  P Thames barrier not high enough  P  P  P
25 3087 The Times 4-Jan-91 484  P  P  P GW cause sea level drop?  P  P  P
26 3274 The Guardian 29-Mar-91 756  P  P  P Eco-debt at Earth summit  P  P  P
27 3774 The Guardian 14-Dec-91 366  P  P  P UK and EU on carbon tax  P  P  P
28 3788 The Independent 21-Dec-91 614  P  P Science on warm temps: GW?  P  P  P
29 4230 The Times 21-May-92 192  P  P GW impact on pollen, hay fever  P  P  P
30 4457 Daily Mail 13-Jun-92 867  P  P  P  P John Major @ Rio  P  P  P
31 4678 Financial Times 23-Sep-92 687  P No progress at Energy Trust  P  P  P
32 5590 The Times 8-Apr-94 162  P  P Cut cars, invest in public trans  P  P  P
33 6139 The Guardian 28-Mar-95 667  P Rich nust act, help dev'ing: creed  P  P  P
34 6340 Financial Times 1-Jul-95 964  P  P Alarmism and empriricism  P  P  P
35 6391 Daily Mirror 4-Aug-95 894  P  P Crazy ozone-GW exagg  P  P  P
36 6604 Mail on Sunday 3-Dec-95 67  P Whales killed by GW tests  P  P  P
37 6698 The Observer 14-Jan-96 1000  P [digest incl] GW higher temps  P  P  P
38 7627 The Times 4-Apr-97 1997  P Blair Manifesto; inclusion of CC  P  P  P
39 8413 The Independent 11-Oct-97 511  P  P  P  P FoE criticises UK 'holier than thou'  P  P  P
40 8765 The Times 29-Nov-97 1113  P  P Pre-Kyoto; Marshall Is evac  P  P  P
41 9319 Financial Times 13-Mar-98 413  P  P Popular rhetoric vs effective policy  P  P  P
42 9356 The Guardian 20-Mar-98 1879  P  P  P  P  P Forest fires; poverty. Complexity. GW/El Nino?  P  P  P
43 9447 Financial Times 16-Apr-98 891  P  P  P  P post-Kyoto review; momentum, issues  P  P  P
44 9709 The Guardian 10-Jun-98 282  P  P Sellafield; public opinion in UK and US  P  P  P
45 9817 The Guardian 11-Jul-98 921  P Eulogy on cherries: minor GW will boost in UK  P  P  P
46 10008 Daily Mail 2-Sep-98 328  P Wet summer in scotland.  P  P  P
47 10345 The Times 9-Nov-98 476  P  P Delays to Venice Barrage  P  P  P
48 10585 Daily Mail 29-Dec-98 1342  P  P Review of 1928 predictions for 2000.  Minor.  P  P  P
49 10661 The Guardian 25-Jan-99 489  P  P  P Dying coral; human pollution  P  P  P
50 10673 The Guardian 30-Jan-99 382  P  P [digest]: Antartic conf on human impact  P  P  P
51 10760 Daily Mail 6-Mar-99 313  P  P Bookies' odds on end of the world  P  P  P
52 11185 The Times 16-Jul-99 39  P  P  P Note of new CC weather research centre  P  P  P
53 11757 The Independent 26-Nov-99 1601  P Sound archive: fauna as measure of CC  P  P  P
54 12089 The Sun 25-Feb-00 758  P  P Jeremy Clarkson rant  P  P  P
55 12812 Financial Times 2-Aug-00 421  P  P  P Achieving effective fuel duty/policies  P  P  P
56 12970 The Guardian 1-Sep-00 518  P  P  P  P Political debate, tax v permits  P  P  P
57 13493 Financial Times 6-Nov-00 674  P US Presidential debates; minor.  P  P  P
58 13912 The Mirror 24-Nov-00 37  P [tiny] GW economic damage warning  P  P  P
59 14332 Daily Mail 23-Dec-00 682  P  P Exotic fish in UK seas  P  P  P
60 14506 The Observer 14-Jan-01 2105  P  P In depth: GW impact on ski industry  P  P  P  
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61 17121 The Independent 28-Sep-01 512  P  P GW 1/many variables change in mallard pop'n  P  P  P
62 17989 Daily Mail 18-Feb-02 112  P  P Ongoing warming even if emissions cut  P  P  P
63 19160 Daily Telegraph 8-Aug-02 230  P Jet trails 'change' climate  P  P  P
64 20529 The Observer 12-Jan-03 812  P Retail: passing ref to CC levy  P  P  P
65 20909 The Times 5-Mar-03 1629  P  P  P  P 9 letters re Gatwick expansion: 1 refs CC  P  P  P
66 21462 Financial Times 7-Jul-03 191  P  P Govt report says flood risks greater  P  P  P
67 23709 Daily Telegraph 7-May-04 385  P  P  P  P UK/EU emissions cuts: targets reduced  P  P  P
68 23880 The Independent 24-May-04 1238  P  P  P  P Lovelock: despair, need for nuclear  P  P  P
69 25344 Financial Times 15-Oct-04 546  P  P  P Tory policy vacuum  P  P  P
70 25655 The Independent 5-Nov-04 354  P  P Electricity generator news, comment on nuclear  P  P  P
71 26320 The Independent 29-Dec-04 859  P Tsunami, mention of man-made GW  P  P  P
72 26816 The Guardian 2-Feb-05 478  P  P  P Plan to focus on biodiversity hotspots  P  P  P
73 27315 Mail on Sunday 6-Mar-05 1039  P  P Supervolcano movie: minor ref CC movie  P  P  P
74 27728 Daily Telegraph 15-Apr-05 482  P  P Examples of earlier spring  P  P  P
75 27854 The Times 23-Apr-05 239  P  P  P  P  P Local council fights faster grass growth  P  P  P
76 27930 Daily Mail 29-Apr-05 2128  P  P Humorous diary of ethical living  P  P  P
77 28656 The Sunday Times 12-Jun-05 628  P  P Legal hearings on M74 extension  P  P  P
78 28812 The Express 20-Jun-05 154  P  P  P Attack on lukewarm CC proposals to G8  P  P  P
79 30227 The Times 25-Aug-05 486  P  P CC makes UK 2nd homes more attractive  P  P  P
80 30472 Daily Star 11-Sep-05 210  P  P Post Katrina; comment on US CC policy  P  P  P
81 30812 Daily Telegraph 28-Sep-05 171  P  P  P EU plan to include planes in ETS  P  P  P
82 30817 Daily Mail 28-Sep-05 386  P Coconuts washed up in UK: can we grow them?  P  P  P
83 30872 The Guardian 30-Sep-05 256  P Music review, track titled 'GW'  P  P  P
84 31283 Independent on Sunday23-Oct-05 903  P space probe to examine 'GH' effect on Venus  P  P  P
85 32095 Financial Times 1-Dec-05 142  P  P  P New chair appt'd at 'Eco-Securities'  P  P  P
86 32430 The Independent 15-Dec-05 255  P  P  P Attack: gov't not serious about CC  P  P  P
87 33103 The Independent 28-Jan-06 796  P  P  P Simon Hughes' sexuality & leadership agenda  P  P  P
88 34580 Daily Telegraph 5-Apr-06 668  P  P  P Review of Ice Age 2  P  P  P
89 34616 The Independent 7-Apr-06 179  P Film list includes Ice Age 2  P  P  P
90 35035 The Independent 28-Apr-06 1401  P  P  P CC: new plants you can grow in UK  P  P  P
91 35426 The Times 18-May-06 513  P  P  P  P UK energy issues: CC, Russian gas, nuclear  P  P  P
92 35605 The Independent 25-May-06 791  P  P  P Reveiw of Attenborough prog on CC  P  P  P
93 35651 Financial Times 27-May-06 151  P  P  P Bonn UNFCCC talks  P  P  P
94 36334 Daily Telegraph 24-Jun-06 882  P  P Ptarmigan population declines  P  P  P
95 36476 Daily Telegraph 1-Jul-06 1045  P  P  P Debate over low-emission auto - technologies  P  P  P
96 37675 The Independent 23-Aug-06 62  P Comment on windfarms  P  P  P
97 37739 The Sunday Times 27-Aug-06 1499  P  P  P "Green is the new black" eco-consumerism etc  P  P  P
98 37874 Daily Telegraph 2-Sep-06 824  P  P  P  P  P  P Motoring & GW; Inconvenient Truth  P  P  P
99 38276 The Independent 15-Sep-06 136  P  P Review of Book, 'Fragile Earth'  P  P  P
100 38766 The Guardian 26-Sep-06 40  P  P  P Trail for web debate on offsetting  P  P  P
101 38808 The Independent 27-Sep-06 737  P Energy saving tips at Ideal Home Show  P  P  P
102 39248 Daily Mail 11-Oct-06 178  P  P UK making more wine than France 2100  P  P  P
103 39257 The Guardian 11-Oct-06 660  P  P Brown on terrorism.  CC as lower priority  P  P  P
104 39489 The Express 20-Oct-06 93  P  P  P Mankind won't survive 1000 years.  P  P  P
105 39703 Daily Telegraph 27-Oct-06 1435  P  P Industrial chemicals reg: Cameron on enviro  P  P  P
106 39855 The Guardian 30-Oct-06 543  P  P  P  P  P  P Can the new Stern review influence the US?  P  P  P
107 40558 Financial Times 9-Nov-06 529  P  P  P Impact on Blair of US politics/Bush.  P  P  P
108 41122 Daily Star 25-Nov-06 386  P  P Bacteria + chocolate = alt energy  P  P  P
109 41215 The Independent 27-Nov-06 1072  P  P EU gas dependence on dangerous Russia  P  P  P
110 41836 The Independent 15-Dec-06 459  P  P  P  P Gov't backs airport expansion  P  P  P
111 41945 The Guardian 18-Dec-06 1538  P  P  P Bruegel; art, meaning & climate change  P  P  P
112 42582 The Guardian 10-Jan-07 656  P  P  P Blair refuses to offset air travel; then does.  P  P  P
113 42770 The Sunday Times 14-Jan-07 143  P  P Balloon flight for enoughsenough.org  P  P  P
114 43421 News of the World 28-Jan-07 164  P  P  P  P Blair claims US attitude to CC changing  P  P  P
115 43465 Sunday Express 28-Jan-07 453  P RSPB birdwatch; birds indicators of CC  P  P  P
116 43584 Daily Telegraph 1-Feb-07 433  P  P 'Balmy' mild winter weather  P  P  P
117 43908 Daily Telegraph 6-Feb-07 52  P  P Pepys' diary records strange warm winter  P  P  P
118 44313 Daily Star 15-Feb-07 732  P "Text Maniacs": celeb hypocrisy moan  P  P  P
119 44915 Daily Telegraph 2-Mar-07 343  P  P  P Lehman's appt new 'Head of CC"  P  P  P
120 45057 Daily Star 5-Mar-07 65  P  P CC may bring new spiders etc to Scotland  P  P  P  
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121 45831 Sunday Mirror 18-Mar-07 517  P  P  P  P Ryanair Rant: hypocrisy of greens  P  P  P
122 46555 The Mirror 7-Apr-07 390  P  P  P  P New IPCC report outlined  P  P  P
123 46868 The Sunday Times 15-Apr-07 433  P Native Irish species that survived Ice Age  P  P  P
124 46991 Daily Mail 19-Apr-07 1252  P  P  P  P  P Kilimanjaro and alarmism  P  P  P
125 47588 Daily Mail 4-May-07 913  P Uk Politics, minor ref CC  P  P  P
126 47794 The Guardian 8-May-07 865  P  P TV review refs meat and CC  P  P  P
127 48818 The Times 1-Jun-07 767  P European beach water quality; minor ref  P  P  P
128 49619 The Guardian 18-Jun-07 767  P  P US presidential election, Gore on CC  P  P  P
129 49793 Financial Times 23-Jun-07 316  P  P  P Darfur and local CC  P  P  P
130 50279 Daily Star 4-Jul-07 736  P Text Maniacs: typical sceptic  P  P  P
131 50300 The Guardian 4-Jul-07 87  P  P  P Govt should practice as it preaches  P  P  P
132 50923 Daily Star 16-Jul-07 272  P Live Earth  P  P  P
133 51135 Financial Times 23-Jul-07 610  P US/UK relations  P  P  P
134 52443 The Guardian 28-Aug-07 1062  P GW humour; dutch flooding  P  P  P
135 52464 The Express 29-Aug-08 489  P  P  P UK green travel policies  P  P  P
136 52915 Daily Mail 11-Sep-07 1092  P  P  P Littlejohn rant at policitians and eco-loonies  P  P  P
137 54099 The Guardian 13-Oct-07 469  P  P  P  P UK backsliding on EU renewables targets  P  P  P
138 54505 Sunday Express 21-Oct-07 132  P Letter demands research to see if CC 'true'  P  P  P
139 54834 The Times 29-Oct-07 233  P  P Vets worry about new diseases  P  P  P
140 54883 Daily Telegraph 31-Oct-07 226  P  P Energy security more urgent than CC  P  P  P
141 55124 The Guardian 7-Nov-07 139  P  P Brown gov't agenda; includes CC  P  P  P
142 55150 Daily Telegraph 8-Nov-07 442  P Post-apocalyptic theatre reviewed  P  P  P
143 55633 Daily Telegraph 20-Nov-07 167  P Electric car infrastructure proposal  P  P  P
144 55921 Financial Times 26-Nov-07 582  P  P  P Brown weak relationship with EU, minor CC  P  P  P
145 55956 The Sun 26-Nov-07 782  P  P  P 'The Sun' campaign: schools plant trees  P  P  P
146 56237 Daily Star 3-Dec-07 81  P  P  P GW threatens tea and coffee production  P  P  P
147 56439 Daily Telegraph 8-Dec-07 571  P Skiing holidays more expensive - minor CC  P  P   P
148 57510 The Sunday Times 6-Jan-08 2234  P Annual horoscopes;  CC passing mention  P  P  P
149 57606 The Times 9-Jan-08 1061  P  P  P  P  P Finkelstein Frum new conservatism; eg on CC  P  P  P
150 57906 The Independent 18-Jan-08 1242  P  P  P  P ETS distortion of UK energy market; coy profits  P  P  P
151 59794 Daily Telegraph 14-Mar-08 813  P  P  P McCain campaign;UK perspective, mention of CC  P  P  P
152 60129 Sunday Express 23-Mar-08 456  P  P  P  P Ethical investment fund recommendations  P  P  P
153 60621 The Express 9-Apr-08 189  P  P 2 letters, 1 'for' and 1 'against' AGW  P  P  P
154 60623 Financial Times 9-Apr-08 140  P  P Energy security more urgent than CC  P  P  P
155 61050 The Guardian 22-Apr-08 966  P  P US democratic campaign;  CC one policy area  P  P  P
156 61476 Financial Times 7-May-08 951  P Frum US election and conservatism, minor CC  P  P  P
157 61903 The Guardian 23-May-08 514  P  P Ocean acidification  P  P  P
158 62245 Daily Telegraph 3-Jun-08 298  P  P  P Bishops attacks CC denial: = child abuse  P  P  P
159 62700 The Times 17-Jun-08 616  P  P  P  P Conservatives ducking hard enviro choices  P  P  P
160 63145 The Guardian 3-Jul-08 292  P Worry over new GHG gas in flatscreen TVs  P  P  P
161 64114 The Guardian 1-Aug-08 338  P  P  P Challen on big energy vs alternative energy  P  P  P
162 64885 The Guardian 4-Sep-08 888  P  P Nanotechnology: incl use in 'green' solutions  P  P  P
163 64987 Financial Times 8-Sep-08 637  P US Presidential campaign; McCain on CC  P  P  P
164 65723 The Guardian 6-Oct-08 407  P  P  P Saving Post offices - enviro benefits  P  P  P
165 66818 Financial Times 20-Nov-08 485  P  P  P  P US Industry lobby for tough CC regs  P  P  P
166 67225 The Guardian 8-Dec-08 275  P  P  P  P Error in biofuels legislation  P  P  P
167 68526 The Guardian 27-Jan-09 935  P  P  P  P Severn barrage consultation process  P  P  P
168 69486 The Times 2-Mar-09 614  P  P  P  P Brown & Obama; policy areas of common ground  P  P  P
169 70349 Independent on Sunday29-Mar-09 519  P  P  P Extra CC summit with G8 pre COP15  P  P  P
170 71041 The Sunday Times 19-Apr-09 2993  P  P  P  P Grow your own; transition towns; Peak Oil  P  P  P
171 71375 Daily Telegraph 30-Apr-09 350  P  P  P Grand (sustainable) designs for Paris  P  P  P
172 71431 The Express 2-May-09 141  P  P CO2 storage under North Sea  P  P  P
173 71765 The Express 15-May-09 530  P Disgraced MP sacked as CC adviser  P  P  P
174 71889 The Times 18-May-09 227  P  P  P Russian claims in Arctic; CC a security issue  P  P  P
175 71985 The Sun 22-May-09 150  P  P New Met office computer  P  P  P
176 72183 The Mirror 28-May-09 390  P  P MPs expenses; more urgent issues like CC  P  P  P
177 73063 The Guardian 26-Jun-09 970  P  P  P  P Congress due to vote on US CC bill  P  P  P
178 74163 The Express 24-Jul-09 210  P  P  P  P EM rant over council tax;eg  'CC co-ordiantors'  P  P  P
179 74597 The Independent 8-Aug-09 2684  P  P Review of Obama 1st 200 days  P  P  P
180 75119 The Independent 28-Aug-09 526  P  P  P  P Adaptation costs much > than UNFCCC estimates  P  P  P  
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Appendix G Main sampling frame; availability of titles on Nexis database 
 
Population of articles on Nexis database
Including phrases 'climate change' or 'global warming'
Main UK national newspapers as and when included on Nexis database
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Financial Times 8 14 8 4 11 29 61 267 294 154 194 136 121 145 142 371 252 263
Times/Sunday Times 0 0 0 6 25 19 88 470 369 171 226 97 84 142 147 295 227 202
Guardian/Observer 0 0 6 12 15 24 85 272 343 223 254 164 161 197 207 430 446 307
Independent/IoS 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 244 393 181 236 128 140 152 221 437 325 270
Telegraph/ST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mail/MoS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 62 32 66 9 86 206 165
Sun/NoW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Mirror/SM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 19 49 59 60
Express, Star/SE,SS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
Total articles 8 14 14 22 51 72 242 1253 1399 729 1020 587 538 718 745 1668 1515 1302
'Broadsheet' 8 14 14 22 51 72 242 1253 1399 729 910 525 506 636 717 1533 1250 1042
'Redtop'/'middlebrow' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 62 32 82 28 135 265 260
'Broadsheet' 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 89% 89% 94% 89% 96% 92% 83% 80%
'Redtop'/'middlebrow' 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11% 6% 11% 4% 8% 17% 20%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total   % of total No in
Jan/Aug sample
Financial Times 373 606 406 408 569 878 1062 2122 1542 838 11278 15.0% 26 14.4%
Times/Sunday Times 423 524 471 371 485 957 1534 2391 1762 2030 13516 18.0% 29 16.1%
Guardian/Observer 523 568 500 495 742 1289 1892 2749 2404 1655 15963 21.2% 41 22.8%
Independent/IoS 520 604 439 429 650 1361 1846 1411 922 559 11476 15.3% 25 13.9%
Telegraph/ST 121 340 252 198 302 544 891 1612 929 555 5744 7.6% 19 10.6%
Mail/MoS 169 179 196 107 178 264 731 1462 973 303 5298 7.0% 14 7.8%
Sun/NoW 91 83 72 59 87 224 482 899 531 771 3308 4.4% 4 2.2%
Mirror/SM 136 168 161 153 217 308 444 776 514 286 3366 4.5% 5 2.8%
Express, Star/SE,SS 166 250 189 164 306 485 718 1650 895 431 5280 7.0% 17 9.4%
Total articles 2522 3322 2686 2384 3536 6310 9600 15072 10472 7428 75229 180
'Broadsheet' 1960 2642 2068 1901 2748 5029 7225 10285 7559 5637 57977 140
'Redtop'/'middlebrow' 562 680 618 483 788 1281 2375 4787 2913 1791 17252 40
'Broadsheet' 78% 80% 77% 80% 78% 80% 75% 68% 72% 76% 77% 78%
'Redtop'/'middlebrow' 22% 20% 23% 20% 22% 20% 25% 32% 28% 24% 23% 22%  
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Appendix H: Coding Matrix populated with references to articles 
 
Items in main sample Communal 
Sharing 
Authority Ranking 
Equality 
Matching 
Market 
Pricing 
Foundational 
Principle 
8, 26, 33, 35, 40, 68, 86, 87,  98, 
170 
1.1: 1, 11, 12, 15, 24, 26, 27, 30, 
42, 106, 114, 169, 171, 174 
1.2: 7, 13, 65, 69, 109 
22, 32, 39, 43, 54, 68, 95, 98, 99, 
136, 148, 149, 150 33, 38, 54, 87, 98, 112, 136, 179 
Approach 
2.1: 8, 9, 12, 18, 33, 68, 98, 100, 
112, 113, 145, 148,  164, 170 
2.2: 9, 34, 68, 76, 158 
5, 16, 17, 30,34,35, 43, 44,55, 
61,67,86,91,97, 
98,105,110,135,136,159, 160,165, 
166,167,168,177 
2.1:54, 68, 78, 136,178 
2.2:16, 23, 30, 39 ,65, 112 
2.3:16,41,33,67,75,98, 136 
2.4: 65, 77, 170 
7, 9, 11,12,38,43, 55, 56, 81, 107, 
110, 137, 150,157, 162, 165, 168 
Economics 
9, 26, 32, 34, 39, 41, 48, 55, 65, 
68, 76, 86, 88, 92, 97, 98, 104, 
112, 113, 126, 143, 164, 170 
3.1: 20 items.  
3.2: 7, 11, 34, 112, 136 
3.3: 31 items 
3.1: 26, 33, 41, 67, 150 
3.2: 9, 11, 39, 41, 42, 54, 55, 81, 
88, 100, 112, 135 
1,7,31,43,44,56,64,67,7179,81,85
,91,97,105,106, 
110,121,128,136,137,150152,161,
165, 170,177 
Nature 9, 22,40, 42,49, 50, 68, 72,74, 76,92,104, 170 
Covered under 
  ‗nature & man‘          
22, 35, 48, 60, 73,  74, 111, 116, 
117, 146 
3,17, 28, 46, 49,  54, 59, 60, 124, 
138, 153,  
Nature & Man 22, 26, 30, 34, 42, 49, 50, 53, 68, 73,104,  170 
7, 9, 11,14, 53, 55,68,72,111,119, 
124, 145, 149, 167  24, 42, 47, 48, 60, 73, 146 
5,6,7,9, 17, 21, 43,48, 56, 75, 82 
,85, 90. 97, 102, 111, 119,140, 
150, 152, 166, 167,170 
Knowledge, Wisdom 22, 26, 30, 40, 49, 53, 68, 84, 92, 97,  98, 99, 111, 170 
6.1:  26 items 
6.2:  25 items 
6.1: 16, 42, 76, 97, 112, 137 
6.2:  8, 11, 16, 33, 77, 98, 121 
7, 17, 34, 43, 44, 98,  102, 108, 
136, 152, 170 
Other people 16, 24, 26, 30, 33, 39, 42, 76, 80, 140, 158, 164, 169, 
7.1: 33, 40, 77, 97, 112, 145, 169 
7.2:  24, 91, 103, 109, 122, 129, 
154, 170 
7.1: 112, 118, 130, 136, 178 
7.2: 41, 97, 98, 138 
7.3:26, 42, 76,121, 178 
7, 54, 71: 
See 4.7.7 for explanation of low 
frequency 
Outlook 
8.1: 9,34, 68, 104, 112 
8.2: 34, 68, 112, 170 
8.3:65, 68, 76, 87, 97,170 
43, 65, 66, 91, 95, 98, 122, 124, 
128, 159,  170, 171, 174, 180 1, 3, 34, 41, 42, 47, 73, 111, 170 
12, 17, 34, 48, 65, 79, 98, 108, 
111, 112, 124,140, 159, 162 
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Appendix I:  Focus group consent form 
 
 
Focus Group held at the Manchester Novotel on 14th December 2009. 
Discussion topic : CLIMATE CHANGE 
Facilitator:  Chris Tennant. 
 
 
 
 
I consent to participate in the above focus group.  I consent to the recording 
of what I say in the focus group and the subsequent use of this data for social 
research purposes by Chris Tennant.  I understand that any information I 
provide is confidential, and that no information that could lead to the 
identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports on the project, 
or to any other party. No identifiable personal data will be published. The 
identifiable data will not be shared with any other organisation. 
 
Apart from receipt of a cash contribution towards expenses, or a course upon 
completion of the discussion, my participation is voluntary, and I understand 
that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can 
withdraw at any stage of the project without being further penalised or 
disadvantaged in any way. 
 
 
 
Signed:       Name: (Caps) 
 
 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
 
 
………………………………………..  …………………………………………….. 
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Appendix J:  Supplement to Chapter 5, analysis of five focus 
groups 
J1. Student Group 1 
J1.1 Student Group 1, outline 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used by the different participants: 
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
Amber 23% 29% 27% 43% 31% 23%
Hilda 34% 27% 17% 43% 33% 25%
Mercy 19% 16% 7% 47% 40% 44%
Keith 24% 26% 34% 48% 34% 19%
* % of participant speech, excluding facilitator
Highest in column Highest RM for individual Both Highest
 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used in the different sections of the focus group: 
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total AR CS EM MP no RMs
SG1 A 24% 3% 23% 32% 21% 38%
SG1B 32% 15% 15% 42% 26% 32%
SG1C 32% 49% 23% 46% 45% 14%
SG1RMQs 13% 9% 7% 33% 21% 53%
SG1 22% 18% 40% 30% 31%
 
J1.2. SG1A 
As suggested by the high percentage of ‗uncoded‘ content in the first section, the 
group takes some time to get going.  Topics include Hilda (SG1.79) and Mercy 
(SG1.89) suggesting personal experiences of the weather.  Other topics, such as 
irritation with people leaving the lights on (SG1.186) or difficulties with public 
transport  (SG1.311) might be coded as CS (3, overconsumption) or EM (6, no 
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alternative to having a car); this is really just an example of the coding being 
imprecise.  Sometimes the Relational Model logic of the argument is very explicit, 
sometimes less so.  As an international group (Singaporean, English, American, 
Australian) participants also provide extra information on the perspective from 
their home country or contrasts with other countries, some of which is not always 
directly relevant to the subject.  The group contrasts the commons dilemma (e.g. 
SG1.107) with the need for everyone to take responsibility for their own impact.  
This latter point is expressed in an interesting way: 
SG1.173 
Amber     I think it‘s too difficult for people to kind of understand you know me turning 
the lights off, would that make a difference?  But then if you think about the 
reverse way if everyone did leave lights on they would see how that would 
make an impact, make a difference, on climate change, it kind of works 
backwards..   I guess, as an argument for individual action. 
(EM6.2, CS2.1, MP5) 
As article #170 in the media analysis on transition towns showed, the CS 
Standpoint seeks to be an empowering call to individual responsibility within the 
collective, not a moaning complaint against consumerism.  If the collective good is 
taken as the goal of action, instead of individual utility, MP arguments for 
empowered individual initiative are still applicable.  The MP Standpoint would also 
see such collectively orientated action as adaptive to the social context. 
The prevailing focus of the section is on overconsumption driven by the 
expectation of convenience: 
SG1.220 
Mercy I wonder though if part of it is people just expect things to be available on 
demand like, erm, I‘m amazed at the number of busses that run in this city, 
and yet people still say there‘s not much, [Keith agreeing] like the transport‘s 
terrible and.  Whereas I see lots of busses and I.. well, and I think, Wow, can‘t 
you just take some of them off the road and have less?  But they have signs 
everywhere saying buses every five minutes there‘s this kind of idea of, like, 
demand, and I guess people demanding that you have a certain quality of 
services 
(MP1 individual freedom, 6, market rationality of demand, CS 3 over-
consumption, EM7 blaming others). 
J1.3. SG1B 
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This focus continues into section B.  As international students wanting to discover 
the world, flying is a convenience and opportunity none are willing to forego.  
Keith captures the tone: 
SG1.418 
Keith Yeah, I think it‘s more, right now, like she said .. like deciding whether you 
need to physically be in that place, because the thing for me is you know like 
getting to school, and the flights that I take is .. unless.. in terms of just the 
environmental effect, this might sound bad but they‘re necessary for me to be 
on those flights.  So really, if that‘s the only way for me to get to these places 
then that‘s how I have to get there.. 
 (EM6.1, no alternatives, MP1 doing what I want/need to do) 
As before, MP1‘s self-assertion is expressed a little shame-facedly.  The EM 
argument that there is no alternative, or the cost constraints of the poor student 
are more comfortable arguments and these dominate the section. 
Asked where they get their knowledge of climate change from, and whether they 
are sure it is real, Amber (SG1.557) and Mercy (SG1.576) both think there has been 
a change in knowledge and attitudes in recent years.  For Amber, the science has 
become more certain; for Mercy in Australia, droughts and bushfires have forced 
the issue centre stage.  Keith (SG1.567) and Hilda (SG1.597) both mention 
awareness gained through education, but direct experience is clearly the most 
powerful thing for Hilda and Mercy respectively: 
SG1.618 
Hilda when I stepped out on the bridge a couple of days [in November] ago cos I live 
in Southwark, walking across I mean, the sun was shining I put my sunglasses 
on I was in a T-shirt and I thought ‗this is climate ch –  ‗   something‘s 
something something‘s changing here.   Like [pheww]  I remember when it 
used to snow and now its relatively rare, but then again I also remember when 
it snowed this January.   When, well it‘s supposed to snow, so I can see that 
there‘s a massive mix up,   
(no RM codes applied to this: possibly EM4, nature unpredictable and 
chaotic) 
SG1.658 
Mercy I think when I was younger, there used to be more a story about luck, so 
there‘s the concept that drought was about luck, or there‘s no rain, it‘s about 
luck, but now, I think there‘s more of a I think the idea of climate change has 
made, erm, some people in the community that I grew up in probably  a bit 
more, erm, not feeling like it was their fault necessarily, that a crop didn‘t do 
very well. 
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(EM5 fatalism gives way to a CS4 diagnosis; CS2.2 sense of own 
responsibility for climate change). 
For the average citizen, the IPCC stressing that individual weather events are not 
the result of climate change makes no difference (IPCC, 2007, p. 310).  People 
need their personal experience of the ‗climate‘ to accord with the science they 
are being asked to accept. 
J1.4. SG1C 
Asked what the Government should be doing about climate change, the students 
have unsurprising expectations: putting up the price of energy to encourage 
efficiency (SG1.694, AR3.3, MP2) emissions trading schemes (SG1.710, MP2) or 
encouragement for voluntary efforts because people do not like to be forced to do 
things (SG1.724 CS2a, EM7j).  As with LG1, Hilda thinks people need a bit of a 
shock to wake them up (SG1.765).  The main topic in the section is government 
policy in Australia, which accounts for the high proportion of the section coded for 
AR arguments.  However, the students recognise that Australia cannot really do 
much in a vacuum: 
SG1.807 
Amber I think it‘s hard, especially in, in the case of Australia, people agree that 
something needs to be done, but the government really can only do so much 
because it is a gl a global problem, if Australia were to do everything it could 
it still wouldn‘t have, like necessarily have an impact in reducing [the 
incidence] of drought.  And that‘s where I think the international agreement, 
you know, [indistinct] an international consensus that we all need to do 
something for an impact to take place but what I think local governments can 
do is take steps to reduce the vulnerability of people to the droughts, er, yeah 
... instead of necessarily changing the in, the occurrence of droughts. 
(CS1 all in it together; 2.1 we can all do our bit, 8.1 need for co-
operation; EM 2.3 commons dilemma; MP5 man adapting to changing 
environment) 
But Mercy is pessimistic about the chances of success at Copenhagen: ― I think it 
will be an absolute miracle if anything happens..‖ (877, EM8).  This prospect 
leaves two options, resignation or blind faith that something will turn up: 
SG1.944 
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Amber I think it‘s like any other political agreement, that you‘ll have those back and 
forths and you can‘t really get angry with it cos it‘s not something that‘s 
unique just to the issue of climate change. 
 
Keith It‘s certainly something we‘ve seen before and you know you‘re going to see it 
again.  So, at this point angry is almost, it almost feels that angry is fruitless 
at this point. 
 
Hilda  Yeah I would agree with that.  Anger is kind of fruitless at the moment, but at 
the same time I kind of feel that someone needs to get angry.  But I don‘t, I 
can‘t see myself becoming angry just because we are so used to these 
negotiations going back and forth and nothing ever coming from them.  It‘s 
just become a habit that we‘ve just got used to that we don‘t expect any 
other way, and no-one sees the point of getting angry because we‘ve got used 
to it. 
(AR 3.2 Business as usual, EM 6.1 pointless, 7.3, blaming others, 8 
pessimism, MP1 role of private interests in negotiations, 7 expect self-
interested behaviour from others) 
 
Or: 
 
SG1.1024 
Amber Hopefully by then we‘ll have better technology to deal with it, so (MP5, 8) 
 
Facilitator To be able to adapt to it? 
 
Amber  Yeah, to adapt, and then even reduce carbon dioxide like with carbon 
sequestration or other technologies that arise in the next 50 years.  Um, so I 
think humanity will find a way to deal with it. 
 (MP5, 8) 
 
Keith Yes, I guess, I guess from  that sense I am confident that this will eventually be 
something that maybe is, maybe it [only?] becomes a big enough deal for 
people to [say] take action because of that type of disaster, or we‘ll find 
technology to deal with it, because I know that there is a lot of time and 
money being spent um on that type of research like 
(MP5,8) 
 
J1.5. SG1.RMQs 
The students‘ responses to the Relational Model statements contain a predictable 
mixture of qualified agreement or challenge using the logic of an alternative 
relational model.  Most interesting is the students‘ wrestling with the CS 
statement.  [As in some of the media articles, ref], willingness to agree to the 
logic of the statement is tempered by a presumption that we will not act on it.  
Because we know that humanity will not, or cannot, curb its consumption, 
somehow the CS diagnosis of overconsumption will not, maybe cannot, turn out to 
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be true.  5.2.7 mentioned Hilda‘s ‗paradox‘ or dilemma between environmentally 
responsible behaviour and cost considerations.  The full text of this piece is: 
 
SG1.1103 
Hilda   For me that sort of paradox makes me feel a little helpless because I don‘t 
know which way to go whether I should think focus on the cost or the 
environment, (EM 6g, too difficult, 8 pessimism) I mean, that [at the 
moment] the situation that we‘re in it has to be cost, (MP1 primacy of 
individual interest) but at the same time I don‘t think there needs to be a 
paradox, I think it can be achieved at the same time, I just think it‘s a matter 
of trying to work out how 
(AR 3.2 business as usual, 3.3, somehow you can square the circle with 
„ecological modernisation‟). 
Like the whole debate through this focus group, this piece shows how EM logic 
appears not just to trump the arguments of the other relational models but to 
take them over.  The students have to fly because there is no alternative: for LG1 
and SG1 adapting to there being no alternative means somehow they (others) will 
find new fuels to make it possible.  For Hilda, in spite of the paradox the current 
system will somehow continue unchanged.  As with LG1, the anticipated solution 
is expressed in AR arguments. 
J1.6 Does the RM Framework account for all of the arguments in SG1? 
 
Section 5.4.6 described the method used to check whether the Relational model 
Framework accounted for the different arguments employed in LG!.   the same 
method has been repeated for the five focus groups analysed in this appendix: 
section 5.5.3 summarises the results of this exercise for the five groups. 
 
To recapitulate the method; to assess whether the RM framework accounts for 
content where participants are making arguments about the ‗rights and wrongs‘ of 
climate change, the transcript was analysed into five different categories: 
 
A. Discussion about climate change with value-based  content 
B. Discussion about climate change with exclusively factual content 
C. Discussion not about climate change, with value-based content 
D. Discussion not about climate change, without strongly value-based content 
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E. Facilitator content. 
 
The table below analyses, by word count, how much of the content in each of the 
above categories has been coded with one or more RM codes: 
Coded Coded with Total
with an RM no RM
A category content 8554 1454 10008
B category content 53 212 265
C category content 314 146 460
D category content 0 121 121
Facilitator 547 1665 2212
Total 9468 3598 13066
 
The section of the table highlighted in yellow requires further investigation.  This 
focus group included an Australian participant, Mercy.  Australian bushfires and 
drought featured prominently in the discussion, and quite often this content saw 
Nancy recounting recent events in her home country.  This material challenged 
the classification system adopted – perhaps it should have been classified under 
‗B‘ above.  Over half of the content covered by the yellow section above was 
actually coded with a ‗maybe RM‘ code. 
This review of the content supports the conclusion that the RM framework does 
satisfactorily account for the climate change arguments in SG1. 
 
J2. Manchester Group 2 
J2.1. Manchester Group 2, outline 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used by the different participants: 
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% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
Bill 8% 20% 6% 57% 22% 14%
Jim 26% 12% 5% 76% 22% 22%
Jayne 19% 27% 36% 30% 22% 25%
Laura 18% 6% 38% 29% 30% 29%
Piers 29% 10% 26% 62% 11% 22%
* % of participant speech, excluding facilitator
Highest in column: Highest RM for individual Both Highest
 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used in the different sections of the meeting:  
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
MG2A 29% 17% 38% 37% 17% 26%
MG2B 26% 12% 10% 60% 10% 26%
MG2C 30% 9% 18% 49% 28% 32%
MG2RMQs 15% 15% 15% 48% 17% 35%
MG2 13% 21% 48% 18% 29%
 
J2.2 MG2A 
Asked for the first 3 things that come to mind when someone mentions climate 
change, most of the participants spell out exactly where they are coming from: 
Laura (MG2.28)  I wrote down, melting polar region, recycling and children. 
 
Jayne (32) Um, first image was blue planet set in the cosmos, sort of, sort of 
looking down.  Second one was fires in various places round various kind of 
continents.  And third one was hurricanes. 
 
Piers (38) Yeah, um, first was floods, second was politicians‘ awareness, um, and 
the third was space travel. 
 
Bill (43) Er, polar ice caps, er kind of unnecessary advertising, and Kyoto. 
 
Jim (47) Well, I put 3 countries down.  Put China, India and America…    -…Cos I think 
they‘re the 3 that aren‘t bothering. 
Laura goes on to express many CS arguments driven by having children (119) and a 
general concern for other people.  Firsthand experience of ‗communal sharing‘ 
following an accident about a year ago has made a lasting impression on her (932, 
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940).  Jayne also presages the CS perspective she adopts; recalling above 
(presumably) the famous Harrison Schmitt photograph of the blue planet, she goes 
on to refer often to the television programmes and public lectures she has seen 
and heard that describe the fragility of nature.  Jayne too is affected by direct 
experience; she has a son and granddaughter in Australia and is well aware of 
floods and bushfires there (106). 
Piers‘s early mention of politicians hints at EM frustration with those in power.  He 
references space travel because he is particularly angered at the pointless waste 
of fuel getting the space shuttle off the ground: this too seems to be driven by the 
direct experience of watching a shuttle launch (133).  He synthesises the ideas of 
politicians and waste later: 
MG2.308 
Piers Now why do we have to have the politicians flying all over the world to these 
meetings, using the fuel on the jet look at Air Force One to start with.  I 
mean, you know, people are saying don‘t take more that 3 holidays a year, 
and yet that gentleman‘s flying about every other week all over the world. 
Bill‘s idea of ‗unnecessary‘ advertising hints at future EM moans about the 
behaviour of others, but his answer to how the issue affects him personally is 
more telling: 
MG2.75 
Bill Erm, I mean personally, I think, I don‘t know if it‘s just because I‘m a younger, 
of a younger generation, I feel fairly, not indifferent but, like, I think there‘s 
probably enough kind of fossil fuels and things like that to see out my lifetime 
so, and maybe it‘s because I don‘t have children that I don‘t really see that far 
ahead, but, [looking] I understand  it‘s an issue and it‘s something that needs 
to be addressed, but I don‘t feel particularly strongly about it either way. 
This relative indifference is an express statement that Bill is not engaging in any 
‗Relational‘ thinking about something that is irrelevant.  He himself acknowledges 
this by saying ‗maybe it‘s because I don‘t have children‘.  The comment about 
there being enough fossil fuels for his life time is an MP5 argument: but it is also 
an example of the way that MP argumentation is typically quite asocial anyway.  A 
model that champions arguments like ‗I‘m alright Jack‘ (914) and ‗Let others take 
care of themselves‘ demands a system of non-interference, almost of non-
relating, more than prescribing ways of relating.  Chapter 7 explores this issue 
further. 
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Jim, who speaks most in the meeting, also gives a very clear introduction to his 
EM perspective by anticipating Commons Dilemma arguments as well as blaming 
others by hitting out at China, America and India as his 3 supposedly separate 
‗ideas‘.  Yet both Jim and Piers, for all their EM readiness to have a go at others, 
are very clear they think climate change is a problem, but it is one that won‘t 
affect them in their lifetime (Jim 57; Piers 78).  They favour EM arguments, but 
because they recognise it is a problem, they do not disagree with Jayne and 
Laura‘s emphasis on CS arguments.  Likewise, although Jayne does bridle at some 
of Jim‘s more excessive complaints (240), she is also thoroughly disillusioned with 
politicians (627, 860).  Laura too can express the EM need for transparency in 
taxes (970) and EM cynicism about airline offsets (978) or the Copenhagen summit 
(1624). 
Laura elegantly captures the dilemmas of modern living: 
MG2.199 
Laura: It is interesting that you mention the industrial revolution, since we have 
become um a, you know, a world of gadgets and machines, and and the need 
for fossil fuels to to power those, or alternative fuel.  Then you know we have 
actually, um, in the last say 250 years you know the amount of damage that 
we seem to have done is just phenomenal.   You know, the, the whole, we 
have, we have literally just started to trash our planet completely. (CS2b,4,5: 
nb „we‟, not „they‟, have trashed the planet.)  However, having said that, 
um, if there hadn‘t been the advances in technology I wouldn‘t be sat here 
now, because I wouldn‘t have made it through, um, having my both my girls, 
you know I would have had, I would have actually probably died having those 
children, but um, and medical intervention, you know, helped me.  So I‘m so 
very grateful for that, (MP2, 5, rational to take advantage of 
technological progress; EM6g, no alternative) however, I have also got 
friends now who are going completely the other end and they, you know, the 
tellies are being ditched, um, the kids aren‘t allowed to have their gameboys 
and whatever, and they have literally taken themselves out to remote 
highlands and set up home there. 
 (Cs3, 5) 
The ambivalence between feeling the CS arguments and giving up to EM despair 
weaves through the whole of the first section.  On the one hand, individual action 
―isn‘t going to make much difference in the grand scheme of things‖ (Bill 273).  
On the other, accumulating individual actions can add up to something: individual 
drops in the ocean can make ―a puddle...a pond... a lake... a sea‖ (Piers 293).    
But here Piers‘s expression of CS logic is really just a justification for further 
complaints about politicians jetting around the world (295) or Digby Cameron 
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going on a bike with his ―security guys following him in a car‖ (381).  Once again, 
Laura expresses the problem best: 
MG2.370 
Laura: I, I come from a, a particularly, um, wasteful, I would say, career.  You know, 
the aviation, you know, it, especially when you‘ve worked in first class or 
club, and you‘ve flown around the world and it is, you know it‘s extravagant 
and it‘s not necessary, but you know, those who have the money will p- will 
always pay for it, there‘ll always be, there‘s always going to be a demand, so 
no amount of arguing from you know Joe Bloggs it‘s just not going to work 
they‘ll always pay for it  
(CS3, overconsumption; MP3, 7 others will behave like rational 
economic agents). 
 
References to ‗unnecessary‘ consumption  have also been coded as ‗maybe AR‘.  
The AR Standpoint accommodates the CS economic diagnosis of overconsumption 
in moralising sermons on waste.  In economic terms, this relies on efficiency to 
eliminate waste (AR3.3); in relation to other people, it becomes a patrician 
admonishment on the sins of wastefulness (AR7.1; Boycott (2007) reports on David 
Attenborough giving this sermon).  As with other overlapping Relational Model 
arguments, this will be discussed further in chapter 7. 
J2.3. MG2B 
Section B opens with a comprehensive statement of the EM Standpoint from Bill: 
MG2.414 
Bill In so far as I don‘t think like on a even as kind of a society in Britain that doing 
little things will make that much of a difference on a grand scale.  It should 
have had to come from even taking Britain out of the equation I think we‘re 
quite good generally certainly in so far as what our government‘s done, and so 
far as trying to combat climate change or the effects of it that countries like 
India, China or America for example, erm, don‘t seem to fall in line and just 
kind of do what they want [with, with..]  their industrial output and things like 
that, so, [I mean] that‘s kind of making me more cynical about it than 
anything else. 
(EM2.2 „we‟re quite good‟, 6 logic of the commons dilemma, 7.3 
blaming others, 8 pessimistic outlook). 
This sets the tone for the section which is dominated by EM arguments as the 
table indicates.  After a brief interchange between Piers and Jayne discussing how 
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long it will be before global warming has a noticeable impact (Piers says 5 
generations, Jayne 2030), Jim returns the debate to EM themes: 
MG2.477 
Jim I think the oil companies have got a responsibility and what they‘re doing is, a 
friend of mine came up with something that would save using oil, and they 
tested it, proved that it worked, and everything and it‘s been shelved.   It‘s 
not been produced.  And this is what the oil companies are doing, no matter 
which one it is, if they get a technology that will stop the use of their 
produce, they‘re shelving it.  It disappears off the face the earth. 
(EM7.3 blaming others; MP 1 role of private interest, 6 market 
rationality, 7 others pursuing their own interest). 
This conspiracy theory was noted in LG1A.  The conviction that dark forces control 
the world in their own interest while the average citizen is powerless to make a 
difference is the core of the EM Standpoint.  It is similar to Cultural Theory‘s ‗high 
grid/low group‘ fatalist, but it is not passive.  Though disempowered, the EM 
Standpoint‘s vocal and cynical complaints about self-interested (MP) behaviour 
obstruct any revolution based on CS arguments or any reforms based on AR 
arguments.  So Jim goes on: 
MG2.580 
Jim And the do-gooders say, oh yeah, we can‘t do that, because of this, but the 
likes of the people sat here, we couldn‘t say, well we want it to happen, 
because you don‘t get your voice heard. 
(EM7.1 It‟s not fair: stop bossing me around, 7.3 blaming others, 8 
general pessimism) 
The EM Standpoint expects everyone else to follow EM logic: people will only 
change direction when they have to (when ―someone smacks you in the face‖ 
535), when an issue becomes personally relevant: 
MG2.581 
Piers Well it was like you said then you know [it‘s all them] do-gooders it‘s it‘s it‘s 
like the other, other things in life.  If it, if, if, it happens to you then it‘s like 
it‘s like human rights isn‘t it really.   You know,  Mrs Smiths‘s a, Mrs Smiths‘s a 
um do-gooder and she says well he can‘t go to prison because that affects his 
human rights.   What about the human rights of the person that that man‘s 
done damage to.. 
(EM1 reciprocal justice; 7.3 blaming others) 
Jim Yeah! 
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Piers ... Now, if that would have been Mrs Smith‘s family that he would have been 
Mrs Smith‘s family that he‘d done damage to or her or her property, would she 
be saying then, um, no he‘s got human rights this bloke (hinting at CS1, 
equality) [using voice of person in troublesome quandary] um, we can‘t do 
anything, we can‘t, no, but she wants, wants something to happen (EM 1 
reciprocal justice, hinting at AR7j denial of rights to those who 
transgress).  But it‘s like you said, if anything happens, erm, to somebody 
close, or somebody sees like this [the?] tsumani, if you‘re there when it 
happens then yeah, it, it, it would trigger something in somebody‘s mind I‘m 
sure it would, I‘m sure it would   
(EM2.1: „what‟s in it for me?‟ is answered by the personal relevance) 
 
The EM Standpoint is trapped in its cynicism about human nature‘s (531) cynicism.   
As before, participants expect that only a shock will shift attitudes: we cannot 
solve it ourselves, something ‗other‘ will have to make us.  Jim illustrates this by 
remembering the Aberfan disaster (685), suggesting that the risks posed by spoil 
tips were well known but nobody did anything until after the shock of the disaster.  
This understanding of human nature combines with EM‘s presumption that those in 
power conspire against the average citizen.  The group‘s discussion over what sort 
of shock might wake people up reflects on recent floods.  Jim has his own reasons 
for believing these are not enough:  
MG2.728 
Jim Yeah, but it doesn‘t affect London.  If it affects London, then they‘re going to 
do something.  If London gets flooded, if the water comes over the top of the 
barrier, and London gets flooded, they‘re going to do something.  Until  then, 
oh we‘re very sorry, we‘ll send you 10 million pounds or we‘ll send you 20 
million pounds, we‘ll help you clean up, but they won‘t physically do anything.  
They won‘t help to raise the wall height of a river, because it doesn‘t affect 
London.  If it affects London then all of a sudden you‘ll see such a big 
difference in the country. 
The implicit tension between the CS arguments and EM arguments persists 
beneath the surface, but both find common ground in attacking the selfishness of 
the MP Standpoint: 
MG2.661 
Laura And its, it all become-, it all comes down to money.  Where, whatever level 
you are on, it always comes down to money, doesn‘t it?  You‘ve got the 
expenses, it comes down to money. 
(MP3 economic self-interest; EM2.1 what‟s in it for me) 
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Jayne  You can‘t eat money, you can‘t breathe money.... 
Laura, Piers No 
 
Jayne But at what point do people realise that you can have as much money as you 
want, but if you can‘t breathe .. 
(CS3 rejection of (over)consumerism: EM7.3 blaming others) 
In the end the CS position seems to be overwhelmed, so much so that Jayne is 
pushed into a detached position observing the different Relational Models in 
action: 
MG2.855 
Jayne It‘s the same thing [others speaking at same time] it is about the willpower of 
of belief systems of of um, of fundamentally what you believe in, and then we 
go back to money again.... 
 
Jim It all comes down to money.. 
 
Jayne ...  That‘s all, that‘s all about money, but, it‘s the same with, with the global 
warming.   What is it about, why is everybody into short short-termism, it‘s 
like the the politicians are into short-termism, ... 
 
Laura   and knee-jerk reactions   
(EM6.1 it‟s just too difficult, 6.2 short-termist logic of the commons 
dilemma, 7.3 blaming others, 8 pessimistic outlook; MP7 expecting 
others to pursue rational self-interest) 
J2.4. MG2C 
The flow of EM arguments continues, only occasionally punctuated by CS 
principles: 
MG2.928 
Piers I think it‘s because we‘re all cynical.  I think that, I think, I think it‘s been 
made that way that we‘re a cynical nation, I mean, my sort of faith in human 
nature or the last few years when you see the things that do happen, it‘s, it‘s 
almost gone which is very sad really. 
(EM7.3 despairing of others; 8 pessimistic outlook) 
Laura    It is.  I mean, I have to say mine‘s been restored this year.  It really has, and 
I‘m, I‘m not a do-gooder at all, but I do have a conscience, you know, I do feel 
that my actions will impact somebody else, and I have always felt like that so, 
you know, that‘s that‘s just the way I feel I you know I can actually contribute 
now.  But definitely my faith in human nature has been restored over the last 
12 months.  
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(CS 1 all in it together, 2.1 we can all do our bit, 7 concern to help 
others) 
Towards the end of the section MP arguments surface after the facilitator prompts 
the participants to discuss their own consumption, such as flying.  Here the roles 
are reversed:  Jim states that he doesn‘t fly any more (‗because I think it‘s a big 
thing the aviation fuel‘; 1270), while Jayne explains her own flying in this way: 
MG2.1290 
Jayne I probably do one big trip a year with having [a] son over in Australia.  And I, I 
wish I could be as good as you are, but I just, I do a deal in my head, you 
know, I want to see my son, and the grandchild, so I‘m going, and the plane‘s 
going anyway [Lorrraine agreeing], so I,  you rationalise it to yourself.   
(MP1 exercising self-interest; EM6.1 no alternative) 
Overall, though, the EM arguments dominate.  The constant distrust of politicians 
and big business prevents the resolution through AR arguments that some of the 
other groups reach. 
J2.5. MG2 RMQs 
The EM tone continues through the responses to the statements of the 4 Relational 
Model principles, and reaches a crescendo in a welter of carping criticism of the 
politicians going to Copenhagen.   AR arguments appear briefly with a call for 
leadership (1442) leading to the possibility of countries like Britain taking a lead 
but this is really only raised just to reject it: 
MG2.1465 
Jim I agree that this country should be, we need to show an example (AR7.1 
stewardship for others as insiders), but as I say at the end of the day we 
will get to the situation where, unless other countries take it up ( AR7.2 
others become outsiders) and show that they are doing a major reduction in 
what they‘re doing, that, the people in this country will just go back, and say, 
well, it‘s not mak-, not making any real effects on the global warming because 
of all these other countries, so we‘re, why should we do it and not enjoy 
ourselves as much as we were doing before we stopped doing the particular 
things 
(EM 1 reciprocity, 2.1 what‟s in it for me?, 6.2 commons dilemma 
logic, 7.3 blaming others, possibly moving to MP1 „why shouldn‟t we 
enjoy ourselves) 
Piers I think [?we should stop] wasting money.  Like I said before, the money‘s spent 
on things that, um, to me should be shouldn‘t be spent on.  It should be spent 
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on health service, („charity begins at home‟ is close to both EM2.1 and  
MP1 arguments) but also, erm, looking at global warming definitely, but I 
don‘t, I don‘t think that other countries are going, they may do eventually, I 
mean now China have got sort of all this recession now haven‘t they, and they 
they‘re struggling, supposedly, you never know they might look at it and think 
well yeah, [?we‘ll do something about it and see what happens] but I don‘t 
think they will.   
(EM 6.2 logic of the commons dilemma, 7.3 blaming others, 8 
pessimistic outlook). 
 
J3.6 Does the RM Framework account for all of the arguments in SG1? 
 
As in 5.4.5 and J1.6, a check has been carried out to assess whether the RM 
Framework adequately accounts for the arguments used in this focus group.  The 
table below indicates that under 7% of the content categorised as ‗value‘ based 
was not coded with an RM code.  
Coded Coded with Total
with an RM no RM
A category content 10408 727 11135
B category content 183 683 866
C category content 696 1049 1745
D category content 174 319 493
Facilitator 58 1435 1493
Total 11519 4213 15732
 
The material in the 'yellow' cell which was not coded with and RM code does not 
include significant arguments not captured by the RM Framework.  Participants in 
this group did tend to ramble and some of the more general remarks have been 
missed in the RM coding process. 
J3. London Group 2 
J3.1. London Group 2, outline 
Of the groups recruited externally by SAROS, LG2 was in some senses the least 
successful.  Only 4 participants showed up, and one of these, Solomon, made 
erratic contributions  while the dominant voice, Tim, was somewhat repetitious.  
The other externally recruited groups achieved a dynamic and interactive 
development of the ideas that was less evident in LG2.  Nevertheless, each 
participant still made interesting contributions, and the group as a whole 
developed an overall, often complaining, tone.  The following table provides an 
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overall impression of the Relational Model arguments used by the different 
participants: 
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
Emma 24% 17% 35% 79% 20% 13%
Mary 18% 18% 56% 60% 20% 7%
Solomon 19% 17% 46% 35% 15% 18%
Tim 39% 28% 19% 73% 15% 20%
* % of participant speech, excluding facilitator
Highest in column: Highest RM for individual Both Highest
 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used in the different sections of the focus group:  
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total AR CS EM MP no RMs
LG2A 41% 9% 24% 58% 6% 27%
LG2B 28% 26% 31% 68% 23% 23%
LG2RMQs 22% 28% 32% 49% 7% 31%
LG2C 9% 19% 41% 18% 30% 53%
LG2 19% 29% 55% 13% 29%
 
At 56% LG2 has by some distance the highest proportion of content coded with EM 
arguments (the range of the other 5 groups is 31% to 48%).  In direct contrast to 
MG2 both of the women in this group used EM arguments in over half of their 
contributions. 
J3.2. LG2A 
The participants express almost the full range of EM arguments in this section: 
EM1, Reciprocity:  ―Tax the car but put that money into subsid subsidising transport 
or something like that.‖ (Tim 263). 
 
EM2.1 ‗What‟s in it for me?‘: ―I don‘t want to be conned by the politicians on the 
basis of using this as a general excuse for higher taxation and taxation of this 
that and the other‖ (Tim 78) 
 
EM2.2 „I‟m doing my bit‟: ―And I think as much as you try and do your part, like you 
know we recycle, and, you know‖ (Mary 100) 
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EM2.3 Commons Dilemma: ―but the problem is that people are not united because 
you‘ve got some countries that want to do it but not others I mean China 
doesn‘t do it very much.  And then I mean, even just on a local thing, you 
know you‘ll have people with, some houses will turn their heating down and 
others won‘t care.  So it‘s very hard, you know, if you‘re doing it to subsidise 
people who don‘t care, and it‘s the same globally‖ (Emma 338) 
 
EM2.4 Nimby‟s is a quite specific topic which is not mentioned by the group. 
 
EM3.1 „We‟re hard done by, and so must be compensated‟.  This precise argument is 
made in Section B (597): in Section A the first part is voiced by Solomon‘s 
references to the hard time ‗genuine people‘ suffer while trying their best 
(121, 139) while Tim‘s demands for fair, reciprocated taxation express the 
demand for compensation (83, 239, 260). 
 
EM3.2 Polluter pays principle, ―i say that may be fair, that may be fair if there‘s an 
issue that, say, cars, planes and what have you are contributing drastically. 
that may be fair to tax it to reduce it‖ (Tim 242) 
 
EM4 Unpredictable nature: ―I mean you know they say the world‘s getting warmer 
and then last year we had a very cold spell which was much colder than it had 
been the year before, so it‘s just sort of it just contradicts.  And then you 
have your dry summer and then the very wet summer‖ (Emma 159) 
 
EM5 People at the mercy of unpredictable nature: ―the weather is like really 
erratic, and I think that‘s sort of worrying problem cos there‘s no 
predictability.  You know you can‘t like people that get their houses flooded, 
you know every year now and you know they can‘t plan for that because they 
don‘t know when it‘s going to come, you know, they don‘t know when it‘s 
when the wet,  bad weather‘s coming cos it‘s not seasonal‖ (Mary 182).  
 
EM6.1 All too difficult: ―Um, and I think all the recycling and things I think we get a 
lot of mixed messages and, you know, we‘re told what we should and 
shouldn‘t do.  And then, a couple of months late in the paper they tell you 
that it you know, perhaps you shouldn‘t have done that‖ (Emma 90) 
 
EM6.2 Logic of the Commons Dilemma: ―It‘s been going on for such a long time, and 
some countries and some people just dig their heels in and won‘t, you know, 
won‘t budge, but then I think on a local level it‘s a real hard thing to police, 
because you can‘t just you know go round making people recycle or making 
people do certain things that will help their area‖ (Mary 370). 
 
EM7.1 ‗Stop bossing me around”: ―I think we get told too much [as it is] what we 
should and shouldn‘t do‖ (Emma 290). 
 
EM7.2 „Why don‟t they solve it?‘: ―I do think we should be looking at it a bit more 
deeper.  Scientists should be out there.  Um [pause] not an individual but 
quite a few of them. In different parts of the area‖ (Solomon LG2.222) 
 
EM7.3 Otherisation, blaming others: ―I think what I hears, was, um, the coloured 
bottles, they get taken to China.  Why they spending so much money um? 
Sending it over there when we can do something over here‖ (Solomon 
LG2.119) or ―the taxes should be on people that have like one or more, more 
than one car, or you know, people that take you know Ryanair flights to go 
away for the weekend, do you see what I mean, like the taxes on things like 
that should be higher things that are unnecessary.‖ (Mary 252).  It is worth 
noting that both of these complaints also rely on CS rejection of other 
Standpoints.  Solomon rejects the authorities‘ attempts to organise recycling 
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and argues that our community can do better here; Mary rejects the free 
market by attacking overconsumption. 
 
EM8 Outlook:  the discussion does not really consolidate into an overall outlook 
until later in the meeting, when, for example, both Emma and Tim emphasise 
that they have lost all faith in government (749ff).    
 
J3.3. LG2B 
As indicated in the table in 5.C.1, the dominance of EM arguments continues into 
Section B, although the other Relational Models find a little bit more space.  
Participants develop the EM ‗blaming of others‘ (EM7l above) that attacks 
overconsumption (CS3) with an extended complaint about cars being too large 
(484ff).  This comfortably gives way to demands for regulation (AR2) to address 
the issue (503-569), until the deep distrust of government undermines this (564ff). 
 
The facilitator then asks whether participants are happy to see the price of energy 
go up: first with the possibility of these funds being used to help other countries.  
Tim (593) and Emma (595) immediately say ‗No‘.  Tim talks about pensioners in 
this country frightened to heat their homes, so the facilitator then asks how they 
would feel if the money went to help people insulate their homes and reduce their 
energy comsumption.  There is some reluctant agreement, then reservations, until 
Emma captures the response: 
LG2.648 
Emma: I think however much people want to help the whole world, um, it comes 
down to what happens in your own home, and if you‘re bills are so high just so 
that you can help other countries, I don‘t think people want to do that. 
(EM2.1 what‟s in it for me) It‘s how it affects you personally, as much as 
you want to do the right thing. (AR7.1 others as insiders, CS 7 helping the 
needy, 8.3 moral imperative; EM2.1) I don‘t think people are prepared to 
pay, you know, I suppose we feel, why is it a personal thing that you‘ve got to 
subsidise the rest of the world.  The government that don‘t seem to be doing 
it, (EM7.3 blaming others) it always comes down to individuals to have to 
pay for things.  
(EM 2.1, 6.2 logic of the commons dilemma, 7.1 it‟s not fair, stop 
telling me what to do). 
In other groups good manners constrain the assertion of MP arguments (5.2.7, 
J1.3).  Here Emma‘s switching between pronouns (you, people (ie they), we) 
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suggests an awkwardness in asserting EM defensive selfishness.  It is more 
comfortable expressing EM arguments as a complaint against others.  Asked about 
the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, participants voice their distrust of politicians 
and return to the need for taxes to be transparent.  Section B ends as follows: 
LG2.784 
Emma You have to know what the money‘s going to  
 
Solomon [talking over] Exactly, you know 
 
Emma not just into a general pot that  
(EM 2.1 „what‟s in it for me?‟; 7.3 blaming others) 
Solomon      It‘s it‘s hard-earned money, I mean, we‘ve been working for I mean.  
There‘s people out there that have been [?] earning thousands and thousands, 
and er, you know some people can‘t afford it, you see. So you have to, if 
you‘re going to be paying that sort of, particular, you know, the money you‘re 
going to be paying, making sure it‘s going in the right direction, you see.  Er, 
for the right purpose.  You know, not buying this, not buying that, you know, 
not for they how they paying rent for their houses and things like that 
[laughter] 
(EM2.1; 7.2 envy, it‟s not fair, 7.3; MP7 expecting others to follow 
rational self interest). 
J3.4. LG2RMQs 
It is a feature of the groups‘ ‗RMQ‘ sections  that participants often express 
agreement but then  reject the extreme expression of the position.   The CS 
statement‘s use of the word catastrophic is often rejected, e.g. in LG1 (5.A.4) and 
also by Tim (883) and Troy in MG1.1667.  In this group, the dominant EM 
arguments become too much for Mary when they are distilled down into two 
sentences: 
LG2.928 
Facilitator Third one was: 
 
 ―There‘s no point in the UK doing anything about climate change when 
countries like China are growing so fast.  So I don‘t see why I should be asked 
to pay higher taxes or to give things up to stop it.‖ 
 
Mary     I don‘t agree with that. 
 
Facilitator  You don‘t agree with that? 
 
Mary No because I think it that‘s a really pig-headed view, because why should, just 
because somebody else isn‘t doing something doesn‘t mean that you shouldn‘t 
and it‘s kind of that thinking that everything makes a difference, do you know, 
330 
 
 
and it‘s like the lady said, you know, a lot of the time you feel that it‘s not 
making a difference because it costs so much to recycle, or, you know and all 
of these different things we‘re told to do, but I, you know, won‘t stop doing 
them because surely it makes a difference somewhere, well that‘s what you‘d 
like to think, anyway. [laughs]  
(EM2.3 commons dilemma; CS2.1 we can all do our bit, 8.3 moral 
imperative) 
 
Facilitator  How do you feel about that one Emma. 
 
Emma Well, [pause] I sort of agree with it, but I know that it‘s not right, but it‘s true 
I mean I think we have a major power like China, who is actually doing 
nothing.  And I do think, not why should we, but we have to educate them in 
order for them to do it too.  
(AR7.1 duty to tell others, as „insiders‟, what to do; CS 8.3 moral 
imperative – „it‟s not right‟; EM 6.2 logic of the commons dilemma) 
 
Mary But then I think that‘s;  I kind of think it‘s unfair because it‘s not, it‘s the 
Chinese government that are refusing to do anything it‘s not the people of 
China, and that‘s why 
 
Emma No no no, but they need educating 
 
Mary Mm, no definitely, but it‘s kind of  you know we say we don‘t have any faith in 
government and I‘m sure that they feel the same and I‘m sure that there‘s lots 
of the people that live in China that would really like to do something but, 
there aren‘t government resources to do so.  It‘s,  you know, I think it go[es], 
it‘s not diminishing responsibility but I think it‘s like you do have to put a lot 
of faith in the government and hope that they do the right thing. 
(AR1.2, need for government; CS1 , all in it together; EM6.1 all too 
difficult,  7.2, „why don‟t they solve it‟, 8 pessimistic outlook). 
EM‘s dead-end seems unpalatable, but any alternative outlook seems to require 
blind faith. 
 
J3.5. LG2C 
This section provides a short coda to the discussion.  The EM frustration with 
confusing official advice leads into disbelief over the suggestion that pets are bad 
for the planet (1061ff) and that we should eat less meat.  The topic of 
overconsumption leads Mary to declare that there is far too much choice (1095ff): 
―I don‘t think humans are actually programmed to have this much choice‖ (1175), 
a proposition that Emma (1185) and Tim (1187) both agree with.  Yet the tone is 
less a CS rejection of the MP consumerist society than an EM complaint at how 
difficult, even bewildering, the modern world is to live in.  Solomon embodies the 
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bewilderment with his incredulous reaction (1169) to Mary‘s offered example of 
too much choice, ‗luxury dog food‘ (1157). 
J2.6 Does the RM framework account for all of the arguments in LG2? 
 
As for the preceeding groups an alternative analysis of the content has been 
applied to guage whether the RM framework does account for the arguments used 
in LG2.  The analysis below suggests that it does, with only a limited amount of 
relevant content not coded as an RM argument (yellow box in table): 
Coded Coded with Total
with an RM no RM
A category content 7353 570 7923
B category content 118 388 506
C category content 67 85 152
D category content 80 173 253
Facilitator 890 2037 2927
Total 8508 3253 11761
 
LG2's tendency to EM arguments went alongside quite a bit of moaning that things 
'aren't the same as the used to be'.  This felt quite value based, but when the 
comments were about the weather or too much choice over foodstuffs in the 
shops it could prove hard to justify attributing one of the RM codes to some 
passages. 
J4. `Student Group 2 
J4.1. Student Group 2, outline 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used by the four students in the group:  
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% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
Careen 20% 33% 30% 50% 38% 16%
Digby 29% 28% 19% 35% 51% 25%
Hanif 14% 23% 17% 47% 22% 24%
Millicent 37% 21% 60% 29% 21% 21%
* % of participant speech, excluding facilitator
Highest in column: Highest RM for individual Both Highest
 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used in the different sections of the meeting: 
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total AR CS EM MP no RMs
SG2A 20% 13% 42% 19% 5% 38%
SG2B 38% 23% 29% 51% 41% 24%
SG2C 35% 32% 31% 27% 35% 25%
SG2RMQs 7% 16% 35% 17% 19% 33%
SG2 24% 33% 34% 30% 28%
 
Compared to the groups reviewed above, SG2 presents an unusual profile:  
Millicient‘s content dominated by CS arguments, as noted in 5.2.7, and Digby is 
the first significant contributor with over 50% content coded for MP arguments 
(the only previous one was the relatively quiet Suzy in LG1).  Digby and Millicient 
are American; Careen comes from Austria and Hanif from London‘s East End. 
 
J4.2. SG2A 
The excerpt in 5.2.5 gives a clear idea of Millicient‘s approach.  She takes a 
quintessentially CS egalitarian perspective, often linking climate change to ―social 
justice‖ (36, 199, 584).  Both she and Digby sometimes talk about the debate 
itself, e.g. whether climate change is the same as global warming (82), and the 
history of the ozone hole (112), so that quite a high proportion of this section is 
actually uncoded for RM arguments.  The other two participants make more 
significant contributions to later sections. 
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J4.3. SG2B 
Following Millicient‘s strong assertion that the world needs to cut consumption, 
(―the number 1 thing that needs to happen in my opinion for sure, is cutting back‖ 
284), Section B opens with the facilitator asking the participants if they are 
conscious of climate change when making their own personal consumer choices 
(291).   
Careen immediately questions whether individual behaviour can make a difference 
because ―I think still like industries and all that is still the main issue that cause 
climate change‖ (302).  For the others the issue seems central to their identity: 
SG2.307 
Hanif    Erm, I think the decisions in my life that directly relate to climate change 
have less to do with climate change and more to do with being a student, so 
being quite, you know,  living on quite a meagre budget, yeah, taking public 
transport and walking is usually cheaper.  I‘m happy that it co-incides with the 
ideals of climate change but it‘s not it‘s not been the driving factor for me. 
(MP1, individual choice, 6 market rationality; possibly EM6.1 „no 
alternative‟ but Hanif is not expressing disempowerment here) 
SG2.331 
Millicient    Yeah, I think it‘s my job as a global citizen to do the most I can in my 
lifestyle to be more climate, or environmentally sensitive in every way, um, so 
like everyone else I do the most I can, um, or I strive for that (CS 1 „global 
citizen‟, 3 overconsumption, 8.3 moral imperative).  But, that being said, I 
think it‘s a problem that um, a lot of companies are selling all their, all these 
products under a green image, cos it seems to me that a throwaway society 
you know, where where this mad level of consumption is actually what‘s 
dragging climate change in the first place 
(CS 3; MP 1 private interests, 3 pursuit of growth, 6 market 
rationality, possibly EM 7.3 blaming others but this is not really the 
focus or tone) 
SG2.350 
Digby That was actually part of the other point that I was going to make that it was 
about waste, and I completely agree we, [it‘s?] there‘s a social thing that that 
encourages people to be wasteful um, and I think that‘s about more than 
climate change because I don‘t like I just don‘t like the idea of being wasteful 
and buying things I don‘t need and , like when you say, oh it‘s cheaper to just 
throw it away and buy a new one, I hate, saying that because that‘s you‘re 
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you‘re still being wasteful and when there‘s so mu-, when there are pe- so 
many people in the world that are going without so many things, for us to then 
be so wasteful with what we have regardless of how that affects climate 
change. 
(CS critique of MP expresses CS arguments but also implies MP 
arguments:  CS 1, so many people going without, 3, overconsumption, 
8.3 moral imperative; MP 1, individual freedom 3 cheaper to buy a 
new one, 5 adapting to the environment that encourages throw-away 
behaviour) 
After reflection on various examples of their own consumption and the throwaway 
society the  facilitator asks participants about flying.   Although the EM7g 
argument that there are no alternatives to high emissions travel does surface, 
these younger (presumably relatively affluent) participants do not seem to have 
experienced the world as constraining in the same way that the non-student 
groups have.  Flying opens up opportunities: you choose to take them, or you 
choose not to fly because you choose to be environmentally responsible.  So 
participants are happy to assert their own interests: Digby (430) recognises that 
the constraint of having to fly is a direct result of his personal choice (MP1) to 
study abroad.  For Careen (466) it would simply be illogical not to take advantage 
of the most convenient solutions on offer (MP5).  For Hanif it‘s not relevant (―I‘m 
not sort of a globetrotter‖ 439), while Millicient just feels guilty (CS2b) ―yuh every 
time I fly I do feel crappy about it.  I think a lot of people think of it as like their 
big exception, oh I can‘t avoid this‖ (495).  But Millicient is simply less candid 
than Digby in dealing with the consequences of pursuing her own dreams ―Um, I 
can‘t think of a reward that would prevent me from going to Africa if I had the 
opportunity to‖ (514). 
The students do express EM arguments (the proportion in Section B is over 50% of 
content coded for EM) but these are often different from the disempowered 
arguments of other groups.  Millicient (561) launches into an attack (EM7l) on 
people who did not participate in an offset scheme for a conference she 
organised, and this leads on to a lengthy discussion of the merits of offsetting 
(EM3f, polluter pays).  These EM arguments are woven into an overall dialogue 
which focuses on the need for market-based approaches (MP2; Careen 630, Digby 
703) to put up the cost of energy to pull through technological innovation.  For all 
the CS arguments about overconsumption, the students have a fundamental 
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confidence that technology will save the day (―because they will invent new types 
of jet engine‖ Digby 519).  The physical world is not a constraint:  
SG2.769 
Digby The other thing is creating green infrastructure, even investing in you know 
ways of coming up with green technologies and making um things like you 
know the things they are investing in [you know] making solar panels cheaper 
and and easier to to use and install, and things like that.  Those technologies 
can be invented but there still needs to be a price incentive for the energy 
companies and people that are using them to switch from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy. 
(AR 3.1 which policy instruments, 3.3 ecological modernisation; EM 7.2 
why don‟t they solve it?; MP 2 market solutions, 3 „need‟ for economic 
growth, 5 adapting nature) 
Millicient   Yeah, and there needs to be a lot more subsidy in the innovation side of 
things, like solar panels should be able to be the size of this cup and do what 
they do instead of the size of this table, you know. 
(as previous, plus MP4 nature as cornucopian) 
Facilitator There is only so much energy you get from a patch of sunlight though. 
 
Millicient   Yeah but I think that with tech, I don‘t know, it seems like there‘s been a lot 
of investment in non-sustainable energies ( EM 7.3 blaming others) and would 
that investment have gone into sustainable energies I‘ve no doubt we [would] 
be able to attack geo-thermal for instance in a really economically productive 
way 
(AR 3.1, MP2, 4, 5) 
J4.4. SG2C 
Section C continues in the same vein.  Digby is convinced that it is an economic 
problem not a social one (805) despite both he (714) and Careen (730) believing 
that consumers just will not tolerate higher prices for energy without immediate 
reward.  Despite these reservations both (Careen 853, Digby 859) assume that 
innovators are going to make ―loads of money‖.  Only after the facilitator asks if 
the purpose of the new technology is to ―maintain the same levels of 
consumption‖ (885) does Millicient return to emphasising the CS3 economic 
diagnosis.  For Careen this contradiction is absurd: ―It‘s just like now like going 
back to a level of like hunters and gatherers would be an impossible thought‖ 
(904). 
Faced with this Millicient has to extol the virtues of the ―teeny little 
contributions‖ that social movements get off the ground (CS2.1, 922).   These are 
not a drop in the ocean: 
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SG2.927 
Millicent ―Oh I think it‘s the ocean!  Um, I think it creates the waves that will change 
people, like for me, I think a lot during the day what is the right moral 
decision what is the right environmental decision.  So if those are powerful 
enough to convince people to give up a lot of comforts then that could reduce 
consumption.‖ 
(CS 2.1, 3, 8.3, AR 7.1 telling others) 
The typical EM response to this (EM7.1) is to reject environmentalist bossing, but 
Hanif, the only participant who seems to have really experienced the monetary 
constraints of the world, has a different response: 
SG2.937 
Hanif Um, in terms of that, you have I think I think social movements are definitely 
sort of less less important to the.. Myself personally, um, I I know it sounds 
terrible, I like the fact that someone else is doing it.  I don‘t think I would do 
it myself but I would feel worse if if there was nothing about it and if if we 
just accepted so I think, I think it sounds there‘s a sort of a mechanism of at 
least just making people think about it a little bit, even even if it doesn‘t do 
anything.  I mean personally I do think they‘re not that useful like directly in 
what they do, (EM 2.1 what‟s in it for me?, 6.2 logic of the commons 
dilemma, 6.1 it‟s pointless to do anything).  but I feel better that 
someone‘s doing something rather than not and we haven‘t just accepted it.  I 
feel like it‘s it‘s not that far gone yet.  Maybe there is sort of hope. (MP8 it 
will turn out alright)  But then someone comes along and tells me it‘s just 
cyclical, and you can‘t do anything about it anyway which really confuses me 
so 
(EM6g all too difficult, maybe EM4 nature uncontrollable) 
 
At the very start of the meeting Hanif stated how disengaged he was from the 
subject (29).  Unlike other group participants whose EM arguments seem fuelled 
with frustration and resentment he seems to be a passive observer who can 
understand the different arguments without really feeling them, so that his 
outlook has a little bit of MP optimism and a little bit of EM pessimism. 
The section finishes with participants considering how consumption might be 
reduced, leading to suggestions of regulation (AR2) and market incentives (MP2).    
This leads on to a discussion about the upcoming COP15 meeting and the role of 
the developed world helping the developing world (AR7h). 
J4.5. SG2RMQs 
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Unusually, the Relational Model statements generally produce some clear cut 
answers rather than spark divergent discussion.  The table below summarises the 
responses to each RM statement: 
AR CS EM MP
Carola Y Y X X
David = Y X Y
Hassan X (Y) Y Y
Meredy X Y X X
Y = agrees; X = disagrees; = means balanced response. (Implicit)
 
 
The committed Millicient and Digby both assert their positions.  The detached 
Hanif can agree with the logic of three of the RM Standpoints: rather surprisingly 
he follows the flow of the others‘ comments at 1389 to agree that there should be 
a revolution away from the consumerist lifestyle.  The more pragmatic Careen 
dislikes the ‗hypocritical‘ EM statement (1333), thinks that technological 
innovation will not be enough (1292) and that we will inevitably need government 
action (1403). 
J4.6 Does the RM framework account for all of the arguments in SG1? 
 
As for the preceeding groups an alternative analysis of the content has been 
applied 
Note frequently more detached observer...  esp Hassan who simply isn‘t engaged 
with it.  Perfectly able to talk about it but just not engaged.  It‘s not what his 
daily life is about.  Esp note 446 
J4..6 Does the RM framework account for all of the arguments in SG2? 
As for the preceeding groups an alternative analysis of the content has been 
applied to guage whether the RM framework does account for the arguments used 
in SG2.  The analysis below suggests that it does, with only a limited amount of 
relevant content not coded as an RM argument (yellow box in table) 
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Coded Coded with Total
with an RM no RM
A category content 10573 807 11380
B category content 109 682 791
C category content 213 410 623
D category content 16 393 409
Facilitator 399 1407 1806
Total 11310 3699 15009
 
Reviewing the content in the yellow cell, the items reflect the specific qualities of 
the participants:  Careen, an Austrian, talked incredibly fast and it was sometimes 
hard to decide exactly what she was getting at.  Hanif was quite detached but this 
meant he sometimes mused rather open-mindedly, again creating content that 
was difficult to code.  Millicent, the global citizen, tended to gush and some of 
her content did not appear to justify coding. 
J5. Manchester Group 1 
J5.1. Manchester Group 1, outline 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used by the participants:  
% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
Clare 8% 13% 65% 36% 10% 15%
Derek 5% 35% 25% 50% 11% 26%
James 45% 25% 45% 35% 34% 25%
Miles 28% 30% 10% 66% 58% 18%
Troy 14% 25% 15% 51% 61% 16%
* % of participant speech, excluding facilitator
Highest in column: Highest RM for individual Both Highest
 
The following table provides an overall impression of the Relational Model 
arguments used in the different sections of the meeting: 
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% % coded % coded % coded % coded % coded
Total* AR CS EM MP no RMs
MG1A 27% 14% 36% 28% 24% 32%
MG1B 28% 26% 25% 36% 46% 25%
MG1C 28% 26% 19% 59% 38% 31%
MG1RMQs 17% 25% 34% 40% 34% 31%
MG1 23% 28% 41% 36% 29%
 
This was a dynamic focus group.  Even though two participants were much more 
vocal that the other three, all made interesting contributions. 
J5.2. MG1A 
The meeting starts with some fairly familiar arguments: the importance of one‘s 
own children in making climate change a relevant issue (Clare MG1. 62; James 
71).  Miles includes ‗sceptical‘ as one of his initial ‗three ideas‘ (42) with him (48), 
Derek (55) and Troy (88) all expressing some doubts about the whole phenomenon.  
Miles (127) and Derek (55) and Clare (138) are all affected by the welter of 
conflicting views, and both Miles (282) and James (297) take the view that 
researchers will find what you pay them to find.  Both Derek (57) and Troy (89), a 
geography teacher, have sympathy with the view that climate change is a natural 
process (MP4).  Of course this can end in different ways: 
MG1.225 
Troy ...If we look at climate fluctuations way back beyond the start of the graph in 
1800 when the industrial revolution was, was kicking off, then we‘ve got 
massive fluctuations and warm periods and and so on.  [agreement].  Nature 
will invariably check, somehow, whether I don‘t know, it‘s a massive volcanic 
eruption which will block [blot?] out the sun for that will the temperatures 
back down again 
(MP 4 nature benign) 
 
Miles It‘s like, we live on a planet, when, if science history is anything to go by it 
goes through stages and cycles of, of destroying itself as such, if the dinosaur 
theory is is anything to go by, then at some point it‘s going to self-destruct 
and start again. 
(EM 4 nature uncontrollable, 8 pessimistic outlook) 
 
340 
 
 
Troy‘s logic in hoping for volcanic salvation is hard to code as an optimistic 
outlook (MP8). Miles‘s argument is similar to the non-relational ‗nihilist‘ (1.3.6) 
and echoes a point made by James:  ―Whether we survive, as creatures on it, is 
another point, but the planet will survive‖ (196). 
Given this scepticism and detachment, it is surprising that each of these three 
participants nevertheless thinks we should do something about it: 
MG1.92 
Troy but at the same time, if there are little things that you can do, that will 
improve your state of, standard of living anyway, things like I‘ve gone out and 
bought a bike for the first time in twenty odd years so I‘m not using my car, 
er, as often. 
(CS2.1 all doing our bit; EM 2.2 I‟m doing my bit!; MP 1 free choice, 
MP5 adapting to the situation) 
MG1.130 
Miles So there‘s that many conflicting arguments you don‘t know where to sit, but 
clearly there must be some, some things we can do to improve it even if it is 
something natural, cos if it‘s even if it‘s something natural the fact is it‘s 
causing changes to to the planet so there‘s gotta to be things in which we can 
help or reduce the, er, the input that we have on it, so 
(Maybe CS2.1, but really this is an assertion of agency: the rational 
individual should at least be doing something to improve the situation, 
so maybe MP5) 
MG1.297 
James Well they‘re all working for someone aren‘t they,  [agreement], whether the 
university or, and even if that university‘s getting funding for various studies 
[agreement] (MP 6 market forces, 7 others as rational economic agents).  I 
think that, I think maybe the more difficult thing going back to a sort of more 
local level, personal level, is how how, what we‘re willing to give up or how 
we‘re going to, how we‘re willing to change our behaviour 
(CS 2.1 we can all do our bit, 3 need to cut back) 
The facilitator challenges why, with their doubts, they still want to change their 
behaviour (310).  James adheres to the CS view that it‘s probably the right thing 
to do and there probably is an issue with overconsumption (313, 427).  Clare‘s 
reply is unusual: 
MG1.330 
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Clare It‘s probably a survival thing as well isn‘t it because you‘re in your mind you‘re 
saving the planet by recycling and not using as much water, and it‘s that sort 
of you know, it‘s, it‘s everybody telling you that you should save this and 
because of that and [all talking over now] 
(AR 7.1 telling others what to do; CS2.1 we can all do our bit; 
reference to survival may be EM but that is not the tone). 
Later (630) she describes herself as a sponge soaking up everything she is told, but 
also refers to her maternal instincts in explaining why she believes in CS 
arguments.  Miles and Troy take a thoroughly different view: 
MG1.337 
Troy I think it‘s the telling for me, I‘ve, there‘s a person I work with who tells 
you‘ve got to do this you‘ve got to do that and [sod?] off. (AR 7h telling others 
what to do) [agreement] cos that‘s the kind of person I am, but if they were to 
try a different form of persuasion, I mean I do all the you know recycling and I 
take the bike instead of car and so on, but there‘s particular reasons for me 
doing those things, and it‘s not necessarily because I‘m super-green and I‘m 
going to save the planet [Clare agreeing throughout], but you know [like?] I 
said switching the lights off that makes economic sense to me I mean  
[agreement] you can‘t leave the tap running when you‘re brushing your teeth, 
again: cash saving!.  [laughter] 
(EM2.1 What‟s in it for me?, 2.2 I‟m doing my bit 7.1 stop bossing me; 
MP1 free choice, 6 market logic) 
Miles Er, that‘s it!.  I‘ll do things that are green purely if they benefit me.  And it, 
that sounds really bad, but, phrew, like you say, turning the lights off and, and 
I used to cycle to work when I lived, when I worked in Sale I‘d cycle to work 
purely because it kept me fit and I didn‘t have to pay for petrol, driving.  
Same with the turning the lights off, it. If, it inevitably benefits me as well, 
so, you know, in that selfish sort of respect being green helps me more than it 
does the planet, and it sound, it sound‘s really bad but you know, I recycle 
purely because there are recycle bins there so it‘s easy to, but if it meant 
having to separate all my own recycling and then take it to a separate bin I 
wouldn‘t bother. 
EM2.1 „what‟s in it for me?‟;  MP1 free choice: as with other groups 
self-assertion is expressed a little shame-facedly). 
J5.3. MG1B 
Both Miles and Troy repeat their dislike of being told what to do and the fact that 
they recycle or turn the lights off out of self-interest (469ff).  Miles adds an 
interesting spin: 
MG1.481 
Miles I don‘t like being told what to do, I don‘t like these, these, sort of orders 
through the media, you know, I don‘t like being told by Bob Geldof to give 
money to charity I don‘t like being told by climate change people that I need 
342 
 
 
to recycle, for, if, it‘s my choice to recycle.  If it really, if there was really 
that much convincing argument for it I believe there would be more stringent 
control on how people recycle, think there would be a legal obligation to do 
such things, there would be a limit on how far people can drive there would be 
a limit on on things like that, and if if the arguments were conclusive enough, 
then.. 
(AR 1.2 need for government, 2 regulation, 6.2 reliance on sound 
science; EM 7.1 stop bossing me, 7.2 why don‟t they solve it, MP 1 
individual freedom, 6 market rationality naturally doing the right 
thing) 
 
This is a fascinating extension of the optimistic confidence in nature that can be a 
feature of the MP Standpoint (MP4): human society is part of that benign nature, 
so that when push comes to shove if there is a real need to do something, we‘ll 
adapt and do something (MP5).  There is also a confidence that our science is good 
enough to know if there is a problem (MP8).  Logically, as we‘re not doing 
something, there can be no need.  As in other groups, Miles assumes that if there 
is a problem, the solution will be based on AR logic, sound science telling us what 
to do.  Being told what to do, when (if) you know ‗they‘ are right, is fine. 
 
As a result, James can get Miles to agree that he would have no problem with 
regulation if the science was certain (496).  This leads to a discussion of whether 
participants really would be happy with regulations that increased their fuel bills, 
and then an extended debate on the motivations underlying pro-environmental 
behaviour.  James emphasises the role of socialisation, saying that littering used 
to be socially acceptable (citing a scene from Mad Men, 677) but is no longer. For 
him not wasting things is a moral imperative (CS8.3) that you instil in your kids 
(597); Miles agrees that he too was brought up not to litter (699) but he is still 
clear that he doesn‘t waste things purely out of selfish economic considerations 
(741).  
Miles‘s MP Standpoint also encourages him to take a punchy view of technology, 
decrying Nimby‘s who block subsidised windfarms (―Are you stupid? Your 
electricity will be cheaper, what are you doing?‖ 859) and embracing nuclear 
power (886). 
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J5.4. MG1C 
Asked what they think will happen in Copenhagen the participants have very low 
expectations.  Miles is forceful again: 
MG1.972 
Miles Rather than coming up with a pipe dream they should say right these are the 
small changes that we‘ll make now and then we‘ll meet again in 12 months 
and see how that goes.   (AR3.2, business as usual, gradualism) No point in 
saying right we‘ll ban all car- , the world will be Carbon-neutral by so-and-so, 
if it‘s, it‘s not going to happen is it cos people..(AR 2 regulation, 6.1 
targets; MP 1,7  people want to do what they want to do) Countries are 
still growing, populations are still growing, so there‘s there‘s always going to 
be an increase in Carbon emissions. 
(EM 6.1 all too difficult, 7.3 blaming others, 8 pessimistic outlook) 
 
Returning to the question of whether participants would be willing to see energy 
costs rise, James makes the EM Standpoint‘s argument that this will only work if 
there are alternatives: 
MG1.1083 
James But then also, the follow up question to that I mean that‘s fine not even 
arguing the toss about them putting the price of petrol up (MP2) but there‘s 
got to be an alternative as well hasn‘t there.  So if they‘re saying use your car 
less, then it‘s kind of like, and we‘re going to help you do that by offering you 
good bus links good train links trams etc. there there, what‘s the alternative? 
(AR 3.2 business as usual, people still need to travel as much; EM 1 
reciprocity, 2.1 what‟s in it for me?,  3.1 need for compensation, 6.1 
all to difficult, no alternatives) 
James has endorsed the CS view that there is overconsumption, but the logical 
response, consume less, travel less, is as usual trumped by the EM logic that if 
‗they‘ make it more expensive to drive ‗they‘ need to provide alternative travel 
technologies.  Like the other groups, participants also worry that they could not 
be sure that taxes on petrol were being spent on improving public transport 
(MG1.1150): intriguingly James rejects this being formulated in explicitly ‗EM‘ 
terms: 
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MG1.1217 
Facilitator So, if you‘re going to pay more you want something back.  But, you 
were saying that you didn‘t trust politicians, so isn‘t there 
 
James I don‘t think it‘s the case you want something back, you want an alternative. 
 
Just as people find it embarrassing to express the self-assertion of the MP 
Standpoint too boorishly, participants are reluctant to sound pathetic or peevish 
in asking for EM‘s ‗something back in return‘. 
 
This section concludes with an extended discussion about food shopping.  
Participants just have a gut feeling that supermarkets selling vegetables flown 
from Africa at cheaper prices than those grown down the road is ‗illogical‘ (1365, 
1395) but they are reluctant to call it immoral.  Shopping at small retailers or the 
market is pleasurably communal (1435) but as Troy points out it can be 
challenging ―you go in and .. it‘s what do I actually do?!‖ (1444).   The 
alternatives do not feel viable when you are so used to the status quo. 
J5.5. MG1RMQs 
Once again the group shows considerable insight in discussing how society can 
respond to the risks of climate change.  James says governments are by their very 
nature reactive not proactive (MG1.1508), an idea Miles illustrates with swine flu: 
MG1.1522 
Miles there‘s no-one going to say well right pigs might get flu, so [laughs] lets er 
give everyone a vaccine just in case, until someone actually dies of swine flu,   
(superficially, this continues the themes of EM 6.1, it‟s too difficult, 
7.3 blaming others; but underlying this is the continuing discussion of 
scientific certainty.  Without empirical, backward looking sound 
science to instruct you (AR6.2) you cannot act preventatively based on 
the logic or mathematical models.) 
The group show less insight, following the same path as other groups, when 
discussing technology.  Troy says ―The technology is out there, somewhere‖ (1547) 
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while James subscribes to the conspiracy theory that the technology is there but it 
has been suppressed by commercial interests (1565).  Miles, James and Derek all 
agree with the MP statement: then, not perceiving the contradiction recognised 
by LG1, Miles and James, along with Clare, agree with the CS statement.  Troy 
and Derek take the line that we do consume too much but reject the assumption 
that this will lead to catastrophic climate change. 
Faced with the EM statement the group is much sharper, parsing it into separate 
moral and logical questions.  Logically there is no point individuals cutting back 
when others do not, but morally you must do your bit (Clare 1687, James 1695, 
Derek 1723).  For Troy the dilemma feels more awkward: 
MG1.1709 
Troy I think that you shou....  Not there‘s an obligation on us to [...] but you‘ve got 
to; yeah, it‘s logical, it‘s something that, is it like think local act global, 
you‘re doing a bit you‘re doing your bit for whatever reasons, and you‘ve 
made your own choice to do that and you‘re not being browbeaten by 
somebody, and equally you‘re not saying to other people, well I do this you 
should be as well, you should be cos I am, and it will save the planet. 
(CS 2.1 doing your bit, 8d co-operation logical, 8.3 co-operation 
morally right; EM 1 I do this you should too in return, EM 7.1 being 
browbeaten/AR7.1 telling others; MP1 making your own choice) 
 
This determination to maintain one‘s own agency continues in response to the AR 
statement.  James says: ―I‘m not waiting to hear what the the erm result of 
Copenhagen is to decide what I‘m going to do.‖ (1773). 
J5.6 Does the RM framework account for all of the arguments in MG1? 
As for the preceeding groups an alternative analysis of the content has been 
applied to guage whether the RM framework does account for the arguments used 
in MG1.  The analysis below suggests that it does, with only a limited amount of 
relevant content not coded as an RM argument (yellow box in table): 
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Coded Coded with Total
with an RM no RM
A category content 10377 953 11330
B category content 473 353 826
C category content 746 659 1405
D category content 28 604 632
Facilitator 388 2154 2542
Total 12012 4723 16735
 
The participants in MG2 had particularly strong opinions: Chapter 5's review 
frequently uses them as the best exemplars of RM arguments.  Of the 'A' category 
content not coded with an RM, over two thirds was coded 'RM maybe' and a review 
of the material does not reveal important arguments that the RM framework was 
failing to capture.  
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Appendix K:  Copy of Internet survey 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey, the results of which are being used 
for academic research. The rules of such research require that participants 
consent to the use of their views and opinions and that each participant has 
their rights explained to them. 
 
 
Research Consent  
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey of people's views on climate change. 
The study forms part of a doctoral project being undertaken at the Institute of 
Social Psychology at the LSE. As a participant you will be asked for your views 
and to make some choices about how you think society should respond, or not, 
to the issue. 
PROCEDURES 
 
The study is expected to take approximately 10 minutes to complete. If you 
choose to participate in this survey, please select continue at the bottom of 
this page and you will be presented with the survey questions.  
POTENTIAL RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
There are no risks associated with participating in this research. Other than 
any benefits arranged by the organization that recruited you to participate, 
you are unlikely to gain direct benefit from participating in this research. 
However, it is hoped that you may find the survey interesting.  
PARTICIPANTS' RIGHTS 
 
You should not feel obliged to agree to participate. 
 
If you first agree to participate and then you change your mind, you are free to 
withdraw your consent and discontinue your participation at any time during 
the survey simply by exiting the website. 
 
Your identity will be kept as confidential as possible as required by law. The 
results of this research survey may be presented at social science conferences 
or published in social science journals. However, your identity will not be 
disclosed, as you will be identified only by a unique participant number. 
 
This study has been approved by the London School of Economics Institutional 
Review Board. 
 
You can print a copy of the consent form by clicking here. 
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CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
Should you have any questions or concerns relating to the survey you can 
contact any of the following:  
Principal Researcher: Chris Tennant 
Institute of Social Psychology 
St. Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 020 7955 7712 
Fax: 020 7955 7565 
PhD Supervisor: Prof. George Gaskell 
Institute of Social Psychology 
St. Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 020 7955 7712 
Fax: 020 7955 7565 
 
If you want to know more about your rights, you may contact the head of the 
Departmental Ethics Committee at the Institute of Social Psychology:  
 Professor Catherine Campbell 
Institute of Social Psychology 
London School of Economics 
St Clements Building 
Houghton Street 
London 
WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 020 7955 7712 
Fax: 020 7955 7565 
E-mail: c.campbell@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE INFORMATION, AND GIVE MY 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY.  
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The survey has two parts, followed by a few questions about you. There are 7 
pages in all. You have to complete each page before moving on to the next 
one. There is a chance at the end to comment on the survey as a whole or any 
particular question if you wish. To participate in the prize draw you need to 
provide your email address at the end so that you can be contacted if you win. 
 
Part 1 Page 1 of 7 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
1. We can go a 
long way to 
meeting the 
challenge of 
climate change by 
cutting waste and 
improving 
efficiency. 
       
2. The threat to 
humanity from 
global warming is 
probably 
exaggerated by 
climate change 
scientists. 
       
3. There are 
limits: we cannot 
go on improving 
everyone's 
lifestyle for ever. 
       
4. Over the last 5 
years quite a 
number of people 
I know have taken 
real steps to 
reduce their 
impact on the 
environment. 
       
5. I really don't 
know who to 
believe about 
global warming; 
so many of the 
experts seem to 
contradict each 
other. 
       
 
disagree 
very 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
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strongly nor 
disagree 
strongly 
6. Science and 
technology will 
solve our 
environmental 
problems with 
little need to 
change our way 
of life. 
       
7. It's not fair for 
us to leave future 
generations with 
a worse 
environment than 
we have now. 
       
8. By 2050, 
climate change is 
unlikely to have 
catastrophic 
effects on us in 
Britain. 
       
9. The threats 
posed by climate 
change are 
unpredictable and 
there's not a lot 
we can do about 
it. 
       
10. By some 
means the world's 
population 
growth must be 
reduced. 
       
11. There are 
endless 
opportunities for 
each of us to 
make a difference 
- we just need to 
make it easier for 
everyone. 
       
Part 1 Page 2 of 7 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
12. People worry 
too much about 
humanity's impact 
on the 
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environment. 
13. I'm fed up 
with being 
lectured by all 
sorts of public 
figures about 
what I should do 
to combat climate 
change. 
       
14. It is now an 
established 
scientific fact 
that climate 
change is largely 
man-made. 
       
15. Over the next 
5 years I expect 
quite a number of 
people I know to 
take more steps 
to reduce their 
impact on the 
environment. 
       
16. The 
government 
should be 
providing tax 
breaks and 
subsidies to 
businesses that 
develop green 
technologies. 
       
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
17. Economic 
growth is 
essential to give 
us the means to 
solve the world's 
environmental 
problems. 
       
18. We need to 
set emissions 
targets based on 
sound science 
and gradually 
reduce our 
carbon emissions. 
       
19. I don't expect 
very many people 
round the world 
to do much about 
global warming, 
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so I'm reluctant 
to change my 
lifestyle when 
that won't 
achieve much. 
20. As the climate 
changes we will 
adapt 
accordingly. 
       
21. Fuel is 
expensive enough 
and I do not want 
to see the 
government 
putting more 
'green' taxes on 
it. 
       
22. In reality, 
people will only 
do something 
about climate 
change when 
they start to 
experience it 
directly. 
       
 
 
 
Part 1 Page 3 of 7 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
23. When fighting 
climate change 
international 
institutions like 
the UN will only 
seek gradual 
change to the 
status quo: this 
will not be 
enough. 
       
24. Dealing with 
Global Warming is 
something for 
governments not 
individuals. 
       
25. We need 
substantial        
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changes in how 
we travel, what 
we eat and how 
we build our 
homes if we are 
going to deal with 
climate change. 
26. I don't trust 
the government 
to come up with 
good or fair 
solutions to 
climate change. 
       
27. We're all 
human beings 
together and the 
rich are going to 
have to help the 
poor. 
       
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
28. We need to 
empower people 
to find their own 
energy-efficient 
solutions. 
       
29. We need the 
international 
institutions like 
the UN to bring 
about the co-
operation needed 
to address 
climate change. 
       
30. Over the last 
5 years I have 
taken real steps 
to reduce my 
impact on the 
environment. 
       
31. By 2050, 
climate change 
will have 
catastrophic 
impacts in some 
countries. 
       
32. We will only 
get people to 
change their 
behaviour with 
strict regulations 
on consumption . 
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33. I'm much 
more likely to do 
something that 
may help the 
environment, like 
turning down the 
heating, if it 
saves me money. 
       
 
 
 
 
Part 1 Page 4 of 7 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
34. By 2050, the 
impact of climate 
change on other 
countries will have 
started to have 
serious 
consequences for 
Britain. 
       
35. When it's 
clearer what the 
impacts of climate 
change are, future 
generations will be 
better placed than 
us to address the 
problems of climate 
change. 
       
36. Politicians and 
scientists have an 
important role to 
play in establishing 
policies that can 
address climate 
change. 
       
37. I do try to do 
things like recycling 
to help the 
environment 
because it is the 
right thing to do. 
       
38. Each country 
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has got to look after 
its own citizens first 
when faced with 
global 
environmental 
challenges. 
 
disagree 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
tend to 
disagree 
neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
tend to 
agree 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
very 
strongly 
39. We need higher 
energy prices to 
encourage 
innovation and 
efficiency. 
       
40. Over the next 5 
years I myself will 
take more steps to 
reduce my impact 
on the 
environment. 
       
41. Unless the 
world consumes less 
and accepts lower 
economic growth, 
we will go on 
making the world's 
environmental 
problems worse. 
       
Part 2 Page 5 of 7 
 
When tackling social issues we often have to choose between conflicting 
approaches or to prioritise alternative responses. The next part takes some 
pairs from the statements above and asks you to choose which of the two 
statements is closest to your own opinion.  
 
Even if you agree broadly, or generally disagree, with both statements, 
please nevertheless choose the one you agree with most or disagree 
with least. 
 
 
Which of these two statements is closest to your own opinion?  
1  
We need the international institutions like the UN to bring about 
the co-operation needed to address climate change. 
  
International institutions like the UN will only seek gradual change 
to the status quo: this will not be enough. 
 
2  
Dealing with Global Warming is something for governments not 
individuals. 
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I don't trust the government to come up with good or fair solutions 
to climate change. 
 
3  
We will only get people to change their behaviour with strict 
regulations on consumption. 
  
We need to empower people to find their own energy-efficient 
solutions. 
 
4  
We need substantial changes in how we travel, what we eat and 
how we build our homes if we are going to deal with climate 
change. 
  
We can go a long way to meeting the challenge of climate change by 
cutting waste and improving efficiency. 
 
5  
I do try to do things like recycling to help the environment because 
it is the right thing to do. 
  
I'm much more likely to do something that may help the 
environment, like turning down the heating, if it saves me money. 
 
6  
It's not fair for us to leave future generations with a worse 
environment than we have now. 
  
When it's clearer what the impacts of climate change are, future 
generations will be better placed than us to address the problems 
of climate change. 
 
7  
I'm fed up with being lectured by all sorts of public figures about 
what I should do to combat climate change. 
  
Politicians and scientists have an important role to play in 
establishing policies that can address climate change 
 
8  
Each country has got to look after its own citizens first when faced 
with global environmental challenges 
  
We're all human beings together and the rich are going to have to 
help the poor. 
 
9  
I don't expect very many people round the world to do much about 
global warming, so I'm reluctant to change my lifestyle when that 
won't achieve much 
  
There are endless opportunities for each of us to make a difference 
– we just need to make it easier for everyone. 
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10  
We need higher energy prices to encourage innovation and 
efficiency. 
  
We need to set emissions targets based on sound science and 
gradually reduce our carbon emissions. 
 
11  
Economic growth is essential to give us the means to solve the 
world's environmental problems. 
  
Unless the world consumes less and accepts lower economic 
growth, we will go on making the world's environmental problems 
worse. 
 
12  
As the climate changes we will adapt accordingly. 
  
The threats posed by climate change are unpredictable and there's 
not a lot we can do about it. 
 
Part 2 Page 6 of 7 
 
Imagine that, in the future, climate change has started to have significant 
impacts across the world, creating a shortage of key materials, energy and 
foodstuffs. In this situation, which of the following approaches in this country 
would work best (again choose the one closest to your opinion, even if you 
agree with more than one or generally disagree with all of them): 
 
We all agree to rationing of key materials, energy and foodstuffs. 
 
We allow market forces to price scarce resources, so that prices can rise 
and people will consume less. 
 
We should rely on the government to make the appropriate regulations 
to control the situation? 
 
 
 
Part 2 Page 7 of 7 
 
Imagine that, in the future, climate change has started to have significant 
impacts across the world, forcing many people to migrate from the hardest hit 
areas to less badly affected countries, including Britain. In this situation, which 
of the following approaches in this country would work best (choose one): 
 
 
All the countries that have not been badly affected, including ourselves, 
should receive their fair share of the migrants. 
 
We should allow in anyone who can make a living and contribute to the 
358 
 
 
economy. 
 
We should rely on the government to make the appropriate regulations 
and/or take appropriate security measures to manage the situation? 
 
 
 
Finally, some questions about you: these allow us to compare the responses of 
people coming from different backgrounds: 
A: Are you: 
  
25 or under? 
  
26-35? 
  
36-45? 
  
46-55? 
  
56-65? 
  
66 or over? 
 
B: Are you: 
  
Male 
  
Female 
 
C: At what stage did you complete your formal education?: 
  
Not applicable, am currently in education 
  
Secondary school up to age 16/GCSE or equivalent, or earlier 
  
Secondary school over 16/GCSE or equivalent 
  
College or University but for less than 3 years 
  
Completed degree at College or University 
  
Masters or higher degree 
 
D: Approximately what is your household income?: 
  
Less than £20,000 
  
Between £20,000 and £40,000 
  
Between £40,000 and £60,000 
  
Between £60,000 and £80,000 
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Over £80,000 
 
E: Would you describe the place where you live as 
  
.... a big city? 
  
.... the suburbs or outskirts of a big city? 
  
.... a small city or town? 
  
.... a country village or, a farm or home in the country? 
 
 
You have now completed the survey. Details of the prize draw follow on the 
next page. 
 
Prize Draw 
 
Please provide your email address so that you can be contacted if you win a 
prize in the draw. You will need to click the 'finish' button at the end to send 
the email address. 
 
 
 
For 150 respondents there will be a draw of 3 prizes of £100 each. The 
number of prizes will be increased if more than 170 responses are received. 
You will only be contacted if you win a prize in the draw and your email 
address will not be used for any other purpose. It will be deleted from our 
records as soon as administration of the draw has been completed. 
 
Should you have any questions about this survey or the draw 
contact c.j.tennant@lse.ac.uk. 
 
Many thanks for completing the survey. If you have any comments about the 
survey, particularly if you found some questions unclear or ambiguous, please 
add them here (however, please avoid using the browser back-button to 
review the survey as this will delete your answers).  
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Appendix L:  Survey Statements coded for Relational Model arguments 
 
Numbers refer to the survey Statements as set out in Chapter 6. 
Survey statements 
(a)-ve: statement rejects this 
RM argument 
(b) [ ]: statement only 
partially fits RM argument 
Communal 
Sharing 
Authority Ranking 
Equality 
Matching 
Market 
Pricing 
Foundational 
Principle 
CS7, CS27 AR10, AR24, AR36 EM33 MP11, MP20 
Approach [-ve AR24] CS23 [MP11] [Misc14]  AR18, AR32 
EM9, EM21, EM33, EM38 
[Misc22] [MP16] 
Economics [AR10] CS3, CS41 AR1 EM19, EM33 MP16, MP17, MP39 
Nature CS3, CS7 
 
EM9 [MP6] 
Nature & Man [CS23]  AR18 EM9 MP6, MP20, MP35 
Knowledge, Wisdom [-veMisc12] AR18, AR36 [-ve EM26] [-ve misc2] 
EM26 
[Misc5] MP11, MP39 
Other people CS7, CS27 [AR29] EM13, EM21 MP28, MP35 
Outlook CS3, CS7, CS27, CS37 [EM9] AR10; AR18 EM9 MP6 
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Appendix M: review of responses to the 41 Statements    
 
M1: Level of agreement with Authority Ranking statements 
The survey included seven ‗AR‘ statements: 
 
 1: We can go a long way to meeting the challenge of climate change by 
cutting waste and improving efficiency 
 10: By some means the world‘s population growth must be reduced 
 18: We need to set emissions targets based on sound science and gradually 
reduce our carbon emissions 
 24: Dealing with Global Warming is something for governments not 
individuals 
 29: We need the international institutions like the UN to bring about the 
co-operation needed to address climate change 
 32: We will only get people to change their behaviour with strict 
regulations on consumption 
 36: Politicians and scientists have an important role to play in establishing 
policies that can address climate change. 
 
Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown below: 
 
Table M-7-1: Authority Ranking Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
Clearly AR24 is something of an anomaly: the average mean for the other 6 is 
5.04, indicative of broad general agreement.  Although AR24 contrasts the role of 
government and individuals respondents appear to emphasise only one half of the 
contrast.  The correlations between answers to AR24 and other Statements clearly 
suggest respondents focus on the ‗individuals‘ part of the question.  AR24 
  Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Extreme  
Agreement 
Extreme  
Disagree't 
AR 1: waste efficiency 5.32 1.081 13% 1% 
AR 10: reduce world population 5.19 1.252 19% 1% 
AR 18: targets based on sound science 5.04 .991 7% 1% 
AR 24: governments not individuals 3.44 1.353 2% 8% 
AR 29: need for UN to create co-operation 5.02 1.127 11% 1% 
AR 32: strict regulation on consumption 4.41 1.289 6% 3% 
AR 36: politicians and scientists key role 5.27 1.043 13% 1% 
Average 4.81 10% 2% 
Descriptive Statistics 
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correlates very strongly with EM19 (rejecting individual action: Pearson‘s 
coefficient +0.474, p<0.01), while correlating negatively with Statements MP11 
and MP28 which both advocate the importance of empowering individual action   
(-0.281, -0.214, p <0.01).  The low agreement level suggests people reject the 
idea that climate change is not a matter for individuals while not actually 
expressing a view on the role of government at all.  In subsequent analyses AR24 
has not been included in the creation of an AR composite score. 
 
Although AR10 generally appears to be similar to the other AR variables, it in fact 
correlates much more weakly than the others do with each other.  The high 
proportion expressing extreme agreement also suggests the argument that 
population will need to be reduced stands separate from the mainstream 
arguments about climate change.  Its strongest correlation (0.238, p<0.01) is with 
CS Statement 3 which asserts the limits to human progress, suggesting that both 
seem to capture a Malthusian pessimism absent from the other AR responses.  In 
subsequent analyses AR10 has also been excluded in the creation of an AR 
composite score. 
 
The remaining 5 items (1, 18, 29, 32, 36) have been combined to create a AR 
Composite scale which shows a Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.748.   Introductory text 
books on statistics for the social sciences often suggest 0.7 as a target level for 
Cronbach‘s Alpha (Bohrnstedt & Knoke, 1994, p. 268) although others offer 0.8 as 
the benchmark (Maxim, 1999, p. 244). In a review, Cortina (1993) corroborates the 
view that the scales with Alpha scores over 0.7 are typically considered reliable,  
He criticises the implied over-simplification of this formulaic threshold, but most 
of the criticism is more pertinent to scales generated with larger numbers of 
items.  His key criticism of the use of alpha is over-interpretation:  ‗internal 
consistency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for homogeneity‘ (p100). 
Although Fiske‘s original theory attributes homogeneity and unidimensionality to 
the Relational Models, the objective of this survey is restricted to exploring 
whether the Models form a coherent Standpoint; interpreting coherence as at 
least internally consistent if not necessarily homogeneous, for the purposes of this 
survey the alpha is an adequate measure. 
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M2: Level of agreement with Communal Sharing statements 
The survey included seven ‗CS‘ statements: 
 3: There are limits: we cannot go on improving everyone's lifestyle for 
ever 
 7: It's not fair for us to leave future generations with a worse 
environment than we have now 
  23: When fighting climate change international institutions like the UN 
will only seek gradual change to the status quo: this will not be enough 
 25: We need substantial changes in how we travel, what we eat and 
how we build our homes if we are going to deal with climate change 
 27: We're all human beings together and the rich are going to have to 
help the poor 
 37: I do try to do things like recycling to help the environment because 
it is the right thing to do 
 41: Unless the world consumes less and accepts lower economic 
growth, we will go on making the world‘s environmental problems 
worse. 
 
Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown below: 
 
Table M-7-2: Communal Sharing Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
The broad pattern is similar to the AR statements.  The high level of agreement 
appears to be driven by Statements 7 and 37, which essentially state moral 
imperatives that respondents are keen to agree with75. 
                                            
75 These responses will reflect a degree of social desirability bias (Alreck & Settle, 1985, 
Ch4), although much of the methodological literature concentrates on the bias operating 
with responses to an interviewer, when concern for appearances might be stronger 
(Fowler, 2008, Ch6). 
  
Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Extreme  
Agreement 
Extreme  
Disagree't 
CS 3: there are limits 4.62 1.411 9% 3% 
CS 7: not fair to leave to fut generations 5.45 1.244 24% 1% 
CS 23: UN/AR gradualism not enough 4.71 1.071 6% 1% 
CS 25: major change in consumption 4.97 1.260 11% 2% 
CS 27: all human, rich must help poor 5.13 1.200 16% 0% 
CS 37: helping enviro right thing to do 5.86 1.070 35% 0% 
CS 41: accept lower economic growth 4.81 1.276 11% 1% 
Average 5.08 16% 1% 
Communal Sharing: Descriptive Statistics 
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Statement 3‘s pessimism has already been mentioned: it has the weakest 
correlations amongst the CS statements.  The other CS statements encompass an 
assertion of personal efficacy – there are things ‗I‘ or we can (or should) do about 
it.  CS3 effectively denies this efficacy: its strongest correlation is with EM9 
(which says there is nothing we can do about climate change: +0.261, p<0.01).  
The statement is excluded from the creation of the CS composite score. 
 
The remaining six items have been combined to form a CS Composite scale, which 
shows a Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.766. 
M3: Level of agreement with Equality Matching statements 
There survey included seven ‗EM‘ statements: 
 
 9: The threats posed by climate change are unpredictable and there‘s not 
a lot we can do about it 
 13: I‘m fed up with being lectured by all sorts of public figures about what 
I should do to combat climate change 
 19: I don‘t expect very many people round the world to do much about 
global warming, so I‘m reluctant to change my lifestyle when that won‘t 
achieve much 
 21: Fuel is expensive enough and I do not want to see the government 
putting more ‗green‘ taxes on it  
 26: I don‘t trust the government to come up with good or fair solutions to 
climate change  
 33: I‘m much more likely to do something that may help the environment, 
like turning down the heating, if it saves me money 
 38: Each country has got to look after its own citizens first when faced 
with global environmental challenges. 
 
Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown below: 
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Table M-7-3: Equality Matching Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
The pattern with these statements is somewhat different from the previous 
groups.  The first three questions appear to include a denial of personal efficacy 
which respondents are less willing to endorse.  Similarly, Statement 38, although 
generating marginally more agreement than disagreement, is less willingly 
endorsed.  Probably this is because it contradicts the moral imperatives (e.g. CS 
Statement 27) that social acceptability demands strong agreement to. 
 
Statement 21, rejecting fuel taxes, correlates strongly with most of the other EM 
statements but it shows an unusual profile: 
 
  Figure M-1: Level of agreement with Statement 21 
  
Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Extreme  
Agreement 
Extreme  
Disagree't 
EM 9: threats unpredictable uncontrollable 3.83 1.334 3% 4% 
EM 13: fed up with lectures 4.04 1.648 8% 7% 
EM 19: other's won't, so I won't 3.31 1.454 2% 12% 
EM 21: fuel expensive, no more taxes 4.83 1.699 21% 5% 
EM 26: don't trust govt to solve CC 4.95 1.229 14% 0% 
EM 33: more likely to act if saves me money 5.25 1.136 15% 1% 
EM 38: look after own citizens first 4.39 1.395 7% 3% 
Average 4.37 10% 5% 
Equality Matching: Descriptive Statistics 
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Other Statements typically have more clearly normal distributions: both 
Statement 21 and Statement 39 (We need higher energy prices to encourage 
innovation and efficiency) appear to provoke extreme reactions – agreement and 
disagreement respectively – in some respondents.  The two are strongly 
(negatively) correlated (-0.611, p<0.01) and appear to be capturing something 
additional to the core position of the other EM questions.   Statement 21 is also 
unusual in that the place of residence demographic is significant in people‘s 
choices:  The 104 ‗big City‘ residents are only 40% as likely as others to agree very 
strongly with this statement (p <0.01), while the 83 ‗Village/country‘ residents 
are 1.8 times more likely to agree very strongly with the statement (p<0.05).  This 
is in line with mainstream coverage of the fuel protests in 2000 which perceived 
resistance to petrol taxes as driven by rural concerns (e.g. Treneman, 2000): 
typically users of the countryside need to drive so that they themselves can 
traverse the open spaces whether for enjoyment or out of necessity, while urban 
dwellers want fewer other drivers on the road to reduce congestion (Christie & 
Jarvis, 1999). 
 
Statements 26 and 33 have the highest level of respondent agreement: they say 
more than a generalised rejection of climate change science and policies, and 
unsurprisingly correlate less strongly with the other five Statements.  However, 
almost the lowest correlation between all 7 Statements is in fact between these 
two (0.100, p<0.05).   Of the two EM33 seems closer to the core of the EM 
Standpoint; by contrast, the phrasing of Statement 26 is probably ill-judged, and 
it is noticeable that only two people strongly disagreed with it.  It appears likely 
that respondents can both think the government will be necessary in addressing 
climate change while at the same time not trusting the government to come up 
with the solutions: the Statement correlates modestly (0.170, p<0.01) with the CS 
Composite score.  Generally, however, the Statement is only weakly correlated 
with most of the other individual Statements, suggesting that different 
respondents have construed the Statement differently.  For this reason it has been 
excluded from the creation of an EM Composite scale. 
 
The remaining six items combine to create an EM Composite scale with a 
Cronbach‘s Alpha of 0.758.  Some further comments on the EM scale are provided 
in the endnotesG. 
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M4: Level of agreement with Market Pricing statements 
The survey included eight ‗MP‘ statements: 
 
 6: Science and technology will solve our environmental problems with little 
need to change our way of life 
 11: There are endless opportunities for each of us to make a difference – 
we just need to make it easier for everyone 
 16: (MP/AR) The government should be providing tax breaks and subsidies 
to businesses that develop green technologies 
 17: Economic growth is essential to give us the means to solve the world's 
environmental problems 
 20: As the climate changes we will adapt accordingly 
 28: We need to empower people to find their own energy-efficient 
solutions 
 35: When it‘s clearer what the impacts of climate change are, future 
generations will be better placed than us to address the problems of 
climate change 
 39: We need higher energy prices to encourage innovation and efficiency. 
 
One of these (16) could more correctly be described as representing both the AR 
and MP Standpoints.  Another, MP6, was derived from the variable ‗sciesolv‘ used 
in the British Social Attitudes 2000 survey (Christie & Jarvis, 2001), as were 
Statements 2 and 12 (6.4.8 below).  MP6 produced a different response pattern to 
the other questions but it does capture the technological optimism identified in 
Chapters 4 and 5 as part of the MP Standpoint (e.g. 4.7.8 ‗Science will save the 
planet‘ in #112) and so it has been classified within the MP Statement set. 
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Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown 
below:
 
Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Extreme 
Agreement
Extreme 
Disagree't
MP 6: science will solve 2.98 1.238 1% 12%
MP 11: empowering everyone to make a diff 5.11 1.075 10% 1%
MP/AR 16: govt incentivise technology 5.13 1.208 15% 1%
MP 17: econ growth essential for enviro 4.34 1.150 2% 3%
MP 20: as climate changes we'll adapt 4.42 1.159 3% 2%
MP 28: empower others to save energy 4.97 1.018 9% 1%
MP 35: fut generations better placed to address CC 4.24 1.170 2% 3%
MP 39: higher prices to encourage innov efficiency 3.06 1.454 1% 20%
Average 4.28 5% 4%
Market Pricing: Descriptive Statistics
 
Table M-7-4: Market Pricing Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
The MP Statements present a more heterogeneous pattern than the previous three 
groups.  Appendix N shows a correlation matrix for the eight MP Statements, 
revealing two distinct groups (6, 20, 35 in the first; 11, 16, 28 in the second), and 
two Statements (17, 39) less closely correlated than the others. 
  
Although MP6 provoked the highest level of disagreement out of all the RM 
Statements, while on average respondents tended to agree with MP20 and 35, 
these three Statements all positively correlate (average co-efficient is 0.342, all 
p<0.01); likewise Statements 11, 16, and 28 (average co-efficient 0.396, all 
p<0.01).  These two groups, when combined as composites, are negatively 
correlated (-0.257, p<0.01).  The first group expresses a laissez-faire philosophy: 
we should ignore climate change because we can deal with it as and when we 
have to.  The second group expresses MP‘s confidence in individual efficacy in a 
different way: it takes the challenge seriously but emphasises the importance of 
empowering individuals to deliver solutions. 
 
 Statement 17, endorsing the primacy of economic growth, correlates more weakly 
with the ‗Laissez–faire‘ group, but does not correlate negatively with the 
‗Empower‘ group.   Statement 39 belongs naturally in the ‗Empower‘ group, but it 
correlates more weakly than the others.  It demonstrates a similar pattern to EM 
Statement 21 but in reverse: a number of people reject higher prices vehemently 
and this aspect of the Statement seems to set it apart from others.   Both 
Statements 17 and 39 have been excluded from the composites described below. 
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Two composites have been formed from the remaining  six Statements.  Built upon 
only three Statements each, these do not have particularly strong Cronbach‘s 
Alphas (Cortina, 1993).  The MP3 Laissez-faire scale has an Alpha of 0.608; the 
MP3 Empower score has an Alpha of 0.659.  The positions should therefore be 
treated more as a loose approach than a coherent Standpoint, but for the sake of 
convenience they will be referred to as Standpoints. 
 
In the focus groups there were clear issues surrounding the social acceptability of 
asserting arguments premised on the individualistic MP Standpoint: given this, the 
nuances of the wording are likely to strike people in different ways.  Yet the 
emergence of two divergent groups ‗within‘ the expected MP Standpoint cannot 
be ignored.   Logically, the MP Standpoint should prompt different responses 
according to how serious the respondent thinks AGW actually is.  The ‗Laissez-
faire‘ responses are a natural expression of confident, assertive individualism if 
one thinks AGW does not pose a risk.  The ‗Empower‘ response is a logical 
expression of the MP Standpoint‘s belief in individual efficacy if one thinks AGW 
does pose a risk.  This adaptive way of responding would fit well with the logic of 
the MP Standpoint.  However, according to Cultural Theory, the individualist 
worldview should determine whether respondents think AGW is a risk.  These 
results offer two alternative, and contradictory, conclusions: 
 
 The MP Laissez-faire and MP Empower groups cannot be part of the same 
Standpoint 
 The MP Standpoint is not a strong determinant in respondents‘ risk 
perception of AGW.  Rather, the Standpoint provides different responses to 
different contexts, one in which AGW is perceived to be a risk, one where 
it is not. 
 
Section 6.7 covers this issue in greater depth. 
M5: Level of agreement with other Statements: Miscellaneous 
There were five ‗miscellaneous‘ Statements in the survey: 
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 2: The threat to humanity from global warming is probably exaggerated by 
climate change scientists (adapted from variable exagenv in BSA 2000, see 
6.4.7 above) 
 5: I really don't know who to believe about global warming; so many of the 
experts seem to contradict each other 
 12: People worry too much about humanity‘s impact on the environment 
(adapted from variable harmvirw in BSA 2000) 
 14: It is now an established scientific fact that climate change is largely 
man-made 
 22: In reality, people will only do something about climate change when 
they start to experience it directly. 
 
Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown below: 
 
Table M-7-5: Miscellaneous Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix O includes a correlation table for these five variables together with the 
Composites EM6 and MP3 Laissez-faire.  These show predictable relationships, with 
Statements 2, 5 and 12 all strongly correlated with each other and the two 
Composite Scale scores (all correlations > 0.500, p <0.01).  Statement 14 
correlates negatively with 2, 5, 12 and the two composite scales (all correlations 
<-0.400, p<0.01). 
 
Only the final statement, 22, does not correlate with the others, but it does have 
a weaker correlation of 0.147 (<0.01) with the EM6 Composite: effectively this 
Statement expresses the expectation that others will follow the arguments of EM, 
but it does not express an EM argument directly. 
 
  
Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Extreme  
Agreement 
Extreme  
Disagree't 
Misc 2: threat exaggerated 3.87 1.544 3% 9% 
Misc 5: don't know who to believe 4.19 1.434 5% 5% 
Misc 12: people worry too much 3.13 1.426 2% 15% 
Misc 14: fact CC manmade 4.43 1.502 8% 5% 
Misc 22 people only act when selves affected 5.31 1.027 13% 0% 
Miscellaneous Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
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M6: Level of agreement with other Statements: Impacts 
Three variables tested whether respondents thought CC would have a serious 
impact in the midterm.  These were: 
 8: (Impact) By 2050, climate change is unlikely to have catastrophic effects 
on us in Britain 
 31: (Impact) By 2050, climate change will have catastrophic impacts in 
some countries 
 34: (Impact) By 2050, the impact of climate change on other countries will 
have started to have serious consequences for Britain. 
Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown below: 
 
Table M-7-6: Impact Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
Although rather tentative, the responses to 8 and 31 reflect the IPCC view (IPCC, 
2007, Ch11) and the responses to 34 reflect the view that indirect impacts such as 
commodity shortages and migration are more of an issue for the UK.  
M7: Level of agreement with other Statements: Action 
Four statements seek to tap respondents‘ willingness to reduce their impact on 
the environment: 
 40: (Action) Over the last 5 years quite a number of people I know have 
taken real steps to reduce their impact on the environment. 
 15: (Action) Over the next 5 years I expect quite a number of people I 
know to take more steps to reduce their impact on the environment. 
  30: (Action) Over the last 5 years I have taken real steps to reduce my 
impact on the environment 
 40: (Action) Over the next 5 years I myself will take more steps to reduce 
my impact on the environment. 
 
Mean scores and standard deviations for these statements are shown below: 
  
Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Extreme  
Agreement 
Extreme  
Disagree't 
Impact 8: 2050 unlikely CC affect UK 3.83 1.317 3% 5% 
Impact 31: 2050 CC catastrophic some countries 4.83 1.351 13% 1% 
Impact 34: 2050 CC other countries knock on to UK 4.49 1.205 5% 1% 
Averages N/A: polarity of 8 reverse of 31, 34 
Impact Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
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Table M-7-7: Actions Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
Respondents may well be exhibiting a self-serving bias in judging others‘ efforts to 
reduce their impact lower than their own, as well as aspiring to reduce their own 
impact more in the future than in the past.    Looking at the difference between 
respondents own aspiration to reduce their impact (40) and their expectations 
that others will (15),  those with higher scores on the CS6 Composite scale show a 
greater difference, perhaps justifying the holier than thou image 
environmentalists can be accused of (B=0.426, R2 = 0.103, at <0.01). 
M8: Relational Model scale scores 
This section looks at the composite scale scores for the different Relational 
Models.  Section 6.4.4 stresses that these are treated as a composite summation 
of levels of agreement with statements expressing the different Models rather 
than measurements of an actual latent factor. 
 
Section 6.2.3 identified that the two samples appeared to be drawn from subtly 
different populations.  Nevertheless, the table below shows that the RM Scales 
sustain their Reliability in both the Saros and Maximiles samples.  Furthermore, 
this is largely true of the Snowball pilot sample (note that one Statement, 
MP/AR16, was missing from the pilot set): 
 
  
Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Extreme  
Agreement 
Extreme  
Disagree't 
Actions 4: Last 5 yrs others reduced 4.49 1.201 3% 1% 
Actions 15: nxt 5 years others will reduce 4.47 1.078 3% 1% 
Actions 30: last 5 years I reduced 4.89 1.183 8% 1% 
Action 40: nxt 5 years I'll reduce 5.00 1.126 11% 1% 
Average 4.71 6% 1% 
Actions Statements: Descriptive Statistics 
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      Table M-7-8: Relational Model scales: Cronbach's Alpha by sample 
 
The scale scores correlate strongly: 
 
        Table M-7-9: Correlations between Relational Model Scales 
These show the same two distinct groups identified throughout Chapter 6: AR, CS 
and MP Empower all engage with AGW, treating it as a problem the respondent 
wants to address or at least to be addressed.  EM6 and MP Laissez-faire form the 
other group.   
  
Merged Saros Maximiles 
Snowball  
pilot 
AR 5 Composite (1,18,29,32,36) 0.748 0.689 0.764 0.703 
CS6 Composite (7,23,25,27,37,41) 0.766 0.748 0.772 0.690 
EM6 Composite (9,13,19,21,33,38) 0.758 0.760 0.751 0.671 
MP3 Laissez faire composite (6,20,35) 0.608 0.572 0.614 0.552 
MP3 Empower composite (11,16,28) 0.659 0.648 0.655 N/A 
MP2 Empower composite (11,28) 0.560 0.575 0.542 0.626 
Sample size 578 149 429 101 
RM Scales:  Cronbach's Alpha by Sample 
 Pearson co- 
efficients 
AR5_score CS6_score EM6_score 
MP  
Empower  
score 
MP Laissez  
faire score 
AR5_score 1 .756 -.431 .668 -.336 
CS6_score .756 1 -.453 .635 -.415 
EM6_score -.431 -.453 1 -.341 .621 
MP_Empower_sc .668 .635 -.341 1 -.257 
-.336 -.415 .621 -.257 1 
Bold italics p<0.01 
RM scales: Correlations 
MP_Laissez_faire 
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Appendix N:  Survey respondent demographics 
 
Question      Saros    Maximiles   Merged
56 Age
25 or under? 3 2% 5 1% 8 1%
26-35? 31 21% 71 17% 102 18%
36-45? 39 26% 130 30% 169 29%
46-55? 44 30% 119 28% 163 28%
56-65? 32 21% 75 17% 107 19%
66 or over? 0 0% 29 7% 29 5%
149 100% 429 100% 578 100%
57 Gender
Male 57 38% 257 60% 314 54%
Female 92 62% 172 40% 264 46%
149 100% 429 100% 578 100%
58 Highest level education
Not applicable, am currently in education 2 1% 6 1% 8 1%
Secondary school up to age 16/GCSE or equivalent, or earlier16 11% 51 12% 67 12%
Secondary school over 16/GCSE or equivalent 17 11% 58 14% 75 13%
College or University but for less than 3 years 39 26% 93 22% 132 23%
Completed degree at College or University 51 34% 158 37% 209 36%
Masters or higher degree 24 16% 63 15% 87 15%
149 100% 429 100% 578 100%
59 Household Income
Less than £20,000 35 23% 78 18% 113 20%
Between £20,000 and £40,000 51 34% 181 42% 232 40%
Between £40,000 and £60,000 38 26% 83 19% 121 21%
Between £60,000 and £80,000 16 11% 51 12% 67 12%
Over £80,000 9 6% 36 8% 45 8%
149 100% 429 100% 578 100%
60 Residence
a big city 41 28% 63 15% 104 18%
the suburbs or outskirts of a big city 48 32% 117 27% 165 29%
 a small city or town, 44 30% 182 42% 226 39%
a country village, or farm or home in country 16 11% 67 16% 83 14%
149 100% 429 100% 578 100%  
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Appendix O:  Correlation table: 8 Market Pricing Statements 
 
MP6 MP11 MP/AR16 MP17 MP20 MP28 MP35 MP39
MP 6: science will solve Pearson 
Correlation
1 -.265 -.249 .211 .357 -.159 .278 -.079
MP11: empowering 
everyone to make a diff
Pearson 
Correlation
-.265 1 .360 .002 -.176 .389 -.053 .043
MP/AR 16: govt 
incentivise technology
Pearson 
Correlation
-.249 .360 1 .062 -.149 .437 -.141 .196
MP 17: econ growth 
essential for enviro
Pearson 
Correlation
.211 .002 .062 1 .189 .054 .116 -.055
MP 20: as climate 
changes we'll adapt
Pearson 
Correlation
.357 -.176 -.149 .189 1 -.060 .393 -.203
MP 28: empower others 
to save energy
Pearson 
Correlation
-.159 .389 .437 .054 -.060 1 -.051 .122
MP 35: fut generations 
better placed to address 
Pearson 
Correlation
.278 -.053 -.141 .116 .393 -.051 1 -.190
MP 39: higher prices to 
encourage innov 
Pearson 
Correlation
-.079 .043 .196 -.055 -.203 .122 -.190 1
Bold italic p<0.001 Underlined p< 0.01
Correlations
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Appendix P:  Correlation table for Miscellaneous Statements 
 
Misc 2 Misc 5 Misc 12 Misc 14 Misc 22 EM6 MP3LF
Misc 2: threat exaggerated Pearson 
Correlation
1 .567 .649 -.604 -.007 .688 .580
Misc 5: don't know who to 
believe
Pearson 
Correlation
.567 1 .393 -.418 .060 .602 .406
Misc 12: people worry too 
much
Pearson 
Correlation
.649 .393 1 -.527 -.076 .621 .524
Misc 14: fact CC manmade Pearson 
Correlation
-.604 -.418 -.527 1 .021 -.543 -.419
Misc 22 people only act 
when selves affected
Pearson 
Correlation
-.007 .060 -.076 .021 1 .147 .003
EM6_score Pearson 
Correlation
.688 .602 .621 -.543 .147 1 .621
MP_Laissez_faire_score Pearson 
Correlation
.580 .406 .524 -.419 .003 .621 1
Correlations
 
 
Bold Italic: p<0.01 
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Appendix Q:  Exploratory factor analysis 
 
The table below presents the results of the exploratory factor analysis using the 
29 ‗Relational Model‘ Statements.  Loadings are presented from an obligque 
(Oblimin) rotation. Loadings <0.25 have not been presented for ease of 
interpretation. 
Analysis: Maximum likelihood, 5 factors.  Rotation: direct oblimin (oblique)
1 2 3 4 5
AR 1: waste efficiency     .422
AR 10: reduce world population      
AR 18: targets based on sound science .649     
AR 24: governments not individuals     -.667
AR 29: ned for UN to create co-operation .841     
AR 32: strcit regulation on consumption .343  .272   
AR 36: politicians and scientists key role .638     
CS 3: there are limits    -.431  
CS 7: not fair to leave to fut generations .339    .352
CS 23: UN/AR gradualism not enough .482   -.308  
CS 25: major change in consumption .379     
CS 27: all human, rich must help poor .464     
CS 37: helping enviro right thing to do .338    .472
CS 41: accept lower economic growth    -.494  
EM 9: threats unpredictable uncontrollable  .488   -.292
EM 13: fed up with lectures  .251 -.346  -.348
EM 19: other's won't, so I won't  .311   -.572
EM 21: fuel expensive, no more taxes  .346 -.590   
EM 26: don't trust govt to solve CC   -.423   
EM 33: more likely to act if saves me money  .407    
EM 38: look after own citizens first  .567    
MP 6: science will solve  .364   -.454
MP 11: empowering everyone to make a diff .273    .495
MP/AR 16: govt incentivise technology .571     
MP 17: econ growth essential for enviro  .424  .344  
MP 20: as climate changes we'll adapt  .496    
MP 28: empower others to save energy .474     
MP 35: fut generations better placed to address CC  .436    
MP 39: higher prices to encourage innov efficiency   .813   
Pattern Matrixa
 
Factor
 
Interpretation: 
1. Factor 1 captures a level of commitment ‗Mainstream‘ view of climate 
change and the potential solutions to it (that it is/isn‘t a real threat, and it 
is/isn‘t something that society will have to prioritise). 
2. Factor 2 captures the response that we should/shouldn‘t ‗Reject and 
ignore the issue‘, and that society shouldn‘t/should place obligations on 
the individual. 
3. Factor 3 endorses/rejects the use of higher prices and regulation to tackle 
climate change. 
4. Factor 4 endorses/rejects the need for economic growth. 
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Appendix Q:  Exploratory Factor Analysis (cont‘d): 
 
5. Factor 5 captures a moral commitment/refusal for individuals to play their 
part 
 
Factors 3, 4 and 5 have fairly predictable correlations (in the table below) with 
the ‗Mainstream‘ view in factor 1.  These correlations are also repeated with the 
ScepticsBelievers scale: in other words these factors sit comfortably with a bipolar 
account in which respondents either do, or don‘t, engage with climate change as 
both real and important for society to tackle.  Factor scores for 1 and 2 correlate 
predictably with the ScepticsBelievers scale (Factor 1, +0.650, Factor 2 -0.519, 
both p<0.01) but not strongly with each other and it is this that suggests 
engagement with climate change is more complex than the simple bi-polar 
account. 
 
 
 
Shown below are the data for the amount of the variance explained by the model: 
 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings (a)
Total
% of 
Variance
Cumulative 
% Total
% of 
Variance
Cumulative 
% Total
1 7.691 26.520 26.520 7.154 24.669 24.669 5.660
2 2.876 9.918 36.438 2.244 7.737 32.406 2.613
3 1.753 6.043 42.481 1.248 4.303 36.710 2.573
4 1.542 5.317 47.798 .950 3.275 39.985 1.567
5 1.199 4.135 51.933 .576 1.985 41.969 4.480
6 1.023 3.529 55.462
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings
Total Variance Explained
 
 
(a): When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to 
obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix R:   Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Path diagram with 4 Relational Model Variables and 26 Indicator Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The latent variables are identified by fixing their variances at 1. 
Loadings are presented in standardised form. 
Diagram reproduced from Amos output. 
Caution is required in interpreting this model due to the high levels of correlation between 
the latent variables. 
All error terms omitted from diagram. 
EM33 if it saves me money 
EM26: don‘t trust gov‘t 
EM9: CC threat unpredictable 
Equality 
Matching 
MP6: Science will solve 
MP20: we‘ll adapt to CC 
MP35: future better placed 
EM9:fed up with lectures 
EM19: others won‘t; I won‘t 
EM21: fuel expensive: no tax 
EM38: look after own first 
AR18: targets, based on science 
AR36: politicians & scientists key 
AR24: gov‘t not individuals 
AR32:strict regs on consumption 
AR1: cut waste, be efficient 
AR29: need UN to co-operate 
Authority 
Ranking 
Market Pricing 
Communal 
Sharing 
MP28: empower to save energy 
MP11: empower to make a diff 
MP/AR16: gov‘t incentivise tech. 
MP39:higher prices drive efficiency 
CS37: helping enviro right 
.98 
.95 
-0.65 
.97 
-0.92 
-0.67 
.16 
.18 
.71 
.77 
.74 
.60 
.41 
.76 
-0.27 
.51 
.49 
.71 
.66 
CS41: accept lower econ growth 
CS27: all human;must help poor 
CS25:major change in lifestyle  
CS7: not fair to future generations 
CS23:UN gradualist;not enough 
-0.56 
-0.42 
-0.30 
.46 
.54 
.54 
.36 
.63 
.61 
.49 
.65 
.49 
.55 
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Appendix R cont‟d::  Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Path diagram with 5 Relational Model Variables and 20 Indicator Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The latent variables are identified by fixing their variances at 1. 
Loadings are presented in standardised form. 
Diagram reproduced from Amos output. 
All error terms omitted from diagram. 
EM9: CC threat unpredictable 
Equality 
Matching 
MP6: Science will solve 
MP20: we‘ll adapt to CC 
MP35: future better placed 
EM9: fed up with lectures 
EM19: others won‘t; I won‘t 
AR18: targets, based on science 
AR36: politicians & scientists key 
AR32: strict regs on consumption 
AR1: cut waste, be efficient 
AR29: need UN to co-operate 
Authority 
Ranking 
MP - Empower 
Communal 
Sharing 
MP28: empower to save energy 
MP11: empower to make a diff 
MP/AR16: gov‘t incentivise tech. 
CS37: helping enviro right 
.89 
.92 
0.88 
.96 
-0.65 
-0.73 
.69 
.75 
.77 
.76 
.51 
.50 
.72 
.67 
CS41: accept lower econ growth 
CS27: all human; must help poor 
CS25: major change in lifestyle 
CS7: not fair to future generations 
CS23: UN gradualist; not enough  
.60 
.62 
.66 
.63 
.61 
.65 
.49 
.55 
MP – Laissez faire 
.47 
.67 
.58 
-0.67 
-0.67 
-0.44 
-0.52 
.49 
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Appendix S: Cluster analysis of responses to 41 statements 
 
Analysis uses Pearson‘s coefficient. 
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Appendix T: Detailed analysis of dichotomised Relational Model 
statements  
 
 
For each dichotomy the following analysis has been performed 
 
 Crosstabulations against level of scepticism/belief in AGW 
 Logistic regressions of the choices made against Relational Model scales 
and demographic variables. 
 
The analysis also provides: 
 
The text of the two Statements: respondents had to prefer one over the other. 
 A note of the correlations between responses to the two Statements when 
they were posed individually – respondents are likely to find closely 
correlated Statements harder to choose between 
 A crosstabulation of the Dichotomised arguments against level of 
scepticism/belief in AGW 
 A note of the Chi2 measure of association within the table, if significant 
(p<0.05).   A Chi2 squared score over 10 is likely to be significant; the 
highest Chi2 squared score amongst the 12 questions was 200.  High scores 
suggest that level of belief in AGW significantly influences respondent‘s 
choice of Statement. 
 A discussion of the crosstabulation 
 A logistic regression, assessing the relationship between the choice of 
Statement and respondent scores on the Relational Model scales (and 
ScepticsBelievers scale) and the demographic variables. 
 Whenever one of the Statements within the dichotomy was included within 
the original calculation of an RM scale, this scale has been recalculated 
omitting that one variable for the relevant regression to avoid circularity  
 Where the dependent variables have been found significant (p<0.05), odds 
ratio‘s have been calculated.  These calculate the odds that a respondent 
towards the top of the scale chooses one of the Statements as compared to 
someone towards the bottom of the scale.  ‗Towards‘ the top and bottom 
has been defined as the range that is nearest to including the middle 90% 
of the sample.  Typically the range of the whole sample is from 1  
(equivalent to disagree very strongly with that Standpoint) or c1.5 to 7 
(agree very strongly) on any scale, ie a range of 5.5 to 6.  The range of the 
central 90% is typically a range 2.7 to 3.5 wide.  A note at the bottom of 
the first regression table illustrates what this means. 
 The Nagelkerke pseudo R2 statistic is provided to give an indication of the 
level of the model‘s explanatory power. 
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Question 42: AR vs CS 
 
29: (AR) We need the international institutions like the UN to bring about the co-
operation needed to address climate change (Mean response to AR29 on its own 
was 5.02) 
 
23: (CS) When fighting climate change international institutions like the UN will 
only seek gradual change to the status quo: this will not be enough (Mean 
response 4.71) 
 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.419, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 37 118 144 39 338
% within AR29 vs CS23 10.9% 34.9% 42.6% 11.5% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 58.7% 55.9% 59.0% 65.0% 58.5%
Count 26 93 100 21 240
% within AR29 vs CS23 10.8% 38.8% 41.7% 8.8% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 41.3% 44.1% 41.0% 35.0% 41.5%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within AR29 vs CS23 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
AR29 vs CS23 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
AR29 vs 
CS23
Chose 
AR29
Chose 
CS23
Total
 
 
 Chi Sq NOT significant. 
 
Responses to these two statements individually are strongly correlated.  Both also 
correlate to the ScepticsBelievers scale (AR29: 0.493, p< 0.001; CS23: 0.432 
p<0.01) suggesting that the nuance in the statements is overridden by a relatively 
simple interpretation that responds to the fact that both statements take AGW as 
a given.  When the two are dichotomised with each other, this simple driver for 
the responses – belief or not in AGW - is no longer relevant. 
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Question 42: AR vs CS 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) AR29 CS23
AR4_score_ex29 -.114 .180 .398 .528 .893
CS5_score_ex23 .397 .176 5.115 .024 1.488 3.3
EM6_score .443 .145 9.389 .002 1.557 4.1
MP_Empower_score -.415 .148 7.890 .005 .660 3.5
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.131 .137 .910 .340 .877
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 .130 .154 .712 .399 1.139
Gender (female=1) -.374 .185 4.083 .043 .688 1.5
age_6cat .058 .082 .506 .477 1.060
income_5cat -.213 .083 6.496 .011 .808 2.3
Big_City -.076 .242 .099 .753 .927
v058xxxeduc_5cat .118 .080 2.144 .143 1.125
Source (Saros=1) .599 .210 8.162 .004 1.821 1.8
Constant -1.790 1.352 1.754 .185 .167
Pseudo Rsq: 0.084 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q42: AR29 vs CS23: variables in the equation
 
The odds ratios can be interpreted as follows.  For the Communal Sharing scale, a 
respondent towards the top of the scale is 2.9x more likely than a person at the 
bottom of the scale to have chosen CS23 over AR29 (controlling for all the other 
variables).  The range of the adjusted CS scale, excluding responses to CS23, is 1.6 
to 7.  To remove the extreme responses from consideration the odds ratio is taken 
of those lying either end of the ‗core‘ of the responses.  The range from 3.4 to 6.4 
holds 90.3% of the respondents.  The odds ratio is calculated for a respondent at 
the top of this range compared to a respondent at the bottom.   
 
For the demographic variables, the odds ratio is calculated to compare the top 
category to the bottom.  Thus a respondent with household income over £80,000 is 
2.3x more likely (after controlling for other variables) to have chosen AR29 than a 
person reporting household income under £20,000.  For Gender, women (after 
controlling for other variables) are 1.5x more likely than men to have chosen 
AR29, while Saros respondents (controlling for other variables) are 1.8x more 
likely than Maximiles respondents to have chosen CS23. 
 
What is noticeable in this regression is the linkage between the EM and CS models.  
When belief or scepticism about AGW is not salient, both EM and CS sometimes 
capture a distrust of the established authorities.  In this dichotomy both the EM 
and CS Standpoints are associated with rejecting AR29 and preferring the CS23 
Statement that criticises the AR position. 
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Question 43:  AR vs EM 
 
24: (AR) Dealing with Global Warming is something for governments not individuals 
(Mean response 3.44). 
26: (EM) I don‘t trust the government to come up with good or fair solutions to 
climate change (Mean response 4.95). 
 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.087, p<0.05. 
 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 20 64 78 12 174
% within AR24 vs EM26 11.5% 36.8% 44.8% 6.9% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 31.7% 30.3% 32.0% 20.0% 30.1%
Count 43 147 166 48 404
% within AR24 vs EM26 10.6% 36.4% 41.1% 11.9% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 68.3% 69.7% 68.0% 80.0% 69.9%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within AR24 vs EM26 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
AR24 vs 
EM26
Chose 
AR24
Chose 
EM26
AR24 vs EM26 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
 
Chi Sq NOT significant. 
 
Section 6.4.4 identified that AR24 was something of an anomaly within the 
collection of AR statements.  It correlates negatively with the AR scale made up 
from 5 other statements (-0.166, p <0.001).   The AR scale score correlates 
strongly and positively with the ScepticsBelievers scale score (0.652, p<0.01), 
while agreement with AR24 correlated negatively with the ScepticsBelievers scale 
score (-0.284, p<0.01): believers in AGW also believe in the relevance of their own 
actions and reject the ‗not individuals‘ part of this statement.  Indeed, responses 
to AR24 correlate positively with the EM scale score (0.326, p<0.01): respondents 
scoring high on the EM score, despite their dislike of government taxes or 
regulations, are pleased to avoid any responsibility to do something about AGW 
(which they may well not believe in) themselves. 
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Question 43:  AR vs EM 
 
Although level of belief in AGW has no influence over the choice in Q43, the 
relational models do show interesting relationships: 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) AR24 EM26
AR5_score -.627 .213 8.683 .003 .534 6.6
CS6_score .662 .207 10.215 .001 1.938 5.9
EM6_score .137 .155 .788 .375 1.147
MP_Empower_score .156 .159 .960 .327 1.169
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.271 .148 3.363 .067 .762
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 -.078 .165 .223 .637 .925
Gender (female=1) .419 .197 4.519 .034 1.520 1.5
age_6cat .028 .087 .105 .745 1.029
income_5cat -.014 .086 .024 .876 .987
Big_City .351 .267 1.727 .189 1.421
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.142 .087 2.687 .101 .868
Source (Saros=1) .006 .226 .001 .978 1.006
Constant .781 1.424 .301 .583 2.184
Pseudo Rsq 0.077 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q43: AR24 vs EM26: variables in the equation
 
 
In spite of the negative correlation between AR24 and the AR5 scale, when it 
comes to the choice in Q43 high AR5 scorers are considerably more likely to 
choose AR24 over EM26, the latter Statement showing explicit distrust of 
government.  As with Q42, this reveals a link between the EM and CS Standpoints.  
Generally speaking the CS and AR Standpoints unite in their determination to 
tackle AGW (the scales correlate +0.756, p<0.01): but high CS scorers are more 
likely to express their desire for radical change by stating their distrust of 
government in picking EM26 over AR24. 
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Question 44: AR vs MP 
 
32: (AR) We will only get people to change their behaviour with strict regulations 
on consumption (Mean response 4.41) 
28: (MP) We need to empower people to find their own energy-efficient solutions 
(Mean response 4.97). 
 
 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.213, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 13 66 91 29 199
% within AR32 vs MP28 6.5% 33.2% 45.7% 14.6% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 20.6% 31.3% 37.3% 48.3% 34.4%
Count 50 145 153 31 379
% within AR32 vs MP28 13.2% 38.3% 40.4% 8.2% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 79.4% 68.7% 62.7% 51.7% 65.6%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within AR32 vs MP28 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
AR32 vs MP28 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
AR32 vs 
MP28
Chose 
AR32
Chose 
MP28
 
 
 
Chi Sq significant:  12.3, p<0.01. 
 
Unlike the first two dichotomies, the contrast here is between AR32, a statement 
which implies a strong commitment to AGW as a serious problem, and MP28, a 
statement which allows a bland assent without much commitment regarding AGW 
at all. 
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Question 44: AR vs MP 
 
The role of belief in AGW dominates the choice made in Q44: 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) AR32 MP28
AR4_score_ex32 .174 .188 .852 .356 1.190
CS6_score .018 .190 .009 .926 1.018
EM6_score -.032 .146 .049 .825 .968
MP_Emp_score_ex28 .225 .137 2.681 .102 1.252
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.031 .137 .051 .821 .969
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 -.559 .161 12.080 .001 .572 7.1
Gender (female=1) -.174 .188 .860 .354 .840
age_6cat -.069 .084 .672 .412 .933
income_5cat -.051 .083 .372 .542 .950
Big_City .014 .246 .003 .955 1.014
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.136 .084 2.644 .104 .873
Source (Saros=1) .130 .216 .366 .545 1.139
Constant 2.143 1.381 2.408 .121 8.527
Pseudo Rsq 0.071 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q44: AR32 vs MP28: variables in the equation
 
 
 
Taken on its own the Equality Matching Standpoint closely associates with 
choosing MP28, but within the complete model high belief in AGW makes 
respondents much more likely to choose AR32‘ strict regulation.  The different 
Relational Models do not add anything to this simple determinant. 
 
Given the strength of influence of belief in AGW, it is surprising that the cross-
tabulation is not more polarised.  Respondents at both ends of the spectrum are 
able to embrace both statements.
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Question 45: CS vs AR 
 
25: (CS) We need substantial changes in how we travel, what we eat and how we 
build our homes if we are going to deal with climate change (Mean response 4.97) 
 
1: (AR) We can go a long way to meeting the challenge of climate change by 
cutting waste and improving efficiency (Mean response 5.32) 
 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.305, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 9 76 129 42 256
% within CS25 vs AR1 3.5% 29.7% 50.4% 16.4% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 14.3% 36.0% 52.9% 70.0% 44.3%
Count 54 135 115 18 322
% within CS25 vs AR1 16.8% 41.9% 35.7% 5.6% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 85.7% 64.0% 47.1% 30.0% 55.7%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within CS25 vs AR1 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
CS25 vs AR1 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
CS25 vs 
AR1
Chose 
CS25
Chose AR1
Total
 
 
Chi Sq significant: 57.8 p<0.01. 
 
This dichotomy follows a similar pattern to Question 44: although both statements 
appear to engage with the issue of climate change, CS25 takes it seriously and 
implies a significant impact on the respondents themselves, whereas AR1 enables 
a bland assent that tends to evade any personal responsibility.  As a consequence, 
preference for CS25 increases the more seriously a respondent takes AGW. 
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Question 45: CS vs AR 
 
Despite the similarities to Q44, belief in AGW is not the determining factor within 
the regression.  Rather, the core AR position prefers the more radical CS25 over 
the bland AR1: 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) CS25 AR1
AR4_score_ex1 -.756 .190 15.852 .000 .470 14.1
CS5_score_ex25 .037 .192 .036 .849 1.037
EM6_score .193 .152 1.616 .204 1.213
MP_Empower_score .528 .161 10.813 .001 1.696 4.9
MP_Laissez_faire_score .198 .144 1.889 .169 1.219
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 -.278 .162 2.938 .086 .758
Gender (female =1) -.116 .193 .363 .547 .890
age_6cat .199 .088 5.147 .023 1.220 2.7
income_5cat .063 .086 .537 .464 1.065
Big_City .211 .253 .696 .404 1.235
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.207 .086 5.755 .016 .813 2.3
Source (Saros = 1) -.001 .222 .000 .995 .999
Constant .641 1.431 .201 .654 1.898
Pseudo Rsq 0.224 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q45: CS25 vs AR1: variables in the equation
 
 
 
AR1‘s prescription of a ‗Business as usual‘ focus on efficiency and waste is much 
closer to the MP Empower Standpoint:  higher scores on the MP Empower scale, as 
well as older people, are more likely to choose AR1 over the stricter CS25.  On the 
other side, those seriously concerned about AGW, captured here by the 
mainstream AR Standpoint, together with the more highly educated, take the view 
that a more efficient ‗Business as Usual‘ really won‘t be enough. 
 
 
Yet in spite of these strong associations, the crosstabulation shows that different 
respondents at each end of the scepticsbelievers scale can embrace both 
positions. 
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Question 46: CS vs EM 
 
37: (CS) I do try to do things like recycling to help the environment because it is 
the right thing to do (Mean response 5.86) 
 
33: (EM) I‘m much more likely to do something that may help the environment, 
like turning down the heating, if it saves me money (Mean response 5.25) 
 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.195, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 23 134 182 48 387
% within CS37 vs EM33 5.9% 34.6% 47.0% 12.4% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 36.5% 63.5% 74.6% 80.0% 67.0%
Count 40 77 62 12 191
% within CS37 vs EM33 20.9% 40.3% 32.5% 6.3% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 63.5% 36.5% 25.4% 20.0% 33.0%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within CS37 vs EM33 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
CS37 vs EM33 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
CS37 vs 
EM33
Chose 
CS37
Chose 
EM33
 
 
Chi Sq significant: 38.6 p<0.01 
 
Although both statements imply engagement with AGW, they do clearly provide 
contrasting positions, both of which are relatively easy to assent to (hence the 
high mean responses to the original questions).  CS37 makes a much stronger 
commitment to tackling AGW so it is unsurprising that increasing belief in AGW 
results in greater preference for CS37, and greater scepticism results in greater 
preference for EM33. 
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Question 46: CS vs EM 
 
However, as with Q45 it is not simple belief in AGW that determines the choice 
made here.  The Relational Model really matters, with high EM scorers more likely 
to reject CS37‘s moral commitment and to prefer the self-centred EM33.  Further, 
despite EM‘s close correlation with MP Laissez-faire (+0.621, p<0.01), the latter 
Model expresses a distinct position which also contributes to the choice made. 
 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) CS37 EM33
AR5_score .055 .207 .071 .790 1.057
CS5_score_ex37 -.351 .189 3.441 .064 .704
EM5_score_ex33 .431 .147 8.654 .003 1.539 4.7
MP_Empower_score -.048 .159 .090 .764 .953
MP_Laissez_faire_score .370 .153 5.854 .016 1.448 3.0
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 .111 .166 .447 .504 1.118
Gender (female=1) -.321 .200 2.581 .108 .726
age_6cat -.054 .089 .361 .548 .948
income_5cat -.051 .088 .332 .565 .950
Big_City -.291 .272 1.142 .285 .748
v058xxxeduc_5cat .081 .086 .876 .349 1.084
Source (Saros=1) .189 .230 .672 .413 1.207
Constant -2.591 1.435 3.259 .071 .075
Pseudo Rsq 0.158 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q46: CS37 vs EM33: variables in the equation
 
 
 
Perhaps because the Relational Models play such a role, different respondents at 
each end of the scepticsbelievers scale are seen to embrace both positions. 
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Question 47: CS vs MP 
 
7: (CS) It's not fair for us to leave future generations with a worse environment 
than we have now (Mean response 5.45) 
35: (MP) When it‘s clearer what the impacts of climate change are, future 
generations will be better placed than us to address the problems of climate 
change (Mean response 4.24) 
 
Correlation between the original two statements -0.151, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 10 103 210 59 382
% within CS7 vs MP35 2.6% 27.0% 55.0% 15.4% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 15.9% 48.8% 86.1% 98.3% 66.1%
Count 53 108 34 1 196
% within CS7 vs MP35 27.0% 55.1% 17.3% 0.5% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 84.1% 51.2% 13.9% 1.7% 33.9%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within CS7 vs MP35 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
CS7 vs 
MP35
Chose CS7
Chose 
MP35
Total
CS7 vs MP35 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
 
 
Chi Sq Significant: 170.3 p<0.01 
 
The previous pairs (42 to 46) were positively correlated.  For Q47, the original 
questions were negatively correlated.  As a result, this dichotomy prompts starker 
divisions than in the previous 5, and the level of scepticism or belief in AGW has a 
decisive effect upon the choice of statement.  
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Question 47: CS vs MP 
 
As suggested by the crosstabulation, higher belief in AGW strongly predicts 
preference for CS7.  However, MP35 was one of the 3 items making up the MP 
Laissez-faire scale: even after excluding it and using a 2 item scale of MP6 and 
MP20, this adjusted scale adds something beyond pure scepticism to make it very 
likely that high MP Laissez-faire scorers will choose MP35: 
 
 
 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) CS7 MP35
AR5_score -.101 .259 .153 .696 .904
CS5_score_ex7 -.167 .234 .513 .474 .846
EM6_score .341 .194 3.083 .079 1.406
MP_Empower_score -.352 .195 3.276 .070 .703
MP_Laissez_score_ex35 .641 .168 14.523 .000 1.899 13.0
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 -.909 .209 18.899 .000 .403 24.1
Gender (female=1) .298 .241 1.537 .215 1.347
age_6cat .053 .107 .250 .617 1.055
income_5cat -.172 .105 2.703 .100 .842
Big_City -.100 .325 .095 .758 .905
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.066 .101 .424 .515 .936
Source (Saros=1) .082 .279 .087 .768 1.086
Constant 2.493 1.696 2.160 .142 12.093
Pseudo Rsq 0.479 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q47: CS7 v MP35: variables in the equation
 
 
 
 
In this dichotomy we have two positions that do tend to polarise respondents, and 
few of those at the extremes of the scepticsbelievers scale are willing to entertain 
the contrasting position.  This is particularly marked for believers in AGW who 
really do not favour MP35. 
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Question 48:  EM vs AR 
 
13: (EM) I‘m fed up with being lectured by all sorts of public figures about what I 
should do to combat climate change (Mean response 4.04) 
36: (AR) Politicians and scientists have an important role to play in establishing 
policies that can address climate change. (Mean response 5.27) 
 
Correlation between the original two statements -0.414, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 58 118 35 1 212
% within EM13 vs AR36 27.4% 55.7% 16.5% 0.5% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 92.1% 55.9% 14.3% 1.7% 36.7%
Count 5 93 209 59 366
% within EM13 vs AR36 1.4% 25.4% 57.1% 16.1% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 7.9% 44.1% 85.7% 98.3% 63.3%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within EM13 vs AR36 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
EM13 vs 
AR36
Chose 
EM13
Chose 
AR36
EM13 vs AR36 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
 
Chi Sq significant: 200.9 p<0.01 
 
 
With only 21 respondents disagreeing with the original AR36 against 218 
disagreeing with EM13, a stronger preference for AR36 than the (less than) 2:1 
actually shown might have been expected.  However, the 242 who originally 
agreed with EM13 suck to their guns, 76% of them preferring EM13, creating the 
most powerful polarity of any of the dichotomies.  EM13 clearly encapsulates the 
EM/MP Laissez-faire Standpoint of ignoring, or wanting to ignore, AGW: AR36 is 
easy to assent to as a truism, but contrasted with EM13 it represents a 
commitment to the mainstream consensus that sceptics are forced to reject. 
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Q48:  EM vs AR 
 
Much like Q47, level of belief in AGW has the strongest influence.  But the EM 
Standpoint‘s antipathy to authority adds something extra, with high EM scorers 
45x more likely to choose EM13 even after controlling for their probable 
scepticism about AGW: 
 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) EM13 AR36
AR4_score_ex36 .247 .257 .928 .335 1.281
CS6_score .053 .255 .044 .834 1.055
EM5_score_ex13 -1.121 .208 29.145 .000 .326 45.2
MP_Empower_score .451 .211 4.576 .032 1.570 3.9
MP_Laissez_faire_score .194 .198 .964 .326 1.214
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 1.361 .217 39.330 .000 3.900 117.1
Gender (female=1) -.565 .257 4.840 .028 .568 1.8
age_6cat -.084 .115 .534 .465 .919
income_5cat .111 .108 1.046 .306 1.117
Big_City -.347 .327 1.126 .289 .707
v058xxxeduc_5cat .001 .107 .000 .991 1.001
Source (Saros=1) -.290 .292 .990 .320 .748
Constant -4.180 1.761 5.635 .018 .015
Pseudo Rsq 0.566 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q48: EM13 v AR36: variables in the equation
 
 
 
The close relationship between MP Empower and the Mainstream AR Standpoint is 
shown in this regression.  The AR Standpoint‘s influence on the choice is subsumed 
by belief in AGW: but MP Empower‘s confidence in established, authoritative 
expertise and human ingenuity still has something to add to the choice. 
 
An intriguing twist is provided by the role of gender.  Women are more likely than 
men to believe in AGW (t= -2.6, p<0.05), and to have lower EM scale scores (t=2.3, 
p<0.05), but here they seem to express some rejection of (maybe patronising) 
expertise.  Controlling for the other variables, they are 1.8x more likely than men 
to endorse the view that ‗I‘m fed up with being lectured by all sorts of public 
figures about what I should do to combat climate change‘. 
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Question 49: EM vs CS 
 
38: (EM) Each country has got to look after its own citizens first when faced with 
global environmental challenges (Mean response 4.39). 
 
27: (CS) We're all human beings together and the rich are going to have to help 
the poor (Mean response 5.13). 
 
Correlation between the original two statements -0.164, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 42 101 72 10 225
% within EM38 vs CS27 18.7% 44.9% 32.0% 4.4% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 66.7% 47.9% 29.5% 16.7% 38.9%
Count 21 110 172 50 353
% within EM38 vs CS27 5.9% 31.2% 48.7% 14.2% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 33.3% 52.1% 70.5% 83.3% 61.1%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within EM38 vs CS27 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
EM38 vs 
CS27
Chose 
EM38
Chose 
CS27
Total
EM38 vs CS27 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
 
 
Chi Sq significant: 49.0 p<0.01 
 
As with some of the other pairs, although both statements are relatively easy to 
agree with (only 175 respondents – 30% - expressed some level of disagreement 
with one or other of them), the negative correlation between responses to the 
original question is emphasised in the polarisation of respondents when the two 
are dichotomised. 
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Question 49: EM vs CS 
This dichotomy reverses Q46, but both pose a similar (though quite distinct) 
dilemma for respondents.  The choice is between moral commitment towards the 
environment and/or others, versus a more self-centred approach. 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) EM38 CS27
AR5_score .324 .220 2.180 .140 1.383
CS5_score_ex27 .178 .196 .829 .363 1.195
EM5_score_ex38 -.500 .154 10.522 .001 .607 5.5
MP_Empower_score .184 .163 1.280 .258 1.202
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.380 .152 6.216 .013 .684 3.1
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 -.055 .170 .105 .746 .946
Gender (female=1) -.128 .200 .406 .524 .880
age_6cat .169 .091 3.425 .064 1.184
income_5cat -.097 .088 1.205 .272 .908
Big_City -.403 .263 2.347 .126 .669
v058xxxeduc_5cat .211 .086 6.048 .014 1.235 2.3
Source (Saros=1) -.197 .231 .732 .392 .821
Constant .094 1.459 .004 .948 1.099
Pseudo Rsq 0.246 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q49: EM38 v CS27: variables in the equation
 
As with Q46, although level of belief in AGW is closely associated with the choice 
(per the crosstabulation), the real driver seems to be the Relational Models.  In 
Q46, high EM scorers were 4.7x more likely than low scorers to make the EM 
choice, similar to the 5.5x for Q49.  In both, the MP Laissez-faire score captures 
something more than the EM score alone: in Q46 high MP Laissez-faire scorers are 
3x more likely to prefer the EM Statement, in Q49 they are 3.1x more likely than 
low scorers. 
The EM and MP Laissez-faire scores capture the Relational Model impact – positive 
CS scores typically suggest low EM scores and so do not have an independent 
influence.  Higher education, typically associated with higher CS scores (t = -3, 
p<0.01, non-graduates versus graduates) here clearly encourages preference for 
the CS27 Statement. 
In spite of these strong associations, different respondents at each end of the 
scepticsbelievers scale do embrace both positions.  A feature of CS27 is that it is 
not expressed as tied to the issue of climate change, which may make it easier for 
sceptics to agree with the statement because it makes no commitment to 
acknowledging AGW.  However, this also implies that those with the CS Standpoint 
are very unlikely to take the EM view, and vice versa, based on the contrast in the 
logic of the Relational Models, not the level of belief in climate change. 
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Question 50: EM vs MP 
 
19: (EM) I don‘t expect very many people round the world to do much about global 
warming, so I‘m reluctant to change my lifestyle when that won‘t achieve much 
(Mean response 3.31) 
11: (MP) There are endless opportunities for each of us to make a difference – we 
just need to make it easier for everyone (Mean response 5.11). 
 
Correlation between the original two statements -0.403, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 34 73 21 3 131
% within EM19 vs MP11 26.0% 55.7% 16.0% 2.3% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 54.0% 34.6% 8.6% 5.0% 22.7%
Count 29 138 223 57 447
% within EM19 vs MP11 6.5% 30.9% 49.9% 12.8% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 46.0% 65.4% 91.4% 95.0% 77.3%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within EM19 vs MP11 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
Chose 
MP11
Chose 
EM19
EM19 vs 
MP11
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
EM19 vs MP11 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
 
Chi Sq significant: 90.6 p<0.01. 
 
EM19 was one of only 5 RM statements to elicit more disagreement than 
agreement: dichotomised with a relatively bland statement which does not even 
mention climate change it is not surprising that most respondents preferred MP11. 
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Question 50: EM vs MP 
 
Like Q49, although belief in AGW is closely associated with the choice in Q50, in 
the regression model it is the Relational Models that appear to drive the choice, 
on clearly partisan lines: 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) EM19 MP11
AR5_score .213 .276 .596 .440 1.237
CS6_score .709 .260 7.436 .006 2.033 6.6
EM5_score_ex19 -.660 .200 10.822 .001 .517 9.4
MP_Emp_score_ex11 .388 .170 5.236 .022 1.474 3.9
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.567 .211 7.241 .007 .567 5.5
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 .105 .215 .240 .624 1.111
Gender (female=1) .736 .259 8.082 .004 2.088 2.1
age_6cat -.004 .113 .001 .970 .996
income_5cat -.043 .110 .151 .697 .958
Big_City -.263 .343 .587 .444 .769
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.218 .110 3.943 .047 .804 2.4
Source (Saros=1) -.085 .301 .080 .777 .918
Constant .466 1.768 .069 .792 1.594
Pseudo Rsq 0.396 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q50: EM19 v MP11: variables in the equation
 
 
Thus high CS and MP Empower scores favour MP11, which though bland does seek 
to do something about climate change: high EM and MP Laissez-faire scores favour 
the ‗do-nothing‘ EM19.   
 
The demographic variables have an interesting impact: in contrast to Q48 where 
women (controlling for the other variables) preferred the EM Statement to an AR 
alternative, here women, typically more concerned about AGW than men, go still 
further than the substantial impact of 4 RM scores so that even controlling for 
these they are 2.1x more likely than men to have picked MP11 (only 29% of those 
choosing EM19 were women). 
 
Instead it is the role of education to ‗go against type‘ once other variables are 
controlled for.  The most educated are 2.4x more likely than the least to have 
chosen EM19.  It may be that more highly educated people are prepared to be 
tough minded about this choice: rather than following moral instincts they reason 
that it really is unlikely that others will act on climate change, and – though many 
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don‘t wish to admit it – it is logical not to want to make pointless self-sacrificing 
gestures and it is more honest to say so. 
 
Perhaps because of this impact of education, a few of those respondents inclined 
towards action on AGW do seem to reject the simplicity of MP11‘s ‗we just need 
to make it easier‘ in favour of EM19 as a tough-minded pragmatic position.  
 
 
Question 51 MP vs AR 
 
39: (MP) We need higher energy prices to encourage innovation and efficiency 
(Mean response 3.03). 
 
18: (AR) We need to set emissions targets based on sound science and gradually 
reduce our carbon emissions (Mean response 5.04) 
 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.207, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 2 21 31 19 73
% within MP39 vs AR18 2.7% 28.8% 42.5% 26.0% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 3.2% 10.0% 12.7% 31.7% 12.6%
Count 61 190 213 41 505
% within MP39 vs AR18 12.1% 37.6% 42.2% 8.1% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 96.8% 90.0% 87.3% 68.3% 87.4%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within MP39 vs AR18 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
MP39 vs 
AR18
Chose 
MP39
Chose 
AR18
MP39 vs AR18 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
 
Chi Sq significant:  26.2 p<0.01. 
 
Like EM21, Argument MP39 provokes strong hostility to the idea of higher 
prices/taxes.  290 respondents both reject MP39 and agree with EM21‘s complaint 
about the price of fuel.  AR 18 provides a relatively vague alternative that is 
greatly preferred to MP39.  It is a little surprising that as many as 32% of the 73 
who did chose MP39 are actually on the sceptical side with respect to AGW.   
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Question 51 MP vs AR 
 
Again, belief in AGW is secondary to the EM Standpoint‘s loathing of price 
increases: 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) MP39 AR18
AR4_score_ex18 .238 .279 .728 .394 1.269
CS6_score -.189 .287 .433 .510 .828
EM6_score .540 .219 6.090 .014 1.716 5.5
MP_Empower_score .285 .224 1.620 .203 1.330
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.161 .203 .630 .427 .851
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 -.384 .237 2.613 .106 .681
Gender (female=1) .653 .287 5.182 .023 1.920 1.9
age_6cat -.052 .124 .177 .674 .949
income_5cat -.036 .121 .089 .765 .965
Big_City -.247 .344 .518 .472 .781
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.198 .128 2.380 .123 .821
Source (Saros=1) -.030 .313 .009 .924 .971
Constant 1.257 2.061 .372 .542 3.513
Pseudo Rsq 0.133 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q51: MP39 v AR18: variables in the equation
 
 
 
As with Q43, women, typically stronger believers in climate change than men, are 
nevertheless more likely than men to chose AR18, the ‗softer‘ option.  However, 
the numbers (26 women out of 73 chosing MP39) are relatively small due to the 
overall unpopularity of MP39. 
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Question 52: MP vs CS 
 
17: (MP) Economic growth is essential to give us the means to solve the world's 
environmental problems (Mean response 4.34). 
41: (CS) Unless the world consumes less and accepts lower economic growth, we 
will go on making the world‘s environmental problems worse  (Mean response 
4.81). 
 
Correlation between the original two statements -0.188, p<0.01. 
 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 41 90 74 8 213
% within MP17 vs CS41 19.2% 42.3% 34.7% 3.8% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 65.1% 42.7% 30.3% 13.3% 36.9%
Count 22 121 170 52 365
% within MP17 vs CS41 6.0% 33.2% 46.6% 14.2% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 34.9% 57.3% 69.7% 86.7% 63.1%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within MP17 vs CS41 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
MP17 vs 
CS41
Chose 
MP17
Chose 
CS41
Total
MP17 vs CS41 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
 
 
Chi Sq 43.4 p < 0.01 
 
Q52 encapsulates the Commons Dilemma.  The original statements were 
negatively correlated and answers divide on partisan lines according to belief in 
AGW. However, this effect is not as great as might be expected – probably 
because the dichotomy does sum up the dilemma.  The respondent‘s heart may 
prefer CS41, but the head may choose MP17. 
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Question 52: MP vs CS 
 
For this reason strength of commitment to the CS Standpoint, as well as level of 
belief in AGW, appear to be the strongest influences over the choice made in this 
dichotomy.  Controlling for their influence the other Relational Models are 
insignificant: 
 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) MP17 CS41
AR5_score -.248 .210 1.401 .237 .780
CS5_score_ex41 .594 .198 9.022 .003 1.810 5.3
EM6_score .041 .156 .068 .795 1.041
MP_Empower_score .119 .161 .543 .461 1.126
MP_Laissez_faire_score -.226 .150 2.274 .132 .798
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 .329 .164 4.040 .044 1.390 3.2
Gender (female=1) .279 .195 2.043 .153 1.322
age_6cat .094 .087 1.146 .284 1.098
income_5cat -.197 .086 5.226 .022 .822 2.2
Big_City -.321 .257 1.553 .213 .726
v058xxxeduc_5cat -.073 .085 .738 .390 .930
Source (Saros=1) .233 .228 1.046 .307 1.262
Constant -2.330 1.434 2.638 .104 .097
Pseudo Rsq 0.183 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q52: MP17 v CS41: variables in the equation
 
 
In the realm of economics level of household income makes a significant 
difference, with the better off more committed to a business as usual belief in the 
necessity of economic growth.  
 
Deciding between these two arguments is hard: the discussion in Chapter 1 
indicated that each position has strong advocates.  So it is not surprising that 
there are some respondents with strong views who can prefer the less naturally 
consistent choice in this dichotomy.  23 (20%) of the 115 respondents with the 
strongest CS scores (excl CS41) preferred MP17 in this dichotomy. 
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Question 53 MP vs EM 
 
20: (MP) As the climate changes we will adapt accordingly (Mean response 4.42) 
 
9: (EM) The threats posed by climate change are unpredictable and there‘s not a 
lot we can do about it (Mean response 3.83) 
Correlation between the original two statements +0.400, p<0.01. 
 
 
Sceptic
sceptic to 
unsure
unsure to 
believer Believer
Count 43 155 183 39 420
% within MP20 vs EM9 10.2% 36.9% 43.6% 9.3% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 68.3% 73.5% 75.0% 65.0% 72.7%
Count 20 56 61 21 158
% within MP20 vs EM9 12.7% 35.4% 38.6% 13.3% 100.0%
% within xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat 31.7% 26.5% 25.0% 35.0% 27.3%
Count 63 211 244 60 578
% within MP20 vs EM9 10.9% 36.5% 42.2% 10.4% 100.0%
Total
 
xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat
Total
MP20 vs 
EM9
Chose 
MP20
Chose EM9
MP20 vs EM9 * xtrscepticsbelievers_4cat Crosstabulation
 
 
Chi Sq NOT significant. 
 
With hindsight the similarity between these two statements is apparent, and it is 
not surprising that the crosstabulation shows little pattern to respondents‘ 
preference between them.  Since both are strongly, and negatively, correlated 
with the ScepticsBelievers scale (MP20 -0.492, EM9 -0.585, both p <0.01) 
variations in the scale do not impact the choice between them. 
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Question 53 MP vs EM 
 
The nuance that makes MP20 more optimistic than the resigned EM9 probably 
explains the greater level of agreement to MP20 both on its own and when 
dichotimised: this optimistic/pessimistic contrast does pick out a significant 
difference between the EM Standpoint and the MP Empower Standpoint: 
 
Odds high/low
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) MP20 EM9
AR5_score -.087 .214 .165 .684 .917
CS6_score .336 .210 2.571 .109 1.399
EM5_score_ex9 .491 .152 10.453 .001 1.635 5.3
MP_Empower_score -.557 .166 11.284 .001 .573 7.0
MP_Laissez_score_ex20 -.140 .131 1.143 .285 .869
AGW_sceptbelief_score3 .345 .170 4.130 .042 1.411 3.3
Gender (female=1) -.398 .208 3.686 .055 .671
age_6cat .066 .092 .516 .472 1.068
income_5cat -.144 .094 2.346 .126 .866
Big_City .107 .267 .161 .688 1.113
v058xxxeduc_5cat .036 .089 .170 .680 1.037
Source (Saros=1) 1.033 .225 21.071 .000 2.810 2.8
Constant -2.811 1.490 3.558 .059 .060
Pseudo Rsq 0.113 Bold p<0.05 Bold Italic p<0.01
Q53: MP20 v EM9: variables in the equation
 
 
On its own the ScepticsBelievers scale has no impact (as the crosstabulation 
indicates).  Yet once the dimension of optimism/pessimism is controlled for, 
greater belief in AGW does encourage a preference for EM9: this probably reflects 
the fact that even when the despair of EM9 is set aside, the Statement does 
suggest that AGW is more serious than MP20 implies. 
 
Caution needs to be used in interpreting this regression.  There is a significant 
difference between the choices made by the two samples.  The only other 
dichotomy where this was the case (Q42) also had an element of pessimism.  
There, Saros respondents preferred the Statement that doubted the efficacy of 
the UN and international efforts to combat climate change: here too Saros 
respondents prefer the more pessimistic EM9.   
 
                                                                                              . 
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Endnotes 
                                            
 
A Kahan and his colleagues describe ‗Group‘ and ‗Grid‘ as heuristics operating 
independently, whereas in CT they only operate in combination.  They continue to treat 
Group and Grid as two continuous dimensions: thus they do not operate as discrete 
decision tools in the manner that Gigerenzer (2008) conceptualises heuristics.  Kahan et al 
are more successful than mainstream CT researchers in producing survey evidence linking 
Group and Grid explanatory variables to risk perceptions, including in respect of climate 
change (Kahan et al., 2007).  However, they have not sought to produce a comprehensive 
theory of social cognition in the way that RMT and CT do: nor could their formulation of 
Group and Grid yield the taxonomy of relationships that both CT and RMT offer.   What 
Kahan et al‘s work does do is to lend support to CT‘s central idea that worldviews 
underpin interpretations of social phenomena. 
 
B People are reluctant to express the diagnosis of over-population as the cause of Global 
Warming.  It smacks of post-colonial criticism of developing world licentiousness.  Stern‘s 
diagnosis of ‗market failure‘ is more palatable.  Yet over-population as an issue does get 
voiced, e.g. by John Major in the media sample (Appendix F #30).   The UN is clear that 
curbing population growth is key (World Commission on Environment and Development. & 
Brundtland, 1987, pp. 55-57).  Overpopulation itself seems to be a market failure: 
population responds to economic stress in the opposite way to one possible market-based 
prediction - that poverty would prevent people having children they could not afford to 
look after.  In reality poorer people have more children (Wilson & Daly, 1997).  Market-
based accounts would have to claim that children represent economic assets (field-
workers, dotage-carers) to the impoverished instead of liabilities. 
 
Over-population is also the diagnosis of revolutionaries when they move from rejecting the 
prevailing world order to imposing, as potential authorities, a new one (Ehrlich, 1971; 
Hardin, 1999). 
 
C As will be seen throughout the thesis, ‗hierarchical‘ and ‗individualist‘ ideas frequently 
combine to form a ‗mainstream approach‘.  CT‘s account of the policy bias describes 
libertarian as ‗market utilitarian‘, contractarian as ‗administrative utilitarian‘ and 
egalitarian as ‗anthropocentric and nature centric‘ (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 309).  
This seems less convincing than Fiske‘s analysis which emphasises policy reliance on the 
status of the policy-maker (Fiske, 1992): by contrast the individualist emphasises the 
importance of enforceable contract, relying upon the hierarchical system to enforce it. 
 
D As was the case with ‗policy bias‘ in note C above, Cultural Theory‘s account of 
‗Distribution‘ is inconsistent with Fiske‘s:  for Fiske, ‗priority‘ is a feature of his ‗AR‘ 
model which is closest to the Hierarchical worldview, while proportionality is a feature of 
his ‗MP‘ model which is closest to the Individualist.  As discussed frequently in this thesis, 
the interactions of the different ‗models‘ or ‗worldviews‘ have become so culturally 
embedded that disentangling them is always going to be imperfect. 
 
E Time perspective:  Thompson and Rayner‘s concept of ‗compressed‘ time needs 
explaining.  Rayner studied millenarian sects and emphasises how egalitarians, despite 
sharing the long view of history that characterises the fellow high-Group Hierarchists 
nevertheless prioritises the present moment as decisive within the long run of history 
(Rayner, 1982; Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 309)  This is certainly true of much climate 
change rhetoric today. 
 
F ‗Risk Management‘ has been added to Thompson and Rayner‘s matrix because it is so 
important to environmental policy discussions.  The myth of nature determines where the 
burden of proof lies: how certain you need to be before doing anything about a risk.  This 
in turn feeds into levels of scepticism regarding the scientific evidence supporting climate 
change.  Many committed believers in scientific progress are the most ready to dismiss 
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scientific evidence that global warming is a serious risk.  For example Matt Ridley, the 
author of many books on genetics and one-time science editor of The Economist, wrote 
many pieces attacking environmentalism in general and global warming science in 
particular (Ridley, 1995, 1996, 2010). 
 
G Section M3 of Appendix M explains the generation of an EM scale for survey respondents.  
The EM Statements 19 and 33 have been included in the creation of the scale despite the 
issues noted below: 
 
 Participant views in the focus groups presaged the relatively high level of 
disagreement with Statement EM19.  People do not like denying their own agency: 
as Jason says in MG2 ―I‘m not waiting to hear what the the erm result of 
Copenhagen is to decide what I‘m going to do‖ (MG1.1773). 
 The reliability of the scale could be improved by omitting Statement 33 (raising 
the Alpha to 0.780).  This statement provokes a high level of agreement – perhaps 
it is a truism that anyone would be more likely to do something that helps the 
environment if it saves them money: the Statement correlates positively with 
Statement CS37 (‗I do try to do things like recycling to help the environment 
because it is the right thing to do‘: 0.195, p<0.01).  Clearly some of those agreeing 
with both Statements EM33 and CS37 are likely to disagree with other EM 
statements (e.g. Statement 37 negatively correlates with Statement EM13; -0.366, 
p<0.01).  However, Statement 33 does capture the idea of reciprocity which is 
central to the EM Standpoint and it has been retained in the Composite. 
 
